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Abstract
Abstract
This thesis considers the Chinese Blueshirts organisation from 1932 to 1938 
in the context of Chiang Kaishek's attempts to unify and modernise China. It 
sets out the terms of comparison between the Blueshirts and Fascist 
organisations in Europe and Japan, indicating where there were similarities 
and differences of ideology and practice, as well as establishing links 
between them. It then analyses the reasons for the appeal of Fascist 
organisations and methods to Chiang Kaishek.
Following an examination of global factors, the emergence of the 
Blueshirts from an internal point of view is considered. As well as assuming 
many of the characteristics of a Fascist organisation, especially according to 
the Japanese model and to some extent to the European model, the Blueshirts 
were in many ways typical of the power-cliques which were already an 
integral part of Chinese politics. The influence of Chinese secret society 
traditions is also examined as an aspect that clearly distinguished them from 
their European Fascist counterparts.
The second part of this study will turn to the ideological development 
of the organisation, and to the ultimately abortive attempt to build up a mass- 
based organisation through the New Life Movement. At the same time, 
connections between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang are analysed. Finally, 
this thesis looks at the apparent disbandment of the Blueshirts in 1938.
The conclusion arrived at, is that the Blueshirts may properly be 
described as Fascist - or an organisation with unmistakable links to Fascism. 
Like Fascist movements in many countries, the Blueshirts displayed the same 
unstable combination of adherence to highly conservative traditional values 
while simultaneously embracing modernism in technology, communications 
and new forms of social and political organisation.
Not only does this study contribute specifically to the political history 
of China, it also examines the development of political and military 
movements in the Far East in the period preceding World War Two.
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Note on Romanisation
Note on Romanisation
How China experts survive the tortured ways of rendering Chinese into 
English is a small miracle of modem scholarship. Mainland China, the 
United Nations, and the Western news media have adopted the Pinyin style, 
while Taiwan and many Overseas Chinese continue to use the Wade-Giles 
system or variations thereof. Furthermore, the Chinese characters used in the 
text are given in Fangsong fanti if  ft (Imitation Song Dynasty style 
type of characters).
For consistency, I have reluctantly used Pinyin for all publications 
sourced in this thesis. For mainland place names, I also have opted for 
Pinyin, with a few exceptions for the names of places known best by their 
earlier forms, such as Canton, Whampoa, Yangtze, Manchuria, and people’s 
names such as Chiang Kaishek, Sun Yatsen and so on. In addition, both 
Chinese and Japanese names are presented with the surname first.
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Introduction
Introduction
Over the last decade there has been a considerable increase in examinations 
of Fascism by historians who are generally described as revisionist. While 
these revisionist historians may often take the initiative in re-examining and 
re-interpreting the history of Fascism in Europe, it is important not to allow 
revisionist interpretations of events in China to pass by default. This thesis is 
a contribution to the political history of China, and, particularly in the context 
of a new questioning of Japanese views about the Second World War, it is 
important to examine political movements and military organisations in the 
Far East. It is an addition to the study of Fascism by examining the Blueshirts 
in China, and by showing that they were indeed Fascist, albeit in a different 
form to their European counterparts.
Those scholars who have written about the Blueshirts have all 
consolidated the viewpoint that Blueshirt Fascism emulated European 
Fascism in Hitler’s Germany and/or Mussolini’s Italy. The possibility that 
Chiang Kaishek and the founders of the Blueshirts were looking more to the 
Japanese example and were influenced by Fascist developments in Japan has 
not yet been explored. The two most prominent analysts of the Blueshirts in 
the West, Lloyd E. Eastman and Maria Hsia Chang (see discussion below), 
have gone to considerable lengths to arrive at definitive but opposite 
conclusions regarding the question of Blueshirt Fascism.1 Eastman concludes 
that Blueshirt Fascism copied in general the pattern of Nazism (National 
Socialism), whereas Maria Chang, although considering similarities with
1 Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; and Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive 
Revolution; China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1990.
9
Introduction
Italian Fascism, finally concludes that the Blueshirts, could not be described 
as Fascists. Despite the exhaustive nature of their work, the conclusions at 
which Eastman and Chang arrive may be considered flawed. In contrast, this 
study will adopt the standpoint that the Blueshirts through the strong 
historical and cultural connections that exist between China and Japan, 
especially at their founding in 1932, emulated a form of Japanese Fascism 
upon which had been superimposed the features and ideas of the Chinese as 
well as Japanese secret societies.
After the First World War and in the wake of the October Revolution 
in Russia, the people in some European countries went on the barricades to 
defend themselves against an advancing Communism. Nationalist feelings 
ran high and Nationalism became the keyword. It was in this environment 
that anti-Marxism and anti-Communism were bom. In Italy the first Fascist 
regime emerged, and in Germany the small National Socialist Party exerted 
its influence on national politics, while also in other European countries 
Fascist movements arose.
However, at the same time events in China were different, because 
under Sun Yatsen’s M M i\\i leadership the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(Zhongguo guomindang^ HU [U KH) co-operated readily with the infant 
Chinese Communist Party, established in 1921 and then a small group of 
people. The Guomindang was in 1924 even re-organised with the help of 
Comintern agents. Thus, the development of Marxism in China during that 
period followed a distinctly different course from most European countries.
2
Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party o f  China and Marxism, 1921-1985, A Self-Portrait, 
London: C.Hurst &Company, 1988, pp.1-9. With the help of Comintern agents in 1921 the 
Chinese Communist Party was established without knowing what Marxism exactly was. At the 
start of the twentieth century very few Chinese had heard of Marx and Engels. This was in 
sharp contrast to Europe where their theory achieved great attention. With Lenin and Stalin, 
Marxism - a doctrine, perhaps even a philosophy - became an ideology and was openly 
acknowledged as such. All Communist regimes are based on three factors: dialectical 
materialism, the power of the party, and a secret police. No Communist regime is based on pre- 
Lenin-Marxism.
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The circumstances in Europe were such that the Communists were attacked 
by nationalist groups from the very beginning, and it was only after the split 
with the Communists in 1927 that the nationalist government, now under 
Chiang Kaishek’s leadership, developed an anti-Communist (anti-Marxist) 
policy. After 1927, much of the Guomindang’s energy was spent on fighting 
against and eliminating the Chinese Communists. Although, until under 
pressure of the circumstances - a full-scale war with Japan - in 1937, against 
the odds, a new co-operation between the two rival parties emerged.
This thesis examines the political developments which took place in 
China between 1927 and 1938 insofar as they relate to the growth of a 
tendency which, it will be argued, was specifically Fascist. This period of just 
over a decade was of central importance in modem Chinese history as it saw, 
in succession, the establishment of the first truly national government in the 
country since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the rapid economic and 
social development of Chinese society as modem industry and technology 
were introduced, and the rising confrontation with imperial Japan. While the 
main contours of political development during the Nanjing period are well- 
known to international scholarship, this thesis takes up a discussion about 
one of the more contentious elements of the periods political history, namely 
the Blueshirt organisation, which existed under the auspices of the 
Nationalist Party during the 1930s.
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Chapter One
Chapter One 
Towards a Working Definition of Fascism : 
Methodology and Sources
Shui ze zai zhou, Shui ze f u  zhou
[The people are the water, and the ruler is the boat.
The water can support the boat, but it can also sink it]
X unzi1
In order to examine the role of the Blueshirts in Chiang Kaishek’s drive for 
power and his espousal of an ideology generally characterised as Fascist, a 
number of preliminary questions require consideration. Firstly, a working 
definition of Fascism needs to be arrived at, primarily in order to determine 
the extent to which the Blueshirts might properly be described as Fascist. 
This definition of Fascism will begin from a theoretical standpoint, and will 
be followed by a detailed discussion of the commonalities and differences of 
European Fascism - particularly in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany - 
and their relation to East Asian Fascism - particularly in Japan.
The second question considered in this chapter is a direct concomitant 
of a theoretical analysis of Fascism, namely, the setting of the birth of 
Fascism in its proper historical context. Whereas many of the discussions of 
political scientists on Fascism are anchored firmly in Europe, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is essential to examine the historical context of East 
Asia.
Aside from discussions into the nature of Fascism, it is also necessary 
at this initial stage to outline the methodological criteria employed to
1 Quoted in Xunzi jianzhu  (Commentary on Xunzi), by Zhang Shitong. Shanghai:
Shanghai renmin chunbanshe, 1974, Jiu xing p i a n ^ f f i f  (The Nine Acts), p.57.
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determine whether the Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation. The various 
sources on Blueshirts’ activities that are cited in this thesis are discussed at 
some length. As this thesis intends to provide a more definitive view of the 
Blueshirts and the question of whether they were Fascist than previous 
scholarly works on the subject, an exposition of the more varied sources used 
is necessary.
1.1 Approaches to the Question of Fascism
It may be possible to pursue many fruitful avenues of research into the 
Blueshirts without addressing the question of whether they were Fascist, but 
any study which does not include this question within its scope cannot be 
considered exhaustive. A study which sets out to determine whether the 
Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation must first have a working definition of 
the term Fascism.
This study does not aim to provide a complete history or definitive 
analysis of Fascism, but to indicate the broad similarities and differences 
between the Fascist regimes in Europe, mainly in Germany and Italy, and 
those in East Asia, in Japan and China. A number of political analysts have 
identified the various similarities and differences within Fascist regimes and 
movements in Europe.2 These differences have hampered attempts to 
formulate a comprehensive definition of Fascism and a coherent theory of 
how it operates. This task would be further complicated by the need to 
encompass Asian Fascism within the definition, because comparing 
European with some form of Asian Fascism may give rise to an even greater 
number of differences. It is, however, probable that attempts to produce a 
single generic definition of Fascism may prove counterproductive.
2
Stanley G.Payne, Fascism, Comparison and Definition, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1980, pp.177-178.
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A popular definition of Fascism is found in the Longman Dictionary. 
The entry reads:
Fascism  is a political philosophy, m ovem ent or regime that is [usually]... 
hostile to socialism, exalts nation and race, and stands for a centralised 
governm ent headed by a dictatorial leader, severe regim entation and 
forcible suppression o f  opponents.3
While such an explanation is, of course, insufficient to determine
whether or not the Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation - or indeed to gain
any further insight into generic Fascism - it may at least be a starting point. It
is interesting to determine the degree to which the word Fascism is explained
in encyclopaedia throughout the years. Naturally, in 1910 the Encyclopaedia
Britannica does not include the word Fascism, but explains the words Fasces
and Fascia as Latin for a bandage or fillet.4 Subsequently, Adair’s New
Encyclopedia of 1925 explains the derivation of the word Fascisti, and gives
a summary of the events that brought the movement in Italy, and Mussolini,
to power. The existence of Fascist movements in Germany and other Western
countries is also mentioned.5 The first time that the word Fascism is found is
in The Colombia Encyclopedia of 1935, wherein the rise of Fascism in Italy
is recorded. It specifies that while Fascism has much in common with
Russian style Communism, Fascism is “essentially and fundamentally
nationalism” and communism is “at least in theory international.” It
explicates furthermore:
Reactionary sentiment, strong nationalist feelings, an authoritarian and 
totalitarian state m oving by non-parliamentary means, a strong 
som ew hat m ilitary party, a dictatorship and regim entation o f  capital and 
labor under the aegis o f  the state - all these are characteristics o f  the
Longman, Concise English Dictionary, Harlow, Essex: Longman Group, 1985, p.502.
4 The Encyclopaedia Britannica, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General 
Information, Cambridge: University Press, 1910, p. 191.
5 Adair’s New Encyclopedia, A New and Up-to-date- Reference Work, for Home, School and 
Office, Volume Two, New York: World Syndicate Company, Inc., 1925, no page number.
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fascist m ovem ents that sprang up all over Europe and in South America,
China, and other parts o f the world.6
This is one of the few references to a Fascist movement in China in the 
encyclopaedia examined. By the 1993 version of the same encyclopaedia this 
reference has, however, disappeared.
Any attempt to define Fascism with any sense of authority must be 
approached judiciously. A number of political scientists have commented on 
the defiance of Fascism to be categorised or defined. Noel O’Sullivan writes 
that Fascism “is the most controversial and elusive term in the vocabulary of 
twentieth-century political thought, in both popular and academic usage.”7 P. 
Hayes claims that “Fascism is one of those ‘isms’ for which every person 
will find his [or her] own definition.”8 While Roger Griffin determines that 
“there can be no objective definition of Fascism, since, like all generic 
concepts in the human sciences, Fascism is at bottom an ideal type.”9 
According to Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism is probably the vaguest of 
contemporary political terms... [because] the word itself has no implicit 
political reference.” 10 Meanwhile Ernst Nolte suggests that “the concept of
6 The Colombia Encyclopedia, Clarke F.Ansley (ed.), New York: Colombia University Press, 
1935, p.608.
7 Noel O’Sullivan, Fascism, London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1983. p.7. “The origin of the 
word “Fascism” is noteworthy for two reasons: it did not derive from Mussolini’s movement 
Fasci di Combattimento, and it was for long without any specific ideological or theoretical 
significance.” (p.207)
8 P. Hayes, Fascism, London: 1973, p.9.
9
Roger Griffin (ed.), Fascism, Oxford Readers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.3. 
Griffin explains that: “In other words, it ultimately results from an act o f idealising abstraction 
which produces an artificially tidy model of the kinship that exists within a group of 
phenomena which, despite their differences, are sensed to have certain features in common.”
10 Payne, pp.4-5.
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Fascism has been understood in different ways and from a variety of
standpoints in the course of time.” 11
Due to this obvious problem, in the literature on Fascism, most
discussions about its definition outline the commonalities of all Fascist
movements without describing the distinctive features of each specific Fascist
movement. Such a technique appears the “safest” method of avoiding lengthy
discussions about ideology. However, Payne warns that “any definition of
common characteristics of Fascist movements differed from each other as
1
significantly as they held notable new features in common.”
Two major points arise from these findings. Firstly, why has there 
been so much disagreement on a definition of generic Fascism? Secondly, 
how is one to proceed with a working definition of Fascism on such unsteady 
foundations? After extensive deliberations, Payne distils the argument for 
and against a generic Fascism in the following terms:
The experts agree that to produce an interpretation and theory about
Fascism has caused much controversy. The problem  prim arily centres
around two questions: 1. the research for adequate theories that can
explain Fascism and its causes; and 2. whether or not a generic Fascism,
as distinct from a variety o f sometimes basically different radical and
authoritarian nationalist m ovem ents and regimes, can be demonstrated to
13have existed w ith any degree o f  similarity.
O’Sullivan concurs with Payne’s view that “reducing all putative 
Fascisms to one single phenomenon of absolutely common identity is 
distortive and inaccurate.”14 He writes that due to the vital difference between 
the Italian and German regimes of the 1930s, it is probably “not permissible”
11 Ernst Nolte (ed.), Vierzig Jahre Theorien uber den Faschismus (Forty Years Theories about 
Fascism), Cologne, Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1967, pp. 15-72.
12 Payne, pp.4-5.
13 Payne, pp.177, 191.
14 Payne, pp. 195-196.
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to use the term Fascism in a “generic” sense.15 Moreover, political scientists 
have attempted to view Fascism in the light of their own personal political 
persuasions. Fascism has been variously diagnosed by Christians as the result 
of the decline of religion, by psychoanalysts as a response to emotional 
deprivation and sexual repression, and by generational theorists as resulting 
from the discontinuity of cultural values from one generation to another.16 It 
is, however, the Marxist analysis of Fascism, which arose in the Soviet Union 
in the 1930s and which depicted Fascism as “the tool of capitalism in its most
1 Hadvanced phase”, which has influenced a number of scholars, most 
especially Maruyama Masao, the leading interpreter of Fascism in Japan.
An unbiased definition of Fascism, particularly in a generic sense, 
seems too beset with pitfalls to be a viable option. The working definition of 
Fascism adopted in this thesis might be better determined from a socio- 
historical, rather than a theoretical, standpoint.
A. The Nature of European Fascism
Most analysts of Fascism view the phenomenon as a purely European 
invention. Even in definitions as all-embracing as that of The Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought, which covers three full pages, Fascism is
1 o
referred to as a “pan-European phenomenon.” No link to East Asian 
Fascism, either in Japan or China, is inferred. Moreover, there are those 
scholars who believe that while Japan “had some of the characteristics of
15 O’Sullivan, p.3.
16 O’Sullivan, pp.24-27.
17 O ’Sullivan, p.17.
18 David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connelly & Alan Ryan, (eds.),77*e Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia o f  Political Thought, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 148-150.
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Fascism”, it “lacked the distinctive features of a Fascist dictatorship.”19 This 
thesis will argue, however, that a form of Fascism did exist in Japan, and it 
was from Japan that Chiang Kaishek derived his desire to form a Fascist 
corps within the Guomindang. In any case, merely because an encyclopaedia 
reference on Fascism fails to mention East Asian Fascism in explicit terms 
does not necessarily imply that a form of Fascism there never existed.
That Fascism was bom in Europe as a result of a change in social 
values in the wake of World War I is beyond doubt. The reasons for the birth 
of Fascism and the ideological system which it upheld are much less clear- 
cut. This comes as no surprise when one considers the difficulties inherent in 
attempting to define generic Fascism.
Noel O’Sullivan writes that the rise of Fascism in Europe is rooted in 
the course of modem European intellectual and political history.20 He 
outlines four basic prerequisites of Fascist ideology which are linked to the 
main trends of European thought after the French revolution. These 
prerequisites are:
(i) the viewing of politics as an activist crusade towards popular sovereignty 
(as J.J. Rousseau contended);
(ii) the fusion of democratic and nationalist sentiments into a militant and 
aggressive tendency;
(iii) creating within the masses a sense of “inner freedom” (following Kant’s 
usage of the term) even if they are not externally free to act; and
(iv) creating a demagogic figure in a belief in the capacity of human will to
0 1shape history.
19 Gavan McCormack, “Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism”, Bulletin o f Concerned Asian 
Scholars, vol. 14, 1982, p.28.
20 O’Sullivan, p .15.
21 O’Sullivan, pp.44-77.
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The face of Europe was changed beyond recognition by World War I. 
Before 1914, the security of the governing order, the economic and social 
system, and the prosperity of the middle classes in Europe existed relatively 
unthreatened. However, due to the rise of the working classes and their 
vociferous demands for equality and political rights, the middle classes 
feared that they would lose their safe and privileged positions. Their reaction 
to real or imagined threats did not bring about Fascism, but it created the 
preconditions for the development of Fascist movements.
Disaffection in the wake of World War I created the breeding ground 
for extreme nationalist groups in Europe. The tendency towards nationalism 
and sometimes extreme nationalism had already begun before World War I. 
This aspect is mentioned by Prof. Nomura, explaining that, starting from the 
sixteenth century, countries in Europe developed tendencies based on 
extreme nationalism. Subsequently, extreme nationalism developed at the 
end of the nineteenth century into ‘national’ imperialism.22
In Italy, for example, the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (ANI - 
Italian Nationalist Party) set up in Florence in 1910 was “the major forum for 
rightist, statist ultra-nationalism in pre-Fascist Italy.” According Enrico 
Corradini, one of the party’s founders, nationalism was the anti-thesis of 
democracy; liberty and equality should be replaced by obedience and 
discipline. His main theme was nationalism, with an emphasis on increasing 
the strength of the army and colonial conquests. The propaganda of the 
Italian nationalists in favour of conquest and expansion had, before World 
War I, not aroused great mass enthusiasm. However, these ideas were to
22 Nomura K oichi, Kindai Chugoku no seiji to shiso (Studies on Political Thought in Modem 
China), Tokyo: Chikuma shoten, 1964, pp.144-145.
23 Griffin, p.37.
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exercise a profound influence on the later Italian Fascists, with whom the 
Nationalist Party merged in 1923 after the March on Rome.24
In comparison with Italy, pre-war Germany was a country of great 
strength and energy, enjoying much more economic progress. As early as the 
1890s the so-called Pan-German League had been founded. It engaged in 
vigorous propaganda for a more militant foreign policy, including German 
expansion abroad, be that in eastern Germany or by the acquisition of new 
colonies. The leader of the League, Heinrich ClaB, favoured an Imperial 
dictatorship to save Germany from liberalism. It was from organisations such 
as the Pan-German League that the Nationalist Socialist Party after World 
War I was to draw of its early members. The nationalist, anti-liberal, racist 
and anti-Semitic propaganda spread by these organisations prepared the soil 
on which National Socialism was to grow. It was especially the emphasis on 
racialism, the firm belief in the natural superiority of an allegedly German 
race and in the great destiny of their Volk (people), that distinguished German 
right wing extremism from that of, for instance, Italy. Although, Mussolini 
often referred to the supremacy of the Roman Empire and drew a parallel 
with Fascist Italy and its superiority over other nations. However, among the 
Italian people this idea was less pronounced and not so generally accepted as 
the idea of superiority of a German race was in Germany.
In Germany, the post war economic situation was deteriorating, while 
the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles hit the country severely. German 
governments changed frequently and were very weak. However, above all, it 
was the vast inflation of the German currency which undermined the very
24 F.L Carsten, The Rise o f  Fascism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1967, pp. 19, 64-66.
25 Carsten, p.31. This belief in natural German superiority and the great destiny of their Volk, 
the volkisch concept, was to remain a distinguishing mark of the new German right. It was not 
shaken, but on the contrary strongly reinforced by Germany’s defeat in World War One.
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foundations of society, ruining the German middle classes, and destroying 
any remaining sense of security and stability.
The situation in Italy was in some ways similar. Here too, the 
economic situation worsened and the value of the Lira declined rapidly. 
Political and social unrest broke out all over the country.
In both countries, there was also the problem of soldiers who had 
returned from the front and felt betrayed by society. Germany had, after all, 
been victorious on the Eastern Front, while its defeat on the Western Front in 
November 1918 came as a complete surprise both to civilians and to most of 
the ordinary soldiers at the front. The German soldiers returning from the 
front regarded the Social Democratic government which signed the Versailles 
Treaty as traitors of the nation. They formed themselves into paramilitary 
units called the Freikorps (Freecorps) and fought street battles against factory 
workers who were turning towards Communists. They also defended the 
isolated and fleeing ethnic German communities in Poland and the Baltic 
states from attack. Despite their role in the formation of the Weimar 
government, most of the Freikorps members found nothing attractive in the 
new republican order.
It is the collusion between the German army and the Freikorps which 
explains why, despite such blatant threats to its authority, the Weimar 
Republic was never able to suppress the Freikorps. The political sympathies 
of the country's military forces lay much more with the Freikorps than with 
the parliamentary regime, and the state was therefore unable to act against 
them in a concerted or decisive manner. The Freikorps had strong links with 
a number of far-right political organisations in Germany in the 1920s, and as 
the National Socialist Party, grew more powerful, they slowly fused into the
26 The Freikorps (Freecorps) were small privately-raised armies, composed of professional 
officers and NCO's of the former Imperial Army.
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Nazi movement. Moreover, there seems to be no borderline where the 
Freikorps end and Hitler’s SA and SS begin. Outward signs of Hitler’s debt 
to the Freikorps movement were the “Swastika”, the Brown Shirts and the 
Hitler salute all of which had been previously adopted by the Freikorps units.
Especially Bavaria in the early twenties was home to many para­
military organisations. One of these Bavarian organisations was the 
Einwohner Wehr (literally: inhabitants defence or resistance), formed in 
Munich to fight the Communists, and led by Colonel H. Kriebel, who in 1929 
became the head of Chiang Kaishek’s German advisory mission. Kriebel 
assisted Hitler by forming a Kampfbund (Combat League), and leading it in 
the Hitler-Putsch in Munich on 8-9 November 1923.27
Despite the overt participation of the Freikorps and other paramilitary 
groups in the Munich Putsch, the Weimar government was still unable to 
suppress them. On the contrary, it soon found that it was relying on them 
more and more heavily. In the early 1920s, under the forceful leadership of 
Hitler in Munich, the Nazis were developing into a strong party, but had no 
great influence outside Munich. In the later years of the Weimar Republic,
the attraction of such Nazi organisations as the SA and SS for the military
28was great.
In Italy, the fact that victory failed to secure all the irredentist claims of 
Italian nationalists, meant that some soldiers felt they had fought for nothing. 
Many veterans joined nationalist groups or paramilitary organisations. In 
both countries, this “front generation” was to play a leading role in the rise of 
Fascism, and it is no accident that the most important Fascist movements had 
their origins in the years immediately succeeding World War 1. In 1919 war
27 Martin Broszat, Die Machtergreifimg. Der Aufstieg der NSDAP und die Zerstdrung der 
Weimarer Republik, Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag Gmbh & Co. KG, 1984, p .l l-  
14,32.
28 Carsten, p, 115.
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and revolution in Europe were more closely contiguous than ever before. The 
year was a crucial one for it signalled the starting point of the first Fascist 
parties. In Italy Mussolini set up his Fasci di Combattimento.29In Germany 
the combined Reichswehr and Freikorps overthrew the short-lived Munich 
Soviet Republic. In Turkey Mustafa Kemal Pasha began a revolt against his 
own government and the foreign powers. In Romania the foundation was laid 
from what later became the Iron Guards of Codreanu. Fascist movements 
were mushrooming in Europe in partial to the threat of possible spread of 
revolution through Communist agitation.
It is undeniable that Fascist movements were centred around varying 
degrees of anti-Marxism. While both Hitler and Mussolini were viewed as 
coming to power “legally”, that is, via the ballot box, Lenin had only 
achieved power in the Soviet Union by “illegal” means, that is, via 
revolution. The perceived threat of the so-called “red peril” was an important 
strand within the Fascist movements of both Europe and East Asia.30 It 
should be emphasised, however, that Fascism was anti-Marxist rather than 
anti-Socialist. Indeed, the aims of socialism and Fascism were not really that 
far removed from each other. Therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to 
classify Fascist movements “according to the nature of the balance they
29 O ’Sullivan, p.7. In ancient Rome the fasces was a bundle of rods carried by the lictors in 
front o f the consuls, as a symbol of authority. During the nineteenth century, however, the 
bundle of rods came to symbolise strength through unity: the point being that, whilst each 
independent rod was fragile, as a bundle they were strong. By extension, the word fascio  came 
in modem Italian political usage to mean a group. Groups of revolutionary socialists in Italy 
were the first to use the word in this sense. Before Italy had entered the first World War all 
over Italy fasci were formed demanding Italy’s intervention in the war. Mussolini belonged to 
the Milan fascio, while in 1915 a national organisation was founded with the name Fasci 
d'Azione rivoluzionaria (l)ands for revolutionary action) (p.207). After the war in 1919 
Mussolini reconstituted the Milan fascio, using the name Fasci di Combattimento. See also 
Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1985, pp.27-28.
30 O ’ Sullivan, p.86. Questions whether the threat of the “red peril” actually existed or not was 
merely “a figment of Fascist propaganda.”
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struck between” socialism and nationalism. Both Hitler and Mussolini 
attempted to unify their respective countries by amalgamation, albeit to 
different degrees of nationalism and socialism.
The Fascist movements that ascended in Europe had so many 
commonalities that they were able to borrow from each other. Essentially 
they were both strongly nationalist and violently anti-Marxist. These traits 
were not unique to Fascism. They were something that they had in common 
with other parties and groups of the extreme Right, such as the Nationalist 
parties of Italy and Germany. More exclusively, the Fascists not only rejected 
liberalism, and other political parties, but they wanted to eliminate them and 
replace them by a new authoritarian and corporative state.32
Despite these commonalities, the Fascist movements which arose in 
Europe during the 1920s and 1930s were very different in character, and 
mirrored the entirely different national backgrounds of the countries in which 
they developed. Some were more conservative, and others more radical in 
their demands and actions. Some were violently anti-Semitic, and others 
were not. Some took revolutionary action and staged armed revolts against 
the government, while others insisted upon legal means of attaining power. 
Some acquired a strong following among the lower classes, while others 
remained almost entirely middle class.
The specific form of Fascism in any country must clearly be shaped by 
the cultural, political and social character of each society. In countries where 
industrialisation was advanced, the working class was already class­
conscious, and was often organised into trade unions and susceptible to 
Communist propaganda. Fascism could not closely resemble a related 
political idea in a country just beginning to industrialise, with an
31 O’Sullivan, p.89.
32 Carsten, pp.230-231.
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overwhelmingly peasant population, low literacy and little access to 
telecommunications, like for example in China. Consequently, the response 
to this variety has been, on the part of some writers, to draw a clear line 
around Europe and state that Fascism can never exist outside a European 
context.33
The diverse typology inherent within European Fascism is perhaps 
best apprehended through the differences between Italian Fascism and 
German Nazism. There were similarities between early Fascism and early 
Nazism, especially in terms of economic goals and, to some extent, style. 
However, the differences are more striking. Firstly, the socio-political 
structure of German society was totally different to that of Italy. While 
Germany had some semblance of a centralised power, the north-south 
dichotomy and the intervention of the Catholic Church into Italian society 
resulted in a more fragmented powerbase. Secondly, and as a direct result of 
the above, the Nazis had more competition from well-organised nationalist 
groups to their right than did the Fascist in Italy.
A number of reasons may be cited to explain the apparent problem of 
incorporating Italian Fascism and German Nazism into one single 
framework. Nazism was more nationalist than socialist, manifested in its 
overt racist tendency. For their part, most Italian Fascists had no concept of 
race and derided the racist standpoint adopted by the Nazis, especially their 
anti-Semitic stance.
One of the most fundamental differences between Italy and Germany 
was that in the mid-twenties the NSDAP (National Sozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiter Partei) had metamorphosed into the Hitler movement. The Italian
33 Payne, pp. 175-176. In the section “Generic Fascism: A Uniquely European Phenomenon,” 
Payne states that: “It is consequently doubtful that a typology derived from European Fascism 
can be applied to non-European movements or regimes with any specificity. As the two most 
assiduous students of Fascism, Ernst Nolte and Renzo de Felice, have insisted, it was an 
historical phenomenon primarily limited to Europe during the era of the two world wars.”
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Fascist movement was not at all created by Mussolini as a party or 
movement, but grew up around or beyond him. Furthermore, Mussolini 
formed a government coalition three and a half years after the start of the 
Fascist movement, whereas the same process took Hitler fourteen years. No 
single factor or simple interpretation can account for something so complex 
and momentous as the process that brought Hitler to power, but the theory of 
mass mobilisation may offer a broader understanding of the problem.
A further difference between Germany and Italy was the economic and 
industrial infrastructure of the two countries: Germany was an advanced 
industrial society whereas Italy, by comparison, was almost backward. The 
very nature of this situation is at fundamental odds with the “delayed 
industrialisation” thesis, which maintains that Fascism occurs in a society 
undergoing industrialisation. The Italian Fascists were not “a mass- 
mobilising developmental dictatorship committed to the modernisation of 
Italy’s economy.”34 On the other hand, that Nazism should arise in a modem 
industrialised society merely weakens the validity of the “delayed 
industrialisation” thesis. Although leading Fascists and Nazis realised they 
had much in common, the uncertainty over the extent of their obvious 
differences prevented them from ever reconciling these differences.
The diversity of form inherent within Fascist movements has led some 
scholars to adopt a “checklist” approach and to exclude from the category of 
Fascism all those movements and ideologies which do not share the same set 
of core characteristics. S.J. Woolf has outlined five ideological traits 
generally displayed by Fascist movements:
34 O’Sullivan, p.22.
35 S.J. Woolf, ed., The Nature o f  Fascism, New York: Vintage Books, 1969 and particularly the 
contribution by N.Kogan, “Fascism as a Political System”, pp. 11-18. Objections to a 
definition of Fascism based upon ideological traits are raised in “Discussions - Fascism and 
Polity”, in the Nature o f  Fascism, pp.51-60. A discussion which emphasises the difficulty, if 
not impossibility, o f establishing a definition of Fascism.
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1) Exaltation o f  the state and advocacy o f  totalitarian controls
2) One-party rule, glorification o f  the leader, and rejection o f  
democracy
3) Nationalism , which often invokes the restoration o f traditional values
4) The goal o f creating a new Fascist m an who would subordinate his 
individual will and aspirations to the collective will
5) The glorification o f  violence and terror
Ernst Nolte, who has written at great length on the subject of Fascism, 
has postulated a six-point “Fascist minimum”, which consists of a set of 
negatives, a central organisation feature, a doctrine of leadership and a basic 
structural goal, expressed as:
1) Anti-Marxism 2) Anti-Liberalism 3) Anti-Conservatism 4) The
leadership principle 5) A party army 6) The aim of totalitarianism36
The assumption is that this “Fascist minimum” allows one to identify 
Fascist movements by attempting to distil generic Fascism into an inductive 
set of characteristics.
The fifth point of the “Fascist minimum” refers to the attempt of a 
Fascist regime to militarise politics to an unparalleled degree. Militia groups 
were made central to the movement’s organisation and they used military 
insignia and terminology in reinforcing the sense of nationalism and constant 
struggle.37 As described by F.L. Carsten: “The Fascist parties were conceived 
as tightly organised semi-military machines with which state and society 
were to be conquered; in all of them, para-military associations or militias - 
clad in black, brown, green or blue shirts and uniforms played a very 
important part.”38
36 Erast Nolte, Die Krise des Liberalen Systems und die Fascistischen Bewegungen (The Crisis 
of the Liberal System and the Fascist Movements), Munich: 1968, p.385.
37 Payne, p. 12.
38 Carsten, p.231.
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Militarism should be distinguished from Fascism in the sense that it 
only represented one aspect of Fascism. Militarism is described as exaltation 
of military virtues and ideals, or as a policy of aggressive military 
preparedness, and may be defined for the purposes of this thesis as the 
promotion of military values and the use of military methods to achieve 
political goals. Fascism in the 1930s represented something much broader. It 
permeated the whole of society, culturally, socially and politically - features 
that were not embodied by Militarism.
There were, however, also distinct militaristic factors behind the rise 
of Fascism in Italy. In January 1919 Mussolini’s Fascio d ’Azione 
Rivoluzionaria (Group of Revolutionary Action), a group initially formed to 
promote the intervention of Italy in World War I at the side of France and 
Britain, combined forces with the arditi - shocktroops with a distinctive 
uniform and armed with daggers, designed during the war for raids on enemy 
positions. When Mussolini founded the Fasci di Combattimento in March
1 Q
1919, this alliance with the arditi was firmly cemented. Although still a 
tiny minority, the Fascists received direct aid from the army, while ex- 
servicemen, especially from the ranks of the arditi, were encouraged to join 
Fascist squads. By October 1922 a private army came into being wholly at 
the disposal of the Fascist leaders - the Blackshirts. Without the support of 
these militaristic elements, the March on Rome and the victory of the Italian 
Fascists would doubtless not have been successful. While the military did not 
bring about a Fascist revolution in Italy, great parts of it co-operated with and 
supported the Fascists. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1923 the newly 
established Fascist Grand Council dissolved all para-military organisations 
and set up in their place a “Voluntary Militia for National Security.” The
39 O’Sullivan, p.207. Mussolini belonged to the Milan fascio, while in 1915 a national 
organisation was founded with the name Fasci d ’Azione rivoluzionaria. After the war in March 
1919 Mussolini reconstituted the Milan fascio , using the name Fasci di Combattimento.
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Blackshirts and armed squads of the Fascists were incorporated into this new 
force and thus acquired legal status.
In this context it should be noted that in Germany, as well as in Italy, 
the military (i.e. the army) in general played a passive role concerning the 
advancement of Fascist ideas. Once the Fascist party had established itself as 
the governing power, the military merely followed its leadership. Therefore, 
in Europe, the military as such did not develop a Fascist policy and did not 
represent the Fascist Party as it later did in Japan. This is one of the essential 
differences between European and Japanese Fascism.
B. The Nature of Japanese Fascism
The contention of this thesis is that Japanese Fascism brought more 
influence to bear on Blueshirt Fascism than either of its European 
counterparts. This was in great part due to the historical and cultural 
connection between China and Japan. This section will outline the 
development of Fascism in Japan in its historical context. Attention is paid to 
the relationship between the Japanese military and nascent Fascist groupings. 
The development of Fascist tendencies among the Japanese military is 
explained and the concept of Japanese Fascism defined. Despite continuing 
debates among political analysts as to whether Fascism actually emerged 
outside Europe, Japan may be regarded as the first non-Westem power to 
produce a recognisably Fascist regime.
It is certainly true that the Fascist regime in Japan came to power in a 
way that was different from the process in Germany or Italy. It is also true 
that it lacked some of the features normally associated with Western Fascism, 
as the Japanese version had its roots in quite different national developments. 
Tanin (Oscar Tarkhanov) and Yohan (Evgeni Yolk), two Soviet 
Japanologists writing in the 1930s, maintain that “the peculiarities of
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Japanese Fascism are closely interwoven with the social structure and the 
historical development of Japanese military feudal imperialism.”40
Essential to an understanding of Japanese Fascism are three 
interrelated factors: (1) the pervasive influence of the military as the most 
pronounced characteristic of Japanese society at that time ; (2) the speed and 
success of Japan’s modernisation, which contrasted sharply with almost all 
the rest of Asia; and (3) the weak and superficial nature of Japan’s fledgling 
democratic parliamentary structures, which readily succumbed to Fascism.41
The pervasive influence of the military is one of the most important 
reasons for the rise of Fascism in Japan. As Anthony James Joes has written, 
“one might say that in speaking of Japanese Fascism, one is actually speaking 
of the increasing imposition of military values on Japanese society as a 
whole.”42 An analysis of Japanese militarism is therefore necessary before an 
examination of Japanese Fascism can be conducted.
The background against which modem Japanese militarism developed 
finds its roots in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), when the governing 
class was the Samurai # , 43 or the soldier-administrator.44 After the Meiji
40 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan. Westport: Greenwood Press,
1973, p.20.
41 Anthony James Joes, Fascism in the Contemporary World: Ideology, Evolution,
Resurgence, Boulder: Westview Press, 1978, p. 147. See also, Kobayashi Hideo, Showa 
Facisito no gun shu (Japanese Fascist Popular Movement), Tokyo: Kokura shobo, 1984. This 
book gives a full reference about the three interrelated factors. For instance, the three factors 
were actually divided into three different groups of people; 1) Kita and Ishiwara 2) Tanaka 
Chigaku, and 3) Kishi Nobusuke.
42 Joes, p. 147. See also Wan Feng, Nihon Fasshizumu no kobo (The Rise and Fall o f Japanese 
Fascism), Tokyo: Rokko shuppan, 1989, p.66.
43 This term has two meanings. (1) Originally, in the development of Japanese feudalism, any 
warrior, whether lord or vassal, but generally the latter. (2) The class, or members of a class, of 
military retainers of the daimyo. The special rights and privileges o f the Samurai were 
abolished after the downfall of feudalism in 1871. In this way the Samurai embodied both, Pen 
and Sword - knowledge and action.
44 Joes, p. 147.
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Restoration of 1868 in Japan the Samurai almost ceased to exist as a distinct 
class, however, most of the Samurai adapted themselves to the changes in 
Japanese society and transposed their role in society. The spirit of the 
Samurai continued to permeate public affairs in Japan because many Samurai 
found their way into positions in the government, industry and commerce. 
Some of them remained petty landowners in the countryside, while others 
took up posts in the expanding state apparatus or became officers in the 
reorganised army. Those members of the Samurai who remained 
unreconciled to the dissolution of their class supported the military expansion 
and hoped for rehabilitation on war outside Japan. The groups of Samurai 
advocating a more aggressive foreign policy formed secret societies such as 
the Black Ocean Society ("Sf #  Genyoshaf5 founded in 1881, and the 
Black Dragon Society (H f |  |± Kokuryusha) founded in 1901.
Movements such as the Black Ocean and the Black Dragon Society 
were strongly nationalistic and played a central role in the development of 
Japanese imperialism.46 It was the period between 1894 and 1904 that saw 
the beginnings of an aggressive militarism in Japan. Japan’s success in two 
wars, that with China (in 1895) and with Russia (1904-5), was mainly due to 
the rapid adoption of Western techniques and industrialisation.47 Japanese 
modernisation emphasised an intense nationalism and militarism, and from 
the very beginning, Japan verged upon the problems of modernisation and 
relations with the West almost completely in terms of national defence. As
45 The origin of this body was Koyosha [p] PJ§ |±  (Expose to the Sun society), founded by 
Toyama Mitsuru in Fukuoka in 1879. In 1881, Toyama and Hiraoka Kotaro(Uchida’s uncle on 
his mother’s side, and a mine-owner and former Samurai who had taken part in the Satsuma 
Rebellion), renamed Koyosha as Genyosha.
46 Wan Feng, Nihon Fasshizumu no kobo (The Rise and Fall of Japanese Fascism), Tokyo: 
Rokko shuppan, 1989, pp.31-32.
47 O.Tanin and E.Yohan, p.43.
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Kobayashi described: “The whole thrust of modernisation in its many aspects 
- the school system, working hours of labourers, properties for the 
government, the conscription system chohei seido Wt ^  rfr'J St,48 heavy 
industries, road building, and port improvements - was thus to mobilise the 
resources of the nation behind a modernised army and navy, the 
embodiments of national purpose and survival.”49
The prestige and power of the military apparatus were mirrored in the 
structure of Japan’s constitutional government, as military men headed the 
ministries of war and of the navy. The demands of the military could not be 
ignored. Moreover, Japanese laws completely privileged the army and the 
navy from control by or subordination to the parliament and the government. 
The army and navy did not tolerate any government intervention, whatever 
the case, in its internal affairs.50
The right-wing or Fascist movements which arose in Japan after 
World War I co-operated with and had the support of the military. Among 
the new nationalist organisations many were merely dedicated to the 
preservation of the “Japanese Spirif\ without any particular programme. 
Numerous patriotic societies sprang up, to combat leftist student activities, 
labour-farmer unions, and socialist - Communist groups.51 The development 
of a militaristic tendency was coupled with a deeper-seated desire for 
nationalism. One of the leading members of a new type of reactionary
48 A revision of the conscription law in 1883, providing for three years with the colours and 
nine with the reserves, raised the peacetime establishment to 73,000 men and wartime strength 
to 200,000 more, which seemed sufficient for this purpose. All were equipped by 1894 with 
modem rifles and artillery, mostly of Japanese manufacture.
49 Kobayashi Hideo, pp.36-37. Presumably this idea was based on Kita Ikki’s Nihon kaizohoan 
daiko. See also Joes, p. 148.
50 Tanin and Yohan, p. 173.
51 Wan Feng, p.42.
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nationalist organisation was Kita Ikki dL —■ )Bp. Kita had been active in 
China during the 1910s, associated primarily with the Japanese intelligence 
service and the Black Dragon Society. After his return from China in 1918, 
Kita published his book Nippon kaizo hoan taiko 0 ^  ja ife M M (The 
Principles of Introduction for Reconstruction of Japan).54 Kita’s book was 
referred to as the Mein Kampf of the Showa Ultra-nationalist Movement.55
The influence of Kita on the development of Fascism in Japan was so 
great that Maruyama Masao referred to him in no lesser terms than “the 
ideological father of Japanese Fascism.”56 Kita’s book summarised the 
attitudes of all those who felt that Japan’s talent and energies were being 
squandered by various Japanese, instead of being harnessed to the cause of a 
Greater Asia under Japanese tutelage.57 During the 1920s and 1930s several 
different Fascist tendencies competed for supremacy in Japan, all of them 
displaying Kita’s aspiration for a Greater Asia (or Pan-Asianism).
The ideology of Japanese Fascism was based on Asian values, and was 
mainly constructed around the Japanese idea of 1) the “Way of the Emperor” 
M iS 5& H  2) the theory of Confucius, and 3) a religious philosophy.58 The 
main thought of the spirit of Bushido iS ± i!  was also based on
52 Kita (1883-1937) was a nationalist revolutionary. Like many Meiji radicals, he came from a 
fairly well-to-do family. He had links with the Kokuryukai, and was much influenced when he 
was young by Social Darwinism. Kita spent several years in China after the 1911 Revolution.
53 . . . .Iwase Masato, Kita Ikki to sho kkoka shugi (Kita Ikki and Ultra-Nationalism), pp.7-8.
54 George Macklin Wilson, “Kita Ikki’s Theory of Revolution”, in Journal o f  Asian Studies, 
November 1966, vol.26, p.89. See also, Iwase Masato, Kita Ikki to sho kkoka shugi (Kita Ikki 
and Ultra-Nationalism), p. 12.
55 Wilson, “Kita Ikki’s Theory of Revolution”, p.89.
56 Maruyama, p.28.
57 Wan Feng, pp.34-36. See also, Joes, p. 153.
58 Wan Feng, p.34.
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Confucianism.59 Furthermore, the teachings of Nichiren 0 M a Japanese 
monk (1222-1282), who was among the first of the country’s religious 
leaders to have given a strongly national complexion to Buddhism, had 
exerted considerable influence on the thinking of many Japanese ultra­
nationalists, including Kita Ikki and Inoue Nissho.60 Inoue maintained that 
Shintoism, the Japanese state religion, and Fascism should merge and raise 
Japan to the leader of the Asian people, and finally of the whole world. Kita 
Ikki was seen as the man to adapt European Fascism and to create a theory of 
Japanese Fascism, and he therefore studied the principles of Confucius. 
Kita’s thought was that through the ideology of Japanese Fascism it should 
be possible to compare the civilisations of the East and West. On the other 
hand, Kita was convinced that the Oriental culture and mental spirit was 
superior to that of the West.61
It might be fairly stated that a distinctly Japanese Fascist state 
comprised militarism, modernisation and Pan-Asianism.
The most cogent re-examination of the problem of Japanese Fascism 
has been conducted by George Wilson, who argues convincingly that the 
concept of Japanese Fascism is mistaken. This is true because no political 
movement arose to seize power, formal Japanese constitutional and
59 Wan Feng, p.37. The core o f Bushido spirit was based on the ideology of Shinto and 
Zenshu which can be compared with Confucian thought.
60 Bom in 1886, a Nichiren priest of extreme rightist beliefs, who before turning to Buddhism 
had spent most of his life on the continent as a secret agent for the Japanese army. On his 
return to Japan, he organised various extreme nationalist societies. The most important of these 
was the Blood Pledge Corps (Ketsumei dan), a fanatic band of youths, centred near Mito, who 
were pledged to remove many of the country’s political leaders by assassination. Inoue’s group 
was responsible for the killing in 1932 of Finance Minister Inoue and of Baron Dan, the Mitsui 
director. As a result Inoue was sentenced to life imprisonment; he was released in 1940 on a 
general amnesty. He resumed political activity after 1952 and in collaboration with several 
members o f his Blood Pledge Corps he founded the extremist National Protection Corps 
(Gokoku dan).
61 Wan Feng, p.34.
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institutional authority remained essentially intact, and parliamentary 
pluralism and elections continued to exist. The main pressure to change the 
Japanese system came from radical elements within the military or from
AOsmall radical nationalist circles.
Wilson has also delineated two basic lines of interpretation which have 
yielded the conclusion that Japan became a Fascist state during the 1930s.63 
The first, the Marxist approach, advocates that first a Fascist movement and 
then a full-blown Fascist regime appeared in Japan as a function of objective 
class conditions and a desperate form of last-ditch defence on the part of 
Japanese capitalism against the menace of social and economic revolution. 
This is the same approach as applied to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The 
second approach, the authoritarian-modemisation thesis, labels as Fascist “all 
those governments which, in the process of rapid and paternalistic 
industrialisation, encounter domestic and foreign crises that lead them to 
pursue policies of regression at home and aggressive expansion abroad.”64
This last thesis has found many competent followers among both 
Western and Japanese scholars. Japanese Fascism is different from the 
European variety chiefly in that it came not from below through successful 
mass mobilisation but from above by transforming the existing state structure 
into an “emperor-system” or “military-bureaucratic” Fascism. By substituting 
the army for the Fascist party, the symbolic force of the emperor for the 
Fascist leader, and drawing other similar analogies, the conclusion emerges 
that Japan had a Fascist system, particularly after 1936. In common with its
62 George Macklin Wilson, “A New Look at the Problem of Japanese Fascism”, in Henry A. 
Turner, Jr., (ed.) Reappraisals o f  Fascism. New York: New Viewpoints, 1975, pp. 199-214.
63 Wilson, “A New Look at the Problem of Japanese Fascism”, pp. 199-200.
64 Wilson, “A New Look at the Problem of Japanese Fascism”, p.202.
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European counterparts, this form of Fascism suppressed liberalism and 
socialism, and cemented state authority over all aspects of national life.
One of the most persuasive advocates of Japanese Fascism is 
Maruyama Masao. According to Maruyama, the development of Fascism in 
Japan may be broadly divided into three stages. The first stage (1919-1931) 
was characterised by Right-wing movements among civilians. In the second 
stage, which began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 
1931, the military became the driving force of Fascism. The final stage, when 
Maruyama Masao treats Fascism as a state structure (1936-1945) in contrast 
with regarding Fascism as a movement during the earlier phases, may be 
termed the consummation period of Japanese Fascism. The military, openly 
advocating Fascism, fashioned an unstable ruling coalition involving the 
bureaucracy, the economy and the political parties.65
The Japanese Fascist movement naturally had elements in common 
with the Fascist ideology current in the world. However, there were three 
distinctive points that were especially emphasised in the Fascist ideology of 
Japan:
(i) The family-system: the basic characteristic of the Japanese state structure 
is that it was always considered an extension of the family. That this structure 
appeared consistently in a Fascist movement stressed that national polity and 
a political slogan were distinctive characteristics not found in the Fascism of 
Germany and Italy. This defines the social context of Japanese Fascism.
(ii) Agrarianism: an important feature of Japanese Fascist ideology was a 
counter-movement that demanded autonomy for villages in an attempt to put 
a stop to the expansion of the industrial productive power of the cities. 
Japanese Fascism represents a confusing appearance because the tendency 
towards the concentration of powerful authority and strengthening of state
65 Maruyama, pp.26-27.
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control, which was common in world Fascism, was limited in Japan by the 
ideology of agrarianism.
(iii) Pan-Asianism: the ideal of the emancipation of the Asian people from 
European colonialism flowed strongly through Japanese Fascism.66
The major characteristic separating Japanese Fascism from the 
European form was the gradation of its development. Fascism did not burst 
on the scene from below as it did in Germany and Italy. Furthermore, in 
Germany and Italy the learned class and university students played a major 
role. This was not the case in Japan, where the intellectual student class as a 
whole never supported the Fascist movement. This can doubtless be 
accounted for by the position of the intellectual and the differing cultural 
values between Asia and Europe.
In line with its European counterparts, Japanese Fascism became more 
radically entrenched during the 1930s. A change of government in July 1934 
brought to power a party which firmly supported the army’s policies on the 
Chinese mainland. The outcome was a strengthening of the position of a 
military and bureaucratic elite in Japan.67
There were a number of extremist organisations operating on the 
fringe of the political arena, frequently following the teachings of some 
prominent ultra-nationalist. These groups were so divergent from one another 
in their attitudes and opinions that political co-operation would have been 
impossible. Similarly, their activities were greatly restricted by their small 
size and financial insecurity. Rather different from these, however, was one 
group which grew up among the young military officers who were opposed
66 Maruyama, pp.34-51.
67 Olavi K. Fait, Fascism, Militarism or Japanism?; The Interpretation o f  the Crisis Years o f  
1930-1941 in the Japanese English-Language Press. Finlandiae: Pohjois-Suomen 
Historiallinen Yhdistys Societas Historica Finlandiae Septentrionalis Rovaniemi, 1985. p.45. 
Also Wan Feng, pp. 137-140.
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to capitalism and Western ideals, and whose position gave them much better 
opportunities for exercising influence.68 This group of young officers got 
more influence after the reorganisation in 1923 of the Japanese military, 
while this influence was greatly enhanced after the Manchurian Incident of 
1932, which is often said to be the first boundary for Japan’s entry into the 
Fascist era.
The period between 1923 and 1932 saw conflicts in connection with 
the reorganisation of the Japanese army between the older and the younger 
generation of officers. These conflicts had a great impact on the further 
development of the situation in Japan until 1936. The struggle between these 
two generations of officers within the army amounted to more than a struggle 
between two currents of military thought, for the younger generation 
represented different social strata.69 The younger officers were often sons of 
the old Samurai families, and although not yet in a position of controlling the 
army, they were nevertheless the main support of the reforms in Japan’s 
military forces which began in 1922. From early 1930 among this group of 
young officers there began to grow rapidly the spirit of violent opposition to 
parliamentary political parties, and co-operation with the right wing or 
Fascist movements which arose in Japan after World War I emerged. Those 
Fascist groups, having gained support of the military, came to manage actual 
political power, and some became engaged in extreme vigorous activity.
Finally, the “February Incident”70 of 26 February 1936, which was an 
attempted coup of the group of “Young Officers” together with the Fascist
68 Fait, p.32.
69 Tanin and Yohan, p. 179.
70 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy, London: Penguin 
Press 1967, pp. 300-301. The February Incident of 1936: In Japan in 1936 there were 
moderately free elections. These elections failed to result in a popular endorsement of 
democracy (absenteeism was high). At the same time the election showed a lack of electoral 
support for patriotic radicalism. To check this, a section of the army(the young officers)
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movements, proved to be a climax of the influence of Fascism from below. 
Maruyama Masao writes: “The February Incident above all proved to be a 
turning-point. This was of course the final and biggest of the successive 
Fascist putsche. Thereafter the Fascist movement from below, led by the 
young officers and/or the civilian right wing, retreats into the background.” 
After 1936 Japanese Fascism is defined as Fascism from above.
Therefore, the February Incident was the occasion that “brought the 
movement of radical Fascism from below to an end, and clearly determined 
that Japan’s course towards Fascism would not take the shape of a Fascist 
revolution and coup d'etat as in Germany and Italy.”71 The military in Japan 
took the power of the government and within the existing political structure 
transformed it into a Fascist state.
C. A Working Definition of Fascism
Reaching a working definition of Fascism that is also applicable to the 
Blueshirts requires a certain degree of flexibility. An ideology such as 
Communism has an established orthodoxy and a clear set of principles that 
finds its theory in Marxism. It is therefore legitimate to maintain that an 
organisation, such as the Chinese Communist Party, which embarks on a 
political route at variance with the ideology, is heterodox or revisionist. It is 
thus relatively easy to determine whether any given ideology or movement is 
or is not Communist. In contrast, as it has no rigorous ideological basis, 
Fascism is by its very nature an opportunist phenomenon an anti-ideology. It 
addresses itself only to the most immediate of concrete conditions. It first acts
responded with another attempted coup, known as the 26 February Incident. The February 
Incident was the prelude to further political manoeuvres to the imposition of a totalitarian 
State. See also Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp.55-56.
71 Maruyama Masao, p.33.
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and it poses the question of power, and then constructs a set of policies, 
organisations, myths and cults which serve that end. This body of thinking 
need never be coherent, because power is important, not the rationalisations 
which accompany it.
In essence, all Fascist movements were anti-liberal and anti-Marxist. 
Indeed, Mussolini himself observed at the beginning that Fascism had 
become “the great anti-party”, opposed to most of the old orthodoxy of left,
noright and centre. Fascists often gave themselves impetus by brutal action 
against those to whom they opposed. Their basis seems to have been violence 
with no ideology behind it. Ideology may here be defined as a systematic 
body of concepts which forms a theoretical approach to the practical 
problems encountered by, for instance, society. The Blackwell Encyclopaedia 
of Political Thought states:
Ideologies are patterns o f symbolically-charged beliefs and expressions
that present, interpret and evaluate the world in a way designed to shape,
m obilise, direct, organise and justify  certain modes or courses o f 
73action.
In short, ideology advocates action to be taken according to theory. 
Fascism may therefore be considered anti-ideology rather than ideology. An 
anti-ideology, such as Fascism, has no theoretical background. As it devotes 
itself to action without theory, an anti-ideology has no need of a systematic 
body of conceptual ideas. Fascism may be described as a “cult of action.” In 
other words, action, rather than the ideology behind the action, is glorified. 
This view, shared by many Fascists, is one of the six points that is discussed 
by O’Sullivan when analysing Fascism: “Was Fascism an ideology, or was it 
- as the Fascist themselves often claimed - an anti-ideology, in which a cult of
72 Payne, p.49.
73 David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connelly & Alan Ryan, (eds.),77ze Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought, pp.23 5-237.
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action took the place of any doctrinal commitment?”74 This view of Fascism 
as an “acting” anti-ideology rather than a “thinking” ideology is central to a 
definition of Fascism applicable to the Blueshirts.
Within the definition of Fascism offered by The Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought is mentioned that: “....Fascist terror was 
doctrine put into practice in the most methodical way. Fascism constitutes 
one of the best examples of the unity of thought and action.”75 That the 
above definition considers Fascism as “one of the best examples of the unity 
of thought and action” is remarkable, because the unity of “acting” and 
“thinking” represented by Fascism is strongly reminiscent of the debates on 
“knowledge and action” (zhixing) which permeated Confucianist thought in 
China since at least the Ming dynasty.76 Sun Yatsen made “Knowledge and 
Action” part of his political doctrine, and Chiang Kaishek also used it to 
encourage his people to better achievements. Sun was, however, mainly 
concerned with revolution and national reconstruction. He developed the 
teachings of ancient times “to know is easy and to act is difficult” (zhiyi 
xingnan into “to act is easy but to know is difficult” (zhinan xingyi
£0HfrJ?). Sun emphasised that the key to progress was action and that to act 
was easier than to know. Sun’s theory reactivated in China the time-honoured
74 O’Sullivan, p.5. The significance of Fascism, as O’Sullivan explains it, lies in its making 
explicit implications o f the new activist style of politics towards three things: 1) a leader, 2) a 
movement, and 3) a “myth” or Weltanschauung, (pp. 113-130). This new activist style of 
politics is being interpreted as “a cult of actions.”
75 David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connelly & Alan Ryan, (eds,),The Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia o f  Political Thought, 1991, pp.148-150.
76 The theory was originally advocated by Wang Yangming in the Ming dynasty, and
maintained that action without knowledge serves no purpose while knowledge without action 
is futile.
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controversy over the problem of “unity of knowledge and action” {zhixing 
heyi f r l f f ) . 77
A similar idea was initiated by the literati in Japan during the Meiji 
restoration. Those scholars decided that the theory of “unity of knowledge 
and action”, which had been developed from the Chinese concept, was an 
obstruction to the development of Japanese modernisation. The hypothesis 
they developed was that “Practice” f f  without the constraints of 
“Knowledge” £p can be successful.78 Thus, in the Japanese case the 
following concept was propagated: instead of Chigyo koichi f t  ^  — using 
Rinki ohen I® 8  J® H, “action is carried out in response to the 
circumstances.” Moreover, the Japanese secret societies which exerted such 
an influence on the early development of extreme nationalism and the 
formation of a Fascist state in Japan, may be interpreted along the same lines. 
The Black Dragon society may be symbolised by “acting” and the Black 
Ocean Society by “knowledge.” The extent to which these societies 
influenced the foundations of the Blueshirts in China will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter Two of this thesis.
Another important aspect was the influence of Chinese secret society 
traditions upon the Blueshirts. This was apparent from the way the 
organisation operated, and is an aspect which should not be overlooked or 
underestimated. Paramount in this was the strong clan-feeling that 
characterised Chinese secret societies - an emotion beyond which the 
Blueshirts were not able to go. Furthermore, the secret societies and gangs
77 Chuan Yunlong, Zhongguo zhixingxueshuo shuping (The Review of Chinese Knowledge 
and Action Studies), Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe, 1988, p .183; see also David S.Nivison, “The 
Problem of “Knowledge and Action” in Chinese Thought since Wang Yang-Ming”, pp.137- 
140, in The American Anthropologist; Studies in Chinese Thought, Arthur Wright (ed.), The 
American Anthropological Association, vol.55, no.5, memoir no.75, December 1953.
78 Takeuchi Hiroyuki, Chugoku no jukyo teki kindaika ron (The Theory Confucius for Chinese 
Modernisation), Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1995, p.302.
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which had existed in China for centuries often derived their right of existence 
from rebellion against “authority.” They were renowned for their “action” 
rather than their “knowledge.” In this respect their ideology may also be 
defined as a form of anti-ideology. The extent to which the ideologies of 
these secret societies concords with the doctrine “unity of thought and 
action” of Fascism is something to which this thesis will return for further 
discussion.
In attempting to arrive at a working definition of Fascism, it is 
important to bear in mind that most Chinese interpreters of European Fascism 
in the 1930s - including Chiang Kaishek himself - had been educated in 
Confucian thought. These interpreters were unsuccessful in arriving at a 
definitive explanation of Fascism. Firstly, the variety and vagueness of 
Fascism made an interpretation all the more difficult. Secondly, the 
peculiarities of Confucian thought instilled in these interpreters encouraged 
them to view Fascism along more traditionally Chinese lines. Interpretations 
of Fascism in China, even among Blueshirts ideologists, advocated emulation 
of the external aspects and techniques of European Fascism (i.e. the action) 
without actually defining the concept (i.e. the thought).
The working definition of Fascism adopted in this thesis has been 
arrived at in the light of a number of aspects. To provide a definition of a 
generic form of Fascism which encompasses all the movements which arose 
under the umbrella of Fascism, be they in Europe or in East Asia, has been 
proven impossible. Fascism is a concept which defies categorisation as a 
simple unified theory. The historical origins of Fascism in Europe have been 
analysed so as to distil a set of values common to most - but by no means all 
- Fascist movements. While the adoption of a “checklist approach” or a 
“Fascist minimum” is not entirely satisfactory, it does at least provide a set of 
criteria by which the Blueshirts can be judged. Moreover, the strong 
influence of militarism on the rise of Fascism in Japan, and the specific
43
Chapter One
cultural and traditional values which moulded Japanese Fascism, are both 
essential in an appreciation of the Blueshirts as a Fascist organisation. Thus, 
the working definition of Fascism may be summarised as follows:
(i) The organisation is formed by social groups which feel threatened by 
social foment. These groups may be drawn from one social class or may be 
assembled by ruling groups.
(ii) The organisation rejects Marxism, liberalism and materialism as 
defining tenets. These ideas are combined with other modernist or 
traditionalist concepts peculiar to the particular social conditions of the 
country in which they arise.
(iii) The organised attempts to extend military models of organisation and 
obedience to wider sections of the populace.
(iv) The organisation activates the masses entirely from above, thereby 
preferring the “directed” character of activist politics above the 
“spontaneous” character of ideological politics, such as Marxism.
(v) The organisation promotes sentiments of nationalism, sometimes 
advocating a restoration of traditional values, such as Confucianism in China.
(vi) The organisation places the explicit cult of a leader at the very centre of 
its teaching in order to uphold the essence of totalitarianism. This so-called 
“leader principle” is often generated through the establishment of an elite 
corps.
1.2 Exposition of the Sources Cited
The Blueshirts were a more or less clandestine organisation; many of their 
actions were violent and outside the law. It seems that even though the 
Blueshirts were a relatively strong organisation, they deliberately obscured 
their relationship to the Guomindang party structure. It is also likely that 
much of the Blueshirts’ own energy may have been spent in systematically
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destroying evidence of its involvement in drug-trading, racketeering, torture
7Qand mass-execution. This secrecy that surrounded the Blueshirts is one of 
the reasons for the lack of documentary sources regarding the organisation. 
With much of the source material available to researchers being of a 
secondary nature, a comprehensive investigation of the Blueshirts has been 
difficult.
A. The Findings of Eastman and Chang
Following a publication in The China Quarterly10 in 1972, two years 
later Lloyd E.Eastman published his book The Abortive Revolution. In his 
writings Eastman developed a thesis which argued that Blueshirts’ Fascism 
was for the greater part modelled on Nazism.81 In his discussion about 
Fascism, the phenomenon is carefully “defined” “one of the most ambiguous 
and emotionally laden words in the political-science lexicon.” He continues 
by stating that “there is no single form or simple definition of Fascism” for it 
is a “political ideology that has historically proven to be attractive to widely 
disparate social groups in widely diverse societies.” In Eastman’s attempt 
to arrive at a viable definition of Fascism applicable to the Blueshirts, he 
adopts the above-mentioned “checklist” of S.J. Woolf. Such an approach is 
without doubt one of the only workable options open to Eastman in the
79 TB (Toyo Bunko), 2057. Rartisha ni kansuru chosa (An Investigation o f the Blueshirts), 
pp.25-26.
80 Lloyd E. Eastman, The China Quarterly, January-March 1972, nr.49, “Fascism in 
Kuomintang China:The Blueshirts.” pp. 1-31.
81 Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental 
Nationalism; and Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution.
82 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.80.
83 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.80.
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absence of an absolute definition of Fascism. However, Eastman’s use of 
sources to support his thesis is limited on two counts.
Writing in the 1970s, Eastman was unable to avail himself of any of 
the archive materials on the Blueshirts from the People’s Republic. Based on 
information from Blueshirts publications and collected speeches from Chiang 
Kaishek alone, Eastman was unable to supplement the information he 
gleaned from Japanese sources to any great degree. In his preface to the 1990 
paperback reprint of The Abortive Revolution, Eastman laments this situation. 
He cites the opening of the Nanjing Di ’er Dang’anguan (Sj % H ffi ^  I t  
Nanjing Second Historical Archives) to historical researchers as a missed 
opportunity on his part. In order to re-assess Eastman’s arguments and to add 
to knowledge on the Blueshirts, this thesis makes full use of the Nanjing 
Historical Archives and the Shanghai Shi Dang’anguan (_h 'M Tp ffi M It 
Shanghai Municipal Archives) in the People’s Republic, as well as the Zhu 
Jiahua Dang’an (^k % SS ®  M Zhu Jiahua Archives) from the Institute of 
Modem History, Academia Sinica in Taibei, Taiwan.
Secondly, that Eastman has not used any Western archive materials, 
even those from Germany, determines that his research is restricted and 
therefore has its limitations. For instance, by not having used the information 
available in the German archives, Eastman was not able to discriminate that 
there was no Nazi influence on the formation of the Blueshirts. On the 
contrary he has concluded that the formation of the Blueshirts was triggered 
by German military advisers, a conclusion which this thesis will show was 
not entirely accurate.84
When Maria Hsia Chang published her “Fascism and Modem China” 
in September 1979 in the China Quarterly she challenged the findings of
84 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, pp.39-40.
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Eastman concluding that the Blueshirts could not be described as Fascist. 
Chang determines that:
The specialists who have dealt w ith European history have not reached 
any consensus how Fascism is to be understood or interpreted. There is 
no agreement about its class base.... or about its theoretical or 
philosophical basis: whether Fascism was revolutionary or counter­
revolutionary... Given this confusion, it is not surprising that the most 
recent efforts to achieve some theoretical understanding o f  generic
Fascism, having recognised this lack o f  consensus concerning the nature
86o f  Fascism, have been far less ambitious.
Owing to this confusion, Chang articulates the difficulty in 
determining whether the Blueshirts were Fascist. Avoiding this question 
head-on she returns to the ideas of Sun Yatsen arguing that the Blueshirts 
were faithful to and were following the Sanminzhuyi. In the course of the 
discussion she compares the Sanminzhuyi with the ideas of the Italian 
nationalists and concludes that Sun’s ideas and those of the Italian 
nationalists were congruent, defining them as “developmental nationalism” 
rather than Fascist.
Chang criticises both Eastman's conclusions and his adoption of the 
checklist approach, claiming that he has actually failed to provide a clear 
definition of Fascism before discussing the Blueshirts. In Chang’s view, all 
Eastman has achieved is providing “a short checklist with which to 
distinguish ‘Fascist’ from ‘non-Fascist’ political movements and 
ideologies.”87 Such an approach, according Chang, fails to interpret the 
historical role and function of Fascism as it is specific to China.
Despite Chang’s valid criticisms of Eastman's methodology, she side­
steps the question of defining Fascism herself by attempting to describe the
85 Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental 
Nationalism, and Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution.
86 Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, pp.7-9.
87 Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, p. 132.
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Blueshirts in terms of a completely different set of criteria. Avoiding the 
question of Fascism in a direct way, she attempts to show that the Blueshirts 
were not really Fascist, because they were exponents of an "ideology of
QOdelayed industrialisation." She appears to assume that an ideology of
delayed industrialisation and Fascism must necessarily be mutually
exclusive. Having criticised Eastman for providing "a checklist of traits",
Chang does little more than substitute her own list of criteria for his.
Eventually Chang abandons any attempt at defining Fascism by dismissing
the exercise as “no easy task.”89
Chang develops the information presented by Eastman through use of
documents from the Guomindang Archives, and the memoirs of Liu Jianqun
§!j I t  HI, a former member of the Blueshirts, entitled Yinhe yiwang (|g M f t
Memoirs of the Milky Way). Chang also cites Deng Yuanzhong’s
Sanminzhuyi lixingshe shi (E  K i  8  i]  I f  ^  The History of
Sanminzhuyi) which was published in 1984. Deng’s book is problematic in
as much as the information it presents adheres very closely to that of the
aforementioned Japanese sources. It fails to shed any new light on the subject
of the Blueshirts. Guomindang spokesmen said that during the war with
Japan, when they moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, they had lost valuable
documents with information about the Blueshirts. Therefore, this raises the
question as to how Deng Yuanzhong’s father or other former Blueshirts
members whom Deng had interviewed remember that clearly every detail
that is given in his book.
Chang, furthermore, criticises Eastman in judging the Blueshirts as a
Fascist organisation based on his documentary materials, As she concludes:
To be persuasive, Eastman's account o f the Chinese Blue Shirt Society 
m ust, like any other historical narrative, be conceptually and logically
88
Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, pp.34-35, 51, 130-131.
89 Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, p. 134.
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clear and be supported by the documentary materials. Regarding the 
latter, Eastm an asserts that the documentary evidence on the Blue Shirt 
Society supports his thesis that the society was a Fascist organisation. A 
review  o f  the primary sources, the very same material he used, fails to
establish this putative match o f  evidence to knowledge. Instead, the
90documentary evidence is indeterminate and equivocal.
It is likely that Chang objects to Eastman's handling of sources in a 
large part because she, from the very beginning, disagrees with his 
conclusion that the Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation. Nevertheless, her 
criticism is largely valid from a purely textual point of view. Even she is 
obliged to concede that where primary sources do not explicitly announce the 
Fascist character of the Blueshirts, however, “one does find in the editorials 
and articles of the Qiantu flu ^  and Shehui xinwen H91 Blueshirt
advocacy of the exaltation of the state, totalitarian controls, one party rule 
and glorification of the leader.” Taking her argument on its own terms, she is 
correct in stating that to rely entirely on primary sources in order to prove 
that the Blueshirts were Fascist is a highly unreliable line of scholarship. 
Looking at the question in wider terms, however, placing primary and 
secondary sources together, comparing materials from different archive 
sources and analysing them in the light of our knowledge of the action of the 
Blueshirts and of the Japanese and European Fascist organisations, it is her 
argument, not Eastman's, which appears much the weaker.
It is unfortunate that other writers fail to include a definition of 
Fascism in their studies of the Blueshirts. Their work consequently addresses 
the question of whether or not the Blueshirts were Fascist without really 
offering a satisfactory explication of Fascism against which to measure 
Blueshirts’ activities. Indeed, unfortunately many studies of interwar China
QOChang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, pp. 13-28.
91 The Blueshirts periodical Qiantu (Future or Forward) and a Blueshirts journal Shehui 
xinwen (The Society Mercury).
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use political terminology without offering any prior definition of terms, and 
the confusion which this engenders is only too clear in many accounts of the 
period. The treatment of the Blueshirts by Jack Gray is one such an example. 
In his chapter on Chinese Fascism Gray writes:
Its original creators were socialists; its ideals o f  social responsibility, 
public honesty and personal austerity were admirable... it was one o f 
those m ovem ents which opposed social revolution (though not social 
change) by stressing the prior importance o f  individual moral 
regeneration.92
This explanation poses more questions than it answers, for the idea 
that "social responsibility, public honesty and personal austerity" were in 
some way specifically socialist ideas is unlikely to be accepted either by 
socialists, or, indeed, by liberals and conservatives, who might equally well 
consider these same virtues to be basic principles of their own philosophy. If 
anything was distinctive about socialist thinking in the early 20th century it 
was the recognition of the need to transcend individual “virtue” and to 
organise collective action for social change. Gray's definition is doubly 
confusing since its denial of a Fascist origin for the Blueshirts is based on a 
false definition of socialism.
Gray's intention is to show that the Blueshirts were not, at their 
founding, a Fascist organisation, but that they were soon "drawn into 
Fascism", because organisations based on such principles "have always 
proved very easy to draw into the service of reactionary violence."93 
However, his decision to label the Blueshirts at their foundation as "socialist" 
merely serves to obscure the fact that certain modem movements which have 
based their platform on calls for "social responsibility, public honesty and 
personal austerity" have in fact been Fascist from the outset. Gray’s
92 Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from  the 1800s to the 1980s, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, pp.247-248.
93 Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p.247.
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conclusions illustrate how an inaccurate use of terms can obscure meaning 
and detract from a proper understanding of the situation.
B. Japanese Sources
An examination of the sources Eastman used for his account of the 
Blueshirts in The Abortive Revolution shows that, with only minor 
exceptions, the only non-Chinese sources used were Japanese. In fact, 
Japanese sources represent an important means of building up a more 
complete picture of Blueshirts activities because of their extensiveness and 
accuracy especially in view of the limited nature of other, Western and 
Chinese sources. As Eastman states, “even as recently as the mid-1970’s, the 
most substantial historical sources on the Blueshirts were to be found not in 
Chinese materials, but in contemporary Japanese intelligence reports.”94 
Most of these accounts are to be found in the Toyo Bunko J$ The
Oriental Library) in Tokyo.
Chang, in her assessment of Eastman’s use of this sources, doubts the 
credibility of many of these Japanese sources which were written for military 
or government purposes. As she argues, “a good case can be made, in fact, 
for a deliberate attempt on the part of the Japanese government to fabricate 
evidence toward the Fascist self-identification of Chiang Kaishek and the 
Blueshirts.”95 More importantly, the Japanese government cannot be 
objectively viewed as a neutral observer of Chinese affairs. If one of the 
purposes of the Blueshirts was to front Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Japanese 
policy and to lead anti-Japanese boycotts, then could the views of Japanese 
observers possibly remain unbiased? Chang approvingly quotes Eastman’s
94 Lloyd E. Eastman, “The Rise and Fall of the Blue Shirts: A Review Article”, Republican 
China, 13 (November 1987), p.25.
95 Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, p. 15.
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contention that “no one... was more disturbed by the Blueshirts than were the 
Japanese” by way of an answer to this question.96 In this light, the reliability 
of the Japanese sources is somewhat diminished. Chang concludes of the 
Japanese intelligence reports that “such deliberately fabricated and coloured 
documents might have been reserved for the indoctrination of high-ranking 
Japanese military officers and government personnel, designed to denigrate
Q7
and compromise the Guomindang.”
Leaving aside the question of the objectivity of the contemporary 
Japanese intelligence sources, the sheer volume of these documents makes 
them a necessary starting-point for any serious study of the Blueshirts. It is 
hard to avoid consulting the documents in the Toyo Bunko, particularly the 
specially bound volume entitled Ranis ha ni kansuru shiryo gg f  6
jf  #  Materials on the Blueshirts). However, these sources will be 
supplemented in this thesis by documents from other Japanese archives such 
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Institute for Defence 
Studies. Given the presumed biased nature of some of the Toyo Bunko 
sources, the inclusion of other Japanese sources should paint a more 
objective picture of the Blueshirts.
QQ
Another important Japanese source is Iwai Eiichi’s #  #  M ^  
publication Ranisha ni kansuru chosa ( £  ^  ]p g  An
96 Eastman, Abortive Revolution , p.78.
97 Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society, p. 16.
98 It is remarkable that the Japanese Who’s Who does not mention Iwai Eiichi as this name is 
found on the Japanese reports o f his hand, and his name also appears in documents from PRO 
(Public Record Office), FO (Foreign Office, London) 371/20983 xc2371 (Chungking Political 
Report), March Quarter, 1937, p.381,point 8. Also Parks M. Coble in, Facing Japan, Chinese 
Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, pp.226, 317, refers to Iwai Eiichi.
Furthermore Keiji Furuya in, Chiang Kaishek His Life and Times, pp.492-493, mentions Iwai 
Eiichi.
See also NA (National Archives, Washington DC), SMP (Shanghai Municipal Police, 
Shanghai) report D4685, 25 June 1935. Morning Translation of the Nippo, Mainichi and 
Nichi-Nichi. It is possible that the name Iwai Eiichi is an alias. It was therefore not possible to
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Investigation of the Blueshirts), which was issued by the research Division of 
the Foreign Ministry in 1937, marked “secret.” Iwai worked for the Japanese 
Foreign Office in China during the 1930s investigating the financial and 
personal connections Japanese officialdom had with Chiang Kaishek. These 
investigations inevitably brought him into contact with the Blueshirts, and he 
wrote about them primarily with financial considerations in mind." Later in 
1938, following the Japanese invasion of China in 1937: “Iwai was assigned 
by the Shanghai Consul-General to head a Special Investigation Unit aimed 
at gathering and analysing wartime data on unoccupied China. With a staff 
numbering sixty or seventy, this so-called “Iwai Outfit” established a wide 
network of contacts throughout China.”100 Eastman comments that Iwai’s 
258-page study “is the most detailed and generally reliable source on the 
Blueshirts” that he encountered.101
establish the identity of Iwai Eiichi. An explanation may be that intelligence people hardly ever 
use their real name.
99 Parks M.Coble, Facing Japan; Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, Cambridge, 
Mass, 1991, p.226: A study by Iwai Eiichi of the Research Division of the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry, for instance, repeated many of the more public charges against the Blueshirts. He 
depicted the group as strongly anti-Japanese, active in leading the boycott organisations, 
prominent in assisting the resistance forces in Manchuria, and engaging in assassinations of 
Chinese who co-operated with Japan. Iwai suggested that the Blueshirts had devised a plan for 
long term resistance to Japan and thus by implication represented a major threat to Japanese 
interests. His footnote, Iwai Eiichi, Ranisha no kansuru chosa, pp.220-234. (from Toyo 
Bunko). Another intelligence report in Iwai Eiichi’s hand completed in 1934, blamed the 
Blueshirts operatives in Manchukuo, headed by Wu Shichang, for a wave of anti-Japanese 
terror at Hsinking(Changchun) capital of Manchukuo.
100 Douglas R.Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands:Toa Dobun Shoin and Its Precursors, 
1886-1945”, p.267. At a higher level of sophistication, in 1938 the Shanghai Consulate - 
General assigned Foreign Ministry officer Iwai (eighteen class) to organise and head a new 
generously funded Special Investigation Unit (Toku betsu chosahan),and Barbara J.Brooks, 
China Experts in the Gaimusho, 1895-1937, pp.391-392, both in Peter Duus, Raymon Myers 
and Mark Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1895-1937, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989.
101 Eastman, Abortive Revolution, pp.380-381.
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C. Use of Western Sources
How do the sources for this thesis differ from those of Eastman and 
Chang and what insight into the Blueshirts do these materials give that add 
to, modify or challenge the arguments of Chang and Eastman? In their 
evaluation of whether the Blueshirts resembled Fascism in Italy and/or 
Germany, neither Eastman nor Chang consulted documents from Western 
archives. If one wishes to argue the point about the influence of European 
Fascism on the Blueshirts, then the consultation of Western archive material 
is unavoidable. In order to study a movement in Chinese society which some 
scholars (Eastman) assert are Fascist with a strong resemblance to Nazism 
and other scholars (Chang) claim are not Fascist but have possible parallels 
with Italian Nationalism, a starting point must be Western documentary 
information on this specific point.
This study’s use of especially the German Bundesarchiv in Potsdam 
and the Political Archives of the Foreign Office in Bonn is to ascertain the 
strength of the link (either economic or ideological) between the Blueshirts 
and the Nazis. One may expect such a link to exist due to the strong 
connection between the Guomindang (Chiang Kaishek) and German military 
and civilian advisers, who were present at the important time between 1928 
and 1938. The German documents are quite general in the information given. 
Nonetheless these documents represent a useful yardstick by which to 
measure the direct influence of Nazism, through the Germans present in 
China, on the Blueshirts organisation. In addition, at the request of Kriebel, 
the German Consul-General in Shanghai, during 1934 German intelligence 
was investigating Fascist movements in China. It is not clear from the 
documents whether this was a direct request on the part of the Nazi 
leadership in Germany, but all reports were sent to Berlin. Reports 
concerning the Blueshirts - as opposed to Fascist movements in general - are 
very few in number. Generally speaking, these German reports may be
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considered impartial. The Germans were working in China in the capacity of 
military and civilian advisers, and were not directly involved in the 
organisation or activities of the Blueshirts. This is an important observation 
not made by other scholars, as it indicates that the Blueshirts organisation 
was not initiated by the ideas about Fascism from Europe, but was an 
Oriental venture. Most other researchers presuppose that the Nazi influence 
on the Blueshirts came directly and almost entirely through these advisory 
missions.
Most of the documented information about the Blueshirts comes from 
non-Chinese sources such as the National Archives (NA) in Washington and 
the Public Records Office (PRO) in London. These reports often relay the 
same information obtained through officers of the Special Branch (SI and 
S2) of the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP).
The SMP officers were generally in a far better position to acquire 
information than the diplomats of the embassies and Foreign Offices in 
China, and their reports contain quite detailed information about the 
Blueshirts. This is conceivably one of the reasons for the paucity of 
documentation concerning the Blueshirts presence and activities in the rural 
provinces. By and large then, information in Western archives was gathered 
by personnel from these countries based on Chinese police sources. Very few 
of these writers were actual eye-witnesses to the events they describe.
Before World War II Shanghai was divided into three sovereign 
jurisdictions: the French Concession, the Chinese Municipality of Greater 
Shanghai and the International Settlement. The latter did not belong to any 
power and its ruling body, the Shanghai Municipal Council, was composed 
of citizens of a number of countries. However, during most of its history, the 
Council was effectively controlled by British interests.
The Settlement’s enforcement agency was the SMP. While the force 
included Chinese, Indian, and later Russian and Japanese personnel, until
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World War II the commissioner and senior officers were all British. The 
functions of the police force were dictated by the strange political 
demarcations of Shanghai and by the opportunities they presented for 
criminal activity. The SMP’s Special Branch with the departments SI and S2 
was the so-called “political police”, and also served as an intelligence 
gathering and, occasionally, as an extensive arm of the British Secret
i noIntelligence Service in the Far East.
The SMP experienced great difficulty in gathering reliable 
information. Often they had to rely on those detectives who could speak the 
Chinese language, or were able to infiltrate. Sometimes information was 
funnelled through Communists who had every reason to be against the 
Blueshirts. It is therefore often very difficult to say whether the information 
of the SMP was impartial. Even if the British officers were impartial, could 
the same be said of those Chinese detectives who were actually gathering the 
information?
Often at the request of the British Consul in Shanghai, the SMP had to 
report on the activities of the Blueshirts. Whether the Blueshirts were a 
Fascist organisation was never a real concern of the SMP. Their main 
interests were the criminal activities in the city, activities which were 
perceived to include the Blueshirts from time to time. What these reports say 
about the Blueshirts is that they wanted to be Fascists according to the 
European model. Their description of the Blueshirts is as such correct, 
although fragmented and not as detailed as the Japanese reports. It should be 
remembered, however, that the Japanese reports were not reliant upon the 
work of the SMP.
Once it became apparent that the Blueshirts’ effort was directed 
mainly against the Communists and the Japanese, the SMP lost their initial
102 NA, RG 263 M1750, “Records o f the Shanghai Municipal Police 1894-1949.”
56
Chapter One
interest in investigating them. As their main source of information dried up, 
Western delegations in turn reported less about the Blueshirts. There are 
fewer materials to be found about the organisation after 1935 and hardly any 
attention is paid to the disbandment of the Blueshirts in the 1938. So for the 
later years of their existence, researchers are obliged to rely increasingly on 
Japanese sources.
While the SMP was investigating the Blueshirts less after 1935, the 
Japanese were investigating them almost continuously from 1933 onwards, 
even after their disbandment. At first, the Japanese were quite confused 
regarding the exact objectives of this new society or organisation. They 
nevertheless succeeded in producing various reports which describe the 
Blueshirts minutely in structure as well as in organisation. The Japanese 
materials, furthermore, are based on a much wider variety of sources than the 
Western ones. Rather than drawing almost exclusively on SMP reports, they 
cite other sources such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Military Defence and the Manchurian Railway Company.
Unfortunately, the SMP reports sometimes include a number of errors 
and misunderstandings which must cause researchers to proceed with great 
caution. Many of the reports sent home from the European delegations were 
in fact highly confused. Patrick Givens, the Chief of the British SMP officers 
was able to speak Chinese, having joined the force in 1907, and must have 
been aware of the Blueshirts and how they were organised. It is hard to 
imagine that the SMP were not well-informed and that there were problems 
with the flow of reporting within the SMP. The problem was evidently one of 
transmission between the SMP and the foreign diplomatic organs resident in 
Shanghai. For example, in a despatch of the British Consul-General in
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Shanghai to the Foreign Secretary in London, the Blueshirts are described 
throughout as a "party." Opening under the heading "The Fascist or Blueshirt 
Party in China", it then continues:
..the following information in connection with the organisation and 
activities o f  the Party in question have been obtained: The Party o f 
which General Chiang Kaishek is the leader, is divided into the 
following cliques...104
The source of this report was, according to the Consul-General, the 
SMP. It is possible that the word "party" was used in the original police 
document. In that case the British authorities in Shanghai clearly lacked 
sufficient knowledge of the Blueshirts to add a comment to the effect that 
they were not a "party" in the sense that a British person would understand 
the term.
Alternatively, the British authorities in Shanghai may have 
mistranslated a Chinese term used in the original Chinese report. Either way, 
it is very odd that Blueshirts should have been described as a "party", when 
they certainly were nothing of the sort. The report proceeds to confuse the 
Blueshirts with the whole Guomindang, and lists the Central Club Clique 
(C.C.Clique), the F.F. (Fuxing fjtJI) Clique of the Whampoa cadets, the Z 
seu Clique (Zi shougtf') of Gu Shunzhang HjlE®105, and the Clique of 
Yang Yongtai ® 7}c|l.106
103 PRO, FO 371/19315, xc 199807, SMP, nr. 411, 29 November 1934, The Fascist or 
"Blueshirt" Party in China.
104 PRO, FO 371/19315, xc 199807.
105 The Curricula Vitae in this thesis are mostly taken from Jerome Cavanaugh, Who's Who in 
China, 1918-1950, vol. 1-3, Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Centre, 1982. The text is generally 
condensed and Wade-Giles names are now rendered in Pinyin.
Koo Shun Tsang (Gu Shunzhang), army officer, bom at Lien-shui (Lianshui) Jiangsu. Graduate 
of the Paoting (Baoding) Military Officers College. He was an instructor at the Whampoa 
Military Academy. He was vice-minister of War, from 1934, and Commander -in- chief of the 
Northern Route o f the Communist- suppression Forces, 1933-34. Member of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Guomindang o f Jiangxi 1934-35. Director of Chiang Kaishek’s 
Headquarters at X i’an, 1936-37.
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The implication is that the author of the report, or at the least the 
British Consul-General who transmitted it, had little knowledge of the origin 
and formation of the Blueshirts as a separate organisation within the 
Guomindang. It further appears that the influence of the Blueshirts was so 
pervasive that they seemed to him to be the whole Guomindang. This is in 
one sense a useful piece of information, since it tells the researcher how the 
Blueshirts were perceived by one set of interested parties in China at the 
time. On the other hand, it is a good example of how careful the researcher 
must be in using the kinds of secondary sources which are available.
The National Archives in Washington (NA) are an invaluable source 
of information. There are many reports about the Blueshirts, reported by 
various detectives or officers of the SMP.107 In the separate documents the 
information is often fragmentary, but together they provide a relatively good 
perception of the Blueshirts organisation. Furthermore, various press articles 
about the Blueshirts, from newspapers in China in the Chinese or English 
language, are quoted or a photocopy is provided. There is a unanimous 
opinion in the documents, that the Blueshirts wanted to become or already 
were Fascists. Sometimes, but not always, a comparison is made with Nazism 
and/or Italian Fascism. The information given in the SMP reports or in the 
newspaper articles is not always impartial, sometimes it is Communist
106 Yang Yongtai (Yang Wingtai in Cantonese) was one o f the leaders of the Political Study 
Clique, an influential Clique within the Guomindang structure. Civil governor o f Canton in 
1920, bom in Maoming xian, Kochow (?). Appointed Civil Governor by the administrative 
Council of the Military government, an institution considered defunct and dishonoured by Sun 
Yatsen, Wu Tingfang, and other constitutionalist leaders. Yang was Commissioner of Finance 
of Canton before receiving this promotion. In 1932 Yang became Chiang Kaishek’s secretary- 
general in the Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission.
107 NA, The SMP documents are listed in National Archives Microfilm Publications, Pamphlet 
Describing Ml 750, Records of the Shanghai Municipal Police, 1894-1949, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Record Group 263.
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propaganda and sometimes it is propaganda from opponents of Chiang 
Kaishek within the Guomindang.
In summary, although these documents were not used by scholars such 
as Chang and Eastman, together with the Western documents they play a 
substantial role in drawing a fairly reliable conclusion about what kind of 
Fascism the Blueshirts emulated.
Information from the Dutch Foreign Office Archives (FOH) in The 
Hague seems to have derived from SMP reports. Although no direct 
reference is made to the SMP, the FOH documents are exactly the same as 
those of the PRO and the NA, sometimes the reports are written in the 
English language and seem to be straight copies. One of the documents 
reports events in China in 1933 and 1934, detailing the names of persons 
involved in criminal activities and murder attempts in Shanghai.
French documents from Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Archives et 
Documentation (MAE) in Paris are not concerned with whether the 
Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation. There are various documents 
regarding German military advisers in China as well as the reorganisation of 
a number of newspapers in Shanghai. The Blueshirts are only mentioned 
directly in relation to the murder on 13 November 1934 of Shi Liangcai, the 
director of the Shenbao ^  ${*, and in two newspaper articles which discuss 
attempts by the “Chemises Bleues” on the lives of Chinese in Thailand 
collaborating with the Japanese. These are a useful source of information for 
the activities of the Blueshirts outside Shanghai.
In summary, the perspectives and arguments available in the Western 
sources add considerably to an understanding of the Blueshirts. A certain 
degree of judiciousness is necessary in determining fact from fiction in all of 
these secondary sources, including the prolific Japanese sources so 
championed by Eastman. That the investigations of the SMP fail on occasion 
to present a clear picture of the activities and nature of the Blueshirts is
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unsurprising. That these investigations, almost without fail, allude to a Fascist 
element within the Blueshirts is significant, for they should assist in 
determining whether or not the Blueshirts were indeed a Fascist organisation.
1.3 Conclusions
The Blueshirts organisation emerged within Chiang Kaishek’s Guomindang 
in response to the changes on the Chinese political stage. In turn, these 
changes mirrored the dramatic transitions in world politics in the period 
preceding World War II. The manner in which Fascism had strengthened 
nationalistic parties in Europe and Japan was particularly attractive to Chiang 
Kaishek. By the early 1930s the Guomindang was in drastic need of 
revitalisation. It was threatened from without by Communist insurgency and 
plagued from within by factionalism.
In its early years the Guomindang had endured a turbulent history, 
having to go through a number of re-organisations in order to preserve its 
unity and to adjust to the volatile political climate. Historically, the 
Guomindang was the party of China’s national revolution. Having organised 
and militated for revolution, the republicans were too weak to maintain 
control of the state apparatus. Following the successes of the Republican 
Revolution of 1911, the imperialist Qing regime was merely replaced by a 
prolonged social crisis. In 1912 Song Jiaoren t 108 organised the party 
under the nominal leadership of Sun Yatsen to succeed the Revolutionary 
Alliance.109 Shortly before his death in 1925 Sun began to reconsider his 
convictions of his central doctrinal tenet Sanminzhvyi (Three Principles of the
1 AO
Bom in Hunan (1882-1913). In 1904 he studied at Waseda University, Tokyo.
109 Columbia Encyclopaedia, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. See entry for 
“Kuomintang” (Guomindang), p. 1506.
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People: Nationalism, Democracy and People’s Livelihood). Indeed, at the 
party congress of 1924, during which a coalition was effected between the 
Guomindang and the Communists, Sun’s doctrinal tent was adopted as the 
basic precept of the new organisation.
There is little doubt that Sun’s Sanminzhuyi was a doctrine that was 
revolutionary nationalist in conception. There is also little doubt that the 
Sanminzhuyi “shared substantial affinities with” Italian Nationalism.110 One 
may even argue that the ideology of the Sanminzhuyi articulates many of the 
tenets of Fascism. The nature of the Guomindang ideology and the heritage 
of Sun Yatsen therefore both remain valid in a determination of the extent to 
which the Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation.
How did the nature of the Guomindang change following its split from 
the Communists and the accession of Chiang Kaishek to de facto party 
leader? In 1926 Chiang Kaishek launched the Northern Expedition, 
advancing from Guangzhou against the Beijing government. In September 
1927 a united Nationalist Government was established under the leadership 
of Chiang in Nanjing. It was at this time that the Communists were purged 
from the Guomindang causing a bitter rift between the two parties that were 
to vie for overall control of China for the next two decades. The anti-Marxist 
and anti-Communist feelings especially among the Blueshirts ran high, while 
one of the differences with European Fascism is that this anti-Communist 
posture in China did not come directly from the common people, as it for the 
greater part did in Europe, but was an emotion that was given impetus by the 
ruling nationalist government. Though Chiang Kaishek was already actively 
opposing the Communists in China from 1927, after their establishment in 
1932 the Blueshirts took a leading role in resisting and eliminating the 
Communists until the second united front with them in 1937.
110 Chang, p.51.
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The Nanjing government carried through a line of thought expressed 
by Sun’s Sanminzhuyi, together with his advocacy of totalitarian one-party 
rule during historical crises such as the confrontation with the Chinese 
Communists. The period was characterised not only by attempts to chart a 
path towards modernisation for China, but by attempts to defeat ideological 
challenges to Guomindang rule. Thus, after several Guomindang military 
campaigns, the Communists were forced (1934-35) to withdraw from their 
bases in South and Central China and establish new strongholds in the 
Northwest. Ignoring the growing Japanese threat until North China was 
invaded by the Japanese, the Guomindang continued the war against the 
Communists.
Running counter to this authoritarian centralising tendency, another 
dimension of organisation permeated the party - that of cliques. Powerful 
figures in the party at city or provincial levels built up networks of patronage, 
and undermined the carefully constructed unity of the Guomindang’s 
organisation. Much has been written about these cliques (or factions) which 
made up the Guomindang, particularly about the large and more powerful 
ones such as the C.C. Clique, the Whampoa Academy Clique and the 
Political Study Groups. Aside from their political or theoretical differences, 
these cliques all shared the common characteristic of a respected leader and 
his personal following. Most of these cliques, it must be noted, were also 
extremely conservative in outlook. This then was the political context within 
which the Blueshirts organisation came into being.
A comprehensive re-evaluation of the Blueshirts organisation should 
be possible by applying the working definition of Fascism as determined in 
the first section of this chapter to the information available from the diverse 
database of Japanese and Western archival materials discussed in the second 
section. In this respect, a departure from the arguments of and an addition to 
the information provided by Eastman and Chang should be possible.
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This thesis goes beyond the findings of Eastman and Chang, because 
as already indicated in the introduction, they have not paid attention to the 
strong influence Japan had on the establishment of the Blueshirts. The 
example of Japanese Fascism, especially their military organisations, was a 
model for the formation of the Blueshirts. Furthermore, Eastman and Chang 
have not apprehended the important historical influence of the Chinese secret 
societies as well as Japanese secret societies, like the Black Dragon, on the 
Blueshirts. The Blueshirts tried to append those aspects to Fascism, which 
was an original European phenomenon, and integrate it within Chinese 
society. The central component of this re-evaluation is aimed at reaching as 
definitive an answer as possible to the question of whether the Blueshirts 
were a Fascist organisation.
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Chapter Two
Chiang Kaishek's Espousal of Fascism:
Inspiration from Japan and Germany
Fascism as a phenomenon is complicated, and as discussed, literature about 
Fascism is substantial, complex and often contradictory. This chapter 
delineates the historical background against which the emergence of Fascism 
in China can be appraised, and characterises the process by which it started 
and the conditions leading to its assumption of power. In Europe, Fascism 
came up through the social, economic and political revolt of the immediate 
post-war period, which generated a turn against liberalism, democracy and 
Marxism, In Japan, it was the reactionary nationalist tendency superimposed 
on the fanaticism of the military that produced Fascism. The particular form 
of Fascism that emerged in China after 1932 may be explained against this 
background.
The discussion will focus on the influence Japan had on China’s 
development from the end of the 19th century up to the 1930s. In this respect 
the Japanese connection will be examined for evidence that might help to 
explain Chiang Kaishek’s later interest in Fascism. The discussion will 
consider the relative significance of the Japanese model, which was 
particularly important to Chiang and his adherents - the Blueshirts. This 
group formed the nucleus of the Chinese Fascists, who tried to expand their 
influence on Chinese society in the short period of their existence from 
March 1932 up to May 1938. The links between Chinese Fascism, Nazism 
and Italian Fascism are also to be examined. In this connection, some space 
will be devoted to the activities and influence of Chiang’s German military 
advisers (1928-38), several of whom had been involved with the right-wing
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Putsche in Germany in the early 1920s. The Italian relationship is given brief 
attention, as its influence on the Guomindang was less important.
2.1 The Nature of the Guomindang
The Three Principles of the People {Sanminzhuyi) advocated by Sun Yatsen 
were to play a fundamental role for China and the Guomindang. Sun’s 
ideology became the Guomindang’s guideline for the development of China, 
especially following the inauguration of the Nationalist government under 
Chiang Kaishek’s leadership in 1927. While Sun may be seen as lacking both 
knowledge and skill in political science, he has always been referred to as the 
“Father of the Nation” (Guofu HI 3£), the one who planned China’s 
development. Arthur N. Young, who served as a financial advisor to the 
Nationalist government, writes:
At this stage, creation o f  viable finances and rehabilitation o f  the 
economy after the revolution took priority over economic development.
Yet Sun Yatsen's long-range program me o f developm ent was not 
forgotten, and several primary steps were taken .1
However, C.Martin Wilbur has described Sun’s historical role in the 
following manner:
In historical terms, Sun is a transitional figure, reflecting the great 
Chinese passage from a decaying imperial tradition to an industrialising, 
nationalistic society. He played a political role in this transition, helping 
to bring about a republic and to prevent a monarchical restoration. Yet in 
historical perspective, he was only one among m any figures swept along 
on the same tide. Sun spent an adult lifetime trying to reshape his 
country's political system according to his particular vision.^
1 Arthur N. Young, China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937, Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1971, p.ix. See for details, Jindai laihua waiguo renming cidian (Dictionary o f Recent 
Foreign Persons in China, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981, p.532. See also, 
BA, Deutsche Botschaft China, 09.02, vol..2245, Foreign Advisers to the Chinese Government, 
February 1931.
2 C.Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1976, pp.7-8.
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The original Guomindang programme had called for parliamentary 
democracy and moderate socialism, although working for democracy inside 
the Guomindang was of more real significance than attempting to establish 
democracy in the country at large. After the establishment of the Nanjing 
government, the Guomindang began to depart from the tightly-organised 
democratic - centralist model imposed by the Russian advisers Michael 
Borodin and Vasili Blucher (Galin) only three years previously. The party 
remained, at least on paper, a highly organised political structure, and in 
certain respects grew even more authoritarian than before. Throughout the 
period of political tutelage, it officially based itself on the principle of party 
dictatorship, although in 1928 it was announced that the long-term goal was 
to found a constitutional democracy.3
At the core of the party's structure was the governing body, or Central 
Executive Committee (C.E.C.), which had the power to formulate the party's 
policy. When the C.E.C. was not in session this was done by the Political 
Council. A Military Council administered policies of a military nature, but it 
merely followed the instructions of the C.E.C. In contrast to this desire for an 
authoritarian centralisation, the Guomindang was riddled, as was pointed out 
in the previous chapter, with internal factionalism.
Therefore, after 1930, Chiang Kaishek sought a cure for the illnesses 
of China's Nationalist Revolution in Fascism. He allowed Fascist tendencies 
to enter his officer corps and more generally into his government - without 
his approval and support Fascism would not have taken root in China.
Fascism in China had no roots in either the common Chinese people or 
in the military. In China it was not a revolt by the masses against the 
government which gave rise to Fascism. It came to the attention of the
3 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.40. See also, Ch'ien Tuan-Sheng, The Government and 
Politics o f  China, 1912-1949, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, pp.133-139.
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Chinese people through a more or less secret society, the Blueshirts, and the 
kind of Fascism the Chinese people were exposed to was an idiosyncratic 
form. During their existence the Blueshirts hardly ever appeared in the 
spotlight, and worked undercover within Guomindang governmental 
organisations. This situation was in great contrast to the development of 
Fascism in Europe, where the Fascist movements prospered in the open.
2.2 Chiang Kaishek's Bid for Fascism
Chiang Kaishek once expressed his views regarding the National Revolution 
thus:
There is no easy task in the world; there is no difficult task in the world.
Our people need only have absolutely sincere confidence in our own 
state and nation - enthusiastically supporting and actively carrying out 
the Three Principles o f  the People and the building o f  the state; 
unanim ously recognising and jointly struggling for the purposes and 
objectives o f  the National Revolution. Then, even though future 
difficulties are as great as removing a mountain or emptying the sea, 
there is no reason why we shall not succeed.4
These words may have stimulated his followers to better 
achievements. Flowever, in 1930 the feeling among many members of the 
Guomindang was that the Chinese revolution had failed, as Chiang himself 
admitted in 1932: “My only desire today is to restore the revolutionary spirit 
that the Chinese Guomindang had in 1924.”5 The Guomindang's loss of 
revolutionary spirit was obvious. Corruption was common in the rank and 
file of the Guomindang, and Chiang regularly reprimanded his subordinates 
severely for their misdemeanours.
4 Chiang Kaishek, China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, London: Dennis Dobson, 
1947, p.236.
5 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p .l, see his footnote 3.
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From the point of view of leadership, the Guomindang experienced
three main problems during the Nanjing period: firstly, how to struggle
against the Communist insurgency in the south and achieve national unity;
secondly, how to carry forward into the economic sphere the spirit of reform
and change which had dissipated so quickly after the Northern Expedition of
1926-1927; and, finally, how to solve the perennial problem of internal
disunity and factions. Fascism appeared to offer a means of addressing all
three issues. In his biography of Chiang Kaishek, Yang Shubiao describes the
so-called “Fascist rule” of Chiang Kaishek:
The National Assembly o f 1931 publicly treated Fascism as the political 
theory o f  the National Party's rule in China. The social basis o f Fascism 
in China are: (1) the national crisis after the “ September 18 event”, to 
resist the Japanese invasion in M anchuria; (2) the demands to reform  the 
National Party Government by m eans o f  Fascism as well as the Three 
Principles o f  the People; (3) The big landlords and capitalists called to 
resist the threat o f  the Com m unist Party's land reform; (4) the successive 
effects in Germany and Italy, which stirred some Chinese to promote 
Fascism  to strengthen China.6
In turning to Fascism, Chiang wanted also to provide his anti- 
Communist activities with a more structured ideological framework and 
greater militancy. In one of his speeches, Chiang emphasised: “Fascism is the 
enemy of Communism, and what we need is Fascism.”7 Fascism also 
purported to offer a panacea for China's economic problems and a sovereign 
remedy for internal disunity within the party.
6 Yang Shubiao, Jiang Jieshi zhuan, (The Biography of Jiang Jieshi), Tuanjie chubanshe, 
1989, pp. 195-199.
7 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo: ranisha no soshiki to hanman konichi katsudo no 
jitsurei (The Organisation of the Blueshirts and Examples of Anti-Manchukuo Anti-Japanese 
Activities), p.3.
69
Chapter Two
A. The Problem of Internal Unity
Under Guomindang rule, competition for political power was 
conducted not in society at large but within the councils of the regime itself. 
Because the distribution of political authority was determined less by formal 
chains-of-command than by the personal decisions of Chiang and his 
favoured aides, allocation of power was determined largely by personal 
influence. It was common practice, for example, for a new minister or bureau 
chief to dismiss the previous employees in that office and to replace them 
with his cronies and supporters.8 The key to political success, therefore, lay 
less in the possession of technical expertise than in the maintenance of a 
personal relationship with the leaders of the regime.
Ch'ien Tuansheng has alluded to this phenomenon in the following
terms:
Aside from  the fact that it has an all-powerftil leader in Chiang Kaishek,
the Kuom intang is disrupted by its inclusion o f a number o f factions.0
In other words, factionalism was the principal medium for political 
struggle. It was another reason why Chiang looked for a powerful system 
which could control and direct the political power the revolution had 
concentrated in the hands of the Guomindang. Fascist organisational models 
appeared to be a solution to this problem, and the Blueshirts' founders, 
considering the central problem in China to be lack of unity,10 followed the 
example of the Fascist parties in Europe advocating dictatorship for China.11
8 Lloyd E. Eastman, The Nationalist Era in China 1927-1949, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p.26.
0 Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, p. 189.
10 Qiantu, Shanghai, vol.2-2, 1933.
11 Shehuizhuyiyuekan (The Socialist Monthly), “Zhongguo faxisizhuyi de xuanchuan yulun” 
(The Propaganda Opinion o f Fascism in China), Shanghai, vol. 1-7, 1933.
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B. The Economic Factors
Another factor in Chiang’s seeking a solution in Fascism was the poor 
situation of the Chinese economy. The economic achievements of the 
Guomindang during the period 1927-37 have provoked a good deal of 
controversy. James E. Sheridan writes: “Some argue that the Guomindang 
wrought, under Chiang's leadership, a transformation with few parallels in 
history, whereas others see little more than the continuance of economic 
stagnation.”12 These conflicting schools of opinion agree, however, that the 
economic problems China faced were enormous. As Chiang was looking for 
a means of improving the Chinese situation in a short time, Fascism appeared 
to him one of the methods that could bring the Chinese economy into line 
with other successful countries like Germany, Italy and Japan.
One major cause of the serious situation of the economy was the 
deteriorating conditions in which the peasant majority lived. China has 
always been primarily an agricultural nation, and agriculture was the heart of 
the economy and the soul of the Chinese way of life.
The urgency of rural reform had been recognised by the Guomindang 
long before it had attained national power. However, opportunism and self- 
interest came to characterise the Guomindang government, for to espouse 
reforms was to risk being associated with Communism. The Guomindang's 
fear of Communism was itself one factor driving the party to conservatism. 
Nevertheless, the failure of the Nanjing government to effect rural reform 
was perhaps largely due to the fact that the government was essentially 
urban-oriented. The Guomindang was “in practice the Party of the 
bourgeoisie, who were not very well informed about and also not very 
interested in the problems of the countryside.”13
12 James E.Sheridan, China in Disintegration; The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912- 
1959, New York: Free Press, 1975, p.220.
13 Sheridan, p.230.
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Monetary deflation caused much of the suffering in the rural areas, as 
China was the only large nation in the world whose currency was backed by 
silver. During the first three years of the world depression, the silver standard 
had been a stroke of luck for the Chinese economy. After the stock market 
crash of 1929 the price of silver dropped sharply compared to the price of 
gold. This led China, in contrast to most other countries, to enter a period of 
commercial and manufacturing boom, although, after the Japanese attack on 
Manchuria in September 1931 and on Shanghai in January 1932, this short 
period of prosperity came to an end. The confidence of foreign investors was 
rocked and Chinese producers were deprived of one of their largest markets.
One of Nanjing's major tasks was therefore to bring order to the 
currency system, for the circulation of different kinds of tael (silver standard) 
caused confusion. Finally, by 1935, the government had successfully 
outlawed the tael, and had created a standard currency which was the only 
legal tender throughout the country. Unfortunately the world depression had 
also reached China. In order to make their goods more competitive on the 
world market Great Britain and Japan abandoned the gold standard in late 
1931. The result was that China was no longer attractive as an area of 
investment. The flow of silver into the country slowed as interest rates rose 
and prices fell.
At the same time, during these years of depression in the 1930s, a 
series of droughts and floods contributed to the agony of the farmers. There 
is no doubt that to a large degree monetary deflation and unfavourable 
weather conditions were the main cause of the agrarian crisis after 1931. 
Other causes contributing to the crisis to an increasing degree during the 
period of Guomindang rule were excessive taxation, usurious interest rates, 
and the inequitable system of land tenure. Chiang realised that harsh 
measures must be taken as quickly as possible to bring government officials 
and the economy under resolute control. Looking around for successful
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models of transformation in the early 1930s, when the German Nazis had not
yet seized power, Italian ideas of Fascism seemed the perfect answer.
Fascism was promoted to save China:
After September 18, 1931, im itation o f  Italian Fascism gained the social 
sympathy. The forum  for the future Chinese revolution is, 'Three 
Principles o f  the People (rightism) + Fascism (strong organisation). It 
m eans that, the Three Principles o f the People o f  the National Party need 
the supplem ent o f  the new blood o f  Fascism... Fascism is the future for 
China...W e have to use the Three Principles o f the People as the 
substance, and Fascism  as the function. In this way, there is hope for the 
rejuvenation o f  China. N
C. Foreign Ideology and Blueshirt Fascism
Fascism seemed to political activists in many countries a “quick” 
solution to their internal problems and a formula for the unification of their 
nation. In this context China in the 1930s was no exception and, impressed 
by the success of Fascism in Italy and Germany, Chinese Fascists tried to 
imitate those components of Italian Fascism and German Nazism which 
seemed relevant to China. It should be noted that Chiang Kaishek was not the 
only Chinese politician who sought ways for China’s development as a 
modem nation by looking in part to foreign models of national development. 
Other politicians, for instance, Chen Lifu, Carson Chang, Zhu Jiahua, and 
later, after 1936, Wang Jingwei borrowed selectively from Germany and 
Italy, accepting what appeared compatible with their own philosophy and 
political situation. 15
Chiang concentrated his policy on military and political unity, which 
he considered to be the fundamental precondition for China in the struggle 
for survival. It was therefore to the military sphere that Chiang - and later the
N  Shehuizhuyiyuekan, Shanghai, vol. 1-7, 1933.
15 William C.Kirby, Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1984, p .185.
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Blueshirts - looked in order to glean and emulate elements of European 
Fascism. Thirst for information about popular military education, sporting 
activities and national service increased dramatically following Hitler’s rise 
to power in Germany in 1933. Furthermore, what interested Chiang most 
about Nazism were the qualities which enabled it to function efficiently as a 
regime: organisation, discipline and the ability to take harsh measures against 
dissidents.
However, the ideologists of the Blueshirts could not ignore Chinese 
history. Most of the time they therefore advocated “foreign” Fascist ideas 
mixed with the typical Confucianist features of classical Chinese thought. 
Furthermore, the powerful military right-wing of the Guomindang, the 
Whampoa Clique (of which the Blueshirts descended), many of whom had 
studied in Japan, brought to the ideological melting pot ideas flavoured with 
the typical Japanese military and thought of the Black Dragon, a Japanese 
secret society embodying radical nationalistic tendencies.
Liu Jianqun §!j$i!¥,16 one of the leading members of the Blueshirts, 
declared in 1969 during an interview with Eastman:
Fascism is now thought to be backward (luo-hou). But then it
seemed to be a very progressive m eans o f  resurrecting the nation. 17
In 1931, when Liu Jianqun wrote his seminal essay, “Gongxian yidian 
zhengli bendang de yijian” (JC JR ^  ^  ;§: JL A Few Ideas for
the Reform of the Party) he was only nineteen years of age, and some of his
16 Liu was bom at 1912, in Zunyi, Guizhou Province. He graduated from the Fazheng 
zhuanmen xuexiao &  (Law Polytechnic School).
17 Lloyd E. Eastman, “Fascism in Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts”, China Quarterly, 
January-March, 1972, p.3.
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ideas were apparently inspired by the successful example of Italian 
Fascism.18
In this inspiration Liu was not alone, because the victory of Italian 
Fascism had accelerated the ripening of Fascist ideas in almost all European 
countries. According to Liu, the problems China was facing were: the poor 
condition of the Chinese economy, the poverty of the Chinese people 
especially in rural areas, the unequal treaties largely dictated by foreign 
powers, attacks on Chinese territory, and natural disasters. In addition to 
these problems, two superpowers - Japan and the USSR - were struggling for 
local hegemony in China. Japanese imperialism had already annexed Korea 
and Taiwan, while it had attacked Manchuria and was ready to conquer the 
rest of China. The USSR had to be regarded differently. Their support was 
ostensibly a gesture to help a weak country, yet hidden behind the USSR’s 
friendly attitude was a conspiracy which aimed at involving the Chinese 
people in a civil war. The USSR’s expectation was that this would bring 
China under their control.
Germany too, while less influential in China, was assisting the 
Nationalist cause simply in order to support the expansion of its own 
economic development, and to block the strategic advance of the USSR 
outside Europe. During interviews conducted in 1992 and 1993, Professor 
Deng Yuanzhong commented : “During the 1930s in fact Russia and 
Germany did not really have China's best interests at heart.”19 Then many 
politically involved Chinese referred to Germany and the USSR as nations 
who were successful in modernising and industrialising their country after
18 Michael R.Godley, “Fascismo e nazionalismo cinese: 1931-1938, in Storia contemporanea 
4, no.4, p.741. See also, Eastman, “ Fascism in Kuomintang China”, pp.2-3; and TB. 2057, 
Ranisha ni kansuru chosa, p.2.
19 My interview with Professor Deng Yuanzhong, Taibei, 13 August 1992 and 29 July 1993. 
Deng is the son of former Blueshirt leader Deng Wenyi.
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World War I. In connection to the efforts to modernise China Professor Deng 
mentioned that the Blueshirts were to be considered to some degree as the 
Chinese Military Modernisation Movement.20 In this context one should keep 
in mind that the initial founders of the Blueshirts were members of the 
Whampoa Clique, which often was referred to as the Army Clique. Professor 
Deng’s reference to the Blueshirts as the Chinese Military Modernisation 
Movement is reminiscent of the situation in Japan where the military and 
modernisation went hand in hand.
2.3 Japanese Fascism and its Impact on the Guomindang
Due to their suspicion of Western Imperialism, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century Chinese intellectuals looked to Japan as a model for the 
modernisation of China and rather than directly to the West. Western 
imperialism constituted a danger to both China and Japan, against which 
radical reforms were thought to be the only favourable defence.21 Preference 
for Japanese rather than European models was initiated by China's disastrous 
defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895. Indeed, the speed of Japan’s victory was 
a salutary lesson in the benefit of modernisation.
A. Japanese Imperialism
After China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, an acute 
awareness spread among Chinese intellectuals that China was a vulnerable 
country in a competitive world.22 The surrender of so much Chinese territory
2® Interview with Prof. Deng Yuanzhong.
21 W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p.27.
22 This Social Darwinian image of the world as a struggle for survival was also popularised by 
the writings of Yan Fu WdMi 1853-1921).
76
Chapter Two
was humiliating, particularly since the victors were the Japanese, whom the 
Chinese had always viewed with patronising superiority as neighbours who 
had once imitated their character, art and culture. The Japanese success was a 
profound psychological shock. In China growing nationalism coincided 
partly with the intellectuals' anti-imperialism, and social reform was actually 
directed against foreigners. The slogan of this Qing elite was “Chinese values 
and Western technology” (Zhongti xiyong 4^  ffl H  ). In other words, their 
notion of reform was merely focused on military technology and 
development, while no attention was given to philosophical developments in 
the West.23 Thus the Chinese reform movement actually used the 
modernisation of China as a pretext for militarisation.
The defeat in the war against Japan and its consequences did more 
than anything else to force the Chinese to evaluate their own strength and 
weaknesses. One of those who faced up to the rise in Japanese power was 
Sun Yatsen. However, Sun was just one among many Chinese who felt that 
the time had come for changes in China. “It is plausible to argue”, writes 
Mary Rankin, “that both Chinese elite and the Chinese state had begun to 
change already in the direction of slow reforms before the late 19th century. 
Japanese and Western imperialism then accelerated these changes and 
brought them to a critical point by introducing new industrial technology and 
organisation.”24
At the beginning of the twentieth century the governmental structure 
in China began to change, and opposition political movements arose with 
remarkable rapidity. These developments led to the 1911 Revolution against
23 D.Chung, unpublished MA dissertation, Huang Zunxian’s Analogy o f  East A s ia : with 
Emphasis on Japan and Korea, 1989. As a sub-theme to the major theme of nationalism, there 
was a strain of universalistic utopianism. As expressed by Kang Youwei, Chinese people 
should also learn Western thoughts and ideologies, not only Western technology.
24 Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986, pp.2-3.
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the Qing Dynasty, an uprising that ended the imperial state in China and set 
in motion processes that would continue to shape politics well into the 
following Republican period.
The influence of Japan was particularly great on Sun Yatsen and the 
political tradition which he carried forward. Sun spent a great deal of time 
overseas and the time he spent in Japan was of major influence on his 
thinking and his activities. Between his first visit in 1895 and his last visit in 
1924, Sun stayed several times for different periods of time in Japan. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Sun had been a refugee in Japan, he was treated 
with respect by certain Japanese groups and developed many important 
contacts.
B. Japanese Secret Societies: The Black Dragon Society
Secret societies were among the groups with which Sun Yatsen made 
contact while in Japan. As described in Chapter One, the rapid developments 
in Japan at the end of the 19th century had dissolved the Samurai as a 
separate class. The consequence of this was that revanchist elements among 
the Samurai based their hopes of rehabilitation on war outside Japan. Hence, 
groups of Samurai advocating a more aggressive foreign policy formed such 
secret societies as the Black Ocean Society and the Black Dragon Society. 
The Black Ocean Society was founded in 1881 by Hiraoka Kotaro, a mine- 
owner and former Samurai, and Toyama Mitsuru, taking its name from the 
Genkai-Nada 1C M #  $1, the gulf to the north-east of Fukuoka. In 1901 the 
Black Dragon Society, which is in Japanese equivalent to the Society of the 
Amur River, was formed by Uchida Ryohei and Sugiyama Gen, with the 
assistance of Toyama Mitsuru.25 The Black Ocean and the Black Dragon
25 Sakurai Ryoju (ed.), Kokuryu kai kankei shiryoshu (The materials of the Black Dragon 
Society), vol. 1, “Kokuryukai to sono kikanshi” (The Black Dragon Association and their 
Organs), Kokuryukai kanke shiryoshu (The Materials of the Black Dragon Association),
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Society were extreme nationalistic groups advocating a Greater Asia under 
Japanese rule. At the time of their establishment these societies represented 
the ideas of the current Japanese military system. After World War I contacts 
between right-wing movements in Japan, with their ideology based on 
Japanese Kokusui shugi H ft5 SL (Ultra nationalism or extreme 
patriotism), and those two societies developed. The character of Kokusui 
shugi may in English terminology best be described as proto-Fascism. From 
then on the Black Ocean and the Black Dragon Societies evolved from 
nationalistic into primarily Fascist groups. Chiang Kaishek and other 
Guomindang leaders were familiar with the concept of Kokusui shugi 
through their relationship with the Black Dragon Society and the Japanese 
military. The ideas may have influenced the Guomindang, especially after 
1927 when Chiang came to power. Chiang Kaishek and his followers may 
have been inspired by the ideas of Kokusui shugi when founding the 
Blueshirts.
Kita Ikki, the aforementioned “ideological father” of Japanese 
Fascism, also was a member of the Black Dragon Society. Ultra-nationalism 
or Kokusui shugi developed into Minzoku shugi ^  ^  ±  (ethnocentrism or 
racial nationalism), and the idea was perfected by Kita bringing forward that 
all embracing concept of Dai Ajia shugi ±  H) or Pan-Asianism.
Many nationalists organisations arose in Japan after WW I, but perhaps the 
most important such an organisation, was the Dai Nihon kokusuikai 0 +• 
HI ){$ #(Greater Japan Nationalist Essence Society),26 which had direct 
connections with the Hara government.
Tokyo: Aishobo, 1992. The hieroglyphics o f the name of the Amur river (forming the frontier 
with Russia and north Manchuria) means “Black Dragon.”
26 Based on Kokusui shugi was the Kokusuikai founded in 1919, and had among its main 
sponsors Tokonami Takejiro, Home Minister in the Hara Cabinet.
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The Black Dragon Society in particular kept up relations for a long 
period with Sun Yatsen and his revolutionary group.27 Uchida knew Sun 
Yatsen through Miyazaki Toten28 and decided both to support Sun and use 
him at the same time. The Black Dragon Society had every interest in 
keeping up with the revolutionaries in China as their goal was to get a firm 
foothold in China, especially Manchuria. To that end, in 1911 Uchida 
organised a special secret society, the Yurinkai for the purpose of
supporting Chinese revolutionary organisations. When, in 1911, the 
revolution broke out, Toyama possibly accompanied by Uchida, went to 
China with a group called Shishi dai to assist the revolutionaries.29 The 
character of this Japanese group Kesshitai (Juesidui jfc lie - death-defying 
corps),30 was similar to the Guomindang faction Cici or Xixiyuan ( M U  
West West Garden), which was established in 1927 by Chiang Kaishek and 
Wang Jingwei.
On 15 January 1912 Uchida was invited by the Republican 
government to act as Foreign diplomatic advisor. Uchida financially 
supported the Guomindang through the Yurinkai. Though, it is more likely 
that Uchida had introduced the Chinese revolutionaries to a group of 
Japanese financiers, who gave them a loan for the purchase of weapons.31
27 George M.Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: K italkki 1887-1937, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1969, pp.45- 47.
28 Of the two brothers, Miyazaki Toten (Miyazaki Torazo) and Miyazaki Yazo, Sun met the 
first in 1897 in Yokohama and then became very close friends with both.
29 Marius B.Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 
pp. 105-107. The Shishi were self-appointed guardians of the national conscience.
30 Ishimaru Tota, Sho Kaiseki (Chiang Kaishek), Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1937, pp. 132-135.
31 Sakurai Ryoju (ed.), pp.vi-vii.
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The military leaders in Japan were highly satisfied with Uchida’s 
group, and the Black Dragon society was soon virtually transformed into the 
secret agency of the Japanese War Ministry abroad. Its services were always 
resorted to when, in view of existing agreements, the state power in its 
official capacity could not very well execute some pieces of unseemly work 
abroad.
Their frequently very effective agents operated more or less 
independently of the official Japanese intelligence system under the stimulus 
and direction of various patriotic societies, the prototype of which was the 
Black Dragon Society. There was a number of smaller groups which, like the 
Black Dragon Society, were engaged in propaganda work and set up schools 
to train operatives. It is certain that many operatives recruited and trained by 
these patriotic societies have played important parts in the work of the 
official Japanese Intelligence System. Apart from the intelligence produced 
by their independent agents, the societies functioned primarily as a training 
ground and recruiting agency for potential intelligence personnel. The Black 
Dragon Society prepared persons for all this work in special schools of 
foreign languages in Tokyo and Osaka.32
Aside from its support of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, members of 
the Black Dragon Society were active in many other countries, for instance 
among the Moslems of Russia and Asia, and in the Indian Independence 
Movement. With an eye to further Japanese control of all Asia, the Society 
worked towards infiltration. The Black Dragon Society had maintained 
subsidiary organisations for the purpose of collecting economic, political and 
strategic information in various parts of Asia and the carrying on of contacts 
with organisations sympathetic to the Japanese brand of Pan-Asianism. The
32 NA, RG 226, SIF (Shanghai Investigation Files), Entry 182, box 11/72, “Japanese 
Intelligence System”, A memorandum prepared by Headquarters X-2 Washington, 11 July 
1945.
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Society controlled high government officials either by direct membership or 
by blackmail or terrorism.33
Following the militarists’ assumption of complete control of Japan and 
open embarkation on expansionist policy in the 1930s, it appears probable 
that the Black Dragon Society had fulfilled a larger part of its needs. In Japan 
its influence and importance seems to have decreased. However, it is likely 
that it was still used abroad as an “unofficial” espionage agency of the 
Japanese Government. The apparent decrease in prominence of the Black 
Dragon Society in Japanese affairs was not due to persecution by the 
authorities, but because its members were working abroad, and it was best 
that they should work in secret.
The three main organisational characteristics of the Black Dragon 
Society share much in common with the Blueshirts. Both organisations 
operated secretly, established ad hoc fronts and employed terrorist methods 
to enforce their aims. The organisational characteristics of the Black Dragon 
Society had certainly been known by Sun Yatsen and also by those Chinese 
students studying in Japan. It is therefore likely that the establishment of the 
Blueshirts was carried out with this Japanese organisation very much borne 
in mind.
The Black Dragon Society never developed into a mass organisation 
and comprised no more than about twenty thousand members in the whole of 
Japan.34 The Black Dragon Society also functioned as a centre for the 
creation of legal organisations in Japanese society, a function which to some 
extent parallels the way the Blueshirts operated in Chinese society. While
33 NA, RG 226, SIF (Shanghai Investigation Files), Entry 182, box 11/72, “Japanese 
Intelligence System”, A memorandum prepared by Headquarters X-2 Washington, 11 July 
1945.
34 O.Tanin and E. Yohan, 1973, p.47.
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both organisations remained ostensibly secret, their memberships strove to 
find outlets through the establishment of legal organisations.
It should also be noted that many of the men in key positions in the 
Japanese Government and in the bodies directing Japanese intelligence 
activities are known to have been members of the Black Dragon Society or of 
one of its affiliates. That this situation closely mirrors the activities of the 
Blueshirts in China further suggests a parallel between the two organisations. 
The Black Dragon Society was still in existence in Japanese affairs during the 
Second World War, albeit as an executive organ of the military of Greater 
Asia.35
C. Learning from the Japanese Example
From the end of the 19th century many Chinese students received their 
education in Japan. Generally speaking the Chinese students were 
concentrated in one place, such as the Hongwenguan m X  I t  founded in 1902 
in Tokyo. This concentration of accommodation allowed for intensive 
reading of and discussion on Chinese politics. The Hongwenguan became a 
breeding ground for revolutionary and dissident thoughts. It is worth noting 
that this place still exists in present-day Japan under the name Ri Zhong 
jiaoliu xiehui 0 ^  3c Wj # •
Kauko Laitinen has written: “Chinese students studying abroad formed 
an important revolutionary vanguard without which ideas of democracy and 
nationalism could hardly have penetrated the Chinese mainland as efficiently
35 NA, RG 226, SIF (Shanghai Investigation Files), Entry 182, box 11/72, “Japanese 
Intelligence System”, A memorandum prepared by Headquarters X-2 Washington, 11 July 
1945.
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as they did.”36 Tokyo around the turn of the century became the virtual 
centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement.
Students were an important propaganda force. This was recognised by 
Sun Yatsen and Huang Xing Jf H  who formed revolutionary groups under 
which students could carry out their revolutionary activities. Much of the 
revolutionary students’ activity in China was carried out under the guise of 
secret revolutionary organisations, with names like the Revive China Society 
(Xingzhonghui H  41 from Canton, the China Arise Society (Huaxinghui 
S i t )  from Hunan and the Restoration Society (Guangfuhui i t  # )  from 
Zhejiang. These societies served the goal to unite both revolutionary 
intellectuals and secret society members in order to propagate anti-Manchu 
revolution and act a c c o r d i n g l y .37
An important interlude, with possibly far-reaching consequences in 
relation to the formation of the Blueshirts, was when Chiang resigned 
government office in August 1927. Shortly after his resignation, Chiang went 
to Japan at the end of September 1927. On 13 October, he met his friend 
Zhang Qun 51 g 38 and two others, who brought Chiang to the house of 
Toyama Mitsuru H  lij I® (the founder of the Black Ocean Society). The two 
men had never met before, but from the beginning there was mutual respect, 
and it seems that Toyama saw in Chiang a great man for China’s future.
36 Kauko Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty, Zhang Binglin as an Anti- 
Manchu Propagandist, London: Curzon Press, 1990, p.49.
3 7 Laitinen, pp.49-51.
3 8 Bom in Sichuan in 1888, he was appointed Director-General of the Shanghai Arsenal on 
behalf of the nationalist Government in March 1928. After receiving a thorough Chinese 
education, he attended the Baoding (Chihli) Military Academy, following which he went to 
Japan and attended the Japanese Officers Military Academy. While in Japan he became 
affiliated with the Chinese Students Revolutionary Party. He returned to China in 1910. 
However, after the occupation of Nanjing in the spring of 1927, Zhang was appointed a 
member of the Military council. On 5 March 1928 he was appointed director general o f the 
Shanghai Arsenal.
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Toyama’s memoirs recall that Chiang wanted to co-operate with Japan. 
Moreover, Chiang had emphasised the need to resist the Communist 
influence in China, and to counteract their power, internally and if necessary 
also externally.39 During the discussion between the two men, a kind of 
informal co-operation between the Black Dragon Society and the 
Guomindang was agreed upon.
During his intermezzo in Japan, Chiang also had the opportunity to 
meet the then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi in Hakone (although 
there is disagreement about the exact meeting place).40 The talks between the 
two men concerned Sino-Japanese co-operation and the situation in Northern 
China with respect to the Northern Expedition. The meeting ended in 
disappointment for Chiang Kaishek, as Tanaka disagreed with Chiang to 
carry on the Northern Expedition.41 However, one of the more positive 
results of this talk came to fruition in 1928, when Chinese military students 
began to be sent to Japan for further study. The above information becomes 
very important in relation to the information provided by Deng Yuanzhong in 
his book Sanminzhuyi Lixingshe shi.
39 Ishimaru Tota, pp.132-135.
The Japanese newspaper Hochi shinbum |pr H  published an article on 14 December
1936 about Chiang Kaishek. Toyama had introduced Chiang to his neighbour Kawano Chosei 
Jl| i f  H  who was a very rich man. Chiang and his group stayed at Kawano’s house on the 
second level for over ten days, but during this time Chiang made trips to Hakone and 
Nikko.Toyama, Kawano and Chiang and Zhang, during their dinners, talked about Sino- 
Japanese friendship. These events are recorded from the memoirs of Kawano during the Xi’an 
Incident period.
40 Katokawa Kotaro, Chugoku to Nihon rikugun (China and Japanese Army), vol.2, Tokyo; 
Keibunsha, 1978, p. 14.
41 Katokawa.. See also, Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kaishek’s Life and Times, New York: St. John’s 
University Press, 1981, pp.225-226.
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Among the students who were secretly recruited to continue their 
study in Japan was Teng Jie jji & 42 This was part of a plan developed by 
Chiang Kaishek, after his first retirement from office, to send Whampoa 
graduates systematically to Japan for further training. The plan started with 
the selection of five students from each of the first six classes. Finally, by the 
summer of 1931, there were more than sixty of the former Whampoa pupils 
in Japan enrolled at variety of schools. Their education was mainly divided 
into two parts, Wen (Pen: knowledge) at Waseda and Meiji University, and 
Wu 5^ ; (Sword: action) which was offered by Chiang’s own former school, 
the Shikan gakko, the Artillery school, and the Cavalry School.43
Future Blueshirts members among this group included, Teng Jie, Gan 
Guoxun, Ren Juewu JSTl, Ye Wei Jjg $£, Pan Youqiang fj§ Du Xinru 
tLfrin, Qiu Kaiji 5# 31, Peng Mengji 35. Li Yimin ^  — K, Zhou Fu
Ml fJE, Yi Deming Js BJj, Ge Wuqi U K Ruan Zhai |5jc Yan Denghan 
Jit ^  81, Chen Jingxian ^jpc Jf, Hu Jingxian Li Shizhen Li
Guojun Le Gan ISIT, while two other men, He Zhonghan 3I3CIS,
Xiao Zanyu MWU  also went to Japan to continue their study when they 
came back from the USSR.44
Teng Jie enrolled at the political and economic science department of 
Meiji University. He started to research political parties, and was able to find 
materials on three issues 1) isms or ideology, 2) organisation, and 3) 
activities or practices. This information certainly helped Teng when the time 
came to form the Blueshirts. Those students in Japan reflected upon the
42 TB, 2057, p. 258, Teng Jie, was one of the main initiators of the Blueshirts. He was born in 
Jiangsu in 1905, graduated at Whampoa Military Academy (4th class).
43 Deng Yuanzhong, Sanminzhuyi Lixingshe shi, Taibei: Huangpu jianguo wenji bianzhuan 
weiyuanhui, 1984, p.82.
44 Deng Yuanzhong, pp.82-83.
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existing situation when they found out that their host country was developing 
an increasingly aggressive attitude towards China.
Many of those who later became important military leaders in 
Republican China, including Chiang Kaishek himself, had received training 
at Japanese military schools.45 Chiang attended, beginning early 1908, a 
three-year course at the school and, at the same time, joined the 
Tongmenghui (|W| M #  Alliance Society), where he encountered Sun Yatsen 
at one of the many secret meetings he attended. In December 1910 Chiang 
concluded his training at the preparatory school and served in connection in 
the Japanese Army as a candidate for the Military Academy.
Chiang’s service in the Japanese Army afforded him an opportunity to 
observe the workings of the Japanese military system from the inside. He 
believed that the strength of the Japanese armed services lay in their rigid 
discipline, political indoctrination and their technical education. 
Unquestioning acceptance of orders and unquestioning belief in the 
infallibility of their superiors constituted the essence of Japanese military 
discipline.46 He obviously never forgot these characteristics and tried to instil 
them in his army. They are, furthermore, characteristics which both inspired 
and permeated the Blueshirts organisation some two decades later.
45 Sinica (Monthly), vol.3, no. 11/1992. “Meiji Nihon to Chugokujin ryugakusei” Chinese 
Students and Meiji Restoration's Japan , Tokyo: Daishukan shoten. pp.21-26. The Sejo gakko 
was originally founded in 1885 as a preparatory school for Japanese students who wanted to 
enrol in the Rikugun Shikan gakko (The Military Academy) in Tokyo. On the highest level, the 
principal members of the Whampoa Military Academy were trained in the Rikugun Shikan 
gakko. These included Chiang Kaishek, Ho Yin-chin, Wang Po-lin and Chien Ta-chun, Chen 
Qimei. See also, Furuya, pp.l l-19.The military preparatory school this source mentions is the 
Shimbu Gakko, which was also a preparatory school especially for Chinese students 
established by the Japanese in 1903. It could, however, not be confirmed what the difference 
was between the Sejo Gakko and the Shimbu Gakko.
46 Furuya, pp.l 1-19.
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D. Japanese Militarism and the Fascist Movement
After World War I Japan's first parliamentary government was formed. 
As in Germany and Italy, this regime was fragile and unstable, unable either 
to manage the deepening economic crisis of the 1920s or to proceed with 
economic transformation without massive social disruption. In this respect, 
the origins of Fascism in Japan are broadly similar to those in Germany and 
Italy.
However, it was the military in Japan which was most influential in 
shaping the political evolution of the country, and the army was the centre of 
the Fascist movement in Japan.47 The word Fascism in Japan may be applied 
especially to the movement among the military.48 The influence of the 
civilian right wing did not expand of itself, but was able to become an 
important factor in Japanese politics only when it joined hands with the 
military and the bureaucracy. Noteworthy about the Japanese Fascist 
movement was that many of its members were followers of Shinto #  I I49, 
the state religion in Japan. The Japanese Fascist movement respected Shinto 
and that had its interaction with the military.50 This factor played an 
important role in Japanese Fascism. Shinto was a strong binding factor 
between the Japanese people, and Shinto religious groups and the military 
wing, who both advocated ultra-nationalism, integrated with each other in the 
1920s, a relationship which became even stronger in the 1930s. For instance 
Uchida, one of the founders of the Black Dragon Society, was a believer in
47 Tanin and Yohan, p. 173.
48 Fait, p.61.
49 Way of the Gods. The religion of the ancient Japanese was for the most part a simple 
worship o f the power of nature, but there were also elements of shamanism and ancestor 
worship. Later, after the introduction of Buddhism, the conglomeration of early religious 
practices and beliefs was given the name Shinto.
50 Wan Feng, pp.35-36.
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Shinto, more especially the Omotokyo ^  |&.5l During the 1930s among 
the believers of Omotokyo were military men, politicians and rich 
industrialists. Uchida was aware of the powerful influence of Omotokyo and 
intended to use this group for his own organisation and financial 
assistance.52 However, in the 1930s, the relationship between Omotokyo and 
the Japanese military had much stronger bonds than those between Uchida 
himself and the military.
It should be noted that the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis 
clearly differ from Japan in having won State power from outside the 
administration, chiefly by mobilising the strength of civilians.53 In European 
Fascism the military element was also significant but - especially in its early 
phases - it did not shape the Fascist movement to the same extent as it had in 
Japan.
Apart from the Japanese secret societies, especially the Black Ocean 
and the Black Dragon, several factions operated within the Japanese military 
system. They worked along the lines of a secret society, directing, organising
51 Hatsuse Ryuhei, Dento teki uyoku; Uchida Ryohei no kenkyu, Kyushu: Kyushu University 
Press, 1980, p.310. In 10 January 1925, Uchida stayed in Kyoto, Omotokyo’s accommodation 
and he discussed with Seishi, Teguchi ojin saburo (Uchida may have persuaded him to join or 
to support). Uchida chose the Omotokyo because he assumed its specific aim was to abolish 
the govemmenting support of State Shinto. This should be seen as a direct attack on Ultra­
nationalist ideology, something Uchida may have tried to prevent from happening. The stated 
aims of disestablishing state religion included preventing a recurrence o f the perversion of 
Shinto theory and beliefs into militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda designed to delude 
the Japanese people and to lead them into wars of aggression..
52 Hatsuse Ryuhei, pp.311-316. Uchida and Toyama (counsellor) established the Dai Nihon 
seisan to'X. 0  ^  (Great Japan Production Party), in 28 June 1931 in Osaka, were
approximately 1500 members participated. The Great Production Party declined as a political 
force after 1933, but even thereafter it had a fairly large membership. The production Party 
consisted to a large extent o f Kansai elements belonging to the old traditions of the Amur 
River Association. Perhaps, in essence the Seisanto was a modernised version of the old 
Kokuryukai.
53 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963, p.52.
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and controlling their members. This is analogous to the Blueshirts in China, 
which also was a semi-secret society with its main strength in the military. 
Examples of such secret societies within the Japanese military system are, for 
instance, the Jinji no kai A  (Personal Affairs Society) established by
graduates of the Rikugun daigaku Iff A  ^ - 54
As in Japan, secret societies in China also worked within the military. 
An exhaustive list of the personal relationship that Chiang Kaishek had with 
fourteen secret societies of different origin is given in Appendix 1.
One of these societies was the Gancheng tonglian hui 
(Gancheng People Association) with Chen Cheng He M as leader. This society 
consisted of three different divisions and had a powerful military influence. 
Another society with the appearance of a military club was the Lizhishe
u
(Moral Endeavqj- Society) with Wang Lizhang Hi \L M as leader. Branches of 
this society existed in many places. The leader, Wang Lizhang, had a special 
connection with Chiang Kaishek. A society made up of Whampoa Military 
Academy graduates and with strong connections with the Blueshirts was the 
Huangpu tongxuehui (Whampoa Graduates Association). Its leader
was He Zhonghan f  J #  and its chief was Yan Bailing R  U  This group 
spread out over many places, especially in the big cities. Another society, the 
Huang ling ma gua , was composed of the first to the third class of
54 Wan Feng, pp.72-75. The Rikugun daigaku is the Japanese Military Academy. The
graduates o f Rikugun daigaku , men like Kobadake, Nagada, Tozho, Yamaoka, Kawamoto and
Itagaki, wanted to innovate the power of the military in benefit of the nation.They founded a
society with the name Jinji no kai around 1923-24. The Jinji no kai, again founded another
faction which was Futaba kai U  | j |  ^(C otyledon Society) made up o f Manchuria and
Mongolia specialists. Another faction was Mokuyo kai A  R  ^(Thursday Society), composed
o f military armament specialists, (reference, 15 September 1928, Ugaki’s Dairy).
Ishiwara Kanji, Suzuki, Nemoto, and Muto founded in 1928 the Mumei kai 4® % ^
(Anonymous Society or Shadow Society), a faction that prepared for a future war and
discussed about Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the navy’s faction Oshi kai EE Biff H '
(The Rule of the Master Society) and the army’s faction Sakura kai @  ^(Cherry-Blossom
Society), were two military Fascist secret societies that had relations with civilian Fascist
groups of Okawa Hsumei, Mankawa, Yasuoka and Nishida.
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the Whampoa Military Academy students and of current staffs from the 
Central Army. More information about the relationship of secret societies with 
and their influence on the Blueshirts is presented in Chapter Five.
In Japan, the connection between modernisation and militarisation was 
very close even before the rise of Fascism.55 One reason for this was the 
rapid improvement in the efficiency of the Army. The General Staff had been 
created on the German model by German advisors, and was one of the first 
thoroughly modem elements of Japanese society during the period of the 
Meiji reform.56 The victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1904, were 
due mainly to Japan's rapid industrialisation and adoption of Western 
techniques. Japanese modernisation, in turn, emphasised an intense 
nationalism and militarism, and by 1905 Japan was ready to begin competing 
openly in the search for new colonies in the Far East.57
Chiang Kaishek never forgot the experience he had gained during his 
service with the Japanese army. During a speech to students held in June 
1932, at the Whampoa Academy, Chiang spoke about the Japanese 
Imperialist spirit of the Samurai (Bushido). This spirit was something the 
Chinese cadets of the Academy also should adopt, he said, and then direct it 
against the Japanese.58
This speech of Chiang’s may have contributed to the idea shared by 
foreign observers, that the Blueshirts had added the spirit of Bushido to their
55 Beasley, p.35. The Imperial institution deserved much of the credit for the orderliness with 
which the Japanese endured the upheavals o f modernisation.
56 Beasley, p.36. The principal German adviser was Major Klemens Meckel, who arrived in 
Japan in 1885.
57 Harold Hakwon Sunoo, Japanese Militarism, Past and Present, Chicago: Nelson Mall,
1975, p.31.
58 Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kaishek] jiangshuji (The Collection of Jiang Jieshi’s Speeches and 
Talks), Lixing zhexue (Implementation Philosophy), Chongqing: Huangpu chubanshe, 1940, 
p.l.
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guiding principles.59 Chiang also made the telling remark that “the rise and 
fall of nations is the responsibility of the Military.” 60 This further emphasises 
his principal view.
The connection between militarism and Fascism in Japan was 
indissoluble. The same remains true for militarism and Fascism in China. 
Thus, Asian Fascism may be characterised as the increasing imposition of 
military values on political and civilian life. In China where there was no 
Fascist party, the ideas of Fascism continuing to be propagated from within 
the military wing of the Guomindang. It should not be forgotten that the 
Guomindang was very much a militarist organisation, having in its leader 
Chiang Kaishek a man schooled in the doctrines of the Japanese military 
rather than the bureaucratic polity of traditional China.
The impact of Japanese militarism on Chiang Kaishek and the 
Whampoa cadets was considerable, and Japanese Fascist ideas were 
becoming increasingly well known throughout China in the Nanjing period. 
Besides the strong presence of the military aspect, it was the control from 
above that attracted Chiang most to Japanese Fascism. He admired them for 
their success to unify Japanese society to such a large degree, and to 
indoctrinate the people with values Chiang so favoured, for example the 
organisation, the rigid discipline, and their technical education.
By 1930, many Japanese books about Fascism had already been 
translated into Chinese, published in Shanghai and distributed nation-wide 
(See the list below). These Japanese materials were supplemented from 1932 
onwards by a number of other books about Fascism.
59 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.36.
60 Lixing congshu (The Lixing Series), Huangpu chubanshe, Chongqing: Huangpu chubanshe, 
1933, p.25, a speech by Chiang Kaishek in Nanchang, December 1933.
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It is also interesting to compare the treatment of Japanese Fascism in 
the Guomindang’s own journals. The right wing Dongfang zazhi jR ~jj f t  M 
(The Eastern Miscellany) wrote at length on Japanese Fascism.61 It traced 
the formation of Japanese Fascism to the Black Dragon Society, the ultimate 
representative of all nationalist organisations, and its promotion of 
imperialism and “Asian values.” The Black Dragon Society became a 
supporter of the ultra-nationalist Dai Nihon seisanto party on its founding in 
June 1931. At the time there were many groups with a strong nationalist 
character in Japan, but these groups were quite divided and needed a 
powerful organisation like the Dai Nihon seisanto in order to co-ordinate 
them.
Articles in Dongfang zazhi were also quite negative. They spoke of the 
uncertain political situation in Japan and condemned the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria. Japanese propaganda surrounding the invasion and the strength 
of the Fascist parties in Japan was called into question. That Fascism, or at 
least ultra-nationalism, was the motivating force in Japanese politics, was 
beyond doubt.62
The left wing Nanfang zazhi S  M (The Southern Miscellany) 
pointed out that Fascism in Japan was not a predominant force until after the 
invasion of China. However, unlike Germany and Italy, where Fascist 
regimes strengthened the economy, in Japan an economic crisis followed the 
invasion of China. In practice, Japanese Fascism amounted to the control of 
politics by the military.
61 Dongfang zazhi (The Eastern Miscellany), Shanghai, vol, 30-3, 1933, pp.25, 29.
62 Dongfang zazhi, p.23. The Cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshi (December 1931- May 1932) and 
the Cabinet of Saito Makoto (May 1932-July 1934) used the kokusui shugi, ultra-nationalist 
organisation, in order to introduce Fascist ideas in their policy and so trying to dominate the 
government.
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Catalogue of Japanese Books Translated in China 63
AUTHOR TRANSLATOR TITLE PUBLISHER YEAR
Fujii Tei
m #  m
Chen Baohua 
Xing Moqing
JPJM W
Faxisi zhuyi zhi lilun yu shiji
iffi H  (Ideal and 
Reality of Fascism)
Shanghai xin 
shengming
±  M  ff £  'np
1929
Tsuchinaru 
Mas ami
AfJi
Wang Zhanggong Faxisidi zhuyi yundong zhi 
sixiang yu yundong j i  
zhengce M  Mfj 3 l
^  MMb 2 .  M  H
MMj] 2k $ C M  (Ideology 
and Policy of the Fascist 
Movement)
Shanghai huatong
± M
1932
Zhang Wojun Faxisidi zhuyi yundong lun
Wi t il (Theory of the Fascist 
Movement)
Beiping Renwen 1933
I man aka 
Tsugimaro
Jin Kuiguang Minzhushehui zhuyi yundong 
lun K  ±  ?± #  ±  
jJI Wj nffl (Theory of Social 
Democratic Movement)
Shanghai huatong
± « * i
1933
Kawano Mitsu
? » J S  *
Tian Qiu
0^
Faxisi zhuyi zh i zuzhu yu  
lilun
& 0 » f  ± # 2 1 1  
n a i
(Organisation and Theory 
o f  Fascism)
Shanghai huadong
l i i l
1933
Zama Katsuhei Shu Yiping Riben faxisi yundong
0  * & H # r S S i
(Japanese Fascist Movement)
Beiping chenbao
I f l i 1933
Gorai Kinzo Liang Weizhi
m&z
Faxisi zhuyi j i  qi guojia lilun
t t l « ± I X S
HI  ^(Fascism and 
Nationalism)
Shanghai minzu
±  M  K M
1935
Kinishita
Hanji
Lin Jidong Riben faxisi zhuyi 
(Japanese Fascism)
Shanghai shangwu
±
1937
^3 Tan Ruqian, Zhongguoyi Ribenshu zonghe mulu (Catalogue of Japanese Books Translated 
in China), Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue, 1980, pp.366-381. The names o f the Chinese 
translators are possibly an alias.
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2.4 European Fascism and Its Influence on Chiang Kaishek's Drive 
for Power
Fascism in Europe emerged as a reaction to the circumstances after World 
War I. Due to the destruction caused by the war many European countries 
found themselves in deep crisis, and many people, influenced by the 
successful Russian Revolution, began to turn to Communism. There was a 
real fear that the Bolshevik Revolution would spread across the continent and 
it was from this post-war crisis that Fascism appeared.
A. German Influence on Developments in the Guomindang
While Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek learnt much about the spirit 
that emanated from the right-wing movements during their stays in Japan, 
the close military relations between Germany and China should not be 
overlooked.
If conditions in Germany and Italy were chaotic and demoralising, the 
state of affairs in China was much worse as the First World War drew to a 
close. China's economic problems were not limited to a few years of 
hyperinflation or the effects of the Great Depression - they were general, 
continuous and all but insurmountable. The sense of betrayal which the 
“front generation” felt in Germany and Italy was common in China too. 
Despite the pronouncements of President Wilson about self-determination, 
China found herself still shackled by the “Unequal Treaties” and, to make 
matters worse, German colonial interests in China were simply taken over by 
Japan.
German - Chinese contacts had existed since the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-95, which clearly had exposed China's military incompetence. Two 
new armies were created that largely followed the German system of 
organisation, training, and drill instruction. It should not be forgotten that
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during the period of the Meiji reform in the late 19th century Japan also 
modelled its army according to the German example and benefited from 
German military advice. Chinese interest in German military and technical 
expertise gave rise to another aspect of Sino- German relations that was to re­
appear during the Nanjing period: the utilisation by German industry of 
German advisers in China to promote trade.
The beginnings of a German influence with the Guomindang date 
from the last year of the First World War, when Berlin hoped to bring a pro- 
German faction to power in China and use it to wage war against Russia and 
Japan. Failing this, they at least wanted to keep China neutral and out of the 
war altogether. Unlikely as it may seem in retrospect, they decided to back 
Sun Yatsen in his bid for power in Canton in July 1917. According to 
German sources, “German officials met with Sun in Shanghai in March to 
induce him to overthrow Duan Qirui In April Sun declared himself
ready, and demanded two million dollars for the purpose of influencing the 
Army and Navy.” 65 These dealings appear to have been initiated by Sun as 
one of his many efforts to gain foreign assistance for the revolution. It should 
be noted, however, that Sun himself always strenuously insisted that none of 
this had taken place - in a letter Sun wrote to the American-Consul General in 
Canton he denied categorically ever receiving German funds.66
64 Bom in Anhui in 1864, he graduated from the Beiyang Military Academy in Tianjin in 
1885. Duan studied artillery science in Germany in 1889, and assisted Yuan Shikai in training 
modem troops in 1895, and in suppressing the Boxer Uprisings in Shandong in 1900. He 
became Commander of the 3rd division of the Imperial Army in 1904. He first fought on the 
side of the Manchu House, but later took lead in asking the Manchu Emperor to abdicate.
65 Kirby, p.29, see his footnote; DZA (Deutsches, Zentral Archiv), Deutsche Botschaft China 
09.02, nr.2232, (115-117), Memorandum by Knipping (German Consul General in Shanghai), 
20 December 1917, cited in J.Fass, “Sun Yatsen and the World War One”, Archiv Orientalni 
35 (1976), p.l 16. See also Wilbur, p.93.
66 Wilbur, p.93, with reference to his footnote 48.
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Certainly Sun had not abandoned his political intuition and was by no 
means entirely in the “Kaiser's” pocket. This became clear with the 
recognition by Sun's Canton government that a state of war existed between 
China and Germany, only a month after the Peking government had declared 
war in August 1917.
After World War I, Sun again sought support from Germany for his 
government in Canton, and remained very keen on German participation in 
China's development, partly because of the renowned skill of German 
workers.
For German industry, the war was to prove no more than an 
interruption in its attempts to participate directly in Chinese economic 
development. These efforts were given new impetus and direction as a result 
of industry's co-operation in post-war German rearmament and after 1927, 
the beginnings of political stability in China under a Guomindang regime 
committed to the “international development of China.” Even after the arrival 
of Soviet advisers, beginning with Mikhail Borodin in October 1923, Sun 
continued his efforts to maintain good relations with the Germans. Although 
he did not see the kind of success he had hoped for in his own lifetime, it is 
certain that many of the contacts he made during these early years were to 
prove of great importance for the government of his successor. Sun died in 
1925 but the co-operation between Germany and China was continued and 
extended by Chiang after 1928.
With the onset of the warlord period the thirst for arms had increased 
considerably in China, this was also an important factor behind the German 
recovery in the economic relationship with China immediately after World 
War I. Despite the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the 
Germans managed to transport arms into China.67
67 FOH (Foreign Office Archives, The Hague), code G nr. 145 and code J I, nr.252; The 
Germans successfully eluded the Versailles Treaty, and managed to transport arms and
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B. The Guomindang and German Military Advisers
Deprived of Soviet advisers and support in the wake of the split with 
the Communists, in 1927 Chiang urgently needed an alternative to Soviet aid 
in many areas of Chinese society, particularly in terms of aid to modernise 
his army. Aid to the newly established Nanjing government was offered by 
the Germans.
At the beginning o f  the Republic o f China, numerous tasks remained to 
be undertaken, the form er president Chiang...eager to make use o f the 
German experts to help the construction in various fields, especially in 
the military and police, that was the key reason why he wanted to 
promote the Sino-Germ an relations.611
Not only German advisers were employed in China, but also several 
American, French, British, Dutch and, later Italian nationals.69
The Chinese were already enthusiastic buyers of German weapons, all 
kinds of industrial equipment and semi-manufactured articles. This was 
demonstrated by increasing German imports to China during the years 1920- 
27. The value of German arms imported to China amounted to over 10 
million dollars a year, more than half of all foreign imports.70 In this respect 
it seemed logical to expand this co-operation and Chiang looked for a closer 
relationship with Germany by offering former German military men and 
civilian specialists posts as advisers in China.71 The hiring by Chiang of
ammunition to China despite the Treaty. They used, among other methods, Dutch steamers 
who first went to the Dutch-Indies, before unloading their illegal cargo in Chinese harbours.
611 Xin Damo, “Deguo waijiao dang’an zhong de Zhong De guanxi” (Sino-German Relations 
in the German Diplomatic Archives 1928-38), Zhuanji wenxue, vol.41-4, October 1982.
69 BA, Deutsche Botschaft China, 09.02, nr.2245, (245), German General Consulate Shanghai, 
27 May 1931, about foreign, not German, advisers to the National government, a full list of 
names is given, regarding the respective task of these advisers to the government.
70 Kirby, p. 25.
71 MAE, Asie-Oceanie, E 503, Instructeurs Militaires Allemands en Chine. Article 179 du 
Traite Versailles, April 1931. Most of this activity was, strictly speaking, illegal. Not only had
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German advisers had led several provincial governments, notably Zhejiang, 
also to employ civilian German advisers. Creation of heavy industry in China 
was the centrepiece of the co-operation between the two countries. The 
direction of the relationship between China and Germany was later 
influenced by the emergence of a clear Guomindang strategy for military and 
industrial development, as a consequence of the invasion in Manchuria by the 
Japanese, and the need of the Nazis, after their seizure of power in 1933, for 
raw materials.72
At the end of 1934 Chiang predicted that a World War would emerge 
by 193 6 . 73 He planned to reorganise his army by establishing new training 
centres in Nanchang, Wuchang, Luoyang, and Hangzhou. In order to fulfil 
his goal, Chiang set about engaging more German, as well as American and 
Canadian, advisers.74
The first German military man to have an important influence on 
China's development in the Nanjing period was Colonel Max Bauer (1869- 
1929), who became Chiang's earliest German adviser in 1928. During his 
short stay in China he had the opportunity to present his ideas directly to 
Chiang, and he became a respected and honoured man in China. Although 
Colonel Bauer was not personally close to the circles of Nazi around Hitler, 
he was familiar with many influential people who supported the movement. 
Bauer's political convictions were extremely nationalistic, as his participation
article 170 of the Versailles Treaty forbidden the export of German war material, but article 
179 proscribed the employment of German nationals in a military capacity abroad.
72 BA, 09.02, nr.2239, In agreement with Chiang Kaishek, the re-organisation o f  Chang 
Hsueh-liang’s army will be set about by German Military advisers, Peking, 21 April 1932.
73 Yamaki Yoshiko, “Chugoku ni okeru fasici shugi o megutte” (China and Fascism), 
Chugoku kankei ronsetsu shiryo, vol.41-14, 1972, p.220.
74 Yamaki, p.220.
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in the Kapp-Putsch of 1920 had indicated.75 His ideas were, however, 
different from the Nazi-ideology of Hitler.76 Bauer did not see in Hitler a 
capable leader and refused to co-operate with or to accept orders from him.
Colonel Bauer went to China in November 1928 at the invitation of the 
Nanjing government and founded the German advisory mission that 
remained in China until 1938.77 Within a couple of months Bauer expanded 
his advisory staff to twenty-six advisers with men who were all experts in 
their respective professions.78 As well as consolidating Germany's position in 
China, Bauer's mission exposed the Chinese officer corps to Fascist influence 
from Germany for the first time. Although Bauer himself cannot be described 
as a typical Fascist, among the German advisers, especially after 1930, were 
military men with avowed Nazi ideas.
Chiang Kaishek and Bauer became close personal friends, and, 
according to the German newspaper Die Brucke published after Bauer's death 
in May 1929, Chiang saw in Bauer a friend and above all his best adviser.79
75 Kirby, p.48, with reference to his footnote 42. See also, Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866- 
1945, London: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.429.
76 Carsten, pp. 116-117.
77 BA, 09.02, nr.2236,Deutsche Botschaft China, (248-249), Shanghai, 5 December 1928; See 
also Kirby, pp.38-61. Bauer actually went to China for the first time in November 1927, 
probably at the invitation of the Canton government, returning to Germany in March 1928.
78 BA, 09.02, J. nr. 475/30, Deutsche Botschaft China, (85-86), Tientsin, 24 March 1930, 
Nanking and, 25 January, 1930, (110-112,113-118). See also, MAE, Asie-Oceanie, Chine 537, 
22 November 1930 and E 503, April 1931. With respect to the numbers o f German advisers, 
the German documents mention the names of thirty-nine advisers at 15 January 1930. The 
French documents mention in November 1930 the number of forty six advisers, and gives in 
1931 the names o f twenty-eight advisers. The exact number of advisers at any time during the 
period of their stay in China could not be ascertained, however, the total number o f German 
advisers involved may not have exceeded sixty or seventy at the time of their withdrawal in 
1938.
79 BA, 09.02, nr.2244, Deutsche Botschaft China, (248,249) ,"Die Brucke", 17th May, 1930. 
“His death on 6 May 1929 was mourned by his German and Chinese friends and officials, and 
he was given a state funeral at Shanghai."
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The post left vacant by Bauer was soon filled by Colonel Herman 
Kriebel.80 However, his first tenure in Nanjing was a short and unhappy 
one.81 Kriebel served briefly, 1929-30, as Chiang's military adviser. Later, in 
1934, Kriebel was appointed by Hitler as German Consul-General in 
Shanghai, where he also took over as head of the “Far Eastern Nazi 
Organisation.” 82 Kriebel was a Nazi, but there is little information to prove 
that he and Chiang were close personal friends; there is also no evidence that 
there even existed a close formal relationship between the two men. The 
impression from German documents is rather that their relationship remained 
a purely diplomatic one. Indeed, it is probable that Chiang's and Kriebel's 
ideological views clashed; perhaps this is why Kriebel's stay in Nanjing was 
so short.
The successor of Kriebel was General Georg Wetzell, who was 
appointed “Adviser General” to Chiang in Nanjing in May 1930. Wetzell was 
in service from 1930-34 and was almost exclusively devoted to the question 
of military training and battlefield tactics. The relationship between Chiang 
and the German advisers was seriously weakened during the tenure of 
General Wetzell. Especially Wetzell's close relationship with T.V.Soong ^  
j t  appeared to have been particularly unacceptable to Chiang, and from 
March 1932 he began to search for Wetzell's replacement.
8® Kirby, p. 155. Chiang's request for information on Nazism grew following Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor, and was funnelled to Ernst Bauer by Liang Yingwen, the former 
chief of the Trade Department in Berlin, who by then had become a secretary to Chiang 
Kaishek.
81 Kirby, p.62.
82 NA, SMP. D.4724, April 1936, Memorandum on the affairs o f  the local Nazi party. This 
branch of the Nazi party was set up to instruct German citizens in China in the tenets and 
beliefs of National Socialism. See also, Donald M.McKale, ’’The Nazi Party in the Far East, 
1931 -45”, in Journal o f  Contemporary History, vol. 12(1977), pp.291-311.
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General Hans von Seeckt went to China in 1934 at the exclusive 
invitation of Chiang, to oversee the military advisership and to reorganise the 
Chinese army.83 Following retirement, von Seeckt had moved increasingly 
into the realm of military and political theory, seeking to generalise his 
concept of the state and the role of the army in it. One of von Seeckt's 
arguments was that the army was the key to state power, a position which 
appealed to Chiang's imagination. Although von Seeckt was not a Nazi, and 
had his own pronounced ideas, he became closer to the circles around Hitler 
after the latter’s rise to power in 1933.
General von Seeckt functioned not only as Adviser-General to Chiang 
from 1934-35, but was also Trustee of the Chairman of the Military Council 
reorganising the Chinese army, overseeing and reorganising the work of the 
German advisership.84 He developed successful relations with Chiang, who 
had been impressed by his plans to reorganise the Chinese Army. After von 
Seeckt completed his work in China, he returned to Germany in early March 
1935, and continued his work in the economic realm from Berlin. Formally 
he remained Chiang's adviser until his death in December 1936.85 It was at
83 BA, 09.02, nr. 2238, Deutsches GeneralKonsulat Shanghai, nr.P57, 13 March 1934, and 
Nanking 26 May 1934, and 5 June 1934, the last two both marked “secret.” See also MAE, 
Asie-Oceanie, nr.483/2, La Mission du General von Seeckt en Chine, Shanghai, 17 Avril 1934. 
The exclusive appointment of General von Seeckt was at the repeated request of Chiang 
Kaishek. The German documents reveal, however, that when von Seeckt continued to refuse 
Chiang’s appeal, there was a possibility that the French Marshall Petain was going to become 
the Guomindang’s Adviser-General. The entire German adviser staff was then also to be 
replaced by French military advisers. Under pressure from the German Foreign minister von 
Neurath and the minister o f Defence von Blomberg, von Seeckt, despite his weak health, 
finally consented to the demands. Both ministers, in turn, promised the full support of the 
German government.
84 BA, 09.02, nr.2238,Deutsche Botschaft China, (56-60), Nanking 26 May 1934, (99), 
Shanghai, 13 March 1934, an article in the Shishixinbao, nr.2239, p .l, Nanking, 18 February, 
1935.
83 Kirby, p. 120. In order to handle future trade on an official level between Germany and 
China, on 24 January 1934 FIAPRO (Handels Gesellschaft fur Industrielle Produkte) was
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von Seeckt's suggestion that General Alexander von Falkenhausen became 
his successor to lead the advisory mission from 1935 until they were forced 
to leave in 1938.
Chiang Kaishek’s successive dealings with the German advisers 
ignited within him an interest in ideas and political practice of Fascism. It 
was through this network of political, military and financial relations which 
flourished between Germany and China in the late 1920s and 1930s that Nazi 
ideas began to flow from Berlin towards Nanjing. Bauer, Kriebel, Wetzell 
and others saw themselves as preservers of a true, if temporarily abandoned, 
“German spirit” 86 and they built the Chinese military apparatus according to 
the German model.
The withdrawal of the military advisers in 1938 was the result of 
Germany’s preference for cultivating relations with Japan rather than China. 
The problem of maintaining links with both countries had posed itself ever 
more sharply for Germany during the 1930s.
In 1935, the newly-appointed Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Count 
Mushakoji, remarked in a speech that Germany and Japan had a natural 
affinity for each other. He said that “With the advent of the Third Reich, 
which in Geist resembles in so many ways the spirit of Japan, a 
rapprochement was under way.” The Nazi party's racial experts were already 
working on ways of restoring relations to their former cordiality, which they 
did by suddenly discovering that the Japanese were “Aryans.” 87
In November 1936 the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact was 
duly signed, marking a decisive shift in German interests away from China
founded. General von Seeckt continued to work for this important trust after he returned to 
Berlin. Hans Klein, director o f HAPRO, was his personal friend.
86 Kirby, p. 151. The "German Spirit", in this sense, meant the German Military's will to win 
and to survive.
87 NA, nr.762.94/60, speech in Hamburg 15 June, 1935.
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towards her more powerful neighbour.88 Japan insisted that closer relations 
with Berlin depended on sacrificing connections with China, and it became 
increasingly clear that the days of the German advisers in China were 
numbered. Finally, in May 1938, von Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister, 
sent a telegram via Dirksen, the Ambassador in Japan, to Trautmann the 
Ambassador in China, ordering him to start withdrawing the military advisers 
immediately. According to this telegram “withdrawal is due to Hitler's 
anxiety that Japan might win an early victory” in her war with China. 89 Any 
contact maintained between Germany and China after 1938 was very much 
low level.
That Chiang Kaishek not only had used German military advisers but 
also profited from Japanese military advice is described by Inaba Masao fg' 
M IE ^ . 90 Major-General Okamura Yasuji |3] $  #C91 of the Guandong
army (kantogun M ^  ¥ ) 92 and famous China expert, was an adviser to
88 NA, nr.762.94/30,36 German-Japanese Agreement, Tokyo, 4 December, 1936.
89 BA, 09.02, nr.2247, Deutsche Botschaft China, (38) 25 May 1938.
90 Inaba Masoa, Okamura Yasuji daisho shiryo (Materials on General Okamura Yasuji),
Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1970, pp.1,5. See also Katogawa, pp.14-15.
9  ^ Okamura Yasuji (1884-1965), graduated at the Rikugun Shikan Gakko Military Academy 
the 16th class (1904). In 1913 graduated at the War College Rikudai. He went to Siberia and 
was in Qingdao(1915-1917), Beijing (1917-1919), Europe(1921-1922), Shanghai( 1923-25, 
1932). Chief of Staff of the Guandong army (1932-1934), Commander of North China Area 
Army (1941-1944), supreme commander in China (1944-1945). In 1921 Okamura and two 
other classmates of the Shikan Gakko’s 16th class met in Baden-Baden in Germany. There they 
promised each other that they would devote their lives to Japan.
9^ Alvin D.Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension”, in The Japanese Informal Empire in 
China, 1895-1937, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989. Peter Duus, Ramon 
H.Myers, and Mark R.Peattie (eds.), pp.395-428. The origins o f the Kwantung army date back 
to the era o f the Russo-Japanese War o f 1904-1905. It was a Japanese military garrison in 
Manchuria, and the Kwantung Army (Guandong army) as such was created in 1919. At the 
time of its creation was more an administrative than a tactical grouping. Until 1930s the force 
that came to be known as the Kwantung Army possessed a rather misleading geographical 
identification deriving from its historical antecedents, and more importantly, constituted an 
army in name alone.
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China and, until his death in 1965, had been very close to Chiang Kaishek, 
Chen Cheng Hi and many other Guomindang leaders. In November 1933, 
Okamura also was a member of the Japanese delegation that had met with the 
Chinese delegation to talk about the future of Manchuria. Remarkable in this 
respect is that in 1907, Okamura was instructor of the Rikugunshikan gakko 
^  W dr Hr $5 and in this qualification was responsible for the education of 
Chinese students. During his time as an instructor, he trained the Chinese 
students Chen Yi I® #|, Yan Xishan g| M ill and Sun Dianfang ^  i f .  
These three military academy students later became close to the 
Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek, and may even have been related to the 
Blueshirts.
2.5 The Nature of Chinese Fascism
A. Influences from Italy, Germany and Japan
Allusions to Fascism appeared in China in the early 1920s when the
term fanxi entered the Chinese vocabulary. At this time, it applied only
to the Italian Fascist party. The term faxisidi meaning Fascisti
entered into usage, but faxisi zhuyi '&M$T±i§, which is used to mean the
ideology of Fascism in general was only used after 193 3.93
That Chiang overtly intended to set up a Fascist organisation in China
is beyond dispute - his own statements on the subject are unequivocal. In a
speech during the second Blueshirts Convention, in late 1933 or early in
1934, Chiang declared:
Foreign countries having a prom inent party are ruled by this party, the 
prom inent party in  China is the Guom indang, however, the Guom indang 
seems only to function as a formal organ w ith no power. Fascist parties 
in other countries are successful and it seems that in the near future they
93 Kirby, p. 153. This analysis is based on titles of periodical articles containing terms for 
Fascism, as compiled in the comprehensive monthly indexes of, Renwenyuekan,\9'SQ - 1935.
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will be able to expand their power with even more success, therefore I 
declare that China also needs a Fascist party.9^
The question of exactly what kind of Fascist party he thought China 
needed and the source of his inspiration has been the subject of much 
scholarly debate in recent years. As the development of the term fanxi 
indicates, China was at first aware of Fascism only as a localised Italian 
phenomenon. The question then arises whether Italian Fascism had any 
substantial influence on developments in China.
The ideology of Sun Yatsen’s Chinese nationalism originally shared 
substantial affinities with that of the Italian nationalists, who later in 1920 
joined the Italian Fascists of Mussolini. However, it should also be noted that 
whatever similarities there were between Guomindang and Italian 
nationalists, there were also significant differences: for instance the 
aggressive and expansionist tenor of Italian nationalism is not to be found in 
Sun's ideology.
In terms of practical relationships Italy never approached the scale of 
involvement in China which Germany achieved, presumably as Italy was less 
industrialised than Germany, and could not provide the same quality of 
technical support and advice as Germany. Although Italy's industrial 
development had been considerable, and in the 1930s the Guomindang was 
assisted by a group of Italian aviation specialists under command of General 
Lordi to set up the Chinese Airforce,95 it could not hope to rival Germany's 
position in the Far East.
9<4 TB, 2051.Ranisha ni kansuru chosa, p.49.
95 NA, 865.22793/1, document from the American Consulate General in Shanghai, 25th July, 
1934. Chinese Aviators go to Italy fo r  training: Italian interest in Chinese aviation. See also, 
BA. 09.02, nr.2246, (32), Nanking, 4th September, 1935. North China Daily News article 
about Gen.Lordi.
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How far did Italian and/or German Fascist models influence Chinese 
Fascism? It may be correct that the Blueshirts’ ideologists were well 
informed about European Fascism, however, this did not mean that Chinese 
Fascism was formed along those lines. The Blueshirts’ organisation and 
structure was basically Chinese in character, while through the significant 
influence of the Whampoa cadets who had studied in Japan, the military 
element was largely drawn from the Japanese. Therefore, despite the German 
influence on the Chinese military via the advisers, and despite all the 
information which came from Europe to China about Fascism, it was the 
Japanese model which the Chinese military understood best. In this 
connection it can be argued that ultimately both the Chinese and Japanese 
army was influenced by German military concepts. As mentioned above, the 
Japanese General staff in the 1880s had, through German military advisers, 
been created on the German model.
Chiang showed an interest in Nazism only when it was on the verge of 
seizing power, and what actually intrigued him about Nazism was its 
organisation. One major objection to the argument that Chiang hoped to 
create a Nazi-style organisation is the clear lack of any evidence of German 
involvement in setting up the Blueshirts. Certainly, official German 
documentation lends little support to the idea that Germany was involved in 
the creation of the Blueshirts. Indeed, German diplomatic circles in China 
seem to have been as mystified by the emergence of the new organisation as 
all the other European embassies and Foreign Offices.
According to German diplomats at the embassy in Shanghai, Hankou, 
and Beijing, it was difficult to gather reliable information about the 
Blueshirts. A message by the Minister-Resident in Beijing to the Consul- 
General Kriebel in Shanghai, who was asking for information about Fascist 
Movements, reveals: “To provide accurate material about the Blueshirts is 
very difficult, because when the subject is discussed with Chinese people
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they always avoid the issue or declare that they do not want to get
involved.” 96 Despite this problem the German diplomats managed to get
information about the Blueshirts’ existence and their goals, although it was
much less detailed than the SMP reports. The information in the report from
Beijing gives a brief description of the Blueshirts' foundation and their
activities. An account from Consul-General Kriebel to Berlin a few months
later provides essentially the same information. This indicates that it was
indeed difficult for the German diplomats to get detailed information.
Nevertheless, as the information shows, the origin of the Blueshirts and
Chiang’s connection with the organisation was detected:
Last year W ham poa cadets under leadership o f  Tung W en Yen [Deng 
Wenyi] presented a clear and convincing plan to M arshall Chiang 
Kaishek. Chiang approved the plan proposed. In this way China’s first 
Fascist M ovem ent was founded with the name Wen hua hsieh hui JC i t  
ffli #  (Cultural Association), with its headquarters in N anking.9^
German documents about a visit of the Chinese Vice-Minister Tang 
Youren JjTPfT:98 to the German ambassador Trautmann in Beijing also
96 AAPA (Auswartiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, Bonn), code, Chi. IV 933, 1506/3150/34. 
Organisation der Blauhemden in China (The Blueshirts Society in China), Hankow, den 26 
Marz 1934, by Minister-Resident Timan.
9^ BA, 09.02, nr.2235, Deutsches Generalkonsulat in Shanghai an das Auswartige Amt in 
Berlin, den 24, September 1934, nr.B.316: Fascistische Vereinigungen in China, undNeue 
Lebenbewegung, by German Consul-General Kriebel.The same document also mentions the 
foundation of the Wen hua xiehui (JCitWiit), by Chen Li-fu. However, the document seems to 
have switched both names. Although the Chinese characters given in the document refer to the 
correct societies, the Zhongguo wenhua xiehui (Chinese Culture Study Society) was a 
Blueshirts’ front group founded in December 1933. The Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui 
(Chinese Cultural Construction Association) was an association founded around January 1934 
by Chen Lifu. See also Kirby, pp. 162-163.
9^ Government Official, son o f Tang Caizhang (one of the early Guomindang martyrs), bom at 
Liuyang, Hunan, 1894. He studied public finance at Keio University in Japan, and graduated 
from that institution in 1919. Tang was director o f the Department of Economic Research, and 
elected reserve member of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, December, 
1931. Secretary-general, Central Political Council in 1932. A member of Legislative Yuan, 
Administrative vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Asiatic Affairs of the Ministry 
1933-35, assassinated at Shanghai December 1935.
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support the view that the Germans officially were not well informed."
During this visit Trautmann tried to obtain information from Tang Youren
about the Blueshirts movement, and Tang replied that it was quite unlike the
Fascist movements in Italy or Germany. The Minister became evasive,
however, when Trautmann pressed him on the subject of political
assassinations. There is, in short, no indication of any insider knowledge
about the Blueshirts in any of the German diplomatic sources.
The founding of a National Socialist Party (Zhongguo minzhu
shehuidang in China in the 1930s may also lead one to the
false conclusion that it was inspired by Nazism. 100 The party’s spiritual
mentor was the reformist Liang Qichao, as Ch’ien Tuan-sheng writes:
It was formed by the amalgam ation o f  the National Socialist Party o f  
Carsun Chang and the Chinese Democratic Constitutionalist Party 
form ed by Chinese living in N orth America. The latter party was the 
lineal successor o f  the Em peror-Preservation Association o f  Kang 
Youwei and Liang C h’i-ch’ao, and the leaders o f the form er including 
Carsun Chang, were, in greater and lesser degrees, associated w ith the 
Research Clique o f  Liang Qichao in its various p h a se s . 101
According to an intelligence report the date and place of founding of 
the party was in 1934 in Beijing. 102 The founders being Carsun 
Chang103 (Zhang Junmai UfMfllij), Luo Longji M li® , Zhang Dongsun
"  AAPA, code,IV Chi 654, Deutsche Gesandschaft, nr. 205, Aktz. 1506/2549/34, 8 Marz 
1934, Trautmann, Peking.
100 Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, pp.354-355. Ch’ien mentions the Zhongguo minzhu shehui dang. This 
party has been known in the West as “Social Democratic Party,” but its leader, Carsun Chang, 
preferred to render it as “Democratic Socialist Party.” See the New York Times, 21 March 
1948.
101 Ch’ien, p.355.
102 NA, SIF (Shanghai Investigation Files), RG 226, 13W3, 3/34/A, entry 182, box 51/ 263, 
“The National Socialist Party”, pp. 1-9.
103 Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai, 1886-1969), was bom in Jiading xian in Jiangsu province 
in 1886. His native district was Baoshan xian, Jiangsu. Zhang received his middle school 
education from the Institute of Modem Languages at Shanghai. He went to Japan in 1904,
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WtMW, Li Gengnian and Pan Guangdan Among the total
members the most were students and a few were politicians. The principle 
and policy of the organisation was National Socialism; with emphasis on 
Absolute Patriotism and Progressive Patriotism. 104
The National Socialist Party offered its support to Chiang Kaishek and 
declared to uphold the Three Principles of the People. Since its 
establishment, the policy of the party had been anti-Communist. However, 
after the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937, the party gradually changed 
its attitude. The result was that relations between the Nationalist Socialist 
Party and the Communist Party improved. For the realisation of their 
proposals at the People’s Political Council they joined the Democratic 
League. In any case the party was far from being a Nazi party related to 
Fascism. 105
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
The Guomindang's task of creating a strong national government was 
hindered and limited by internal conflict, inept administration, the continued 
imperialist role in China, and most importantly, its weak hold over rural
where he graduated at the Waseda University in Tokyo in 1909, having taken the Political 
Science Course. Upon returning to China he attended the Imperial Examinations for returned 
students and was subsequently made a Han Lin Compiler or Compiler of the College of 
Literature, a degree equivalent to Ph.D. After the outbreak of the first revolution in October 
1911, Zhang resigned from the Han Lin post, and became editor-in-chief of the BeijingTianjin 
shibao, Tianjin. In 1912, immediately after the establishment of the Republic, Zhang was 
appointed secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. In 1931 Zhang went to 
Germany, where he studied at Berlin University. He also spent almost a year in England. 
Zhang is the author of standard works such as, “Draft for the Chinese Constitution” and 
“Social Democracy in New Germany.” He wrote also many philosophical articles.
104 NA, SIF (Shanghai Investigation Files), RG 226, 13W3,3/34/A, entry 182, box51 nr 263, 
“The National Socialist Party”, pp. 1-9.
105 Ch’ien, p.355. The policies and programs of the Democratic Socialist Party are in general 
close to those of any social democratic party.
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China. Chiang Kaishek's energies were directed foremost at neutralising 
military and political forces that might undermine his authority.
That the Guomindang turned to Fascism followed from the stress of 
circumstances in the 1930s, as a result of a general feeling that the revolution 
had failed, due among other things to the malfunctioning of the Guomindang 
government and its officials, and exacerbated by the worsening of the 
economic situation.
Chiang's ultimate goal was to transform and modernise the whole of 
Chinese society, and he decided to adopt Fascism as the vehicle for this 
transformation. He intended to begin mass-mobilisation of the Chinese 
peasantry his agenda of social transformation, but remained reserved on this 
point and set up the Blueshirts as his “task force” to accomplish this goal of a 
“revolution from above.” Chiang drew on the experiences of various 
constituencies within the Guomindang when founding the Blueshirts. 
Students who had studied in Japan had been influenced by the Japanese 
Fascist movement. They brought to the ideological melting pot ideas 
flavoured with the typical Japanese military and extreme nationalistic thought 
of the Black Dragon Society.
The parallel between Japanese and Chinese Fascism continues in their 
religious and philosophical backgrounds, as well as their approaches to 
Fascism. Japanese Fascism developed within the state religion Shinto and 
could thus easily integrate with the existing culture. Fascism accordingly 
adapted to suit the religion. In China it was also tried to reshape Fascism into 
a form which could exist alongside the Confucian ideas and background of 
the Chinese people. Furthermore, the way the Blueshirts seemed to function 
in Chinese society parallels the methods of the Black Dragon Society in 
Japan. Following Chiang’s visit to Japan in September 1927, Whampoa 
graduates, many of whom were to become Blueshirts, were systematically 
sent to Japan for further training. The influence of this society and of the
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secret societies working directly within the military must have been an 
example to the founders of the Blueshirts.
The Fascist influence also came from army officers, police officers and 
government officials, who had been exposed to Nazism and European 
Fascism, partly through the German advisory missions and partly through 
visits of Chinese military and police officers to Europe. Broadly speaking, 
European Fascism was an inspiration for, rather than a direct influence on, 
the Blueshirts. Chiang was very selective in borrowing from Germany and 
Italy, and it was from Japan that the principal lines of the new organisation 
were drawn.
Chinese intellectuals had access to information about Nazism and 
Italian Fascism, but in no known case did the values of these dimly- 
understood foreign ideas completely transform the thinking of those who 
came into contact with them. Most intellectuals were educated in traditional 
Confucianism and whatever overlays of foreign thinking they may have 
acquired, it was their traditional views and values which dominated their 
arguments in favour of the founding of a Fascist organisation in China. 
Therefore they advocated “foreign” Fascist ideas mixed with typical Chinese 
thought and ancient Chinese - Confucianist - features. The form of Fascism 
espoused by Chiang Kaishek and which permeated the Blueshirts 
organisation is perhaps best termed idiosyncratic.
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Chapter Three 
The Emergence of the Blueshirts
The formation of the Blueshirts coincided with a period of great tension in 
China. The threat from Japanese imperialism culminated, in September 1931, 
in the invasion of Manchuria. It is likely that this invasion triggered the 
formation of the Blueshirts, the initiators of which were Whampoa cadets 
studying in Japan.
It may be argued that the Blueshirts developed more as a reaction to 
Japanese imperialism, rather than as a direct result of the influence of Italian 
Fascism or German Nazism. One of the main initiators of the movement, 
Teng Jie, had little knowledge of European Fascism at the time the Blueshirts 
were founded. 1 Liu Jianqun, the man who, because of his well-known essay 
to reform the Guomindang, was seen as the spiritual father of the Blueshirts 
may, however, have had some idea about European Fascist concepts.2
Everything about the Blueshirts - their origins, their political role, and 
even their name - has been the subject of controversy. Most research on the 
Blueshirts has concluded that the Blueshirts' name and organisational model 
originated in Germany or Italy, and has compared them with the Italian 
Blackshirts and Nazi German Brownshirts. Whatever influences may have
1 Lloyd E. Eastman, “The Rise and Fall of the Blueshirts; A Review Article”, in Republican 
China, Vol. XII, November 1987, p.40. Teng Jie studied in 1931 in Japan, but Eastman's article 
does not reveal that he had any notion about European Fascism. However, after 1932 he 
frequently visited Germany and Italy, and "got so deeply impressed by “Hitler Germany, that 
he strutted about in a Nazi uniform." See also, Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism in China, 1924- 
1949, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p.54.
2 Eastman, “The Rise and Fall”, p.40. Liu referred to Italian Fascist concepts in his essay, A 
Few Ideas fo r  the Reform o f  the Party, (described later in this Chapter). See also Hung-mao 
Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1972, pp.55-56. Note: In order to put things in a correct perspective, when 
Liu Jianqun wrote his essay he was only nineteen years of age, and was serving as He 
Yingqing’s secretary.
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come from Fascist organisations in Europe or Japan, it should be noted that 
the history of China provides many examples of organisations that resemble 
the name “Blueshirts.” For instance, during the Ming Dynasty, the Emperor's 
secret police was known as the “Brocade Shirt Guardians” (Jinyiwei £8
ft).
The previous chapter discussed how European Fascism was 
characterised through mass mobilisation. The representative of Chinese 
Fascism, the Blueshirts, were in essence a small, elitist military group inside 
a larger political party. Due to there being a quite active secret police force 
within the Blueshirts’ organisation, many observers have reached the false 
conclusion that the organisation was nothing more than this. In fact, the 
Blueshirts represented a much broader organisation.
The stated aims of the Blueshirts were far from being unique in 
modem Chinese politics. It was their method of organisation and their 
ruthlessness which was “new.” Previously, organisations and tendencies 
within the Guomindang had declared their dedication to Chiang Kaishek and 
his endeavour to unify and modernise China. The most important of these 
groupings, the C.C.Clique (CC ^ ) , had ended up causing Chiang so many 
difficulties that by 1932 he decided a different approach was necessary to 
bring about the change he sought in the party and in the country.
The C.C.Clique had been able to organise students and workers in 
anti-Japanese bodies, but it was not successful in controlling their behaviour. 
Thus, the anti-Japanese feelings unleashed by the C.C.Clique in July 1931 - 
and provoked further by the invasion of Manchuria - soon became 
unmanageable, and in December 1931 led directly to Chiang Kaishek's 
downfall. Intense criticism from anti-Japanese militants who were angered by 
Chiang's policy of appeasement and ensuring internal unity before resisting 
the Japanese, eventually forced him to resign as President. Chiang blamed the
114
Chapter Three
C.C.Clique for this, and this sentiment paved the way for the creation of the 
Blueshirts.
3.1 Description of the Blueshirts
It became increasingly clear after the establishment of the Nanjing regime in 
1927 that neither the party nor the civil administration of the Guomindang 
were adequate to the task of building the nation and shaping a coherent 
government policy. Consequently, the relative power of the military 
gradually began to increase, while the power of the party and government 
institutions correspondingly waned. The continuing threats from the Japanese 
in North China and the on-going campaigns against the Communists only 
served to strengthen the power of the militarists. Increasingly, the formal 
organs of the party ceased making decisions themselves and simply approved 
what had already been decided by the factions around Chiang. These factions 
operated in the political arena as the most viable alternative to the paradox of 
a system which vested immense authority in the President, yet whose 
moribund bureaucratic structures were too weak to implement central 
decisions.3
It was Chiang's ability to manipulate these internal factions which 
contributed to his ascendancy in the Nationalist movement. He seldom 
committed himself irreversibly to an ideological position or factional policy. 
He easily accommodated himself to, without becoming a part of, any faction 
which might afford him political advantage. He also had a talent for retaining 
the loyalties of factions, that were bitterly antagonistic to each other, for 
instance, the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts.
Following the Japanese invasion in 1931, Chiang was caught off­
guard, and found himself momentarily unable to control the internal politics
3 Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937, p.45.
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of the Guomindang in the usual way. Certain key cliques lost confidence in 
his leadership ability. As Chiang was apparently incapable of performing the 
primary function of a head of state, that of defending the national territory, 
the call arose for him to resign. As a result, Chiang left power and “retired” 
to his native village in Zhejiang province, although he retained his military 
position.
Chiang's semi-retirement brought about a coalition of interests 
between those political thinkers in the party who had published authoritarian 
manifestos calling for a more dictatorial form of rule and Chiang's own plans 
to reassert himself as undisputed master of the party and of the country. It 
was against this background that the Blueshirts came to play an important 
role in Chinese politics.
A. The Formation of the Blueshirts
The original stimulus for the Blueshirt Movement came from Teng Jie, 
a graduate of the fourth class of the Whampoa Military Academy (.Huangpu 
junxiao M $3 jp and one of over sixty Whampoa graduates who had gone 
on to study at Japanese universities and military academies.4 Teng studied in 
Japan at the time of the Wanbaoshan Incident and together with
4 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite (The concept of the Blueshirts 
and their Special Service Operation), Reported by the General Headquarters of the 
Expeditionary Army in China, 23 August 1940, no pagination. A 29-page report, based on 
interrogation o f a former Blueshirt member. See also Lincoln Li, pp. 53-54; Eastman, “A 
Review Article”, p.26; Deng Yuanzhong, p.83.
5 The Korean issue came to a head on July 1931 at Wanbaoshan, a small town eighteen miles 
north of Changchun. A Chinese company had been leasing land first from Chinese farmers and 
then in turn to Koreans. Chinese authorities held that this practice was illegal because it 
violated a September 1909 agreement which prohibited Koreans from settling in non-border 
areas, a view disputed by Japan. A fight developed between Korean and Chinese farmers when 
the Koreans constructed several miles of irrigation ditches to which the neighbouring Chinese 
objected. The latter complained to local authorities, who stopped construction, whereupon 
Japanese consular police from Changchun armed with machine guns intervened to protect the 
Koreans, who resumed digging. On the first of July 1931, a Chinese mob attacked the Koreans 
and refilled a portion of the ditch. The Japanese police fired over the crowed, dispersing it 
without bloodshed. The Koreans then completed the irrigation canal.
116
Chapter Three
fellow Whampoa students, he became convinced that their host country was 
planning to launch an aggressive war against China.6 This group resolved to 
take some kind of pre-emptive action, and chose Teng Jie and a fellow 
student Xiao Zanyu W to return to China in late July. They were
assigned the task of warning the government in Nanjing of the impending 
danger, and hoped that Chiang would anticipate this threat by putting more 
emphasis on China’s unification. However, Chiang was advocating his 
appeasement policy with the accent on internal unification, which met a lot of 
resistance among politically involved Chinese.
Upon arriving home, Teng Jie found greater chaos than expected, and 
became convinced that China was in grave danger. He decided not to return 
to Japan, and instead drew up a plan of national salvation. Teng’s plan was to 
set up an underground organisation, the key element of which was the 
formation of a kind of taskforce, a “powerful, secret, highly disciplined 
organisation whose leading cadres would all be graduates of the Whampoa 
Military Academy.” 7 It was proposed that the organisation operate under the 
direct guidance of Chiang and in accordance with Sun's teachings.
By the time the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931, Teng 
had managed, after three meetings, to assemble a core of around forty like- 
minded nationalists, all graduates of the first six classes of the Whampoa 
Military Academy.8 Many of these officers had received their education at 
Japanese universities and military schools, and it is therefore plausible that, 
despite their opposition to Japanese designs on China, they were influenced
6 Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 103-106.
7 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.26; see also, Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 104-105.
8 Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 106-107 ; Among the group were, Feng T ifp ^ ,  Cai J in g ju n ^ K j^ , 
Lou Shaokarjt&Hia. Li B ingzhong^fltff1, Zhou F u jfJ^ , Deng Wenyi Zhang 
B en q in g ^ ^ t^ (w h o  later gave up his membership), He Z h o n g h a n ^ ^ ^ .
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by Japanese military groups, like the Black Dragon Society, advocating 
Fascist ideas. This group of Whampoa officers called itself the Sanminzhuyi 
lixingshe (Three Principles of the People Implementation
Society)9 , and it devoted itself in these early days to recruiting new members 
among other Whampoa graduates. At that particular time, September 1931, 
the name “Blueshirts” with which the organisation later became familiar, was 
not yet mentioned.
The Lixingshe soon developed cells in the police, the army, the party 
and government agencies. It began to direct the energies of these new recruits 
against alleged Communists within the Party, the Communists in the 
countryside, and pro-Japanese elements collaborating with the invaders. In 
January 1932, when the Japanese attacked Shanghai, it appeared to many 
observers that the Chinese had overcome the disorientation of five months 
earlier, and faced their aggressors with greater spirit and stability. This “was 
in large measure ascribed to the action of the new organisation.” 10
Initially, the members of the Lixingshe did not inform Chiang either of 
the group's existence or its activities. The reason for this was ostensibly that 
the organisation did not wish to burden him with yet another concern during 
a national crisis. By January 1932, however, fearful that Chiang would 
interpret their intentions as either disloyal or subversive, the Lixingshe’s 
leadership appointed Deng Wenyi f$ Jc H , 11 then serving as Chiang's 
personal secretary, to advise him of their existence and plans. 12
9 Gan Guoxun, et al., Lanyishe, fuxingshe, lixingshe. pp. 110-117. See also, Deng Yuanzhong, 
pp. 106-109.
10 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.27; see also Gan Guoxun, pp. 108-110.
11 Deng was bom in 1906, at Hunan Province. He graduated from Whampoa Military 
Academy in the First class. Deng’s work in the Blueshirts was considered very important.
From 1931 to 1934 Deng was primarily engaged in anti-Communist espionage. Afterwards, his 
interests shifted to cultural warfare and political indoctrination in the military.
12 Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 111-112.
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Languishing in his internal exile, Chiang originally greeted his 
secretary's announcement with little enthusiasm. He was, nevertheless, 
intrigued by the possibilities that it might offer him of coming out of his 
enforced retirement and resuming leadership of the party. He was also 
genuinely distressed by the lack of unity and the impotence of the regime. To 
Chiang, the group of highly motivated Whampoa graduates, who were not 
only fiercely nationalist but devoted to him personally, represented some 
kind of hope for a greater future. 13
Firstly, the “Whampoa Spirit that they had manifested during and after 
the Northern Expedition stood in shining contrast to the distressing display of 
self-seeking ineffectuality and corruption typical of most other party 
members.” 14 Secondly, the personal loyalty that they had manifested 
towards Chiang stood out against the factionalism and opportunism of many 
leading Guomindang politicians, 15 such as Wang Jingwei £EflHtj\ 16
13 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.27.
14 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p27.
15 Hatano Kanichi, Gendai shina no seiji to jimbustu (Politics and Personalities of 
Contemporary China), Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1937, pp.6-14; After the arrest o f Hu Hanmin in 
March 1931, Wang Jingwei organised his own organisation called Gaizupai \ Later, 
more pro-Wang Jingwei factions emerged with the following names: Xiandaipinglun pai
Nanhuapai Xueshengpai Sanminzhuyi qingnianpai
Gemingpinglun pai Those five factions became a powerful
opposition within the Guomindang. After his release on 14 October 1931, Hu Hanmin also 
organised his own organisation called the Zhishe f±. In 1932 the Guomindang’s left wing 
announced in a newspaper article four points of their policy (1) Adopting o f British Policy (2) 
anti- Nanjing government Policy (3) Assassination Policy (4) Contact with Manchuria. 
However, these four points were not adequately explained. That time a group o f Cantonese 
strongly advocated the Divide China Policy. This idea came basically from Da ke jia  zhu 
Among the Hakka were many important people, even some unclear
sources say that Sun Yatsen was also Hakka. Another example is, Deng Yandaf?P'$|jii, who 
had founded Di san dang (“Third Party”), the first party being the Guomindang, and
the second the CCP. Deng was also Hakka (he was in Germany during 1928-1930, and was 
killed in China in 1932). Chen Mingjiu $|l who founded the Guoguangshe and
Sun Ke who set up the Zaizaoshe were both Hakka.
^  Revolutionary leader of the Guomindang, native of Zhejiang bom in Canton. Received his 
Chinese classical education at Canton specialising in Chinese history, from which he imbibed 
the idea of racial independence. He went to Japan at the age of 19, and studied political science 
and sociology at Tokyo Law College, from which he graduated. During his stay in Japan, he
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Disloyalty was spreading down from the top levels of the party to the
ordinary membership, and was beginning to undermine seriously Chiang's
authority with rank-and-file party members. It is also likely that one of the
factors leading to the decision to form the Blueshirts was growing evidence
of personal disloyalty towards Chiang among certain student militia in the
autumn of 1931.
The fact that the central government ordered the anti-Japanese militias to 
disband in February 1932, followed so closely by the emergence o f the 
Li-hsing [Lixing] nicknam ed Blueshirts, suggests a probable 
connection.17
These militias had become highly critical of Chiang, censuring him for 
being unprepared to meet the Japanese attack, for being incapable of 
defending the country, and for failing to provide China with the decisive 
national leadership which it needed.18 Thus, in an attempt to monopolise, 
control and moderate anti-Japanese sentiment, Chiang decided to make use of 
the fledgling Lixingshe organisation, the existence of which he had just 
learned about.19
joined the Tongmenghui. Was elected member of the Central Executive Committee o f the 
Guomindang during its first National Congress in 1924.
17 Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs, The Failure o f  China's 
Revolutionary Diplomacy, 1931-1932, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991, p.104. 
With reference to his footnote 11, p. 106.
18 John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966, 
pp.169-176.
19 Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 111-112. Much of the Lixingshe’s efforts during those early days of 
their existence, were in fact directed against the Japanese, and pro-Japanese people, not 
exclusively against the Communists. At the same time Chiang was promoting his appeasement 
policy, one of the reasons for his forced retirement. Although the members of the new 
organisation wanted resistance against the Japanese, Chiang believed that the Lixingshe 
provided the best answer to encounter the crisis he faced.
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At almost the same time, a young Chinese man, Liu Jianqun was 
making his own contribution with the idea to “save China.”20 At the end of 
1931 he had put down his plans to reform the Guomindang in an essay 
entitled Gongxian yidian zhengli bendang de yijian (A Few Ideas for the 
Reform of the Party) which he brought to Chiang's attention in March 1932. 
Chiang thus found himself at an exceptional political conjuncture: a respected 
thinker was arguing for the formation of a new organisation at the same time 
as another party loyalist had actually founded just such an organisation. 
Furthermore, both events coincided with Chiang's own personal political 
need for a new body to bring him back into power and keep him there 
permanently. It was out of this marriage of the philosophical and the practical 
that the “Blueshirts” were bom.21 Just before fighting in Shanghai officially 
ended in March 1932,22 Chiang assembled the founders of the Lixingshe. 
After a ceremony comparable to the ritual Chinese secret societies used, the 
members had sworn an oath, and Chiang officially declared the formation of 
the new organisation with the name Sanminzhuyi lixingshe.23
When it was founded the Lixingshe was, at least on one level, merely 
another organised faction within the ramshackle structure of the Nationalist 
Party. On another level, however, it was exceptional, for it was created with a
20 Hatano Kanichi, Gendai shina no seiji to jimbustu, pp. 178-179 : He Zhonghan and Liu 
Jianqun suggested to adopt Fascist ideology. Liu was Re xue han (extremely pro-Han 
Chinese).
21 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.30; Actually Liu Jianqun had formed the beginning of a 
secret association in January 1932 on the model envisioned in his essay. See the next part of 
this thesis “Liu Jianqun and his Significance in the Formation of the Blueshirts.”
22 The date given for the establishment of the Blueshirts varies. For example Maria Chang, 
(p.57), refers to an unpublished diary on the Lixingshe, “hand-written by Chiang Kaishek”, and 
mentions 29 February 1932. Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.28, footnote 6, Deng, pp. 12 and 
118, and Chen Dunzheng in Gan Guoxun, et al., p.71, insist that the Lixingshe was formally 
established on 1 March. These sources reject the date 8 March, given by Gan Guoxun, pp.l 15 
and 117.
2^ Deng Yuanzhong, pp.l 10-111, 119.
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specific and entirely new role in mind. It was not only to embody the 
personal political beliefs of Chiang himself, but to spy on his opponents and 
other cliques, and to curtail their activities as far as possible.
B. The Significance of the Blueshirt Name
The organisation which operated within the Guomindang from 1932- 
38 became familiar to the Chinese public and the outside world as the 
Blueshirt Society (Lanyishe rather than by its more appropriate title
of Implementation Society {Lixingshe A frtt) . Some explanation about these 
two terms is required, as they caused much contemporary confusion, both 
among the public and in the official documentation of the Shanghai 
Municipal Police (SMP), which was circulated to most of the foreign 
embassies. In the Japanese reports the name Blueshirts was also used and it is 
often suggested that Japanese intelligence deliberately used this name in 
order to emphasise their Fascist label. This confusion continued when 
modem scholars began researching the Blueshirts.
Japanese intelligence was investigating the new organisation 
intensively almost from its inception, and almost always referred to it as the 
Blueshirts. Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party and the left-wing of the 
Guomindang in their publications invariably used the name Lanyishe 
(Blueshirt Society).24 Newspapers in China in the Chinese and English 
language and foreign newspapers cited the name Blueshirts, and the name 
was broadly adopted by the Chinese public. Yet this name, which had such 
general currency, was not in fact the official name of the organisation. Why 
did the Guomindang or the Blueshirts themselves not correct the widespread 
error? Almost certainly because the Blueshirts were a clandestine
24 Chen Gongshu, Lanyishe neimu, (Behind the Scenes of the Blueshirts) Shanghai guomin 
xinwen ,1942, (Chen Gongshu was a left wing member of the Guomindang).
122
Chapter Three
organisation working within the Guomindang party ranks, the existence of 
which was always officially denied by Chiang and the Guomindang. The 
confusion about names may indeed have been seen by the Blueshirts leaders 
as a ideal smokescreen behind which they were all the more free to operate 
without fear of recrimination or accountability.
An article in the newspaper Dagongbaoj^fc^ on 10 July 1932 
revealed : “When the name Lanyishe started to circulate among Chinese 
people, Chiang was criticised from various sides that he had formed a Fascist 
party within the ranks of the Kuomintang.”25 Chiang, interviewed about the 
Blueshirts in July 1932, publicly denied any knowledge of their existence, 
and he stated: “I shall live and die for the Guomindang, in life I am a member 
of the Guomindang and in death a spirit of the Guomindang.”26 While 
Chiang publicly denied the very existence of such a Fascist group, during a 
personal interview he later had with Dagongbao's editor-of-chief Hu 
Zhengzhi ®C£,27 Chiang actually admitted the Blueshirts' existence. He 
confessed to Hu Zhengzhi that “if people knew the exact truth, it would be 
much easier for my political opponents to destroy this organisation.”28
2  ^PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930, (469), Extract from: Peking and Tientsin Times, From Party 
to Personal Dictatorship, 8 August, 1933. See also, NA, SMP, D.4685, 20 June 1933, Special 
Branch, Blueshirts - Fascisti Movement in China.
26 PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930, (469).
27 Journalist, bom in Sichuan in 1893. He completed his early education in his home province. 
He went to Japan and studied at Tokyo College, from which he graduated in 1911, after taking 
the general college course and a special course in law and political science. On his return to 
China, he made an application for admission to the bar and passed the examination. In 1915, he 
went to Qirin in connection with the Sino-Japanese negotiations about the time when the 
twenty-one Demands were presented to China with an ultimatum. In 1921, he went to Shanghai 
and organised the Guowen News Agency, an independent news and advertising service, in 
1926 he assisted in promoting a company to take over the Dagongbao from the old 
management and became its general manager.
28 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru chosa (An Investigation of the Blueshirts). Issued by the 
Research Division of Foreign Ministry, marked "secret" 1936), p.40.
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When the National Salvation Corps (Jiuguotuan ifcUH), organised by 
students of the Whampoa Military Academy and adherents of Wang Jingwei, 
placed searching questions to Chiang regarding this “Fascist Society”, 
Chiang once more denied any connection with the Society, stating that he 
hated it.29
It seems to have been Chiang's opponents - the Japanese, the 
Communists30 and the left-wing of the Guomindang under the leadership of 
Wang Jingwei - who insisted on the Blueshirt label, doubtless because it 
made the political point about their Fascist nature all the more readily.
Blue Shirt A ssociation under the leadership o f  Chiang Kaishek is only 
an instrument to oppress the people and safeguard the rule o f  
Imperialism in China. It is the organisation to help Chiang to sell 
China.3 1
The name “Blueshirts” obviously bears strong resemblance to the 
names given to the Fascist movements in other countries, such as 
“Brownshirts” in Germany and “Blackshirts” in Italy and the UK32; in the 
US too, Fascist movements were known as the White Shirts, Silver Shirts, 
and Khaki Shirts.33 Indeed, organisations with the name Blueshirts also 
existed in Egypt,34 Ireland and France.
29 PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930 (434-437), Enclosure in Shanghai P/L despatch to Beijing 
nr.202, 17 July 1933.
30 Ou Weiwen, “Lanyishe yu zhongguo guomindang”, Nanfangzazhi, vol.2-7, 1933.
31 NA, SMP, D4685, Special Branch, 7 March, 1933.
32 As far as could be confirmed the term Braimhemden -“Brownshirts” was not used in 
Germany during the 1930s. The preferred name was the abbreviation SA. The same approach 
may count for Mussolini’s Camicie Nere - “Blackshirts”, in Italy they were often referred to as 
Squadristi.
33 AAPA, Deutsche Botschaft, Washington D.C., 19 January, 1934, “Faschismus in America, 
Silver Shirts, Khaki Shirts and White Shirts.”
34 PRO, FO, 371/20123-2052, 5 December, 1936, 371/20883-2763, 3 May, 1937, and 
371/20884-2763, 7 June, 1937, “Blue Shirts in Egypt”, Nahas Pasha is mentioned as the leader. 
Also Green Shirts existed in Egypt.
124
Chapter Three
Although the term “Blueshirt” was used widely, it was certainly not 
used universally, and there were a number of other names in fairly common 
circulation. In the Chinese press, especially the Japanese-controlled 
“mosquito newspapers”,35 as well as in documents from embassies, slight 
variations occur regarding the name Blueshirts Society. Sometimes they were 
referred to as Blue Jackets,36 or the Blue Shirt Group (Lanyituan SS ^  ffl). 
Names such as the Blue Shirt Party (.Lanyidang M),37 and the Blue
Clothes Society were not uncommon.
A number of other names were in use, indicating either the entire 
Blueshirt organisation or perhaps confusing a particular department or bureau 
with the entire organisation.38 One of these other names was Jiuwanghui 
#■ £# , meaning “Save the Nation from Ruin Society.”39 British documents 
suggest that some attempt was made to use the latter name for public 
purposes, while the shorter form “Blueshirts” was only used for secret or 
internal communications.40 A report from the British legation in Beijing 
mentions that “reports of the activities of the organisation, also apparently 
styled the Jiuwanghui, have from time to time appeared in the Chinese press,
35 A “Mosquito” newspaper, was a newspaper printed in the Chinese language, but published 
by foreigners such as the Japanese or the British.
36 J.W.Phillips, “Blue Jackets in China, A Study in Colonial Fascism”, China Today, vol. 1-2, 
November 1934 and vol.l- 3, December 1934.
3)7 AAPA, 1506/2549/34, 26 March 1934, by Timan Organisation der Blauhemden. See also, 
BA, Deutsche Botschaft China, 09.02, nr.2235, 24 September 1934, by Consul-General 
Kriebel, Fascistische Vereinigungen in China, Neue Lebensbewegung.
38 Manshu hyoron (Manzhou Critics), vol. 5-2, July 1933, Tachibana Shiraki.
39 PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930, SMP, report, (469-473). Enclosure No.2 in despatch to 
Foreign Office; Extract: Peking and Tientsin Times, 8 August, 1933: From Party to Personal 
Dictatorship.
40 PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930, SMP report, (437-445), Enclosure in Shanghai P/L despatch 
to Peking nr.202, 17th July, 1933, (437) “The Blueshirt Society.” See also, NA, D.4685, SMP 
report, 20 June 1933, Blueshirts- Fascisti Movement in China, by Robertson Officer Special 
Branch. This information comes from a very confidential source.
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where it is often referred to as a Fascist or semi-Fascist body under the 
control of Chiang Kaishek.”41
This misinterpretation of the movement’s name emphasises the 
problems regarding accuracy of information about all aspects of the 
organisation even when the information came from normally well-informed 
sources. It was clear that only a few confidants had a complete insight into 
the structure of the organisation 42 Japanese scholarship may provide a way 
out of some of the difficulties by providing a geographical perspective:43 one 
study reports that members in Hankou used to call the organisation Fuxing 
she H ?± (Revival Society), while those in Nanjing and Shanghai tended 
to use the name Jiuwanghui. In the North of China, the most frequently used 
term was Tucunshe ® ?±, (Contrive to Survive Society). Unfortunately,
this name is not found in any other document.
As far as the organisation's official name Lixingshe is concerned, its 
first use in documents of public record was in a secret report in April 1939 by 
the S2 Special Branch of the SMP. The report discusses the Blueshirts, or the 
Moral Culture Association, although this translation is certainly incorrect:
He [Dai Li] is the founder o f  the Blueshirts or the M oral Culture 
Association  (Lixingshe J j  f t  ?±), which was form ed in 1932 w ith the 
object o f  supporting Chiang, rem oving all obstacles from the path o f  the 
m ilitary leader and effecting a strong union o f W ham poa Cadets.44
4  ^ PRO, FO, 371/17142 xc 930, British Legation Shanghai, July, August 1933, (434-445); 
Shanghai despatch nr.226, 31 August 1933. Extract from Peking and Tientsin Times, 31 
August 1933, (469-473).
42 Deng Yuanzhong, pp. 108-109. That cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy had formed 
a group called "Brown Shirt Society" in order to "Save the Nation from Ruin", was revealed in 
the New York Times, 9 September 1932. There is, however, no indication why this newspaper 
published the name Brown Shirts in relation to the Blueshirts.
43 Manshu hyoron (Manchu Critics), vol.4-2, 14th January, 1933. Tachibana Shiraki (ed.).
44 NA, D.7657, S2. Special Branch SMP, 24 April 1939, General Tai Li, founder o f  the 
Chinese Blue Shirts Society. The Chinese characters used in the document stand for Lixing she, 
The name Lixingshe was also used in the Japanese documents, TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen 
to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite, 1940.
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An earlier use of a version of this name is found in an open letter of 
Whampoa cadets to Chiang, published in 1936 in China Today containing, 
among other information, details of the attempt on the life of Wang Jingwei 
by the Blueshirts: “It was organised and carried through by Chen Kwangkuo 
[Chen Guangguo], head of the Special Section of the Lis king huei 
[Lixinghui, i.e. the Blue Shirts], which is your [Chiang's] private party 
outside the Kuomintang.”45 It is therefore clear that the name Lixingshe 
(used here in the version Lixinghui), was well known as a name for the 
Blueshirts well before the 1939 report. Despite the apparent knowledge of 
their official name, the term “Blueshirt” continued in almost universal use 
and the name Lixingshe was hardly ever used.
The name Sanminzhuyi lixingshe in literature and
official documents is translated into English in a variety of ways. The 
translation used by Maria Chang and others is “Earnest Action Society o f The 
Three Principles o f the People ”,46 while Eastman used “ Vigorously Carry 
Out Society o f The Three Principles o f the People.”47 However, the preferred 
translation used in this thesis is the Implementation Society of the Three 
Principles of the People. That said, as it has now slipped into both common 
and historical convention, the more familiar term Blueshirts Society will 
continued to be used in reference to the Lixingshe.
4 5 China Today, vol.3, nr 2, November 1936, “Chiang Kai-shek’s Whampoa Cadets Accuse.” 
See also NA, D7657, S2, Special Branch Anti-Chiang Kai-shek Propaganda, obtained by 
SMP, 14 November 1936.
4^ Chang, p.4.
4^ Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.27.
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C. The Symbolic Significance of The Colour Blue
The Blueshirt publication Shehui xinwen ($t #  §r H Society Mercury)
drew attention to the importance of colour symbolism in Chinese public life
in its criticisms of the Communist Party:
W here the Guom indang uses Blue and W hite as colour symbols, and the 
Italian National Socialists are using Black, the Chinese Com m unist Party 
needs three different colour symbols; viz. Red, Burgundy and a Paper 
M ulberry colour, in order to describe their party. Keeping in m ind that 
the bandits are symbolised by M ud colour, and the Chinese opportunist 
politicians represent colour Grey, we m ay ask the following question - 
when the three colours, Red, Burgundy and Paper M ulberry are mixed, 
what kind o f  colour are we supposed to get? 48
Clearly, “colouring” your opponents was of some significance. 
Traditionally, colour symbolism in Chinese culture is of great importance and 
it is common practice, instead of using the name of a group or party, to refer 
to the colour symbol associated with it: as with the Green and Red Gangs. 
The Guomindang Party has always regarded Blue and White as their 
principal colours. The ranges of meaning attributed to these colours may vary 
according to context: blue colour may signify the Han Chinese, and blue and 
white may symbolise Heaven and Earth. Generally China is described as 
“Land of Blue Gown” (Lanshan dadi J&).
The Blueshirts themselves certainly used a much wider range of 
colours than a simple blue. For example, they often used a patch or badge in 
the shape of a triangle with sides one inch long in order to distinguish their 
members, and the patch was coloured differently to denote different sections 
of the organisation.49 For instance, the Military used red, and the Military
48 SHXW, vol, 5-19, “Shemindang de sediao” (Social Democratic Party’s Colour Symbolism), 
27 November 1933, no pagination.
49 PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930,16 October 1933, from British Legation, Peking. Evidence that 
badges were used was given in this report. The report describes how the police at Wuchang 
wanted to arrest two ’’Chinese gangsters”, who were suspected of being Blueshirts members 
having murdered a Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese. However, they exhibited 
badges which were apparently sufficient to allow them to go their way.
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Police used pink and Police Officers used white. Ordinary Guomindang Party 
members in turn wore Blue patches. When members were wearing traditional 
Chinese costume, the badges were hidden in the inside of the right sleeve, 
similar to members of the traditional secret societies; on Westem-style suits 
they were fixed on the right side of their waistcoats under their jackets.50
D. Organisation and Structure of the Blueshirts
The earliest systematic investigations of the Blueshirts' organisation 
are described in detailed reports made by Japanese Intelligence in 1937 and 
later in 1939 after the interrogation of the former Blueshirts member, Zhuan 
Shenglan AM#H.51 Japanese Intelligence had observed that the previous 
report describing the organisation was not detailed and not distinct enough, 
and the hope was expressed that this new report would fill in the gaps. The 
Japanese reports make use of various illustrations to describe the structure 
and organisation, such as three concentric circles in its simplest form up to 
quite ingenious constructions. In different ways the Japanese also used a 
hierarchical pyramid to explain the organisation and structure. However, 
essentially these illustrations all represent the same intention, namely to 
emphasise the maintenance of control and secrecy of the organisation. 
Fundamentally the Blueshirts’ organisation resembled that of the traditional 
Chinese secret society. Although the ideas in the 1930s in Chinese society 
about the traditional secret societies had already changed, that may have been 
the starting point for the (semi-open) Blueshirts Society. This change was 
directed in the “military” way, which was suitable for Chiang Kaishek. It
50 TB, 6017, Shin fassho no naimaku (The Inside Story of Chinese Fascism), p.4, by 
Nammanshu tetzudo, Shanghai Office, June 1935.
5 1 TB, 2057, see also TB, 8463, Ranisha no bocho kyu choho kosaku ni kansuru shiryo 
(Materials about the Blueshirts’ Intelligence Activities), see also TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen 
to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
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should be kept in mind, however, that no traditional secret society actually 
had military power, whereas the Blueshirts had.
The most spectacular ritual of the secret society was undoubtedly the 
initiation ceremony. New members were introduced by old members and had 
to learn the secret signs and esoteric language of the society. At the initiation 
ceremony candidates vowed to keep the secrets of the fraternity, and read 
oaths from a paper which was then burned and mixed into a bowl of chicken 
blood, tinted with wine and sugar. They also became bloodbrothers by 
squeezing some of their blood into the bowl and drinking from it. Such 
ceremonies were often accompanied by secret body and hand signals and 
perhaps even a secret dance, which was one of the means by which the rank 
and file as well as officers identified each other.
Chinese secret societies tended to vary their ostensible aims, activities 
and even to some extent, organisation, according to circumstances. Secret 
societies could disguise themselves as open associations like friendship clubs, 
or maintain both their existence and their functions in strict secrecy. In this 
respect the Blueshirts were very similar to traditional Chinese secret 
societies.
The structure, organisation and objectives of the Blueshirts are also 
described in various reports from Western archives,52 drawn mainly from 
investigations by SMP agents. The principal difference between the Japanese 
and Western reports observed is that the reports from, for example, the SMP 
officers never attempted to analyse the structure of the Blueshirts in a 
systematic way - indeed, the Western reports were less detailed and more 
fragmented in their information.
52 NA, SMP, D4685, 20 June, 1933, Fascisti Movement in China. See also FOH, code J l, 
nr. 1866/191, 26 June, 1933, Shanghai, Political and Military Messages, "Blueshirts." See also, 
PRO, FO, nr. 371/17142 xc 930, pp.434-445, 17 July, 1933, SMP report.
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In addition, the more recent publications of Gan Guoxun and Deng 
Yuanzhong describe the Blueshirts’ organisation and structure minutely.53 
Eastman in his study of the Blueshirts was one of the first scholars to refer to 
both these sources, by stating that:
In 1972 I published an article on the “Blueshirts,” and Gan Guoxun may, 
in fact, have written his first article on the Lixingshe in response to 
mine.... M uch that I wrote about the Lixingshe in that article is, I believe, 
still o f  use, but these two new books do indisputably correct some o f  my 
previous m isconceptions — principally about the m anner in which the 
organisation came into being.5^
For his initial research on the Blueshirts Eastman mainly used 
Japanese sources. Comparing the information given in the Japanese reports 
with the publications of Gan Guoxun and Deng Yuanzhong, the Japanese 
sources prove to be quite reliable. In response to Eastman’s observations, the 
description of the Blueshirts’ structure and organisation in the earlier 
Japanese and more recent Chinese sources will be adopted in this thesis.
E. Japanese and Chinese Analyses
According to the Japanese reports, the Blueshirts were organised as a 
series of three concentric circles.55 The innermost circle, the core of the 
organisation, formed the Lixingshe, which numbered only 528 members in 
193 7,56 with Chiang Kaishek as its paramount leader in the centre. The
53 Gan Guoxun, Lanyishe, Fwcingshe, Lixingshe (Blue Shirt Society, Revival Society), Taibei: 
Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, 1984, and Deng Yuanzhong, Sanminzhuyi Lixingshe Shi.
54 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.26. For his earlier studies Eastman refers to “Fascism in 
Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts,” China Quarterly, 49 (January-March 1972), pp. 1-31.
55 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite. See also, TB, 2057, Ranisha 
ni kansuru chosha, pp.45-47.
5^ TB, 2196; see also Eastman, “A Review Article”, pp. 30-31. Eastman mentions about 300 
members and refers to Gan Guoxun, pp.7, 118-120, and Chen Dunzheng, in Gan Guoxun, et 
al., p.58, and Deng, pp.13, 25, 142-143.
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control of this core level was in the hands of a Central Executive Committee 
(C.E.C.) consisting of seventeen full and nine reserve members, although the 
exact size of it may have varied over the years.57 This central cadre formed 
an administrative centre determining the Blueshirts policy. The heart of this 
organisation was a five-man standing committee, one of these five men being 
the executive secretary. It is known that from 1932 until their disbandment in 
1938 five different persons served as the Blueshirts’ executive secretary.58
In order to supervise the decision making of policies and operations 
determined by the C.E.C. of the Blueshirts, the executive secretary was given 
assistance by a secretariat and by four separate functional departments, 
namely General Affairs, Propaganda, Organisation, and Special Services. 
Similar departmental divisions also directed operations at secondary 
organisational levels.59
The second ring of the concentric circles initially contained two elitist 
organisations, formed about a month later than the Lixingshe. The first one 
was Zhongguo geming qingnian junren lianhehui 4^  W^?A®1E^1|■
or4:,?  (the Revolutionary Army Comrades Association), based around He 
Zhonghan and graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy, and the second 
one Zhongguo qingnian tongzhihui or (the Youth
57 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite. The top of the Lixingshe 
became known as the Thirteen Princes. The names of this core of the Blueshirts from its 
establishment, and that appear most frequently were: Feng Ti f  P^>, He Zhonghan
Kang Ze Deng Wenyi Zhou Fu JfItH, Pan Youqiang Dai Li JUgai:, Liu
Jianqun Zheng Jiemin Xiao Zanyii Gui Yongqing , Teng Jie
JH'fc, and Zeng Kuoqing . See also, Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.79.
58 TB, 2057, pp.49-50, (only five men but no names are given). See also Eastman, The 
Abortive Revolution, p.57, see his footnote 86. The men who served as executive secretary 
were: Teng Jie (March 1932-January 1933), He Zhonghan (January 1933-August 1934), Feng 
Ti (August 1934-October 1935), Liu Jianqun (October 1935-September 1937), and Kang Ze 
(September 1937-April 1938).
59 TB, 2057; see also Eastman, “A Review Article”, pp.30-31, see his footnotes 15 and 16
which refer to Gan Guoxun, pp.7, 118-120, Chen Dunzheng, in Gan Guoxun, et al., p.58, and 
Deng, pp.13,25,142-143.
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Comrades Association), based around Liu Jianqun and non-military 
members. The Revolutionary Army Comrades Association, was abolished in 
early 193 3.60
Factionalism had begun tearing at the fabric of the organisation almost 
from the beginning. Competition between the two factions within the 
organisation soon became endemic, sometimes even erupting in fights 
between members of the two groups. As a consequence, in early 1933, 
Chiang ordered the Revolutionary Army Comrades Association to cease all 
activities.
The Youth Comrades Association became the Lixingshe’s main cover 
group, consisting of the upper-middle divisions of the cadre strata. They were 
actually instrumental in creating the Blueshirts. It was through this 
Association that new members enrolled in the organisation, and many 
activities planned by the Lixingshe were in the first place executed through 
this Association. They infiltrated the civilian populace, the bureaucracy, and 
numerous military units. The Youth Comrades Association organised 
networks all over China, and was said to have had about 30,000 members in 
1938.61 Sometimes people mistakenly referred to the Youth Comrades 
Association as the Zhonghua fuxingshe (China Revival Society or
Renaissance Society). In fact the Fuxingshe formed the third ring, and was in 
size and character the most significant vanguard organisation brought into 
being by the Lixingshe.62 The Fuxingshe was the organisation’s mass base
6® TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo. See also Eastman, “A Review Article”, pp.30-31.
6  ^ TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo. See also Eastman, “A Review Article”, pp.30-31.
62 Gan Guoxun, p. 120. See also Deng, p. 120, and Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.31; see also 
Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 60 with reference to his footnote 94. Eastman observed 
that the Fuxingshe was not brought into existence until July 1934. He could, “however, see no 
corroborating evidence in other sources.” Nonetheless, carefully reading of Gan Guoxun and 
Deng, reveals that a name for the new front organisation, the Fuxingshe, had been chosen 
informally by April 1932. However, it was not until July 1934 that the Fuxingshe became 
actually fully active. In order to confuse matters more, Gan Guoxun and Deng Yuanzhong 
report that the name Fuxingshe was officially recognised in July 1933.
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and included staff members of the central headquarters and branch 
organisations. It was at the lowest level of the organisation and relatively 
easy for new members to join through recommendation by older members.
Application for the Youth Comrades Association and the Lixingshe 
was much more difficult, as screening and approval procedures were harder 
to pass. The Fuxingshe numbered approximately 300,000 members in 1937, 
although figures given varied between 100,000 to nearly 500,000. The 
organisational design of the Fuxingshe was essentially the same as that of the 
Lixingshe and the Youth Comrades Association, namely division into four 
departments. However, the Fuxingshe had no leadership and organisation of 
its own, this was vested in the Youth Comrades Association with, at the top, 
ultimately the same men that headed the Lixingshe. The whole organisation 
was ruled by the principle of democratic centralism, meaning that debate was 
admitted at lower levels, but decisions were made at the top. Thus, decision 
making remained reserved to this highest level, and as such the Fuxingshe 
had no leadership of its own, all decisions coming from the top of the 
organisation.
Coexisting with the above described bureaucratic construction was a 
supervisory system, a control commission, performing as a watchdog 
overseeing the Blueshirts’ administrative work. This commission checked 
estimated expenditures of the Blueshirts, and kept watch over the thoughts, 
behaviour and actions of individual members.63 The total membership of this 
control group may have numbered over one thousand people, with at its top a 
supervisory committee with an executive secretary at its head. At the branch 
and sub-branch levels corresponding committees operated which were 
nominated by the co-ordinating committee.64
63 TB, 2057, pp.76-77.
64 TB, 2057, pp.76-77. 
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Japanese sources also describe how the Blueshirts’ organisation 
essentially consisted of a pyramidal structure at the top of which was, of 
course, the leader Chiang Kaishek.65 Under him, the pyramidal structure 
was, from top to bottom, divided into three distinct layers. At the highest 
level was the Lixingshe itself, forming the command stratum of the 
organisation. The second layer formed the middle cadre (including the Youth 
Comrades Association), while the third and lowest part consisted of the mass 
base of the organisation (Fuxingshe). Each of these layers again was 
vertically subdivided into three separate sectors, representing different 
occupations and each having its own organisation and leaders. One sector 
was made up of civilians, the second of officials (from the government), 
while the third sector was made up of military members.
The Blueshirts’ foremost strength was in military organisations, the 
operations of which were centralised in the Military Council, which was one 
of the most significant institutions in the Guomindang organisation. The 
Blueshirts’ influence over central military organisations was clearly because 
Chiang was chairman of the Military Council. Practically each administrative 
bureau of the council had been led by a Blueshirts member. Control systems 
spread out from these bureaux to the provincial branch offices. Though the 
Blueshirts were strongest in military organisation, some of the non-military 
members were particularly important in the political developments of the 
1930s. The four most important were Kang Ze lj£§> Dai Li He
Zhonghan and Deng Wenyi ffJS #|. Liu Jianqun §!) fit also held
an important position in the organisation.
The objective of this three-tiered organisation was to revive the nation. 
Indeed, one Japanese source referred to the Lixingshe and its subordinate 
units as the Minzhu fuxing yundong K±tSJ|jl[!8j (Democratic Revival
65 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
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Movement). Democracy - or sovereignty - was, of course, one of the pillars 
of Sun's Three Principles of the People.
The second level of the hierarchical pyramid, containing the middle 
cadre was divided into several branch and sub-branch associations. This level 
included the Youth Comrades Association, forming the Blueshirts’ secondary 
level of leadership. Cadres of this level in the branches and sub-branches 
were involved with the special service operations of the Blueshirts, 
performing especially important functions, such as that of instructor in the 
Military Academy. There may have been about ten branch organisations, 
spread out over the provinces and important cities. These branches again 
were divided into sub-branches. Subsequently each branch and sub-branch 
was headed by a secretary. Together with the central cadres, these secretaries 
composed the Lixingshe.
The third and lowest level of the pyramid formed the Zhonghua 
fuxingshe, and was the mass base of the organisation, containing all other 
ordinary members of the Blueshirts. It was organised as the Guomindang 
party itself. One of the enduring hallmarks of Comintern influence on the 
Guomindang in the early 1920s was the fact that this level was organised into 
small cells of militants. These so-called small groups consisted of three to 
nine members.66
All members of the Blueshirts were expected to measure their 
behaviour against the most severe criteria; such as to obey the leader under 
all circumstances, to maintain secrecy, and the members were to be 
committed single-minded to the corps.
The organisational network set up by the Blueshirts was intended to 
cover the whole nation.67 To achieve this, the Blueshirts focused their efforts
66 TB, 2057, pp.115-116.
67 TB, 2057, pp.131-137. Areas and places where important Headquarters of the Blueshirts 
were located included Sichuan Province, where a large and major military headquarters was
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on four major movements: New Life, National Military Training, National 
Economic Reconstruction, and Internal Pacification and Resistance to 
Aggression Movements.68 The Internal Pacification and Resistance to 
Aggression Movement was considered to be the basis of the other three. It 
was determined that unless the nation was first unified and secure, it would 
be impossible to realise the spiritual, social, and economic reconstruction of 
the nation, which were the goals of the other movements.
F. Western Analyses
In order to indicate that the Western reports were essentially correct, 
although more fragmented and less detailed in their information about the 
organisation of the Blueshirts a few examples are described below. The 
reports conclude that members of the organisation were temporarily limited 
to 3,000 of which about 2,000 men should come from the graduates of the 
Whampoa Military Academy and the rest should be chosen from the people 
at large. Leaders in the Central organisation were thirteen altogether, possibly
found, because of the presence of the Red Army, while many Blueshirt members came from 
Sichuan Province. In Jiangxi Province (in the Nanchang area) the second most important 
headquarters was located, also, because of the Red Army. Nanjing was the Blueshirts* home 
base, and the main activities of Blueshirts were channelled through Nanjing. In Zhejiang 
Province there was also an important headquarters, because it was Chiang Kaishek's birth 
place. In Fujian Province the 4th most important headquarters of the Blueshirts was located 
(possibly as a result o f the Fujian rebellion). Other headquarters were in order of importance 
located as follows; the 5th ( Hubei), the 6th (Anhui), the 7th (Henan), the 8th (Guizhou), the 
9th (Shaanxi), the 10th (Gansu), the 11th (Ningxia), the 12th (Shanxi), the 13th (Yunnan). 
Shanghai had no location of any formal military headquarters of the Blueshirts, but as is well- 
known, quite a few Blueshirt groups were working in the Shanghai area, where it controlled 
the Police and Security forces. Blueshirts, through Qing Bang influence, exercised a firm hold 
on the French Concession Police and tried to do the same on the SMP. Blueshirt members had 
also infiltrated the Guomindang’s Public Security Bureau and became very influential. For the 
influence of the Blueshirts in the Shanghai area, see also Chapter 5 of this thesis.
68 See “Ranyisha”, Ajia rekishi jiten  (Asia’s Historical Event Dictionary), Tokyo: 
Heibonsha,1959, vol. 9, p. 174, and Toyo rekishi jiten  (The Great Historical Asian Dictionary) 
Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1959. See also, Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.31; Gan Guoxun, pp.141- 
148.
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referring to the Thirteen Princes (Shisan taibao +  H ffi), the name given 
to the group of devoted followers of Chiang Kaishek who played leading 
roles in the Blueshirts.69
The A ssociation established its branches in every part o f the country 
where is a local organ o f  the Kuom intang [Guomindang]. The branch 
officers picked up the loyal m em bers o f  the party and made them 
m em bers o f  the branch. Its purpose being to grasp the dom inant power in 
the 5th General M eeting o f  the Kuomintang. The purpose is to establish 
a central political power, which should be established under the 
dictatorship o f  Chiang Kai-shek. To attain the goal, the Association 
wants to develop three m ovem ents.?6
The movements described in the document are.
Jianjun yundong MWMMt (The movement to make the army sound) 
To watch generals in various parts of the country - To seize the power of the 
existing generals - To train the Chinese armies in a Fascist way and to 
indoctrinate the soldiers with Fascist ideas - The most important part of the 
Association should be occupied by the militia-political student group and 
political student group at the Political Training Institute.
Jiandangyundong WzMMM) (The movement to make the party sound) 
To drive out all the party leaders of the various cliques and keep party 
business under the influence of the association - to restore the presidency in 
the party - to send the efficient elements of the Association to the local
69 TB, 2196, as mentioned before the top o f the Lixingshe became known as the Thirteen 
Princes. See also Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.36, with the Thirteen Princes, not 
exactly thirteen persons were meant. The term referred loosely to the group who played a 
leading role in the Blueshirts and they numbered somewhere between nine and eighteen men.
70 NA, SMP, D4685, 20 June 1933. See also FOH, J1 nr. 1866/191, Political & Military 
Information about “Blueshirts”, 26 June 1933. See also.PRO, FO, nr. 371/17142 xc 930, pp. 
434-445, 17 July, 1933, SMP report. These relative early investigations, about the Blueshirts 
provides a good insight regarding the organisation and objectives. Although here describing 
Western sources, nearly the same information is also found in Japanese documents or books; 
TB, 2196, Ranisha no shoshiki to hanman konichi katsudo no jitsurei, pp. 20-21. The 
information in the Western reports is in part different from the Japanese Intelligence report in 
1940, referred to before. Because in the Western reports, produced in 1933, only three 
movements are mentioned, as the New Life Movement had not yet been founded in 1933.
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Dangbu M pP (L o c a l p a rty  o rg a n )  in  o rd e r  to  sa fe g u a rd  th e  F a s c is t  m o v e m e n t 
o f  th e  o rg a n isa tio n .
Jiancai yundong (The movement to make finances sound)
Equalisation of land rights - to raise loans in the name of the state-owned 
enterprises and provide the Fascist movement with financial support.
Through these three movements, the Blueshirts tried to assume 
dominance within the party and the state. According to the Western reports, 
the policy of the Blueshirts was directed towards six main objectives.
(a) Propaganda policy, aimed at achieving a unity of national views in its 
newspapers and periodicals. This line of work was the responsibility of 
Generals Cheng Tianfang g  Shao Yuanchong E|5 jcM1 and Chen Bulei
(b) Financial Policy, laid down by T.V.Soong. This aimed at inducing all the 
compradores in Shanghai and their subordinates to support the Blueshirts.
(c) Educational Policy, under the authority of Zhu Jiahua ^  ^  !$, ex- 
Minister of education, and Chen Guofu Eft HU
(d) Foreign Policy: In order to forge links with Fascist parties in Italy and 
Germany, Liu Wendao $J JS and H.H. Kung ?L the then Chairman 
of the Central Bank in China, were sent respectively to Germany and to Italy.
(e) Internal Policy : All those opposed to the Blueshirt Movement were 
purged from the Guomindang as reactionaries and attacked as political 
enemies.
(f) Terrorist policy : The Blueshirts instituted an Assassination Corps, 
divided into two departments :
a. Detective Department, and b. Assassination Department.
Each of these two departments was, in its turn, divided into two sections. The 
Detective Department had a Military Secret Service under Wang Bailing 3E
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and a Special Secret Service, under Gu Jianzhong f i  in charge
of political information.
The two sections of the Assassination Department were the anti-
Communist Campaign Corps, selected from among the Social Corps of
Public Security Bureau, and a Sniping Corps, mostly referred to as the Blood
and Iron Corps, headed by Gu Shunzhang ( g  J l [ j f  j p c ,  who had formerly been a
well-known Communist leader.
The B lood and Iron Corps was a name given to the Blueshirts' sniping 
corps, consisting o f  graduates o f  the Political Training Institute at the 
W hampoa M ilitary Academy, who were specially selected to perform 
this task. The Blood and Iron Corps, was part o f  the Blueshirts 
Assassination Department, headed by Koo Shunchwang. The members 
o f  this later section were picked from among the graduates o f  the 
Political Training Institute o f W ham poa M ilitary Academy. General 
Yang Hu, Com m issioner o f the Public Order Corps at Shanghai and 
notorious Ching Bang leader, was in charge o f training. In 1933 it was 
estimated that members o f  this corps in Shanghai numbered about 
200.72
Within these Blueshirt branches, tight security was maintained by a 
traditional Chinese cell-system of organisation, within which each group 
knew only its own leader, who in turn had contact with only one superior, 
and not with other cells. All members should be prepared to sacrifice 
everything in the interest of the country, thereby to foster the idea of a central 
authority. Each member had to be sworn into the Blueshirts by a solemn 
oath, and each member received a certificate on joining, and could only leave 
the Society upon death.
7  ^ Government officer, bom at Yangzhou, Jiangsu, attended the Beijing Military College, 
Tianjin, also studied at the Japanese Military Officers College at Tokyo, where he joined the 
Tongmenghui, took active part in the first Revolution of 1911; served as high adviser to Sun 
Yatsen then Chiang Kaishek in Canton in 1923; assisted in organising the Whampoa Military 
Academy in which he served as an instructor in 1924.
7^ NA, D4685, SMP report 20 June 1933 (see for more information on the phrase Blood and 
Iron the section about Dai Li, Chapter Four).
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This system of course also lent itself very well to individual cells 
acting on their own without orders from above, and this may go some way to 
explaining some of the atrocities which were attributed to the Blueshirts by 
their enemies - some of their activities seem to have a clearly political 
motivation, while others seem little more than brigandage.73
G. Liu Jianqun and his Significance in the Formation of the Blueshirts
It is possible that Liu Jianqun’s contribution to the formation of the 
Blueshirts has been somewhat overestimated. However, as most documents 
relating to the organisation refer to his essay, it is necessary to consider his 
work as part of the process which led to the setting up of the Blueshirt 
organisation.
Liu was a civilian who had served the revolution during the Northern 
Expedition and who was employed in 1931 as General He Yingqin's 
mM§k1A secretary, serving in his anti-Communist headquarters in Nanchang. 
It was during his period of service here that Liu began to discuss with his 
colleagues subjects such as the decline of the revolution and the rampant 
corruption among the officers which paralysed any effective action. After his 
views were challenged by military officers, in October 1931 he produced his
73 BA, 0902, nr.2235, Deutsche Botschaft China, (31-34), 24 September 1934. nr. B.316, 
Akt.P.0.7, nr.5726/34.
7^ General assistant Chief of Staff to the Nationalist Army Headquarters at N anjing, and 
Chairman of the Zhejiang provincial government committee. Native o f Guizhou province 
where he was bom in 1891. After receiving a Chinese education in his home village, he was 
sent to the Japanese Officers Military Academy in Japan from which he graduated with 
honours. He returned to Guizhou province and for a time was commander o f an army brigade 
there. When the First Division of the First Nationalist Army Corps was organised at Canton in 
preparation for the Northern advance, He Yingqin was appointed Commander of the First 
Division, under Chiang Kaishek who commanded the corps. Upon Chiang Kaishek’s return to 
the Government and resumption of command of the Nationalist forces, He was made Assistant 
Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Army Headquarters. Since 1930 Minister of Military 
Administration [Defence Minister],
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aforementioned 87- page essay “A Few Ideas for the Reform of the 
Party.”75
The Beijing Morning Post published an interview with Liu in 1934, 
which revealed:
During the course o f  his reception o f  newspaper reporters at Peiping 
yesterday at his headquarters, Mr. Liu Chi Chuin [Liu Jianqun], C hief 
Captain o f  the N orth China Propaganda Corps7** [a Blueshirts front 
organisation], distributed among the attendance three kinds o f  his own 
writings, am ongst which was one entitled Offer some views fo r  the 
adjustm ent o f  the Kuomintang, w ritten in October 1931. Article 5 o f  this 
article contains a rem arkable subject entitled: The Organisation o f  the 
Blueshirts Society o f  the Chinese K uom in tang ....... 77
Liu's essay has caused much of the confusion with respect to the 
Blueshirts’ name since it contained the section called “The Blueshirt Society 
of the Chinese Guomindang.” Portions of the essay were published, and Liu 
became known as the author. It was therefore a natural assumption that Liu 
was the Blueshirts' founder, or that his essay had led directly to their 
formation - neither of which appears, in retrospect, to be true. Liu did set up 
his own organisation, but his attempt to create a new political force within the 
Guomindang was short-lived. His main contribution to the formation of the 
Blueshirts (Lixingshe) was the ideas expressed in his essay, not the 
organisation he briefly sponsored. To make the issue more complex, the 
organisation he actually founded was called the Blueshirt Society (.Lanyishe). 
Later Liu himself became a leading member of the Lixingshe, which 
complicated matters still further.
75 TB, 2057, p.2; see also, Lincoln Li, pp.55-57; see also, Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.29.
7*> The North Propaganda Corps was created in June 1933, and was part of the Military 
Council of which Chiang was chairman.
77 NA, SMP, D.4685, S2, Special Branch, 29 July, 1933. Translation of a newspaper article 
from the Beijing Morning Post. The organisation was divided into the following eight 
divisions: 1) Objects, 2) Title, 3) Nature, 4) Articles for selection of members o f the Society, 5) 
Procedures of selection, 6) Connection of the society with various sources, 7) Organisation 
system, 8) Disciplinary measures.
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In his assessment of Liu's essay, Eastman struggled to identify the 
origin of the section, supposedly part of the original text, called “The 
Blueshirt Society of the Chinese Guomindang.” Eastman believed that this 
may have been a second or alternate title for the whole essay, “A Few Ideas 
for the Reform of the Party”, or that it may indeed have been an entirely 
different document.78 Eastman may be correct in his suspicions, but Liu's 
own intentions were very clear. Even if there were originally two documents, 
or if there was a new section added onto an original, Liu was distributing the 
new version himself only a few months after the original had first been 
circulated.79
By this time Liu had moved on from recommending party reforms to 
enthusiastic membership of the new organisation, a redrafting of his essay to 
bring it into line with actual developments would have been the most natural 
move.
When the Beijing Morning Post’s reporter asked Liu whether an 
organisation like the Blueshirts mentioned in the essay had already been 
inaugurated, and whether he could give any information about its activities, 
Liu replied:
The Blueshirt Society will have no new doctrines beyond those o f  the 
Kuomintang. W e can at once know  the object o f the organisation by 
understanding its original title, The Blueshirt Society (Lanyi she) and not 
The Blueshirts Party (Lanyi dang). This scheme o f  mine was only a 
suggestion to the leaders o f the Kuomintang, and I have not, as a m atter 
o f  fact, participated in any m ovem ent o f this nature.8®
78 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.30, with reference to the footnote. See also The Abortive 
Revolution, Appendix; Deng thinks the two essays were one and the same, but in the version of 
"A Few Ideas for Reform of the Party” which Eastman had read, the term Puyi t'uan, and not 
Lanyi she, was used. Xuan Jiexi indicated that they were two separate essays, see Gan Guoxun, 
pp.24,30,32.
79 NA, SMP, D.4685, S2, Special Branch, 29 July, 1933.
80 NA, SMP, D.4685.
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In the light of future statements by party leaders denying the existence 
of the organisation outright, this rather lame half-truth actually appears to be 
honest, even though Liu modestly denied ever having put his “suggestion” 
into practice.
In this controversial section of his essay, Liu actually proposed several 
names for the new organisation such as “Youth Corps” and the “Cotton 
Clothes Corps” (Buyituan However, in the end he deemed both these
titles unsuitable. In Liu's words: “the former might be mistaken for the Youth 
group of the Communist Party, while the second name is not complete, as 
there are other native products such as silk. I therefore took the name 
Blueshirts Society o f the Chinese Guomindang. ”81
The newspaper article concludes by explaining that the Guomindang 
regarded Blue and White as their principal colours, and that the blue shirt was 
the stipulated formal uniform of the Guomindang. It also recalled that since 
ancient times, blue shirts have been recognised as the dress of the common 
people. In this sense the colour blue took on a distinctly populist and anti­
imperialist meaning. Liu argued that: “Members of the Society must use 
native goods everywhere and those attending a formal conference of the 
Society must wear the Sun uniform (made of cotton).”82
This ideological approach underlies also the anti-Japanese boycott 
which started just before the Manchurian incident of 1931, and continued and 
intensified thereafter. The cotton industry was China's largest modem 
industry, producing the needed cloth for a vast, although poor, market.
Although Liu denied in the above interview that he ever participated in 
any movement of this nature, investigations by various researchers, of whom 
Eastman was the first, reveal that this was not entirely true. As mentioned
81 NA, SMP, D.4685 .
82 NA, SMP, D.4685.
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above, an organisation called the Blueshirt Society had been established in 
January 1932 by Liu and a friend.
There was a rum our in society and in the world that the Blue Shirt 
Association was another name for the Implementation Society o f  the 
Three Principles o f  the People. This is a  m isunderstanding. Actually, the 
Blue Shirt Association had plans o f  revolutionary rejuvenation. The 
organisation was founded ju st before January 1932, although the 
Association had not yet developed into a national organisation. The Blue 
Shirt Association co-existed w ith the Implementation Society .83
The information refers to the infant Blueshirt Society of Liu Jianqun 
and the Lixingshe of Teng Jie. Apparently Liu Jianqun’s Blueshirt Society 
survived only a couple of months, and probably fused with the Lixingshe 
shortly after Chiang Kaishek appointed Liu head of the Political Training 
Section of the Central Military Academy.84
The relationship between the two organisations and Liu’s involvement 
is confirmed by a record of the interrogation of Zhuan Shenglan, a former 
Blueshirt member, by Japanese intelligence in 1939.85 This affirms that in 
October 1931 Liu wrote a pamphlet, on blue paper, entitled “A Future View 
of the Guomindang” - in fact the same essay as the above-mentioned “A Few 
Ideas for the Reform of the Party.” As Liu Jianqun later became one of the 
leading members of the Lixingshe, many people made the understandable 
error of calling this organisation the Blueshirt Society or Lanyishe, the name 
proposed in Liu’s essay.86
8  ^Xuan Jiexi, “Lanyishe zhi lailongqumai” (The Origin and Development o f the Blue Shirts 
Association), Zhuanji wenxue, 1982, vol.41-5.
84 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.30; see also Lincoln Li, pp.55-57.
86 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
86 An inaccuracy never refuted by the members involved in the organisations, until Eastman’s 
contribution on the “Blueshirts” in 1972, which was soon followed by publications o f Gan 
Guoxun, a former Blueshirt member and Deng Yuanzhong, the son of Deng Wenyi.
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3.2 Guomindang Factions : Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique
A. Sword and Pen / Action and Knowledge / Blueshirts and the C.C.
Clique
Chinese society considered bureaucracy as being divided into two 
main groups: the Pen=Knowledge (Wenchen:Jt&) and the Sword=Action 
{Wujiang'.^M)- These groups represent respectively “Civil” and “Military” 
officers. This traditional distinction is pertinent in considering the role of the 
Blueshirts within the Guomindang, especially when they are contrasted with 
the C.C. Clique. Broadly speaking, the C.C. Clique was more akin to the Wen 
(civil officers), while the Blueshirts activities more closely paralleled Wu 
(military officers). In terms of colour symbolism, this distinction may be 
expressed as Wen = White and Wu = Blue.
The distinction between the pen and the sword may also be relevant in 
discussing the ideologies of the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts. The
C.C.Clique was defined very much by knowledge (zhi £n) while the
Blueshirts tended towards action (xing fr). A similar distinction existed in 
Japan between the Black Dragon and the Black Ocean Societies. The 
influence of Japanese secret societies on the factions within the Guomindang 
were indeed far-reaching.
The C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts organisations were very
comparable, sometimes covering the same activities, and both were 
supervised by Chiang, although despite this members were in constant 
rivalry.
The C.C.Clique came into existence in June 1927, after the
establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing.87 The C.C.Clique
87 Several names are given to explain the C.C. abbreviation, respectively: Central Club, China 
Club, and C.C derived from the Chen brothers (Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu), this last 
explanation is mostly used.
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coalesced around the Chen brothers (Chen Guofu E fc l^88 and Chen Lifii 
^ al^c89), was bound to Chiang by extraordinarily close personal and 
emotional ties,90 and like him, came from Zhejiang province. The Chen 
brothers gathered those who had worked directly with Chiang, many of 
whom had close ties with the Shanghai business world. The C.C.Clique 
recruited members from the so-called Stickers Clique of Guangdong, the 
Western Hills Group and the Sun Yatsen Study Society at the Whampoa 
Academy.91 In addition, the Zhejiang Society of Revolutionary Comrades 
and the anti-Bolshevik group of the Jiangxi apparatus were absorbed. These 
groups formed the core of the C.C.Clique and its political influence rapidly 
became of great importance. By 1931 the Chen brothers and twenty-seven 
others made up the top rank of the C.C.Clique which controlled 15 percent of 
the new C.E.C., and had recruited thousands of mid-level and lower level 
party cadre into its rapidly growing lower ranks 92
The Organisation Department was controlled by the Chen brothers. 
They additionally created an intelligence network that served as the party's 
security police force. Thus the C.C.Clique was sometimes referred to as the
88 Government official, bom at Wuxing, Zhejiang in 1892. Chen Guofu studied at the Military 
primary school o f Zhejiang, 1908-11, promoted to the Military middle school at Nanjing and 
joined the Revolutionary Party headed by Sun Yatsen, 1911. He took a prominent part in the 
First Revolution being the right hand man to his uncle Chen Qimei Elected as a
member of Central Supervisory Committee of the Guomindang at the second convention of the 
party in January 1926. Secretary to Chiang Kaishek, and chief of the Organisation Department 
of the Guomindang in 1926.
89 Chief secretary of the Central Party Headquarters, younger brother o f Chen Guofu, studied 
in America and received his M.A degree from Pittsburgh University. Author o f a Chinese 
dictionary published by the Zhonghua Book Co., Shanghai, publisher of the Current Events 
Monthly, Nanjing.
90 The Chen brothers were nephews of Chen Qimei (murdered in 1916 by Yuan Shikai).
Chiang Kaishek and Chen Qimei had been bloodbrothers. Chiang Kaishek's contact with the 
Chen brothers dates from that period.
91 Hung-mao Tien, p.49.
92 Jordan, pp.34-35.
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Organisation Clique. The Clique controlled not only positions inside the 
party, but also a wide range of positions in the civil administration and 
cultural education institutions. The Chen brothers placed adherents 
throughout the party and governmental apparatus, particularly in the middle 
and lower strata of those organisations. In this way the C.C.Clique came to 
have a dominating influence in the civilian branches of the regime, 
controlling much of the bureaucracy and labour unions.
Moreover, they recruited intellectuals, bureaucrats, and military 
officers to serve in the upper level of the organisation. Students from the 
Central Police Academy, which was set up by the Chen brothers, were sent to 
the provinces in order to control the local administrations and other 
institutions. The Clique also controlled different publications, such as the 
Shishi Yuebao M #  (Monthly Times, also named Current Events),
Wenhua Jianshe K  (Cultural Reconstruction).93 The Chen brothers
most actively promoted the revival of the cult of Confucius during the 
Nanjing period. The C.C.Clique was a well-structured political group, and its 
members shared six fundamental ideological and political conceptions,94 
which were actually very similar to the Blueshirts’ principles:
1. The Three Principles o f  the People o f  Sun Yatsen form the basis o f 
the National Revolution.
2. Chiang Kaishek is the suprem e leader o f  the revolution, and the 
Party.
3. Opposing any other political doctrine not in line w ith the Three 
People’s Principles.
4. Supporting o f national independence and against foreign 
Imperialism.
5. Centralisation o f  power.
6. A dvocating the revival o f  traditional moral, and religious teachings.
93 Lloyd E. Eastman [et al.], “Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937” in 
The National Era in China 1927-1949, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.27.
94 Tien, p.51.
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The leading members of the C.C.Clique shared a belief in the nation's 
psychological reconstruction,95 through reliance on traditional morality as a 
foundation and driving force for modernisation.
The C.C.Clique was one of Chiang's most effective political factions 
over a long period. However, among politically involved Chinese it was felt 
that the C.C.Clique actually failed to counteract successfully the Japanese 
invasion in Manchuria in 1931. This failure was one of the reasons that 
Chiang gave his approval to the Blueshirts. The secret formation of the 
Blueshirts did not escape the notice of the Chen brothers, who at that 
particular time were not yet involved in the Blueshirts. Nevertheless, on 
inquiry in June 1932, Chiang denied any knowledge of the Blueshirts to the 
Chen brothers.96 This denial is all the more interesting as Chiang and the 
brothers were very intimate. After the Blueshirts had established their mass 
base of the organisation called the Fuxingshe, the C.C.Clique decided to 
change its own name to the Qingbaishe W fi (Blue and White Society). 
The reason for this may have been to show a new and stronger image to the 
public.97 However, this new name was hardly ever used by the Chinese and 
was also rarely referred to in official documents - the “old” term C.C.Clique 
was mostly used.
B. The C.C. Clique and Blueshirts in Conflict
Despite their mutual goal of making China and the Chinese people 
strong and prosperous, the C.C. Clique and the Blueshirts came into conflict 
almost from the outset.98 The similar aims of the organisations underlay also
95 Kirby, p. 157.
96 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
97 Chen Dunzheng, in Gan Guoxun, p.50.
98 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
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the basis of the conflicts between them. The C.C.Clique, being civilian 
orientated, had a dominating influence in the civilian branches of the regime, 
controlling much of the bureaucratic administration, educational agencies, 
youth organisations and labour unions. The Blueshirts, although in general 
military orientated, showed broad political concerns that at least touched all 
aspects of national life. This was the foremost reason for the Blueshirts 
coming into conflict with the C.C.Clique. The Blueshirts tried to expand their 
influence at the cost of the C.C.Clique by founding their own youth 
organisations, cultural clubs and newspapers. This Blueshirts’ expansion drift 
was heavily resisted by the C.C.Clique, who claimed it had the first right.
A document from the Washington Archives described the conflicts as 
follows: “When in 1934 tensions between the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique 
became so sharp that fighting nearly erupted, Chiang merely arranged for a 
division of labour between the competing factions.” 99 A similar account is 
found in an SMP report dated 1935, this report also refers to conflicts 
between the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique: “Members of the various cliques 
of the Blueshirts or Fascist Party in China, although at loggerheads over the 
question of authority, have not yet come into open conflict.” 100 Eastman 
recounts this conflict, paraphrasing Deng Yuanzhong:101 “they [Blueshirts] 
also struggled against the civilian apparatus of the regime - and especially 
against the C.C.Clique... Chiang in 1933 named four civilian bureaucrats to 
the Lixingshe's Executive Committee: Dai Jitao ® ^ R 102, Zhu Jiahua
99 NA, D.4685, SMP, report 22 August, 1933; Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu were already at 
variance with the military element of the Blueshirts.
100 n a ,  SMP, D.4685, 28 June 1935. The Blueshirt Society and the arrest o f  Yan.
101 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.36.
102 President o f the Examination Yuan. A native o f Zhejiang, born in Hankou, Sichuan, 1882. 
Wrote poems when only nine years old; studied from the age of 13 to 16 at various school in 
Chengdu. He took an oath with his fellow students to overthrow the Manchu regime while still 
a student. Went to Japan at age of 16 and studied law at Law College of the Imperial
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103 and the two leaders of the C.C.Clique, the Chen brothers. The 
following year, however, Liu Jianqun was appointed Secretary General by 
Chiang Kaishek. All these measures did little or nothing to ameliorate the 
factional enmities.”
In August 1935 the Blueshirts arrested a pro-Japanese newspaper 
reporter named Yuan Chaoyi [Yuan Zhaoyi?] who was promoting co­
operation between Chinese and Japanese newspaper circles. His arrest was 
said to be due to differences between the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique. Yuan 
was a supporter of Wu Sung Ah [Wu Xingya], chief of the social bureau of 
the municipal Shanghai government, and the leader of the C.C.Clique which 
had control over local Chinese newspapers. The Blueshirts seemed to have 
arrested Yuan as an indirect attack upon the C.C.Clique. The reporter, Yuan, 
had disappeared after attending a meeting that was organised by Iwai Eiichi, 
chief of the Intelligence section of the Japanese embassy. This meeting was 
joined by a number of Japanese and Chinese newspaper reporters. Yuan had 
delivered a speech advocating rapprochement between Japanese and Chinese 
newspaper reporters and supporting Sino-Japanese economic co-operation. 
His arrest was supposedly executed by the special service corps of the 
Blueshirts in Shanghai, which was an assassination organ under the 
leadership of Oong Kwang Huei [Weng Guanghui? ] . 104
University, Tokyo. Returned to China at the age of 19 and became an associate editor of the 
Zhong wai bao in Shanghai, 1908. President of the National Zhong shan University at Canton, 
1926 and resigned this presidency in October 1930. A close friend of Chiang Kaishek and his 
ideas had an influence on the ideological development of the Guomindang.
I®3 University President, bom at Huzhou, Zhejiang. Doctor o f Philosophy of Berlin 
University, Germany. Professor o f Beijing University. Member of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Guomindang, member of Zhejiang Provincial Guomindang Headquarters, 
member o f the Central Political Council, and member of the Zhejiang Provincial Government.
IO4 SMP, D4685, 25 June 1935, Morning Translation of the Nippo, Mainichi and Nichi-Nichi, 
Blueshirts Society Arrests pro-Japanese Chinese Newspaper reporter. See also, NA, 28 June 
1935, The Blueshirts Society and the Arrest o f  Yuan Hsueh Yi.
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The friction between the two organisations had also captured the
SMP’s attention and one of their reports describing the efforts to channel
this conflict runs:
In order to avoid the overlapping o f duties, the Blueshirts have divided 
the responsibilities for their operations in the following manner: Chen 
Kuofii the leader o f the C.C. Clique to take charge o f the activities 
among educational and social circles. Yang Yungtai, Secretary General 
to the Field Headquarters at W uchang, to take charge o f  the activities 
among political and military circles. Shanghai being the first city in 
China from the educational and social point o f  view, it is considered 
necessary for the C.C.Clique to devote its attention to this city. Chinese 
writers should be brought under its control. To achieve this end, the C.C.
Clique has the support o f  some well-known Chinese writers and 
professors to form a special body, whose duty is to investigate the 
political inclinations o f Chinese literati. This special body includes ten 
professors, and 10 January, 1935, these professors issued a manifesto 
through the Chinese press. Chen Lifu, issued on the following day a 
declaration in support o f this m anifesto.1^5
Nevertheless, despite all the attempts to solve the problems between 
the two organisations, the conflicts continued, and in July 1937 Chiang again 
called in leaders of the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts. The C.C.Clique 
members present at the meeting were Chen Guofu, Chen Lifu, Zhang 
Lisheng Zhou Fuhai Ye Xiufeng of Xu Enzeng
ft® ®  and Zhang Daopan 3fai$t,107 and leaders from the Blueshirts
105 NA, SMP, D.4685, Blueshirt Society, 18 July 1935.
106 Leading supporter of Wang Jingwei’s Peace Movement and member of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Tokyo Imperial University, Japan. Professor of National Canton 
University. Secretary at the Headquarters of Commander in - chief of the Nationalist Army. 
Chief secretary of the Wuhan school of the Central Military and Political Academy. Vice- 
Director and acting Director o f the Central Publicity Council of the Guomindang, 1937-38. 
Fled from Chongqing with Wang Jingwei in December 1938 to launch a peace movement and 
has since been his leading supporter and collaborator. Author of “Basic Problems of the Three 
Peoples Principles”, and “Fundamentals of Economics.”
I®7 Bom at Guise, on July 1897. He graduated from the Department of Fine Arts (Slade 
School) University College, University of London. While he was in England he served as head 
of the Assembly of the London Branch o f the Guomindang, 1923. Upon return to China in 
1926, he was appointed secretary o f the Department o f Agriculture and Labour o f the Canton 
Provincial government. Dean of the Qingdao National University, 1930, and member of 
Zhejiang Provincial Government and concurrently Commissioner of Education, 1931. Shortly
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attending were Liu Jianqun, Dai Li, Deng Wenyi etc. 108 During the meeting 
it was decided that the organisations should limit themselves to their own 
sphere of activities: for the C.C. Clique this was party organisation and the 
civil administration; the Blueshirts were to focus their efforts on military 
policy and security matters. Because of the close relations between both 
organisations and their mutual interests, and as the Chen brothers became 
involved in both movements, one organisation was often mistaken for the 
other, as revealed by various SMP reports about the Blueshirts: “The 
C.C.Clique, embodies faithful members who wish to inculcate a new spirit, 
Fascism, into the masses as a measure to save the country from its perilous 
position.” 109
Japanese reports also describe the confusion among Chinese about the 
two organisations. 110 The reports suggest that the main ambition of the 
C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts in Shanghai was their policy of secret terrorist 
activities, which was essentially correct. Sometimes the methods and 
activities of both the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts were referred to as being 
the same as the Gestapo in Germany or GPU in the U.S.S.R. 111 This
after, he was transferred to Nanjing as Vice-Director o f the Organisation Department of the 
Central Party Headquarters during the Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai in 1932.
108 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite.
109 PRO, FO, 371/19315 xc 199807, Blueshirts Party in China, 29 November 1934.
110 JMFA, A 610-7 / 1516, vol.3,( 250). Shina seito kessha kankei zakken, (Miscellaneous 
articles about Chinese parties and Societies), reported by Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, 5 
October, 1933. And Telegraph from Shanghai to Jinan, 1935.
111 NA, SMP, Special Branch, D.4685, Memorandum on the Blueshirts, 10 December 1940. 
GPU = The Soviet government in 1917 instituted its own secret police, the Cheka(All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counterrevolution and Sabotage) under 
Felix Dzerzhinsky. This was reorganised in 1922 as the GV\]{Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe 
Upravlenie= State Political Administration). It was later named the OGPU(United State 
Political Administration), while in 1934 the functions of the OGPU were transferred to the 
NKVD. This NKVD was also responsible for the Stalinist purges which culminated in the 
wave of terror o f 1936-38.
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indicates once more how difficult it was to distinguish between the activities 
of both organisations, the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique.
Initially the C.C.Clique's espionage activities were channelled through 
a company with the name Zhengyuan shiye she IEjgH U ft (Origin of Basic 
Industrial Company), which was of course an alias. This company was 
established by personnel of a secret agency which was financially supported 
by Chiang. During this period - 1933 - the C.C.Clique controlled 
headquarters in Nanjing and two in Shanghai, while headquarters with the 
name of Zhengyuan or Zhongguo gongchenghui (Chinese
Engineering Association) were to be found in Canton, Hong Kong, Tianjin, 
Hankou and Beijing. Altogether there existed thirty C.C.Clique branches.
Despite their attempts not to aggravate each other or interfere in each 
others' affairs, the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique by no means merged or 
became indistinguishable. For example, Chiang allowed two different secret 
police forces to be retained, both known as Bureaux o f Investigation and 
Statistics (BIS) . 112 The first was the Zhongyang dangbu diaocha tongjiju
(commonly referred to by the Chinese as Zhongtong
the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Central Guomindang' 
Special Services, controlled by the Chen brothers and the C.C.Clique. The 
second, under the guidance of Dai Li and the Blueshirts was called the Junshi 
weiyuanhui diaocha tongjiju (abbreviated as Juntong
j|l$|;) the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs 
Commission's Special Service. 113
112 NA, SIF 226 13W3.3/34/A, Entry 182, Box 51, 263, date of information, 21 May 1946. In 
a report made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Strategic Service Unit, 
Chungking detachment in 1946. This report explained that there was the C.C.Clique’s Bureau 
o f  Investigation and Statistics - BIS - which operated under the Ministry of Organisation o f the 
Guomindang, with Chen Lifu as Head, and the - "BIS" - which operates under the Supreme 
National Defence Council, and which was formerly headed by Dai Li. After 1936 strong 
rivalry existed between these two intelligence services.
113 He Wenlong, Zhongguo tewu neimu (The Inside Story o f the Chinese Special Agents), 
Hong Kong: Fengyu shuwu, 1947, pp.5-9.
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These two organisations were renamed after the beginning of the Sino- 
Japanese War (1937-1945) as the Baomiju (Security Bureau) . 114
The existence of more than one secret police force under the same 
leader was not at all unusual, for they had been part of Chinese history for a 
long time. The ruling Emperors of the various Chinese dynasties had also had 
two distinct secret police forces. 115 The Han Dynasty used two secret police 
forces, respectively the Zhaoyu fg UK, 116 and the Dashuihe 0 .  The Tang 
Dynasty had also two secret police units, Lijingmen and the Bu liang
ren | A ,  while only the Song Dynasty apparently used one secret police 
force, the Junxunyuan jft M IS.117 Moreover, during the Ming dynasty two 
police forces, Jinyiwei £$ #r, and Dongxichang ^  0  jjfc were working for
the Emperor's prestige and benefit. 118 Also in early Republican China secret 
police forces were part of Chinese society, Yuan Shikai during his period of 
rule founded the Zhenqidui M^tHt. 119 Thus, in the perspective of Chinese 
history, Chiang's use of two separate forces was not at all a new 
development. Indeed, his preference to use two forces continues the tendency 
of Chinese thinking towards dualisation, marked perhaps most clearly by the 
differences between Wen (invisible) and Wu (visible).
114 Tejima Hiroshi, Chugoku rodo undotsushi (A History of Chinese Labour Movement), 
Tokyo: Toyo shobo, 1985, pp. 348-349. Chiang Kaishek founded two different Secret Service 
Organisation, one belonged to the Fuxingshe - originally from the Lanyishe or Blueshirts. For 
more information regarding the Baomiju see Chapter Six.
115 He Wenlong, Zhongguo tewu neimu, p.8.
1 ^  The meaning o f Zhaoyu  Meaning is “Punishment or put in jail, according the law of the 
Emperor”, by Zhao Shu (Imperial edict).
117 The meaning o f Jun xunyuan  is “Military Patrol Courtyard.”
118 Jin y i wei means Brocade Shirts Defenders (or Guardians), and Dongxichang means East 
& West or Goods Storehouse. Both were the Emperor's secret police. The criminals were not 
subject to jurisdiction for hardly ever was used law, rules, and martial court; they were most of 
the time just straight away put in a jail or were killed.
119 Zhenqidui means Squad of Scorch and Seize.
155
ChapterThree
In order to support the C.C.Clique's espionage activities the Central 
Party Bureau of the Guomindang fostered the training of telegraphers, who 
after finishing their training, worked under C.C.Clique instructions. 
However, the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts used different names for groups 
with the same function, which made it nearly impossible for outsiders to 
distinguish their respective activities. An example of this is the case of two 
members of the Shanghai headquarters. Wang Longzhang i l l #  (aged 
thirty) and Yin Mingkui (aged thirty-five) went on a so-called study
trip to Japan on 5th September 1936 from Shanghai, ostensibly in order to 
study the agricultural situation in Japan. 120 However, their actual plan was to 
investigate Chinese students suspected of pro-Japanese attitudes. It could not 
be determined initially whether they were Blueshirt or C.C.Clique members. 
Ultimately they were confirmed as being C.C.Clique members.
3.3 Conclusions
As a result of the threats from the Japanese and the fight against the 
Communists, Chiang Kaishek gradually came to rely less on the party and 
more on the army after 1928. This expanding military power was achieved at 
the cost of the civil administration of the Guomindang Government. Both the 
military and the civil administration of the Guomindang proved incapable of 
fulfilling the demands of the Chinese people of improving their conditions.
Factions operating in the Guomindang contributed to this process; 
instead of co-operating with each other, they often were in conflict. The most 
powerful faction before the establishment of the Blueshirts was the 
C.C.Clique. Although this Clique was relatively powerful, it indirectly 
caused the foundation of the Blueshirts as Chiang blamed the C.C.Clique for
120 JMFA, A 6107, 1111, vol. 3, Shina seito kessha kankei zakken (The Relationship of 
Chinese Political Factions), 1933. From this document, reported on 10 September 1936.
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his forced resignation at the end of 1931. After the invasion of Manchuria by 
the Japanese, the C.C.Clique proved unable to manage the anti-Japanese 
movements, which ran out of control and began to pose a threat to Chiang's 
personal rule.
As a result, Chiang set up a new organisation designed to ensure his 
personal control over the factions and to bring about his vision for a radical 
transformation of Chinese society. Its official title the Lixingshe, however, 
never became familiar among either Chinese or foreigners, and it became 
publicly known as the Blueshirt Society or Lanyishe.
At its peak, the Blueshirts core group, which was in fact the Lixingshe, 
contained the 300-500 members of the Blueshirts’ leadership. These were the 
only people with some knowledge of the overall operations of the Blueshirts. 
Even at this level activities were sectioned to enhance security and secrecy. 
Ambiguity was one of the most convenient means for the Blueshirts to build 
up its image.
An organisational design was set up to minimise lateral connections 
between operating units. This secret structure based on converging lines of 
vertical relationship and minimising horizontal contact was an innovational 
scheme, inherited from the Chinese secret societies. This structure also 
allowed for the organisation to be not only hierarchical but also loosely 
articulated. Thus, the two outer rings of membership did not know of the 
existence of the core of the Blueshirts, the Lixingshe, since they knew only 
the members of their own cell or branch. The policy of the founders of the 
organisation, especially in the beginning, and particularly for the membership 
of the two inner circles, was recruitment by invitation. Emphasis was placed 
on quality rather than on quantity.
The organisation of the Blueshirts broadly resembled the structure of 
the Guomindang. The national government divided its organisation into five 
separate powers which was analogous to the organisation of four departments
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and a Control Commission within the Blueshirts. In addition a C.E.C. had the 
authority to formulate policy within both the organisations. The difference 
was that the Guomindang’s organisation contained horizontal lines of 
leadership, in contrast to that of the Blueshirts. Furthermore, division into 
three distinctive layers in order to maintain secrecy, as in the Blueshirts 
structure, was not an issue in the Guomindang.
The Blueshirts expanded into a relatively large-scale movement within 
a few years, and their rising importance brought them into conflict with one 
of the main existing factions, the C.C.Clique. Chiang attempted to resolve 
the rivalry between these two most important organisations within the 
Guomindang, by appointing, among others, the Chen brothers to the top 
stratum of the Blueshirts organisation. In practice, this meant that the 
C.C.Clique largely directed its energies against foreigners, including the 
Japanese, while the Blueshirts generally fought the Communists. Although 
Chiang was a master in manipulating the various factions, corresponding to 
the motto “divide and rule”, in reality he failed to channel these conflicts 
effectively.
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Chapter Four 
The Ideology and Implementation of Blueshirt Fascism
The interwar period was dominated in Europe by the rise of Fascism, and this 
trend had important repercussions on other continents around the world. It 
appeared to many political organisations that Fascism was an almost 
unqualified success story. Several countries therefore adopted certain of the 
ideas and practices of Fascism as a means of accelerating their national 
development, without necessarily subscribing fully to the complete 
ideologies generated in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. The Blueshirts were 
one of the movements which did just this, as they were primarily interested in 
strengthening their nationalist revolution and in promoting the dictatorship of 
Chiang Kaishek.
This Chapter examines the Blueshirts' interpretation of Fascism and 
how they sought to implant it in their society to create a new hybrid which 
was distinctively Chinese. Following on from the description of the influence 
of Japanese and European Fascism on the Blueshirt organisation outlined in 
the previous chapter, discussion now considers whether there was a new 
Blueshirt ideology distinct from the general philosophy of the Guomindang. 
Initially, this discussion compares the Three Principles of the People 
(Sunism) and Blueshirt Fascism. Researchers in this field have offered 
different analyses of this question and, even among the Blueshirts 
themselves, there was disagreement on this subject.
Secondly, this chapter considers how the ideology of the Blueshirts 
was put into effect and enforced through the practical work of the 
organisation. Special attention is afforded to Dai Li, a leading exponent of the 
Blueshirts. Thirdly, the Blueshirts' attempt to build a mass organisation 
during the New Life Movement is also examined.
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4.1 The Ideology of Blueshirt Fascism
A. The Debate on Blueshirt Ideology
Chapter One of this thesis referred to the disputes between scholars 
about a set of definitions which would enable an organisation to be classified 
as Fascist. A working definition of Fascism and the extent and scope of 
foreign influences on the formation of the Blueshirts have both been 
discussed within the scope of this study. The tentative conclusion drawn so 
far is that the organisation owed more to Japanese than to German Fascist 
models. On the other hand, an examination of the relationship between the 
ideologies of the Blueshirts and of Sun Yatsen may help in further 
appreciating the theses of other scholars. For example, Maria Chang attempts 
to show that the Blueshirts were not Fascist, but loyal to Sun’s Three 
Principles of the People.
For his part, Lloyd Eastman may have greatly overestimated the 
importance of German advisers and influences from Germany. He was 
basically correct in describing the organisation as Fascist. Moreover, his 
work at least provided a proper scholarly basis for making such an assertion. 
Many other writers have been content simply to reproduce this as a received 
opinion without having any perception of the real ideology underlying the 
movement. 1
It is significant that neither in his book The Abortive Revolution nor in 
any of subsequent his articles does Eastman directly refer to a relationship 
between Sun's Three Principles of the People and what he asserts to be the 
Fascist character of the Blueshirts. Instead, he concentrates almost 
exclusively on foreign influences. It is on precisely this point that Chang
1 Notable exceptions to this rule are: Kirby, Germany and Republican China, and also Hung- 
mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937.
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criticises Eastman's argument and his checklist of characteristically Fascist 
traits.
Chang’s contribution to the debate begins by comparing Eastman's 
checklist with the guiding ideals of the Guomindang, concluding that “if we 
look no further than the Sanminzhuyi of Sun Yatsen we find every theme 
Eastman has identified as Fascist.” 2 She proceeds to use this very sound 
conclusion to support a very weak argument. Since it is true that the Three 
Principles of the People could perfectly easily be made to fit into Eastman's 
checklist definition of Fascism, his definition may be discarded as unhelpful. 
Chang fails, however, to examine why it is so. Following her argument, one 
is left with the impression that because the Three Principles of the People 
could be defined as Fascist, the only conclusion must be that the basic 
definitions are at fault. Chang merely assumes that the Three Principles could 
not, under any circumstances, properly satisfy the conditions Eastman set out 
for a Fascist ideology. She does not address the problem posed by the fact 
that they do indeed conform to Eastman's definition.
Chang's argument culminates in a clear alternative. On the one hand, 
she contends that if Eastman's criteria were valid and the Blueshirts were 
Fascist, then the entire ideology of Sunism and the whole Guomindang must 
have been as well, because the Three Principles of the People conform to his 
definition. Assuming, quite reasonably, that no-one will be persuaded by this 
argument, she proposes an alternative view point: that Eastman's criteria are 
invalid and neither the Guomindang as a whole nor the Blueshirts in 
particular were Fascist. It is interesting that the clear distinction which Chang 
draws between the Three Principles of the People and Fascism follows the 
schema laid down by Eastman, who had stated that over time, “Fascism,
2 Chang, p.33.
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rather than the Three Principles of the People of Sun Yatsen, became the 
guiding ideology of the Blue Shirts.” 3
Developing this distinction in her argument, Chang concluded that the 
Blueshirts, which she persistently labels the Chinese Renaissance 
Movement,4 did not have to seek out themes in the literature of a foreign 
political ideology, as these were already available in the traditional ideology 
of the Guomindang, namely the Three Principles of the People of Sun 
Yatsen. Her argument therefore depends on excluding any possibility that the 
Three Principles of the People might, under any circumstances, satisfy a 
definition of Fascism.
Chang's criticism of Eastman's definitions pointed to a path of enquiry 
which she chose not to pursue. She does not indicate whether Sunism fails to 
conform to definitions of Fascism proposed by other scholars. Furthermore, 
she fails to provide an entirely satisfying explanation of how an organisation 
which bore a considerable resemblance to Fascist organisation elsewhere 
could have been based so squarely on Sunism. Whereas Eastman did not 
investigate Sunism's relationship to Fascism, Chang examined it in terms 
which did not allow for any relationship between the two. This chapter will 
show that it was in fact quite possible for a fully Fascist organisation to exist 
within the framework of a party based on the Three Principles of the People,
3 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.54, cited by Chang, p.l 1.
4 Fuxingshe, can be translated as revival- or rebirth Society, both translations are used in 
literature and documents, while the translation used by Han Suyin is Resurrection Society. 
However, Maria Chang translated it as Renaissance Movement, which apparently is not wrong 
but also does not make much sense in this context; for Renaissance is a term to describe the 
development of Western civilisation that marked the transition from medieval to modem times 
(The Colombia Encyclopaedia). In China Today, vol.l, no.l, p. 14, October, 1934, we find an 
article in this Chinese Communist related periodical, about a Chinese Renaissance Movement, 
which mainly dealt with the reform of Chinese literature. The China Critic, vol. XVI, no.5 ,4 
February, 1937, said that: The Chinese sentiment about National Salvation, just before the war 
with Japan in 1937, was first expressed in the rather vague term of National Renaissance, 
Minzhu Fuxing. But later a much more expressive phrase would be coined, namely “rebirth by 
its own vitality.”
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without facing any significant problems of ideological contradiction or 
political disloyalty.
B. Sun Yatsen and His Political Legacy
As Sun Yatsen failed to provide a coherent theoretical study of his 
views on social and political questions, all kinds of interpretation have been 
placed upon the Three Principles of the People. Sun himself interpreted them 
differently in different periods of his life. The origins of the Principles are as 
unclear as their meaning. Sun may have formulated them as early as his visit 
to London in 1896-97.5 In that case a full twenty seven years passed before 
Sun publicly enunciated them at Canton in 1924. His original conception of 
them may well have changed during the intervening years.
It is clear that the philosophical and political antecedents of the 
Principles were highly eclectic in character. It is known, for example, that 
Sun was interested in the achievements of the Japanese Meiji Restoration and 
its parallels with the French Revolution.6 Sun's ideas about welfare for the 
people may have been formed during his stay in London where he frequently 
visited libraries.7 Books which came to his attention included Henry
5 J.Y.Wong, “Sun Yatsen and the British Connection, 1896/97 and 1984”, Sydney: University 
of Sydney Press, 1986, Sun Yatsen, His International Ideas and International Connections.
6 Kobayashi, Meiji ishin to Furansu kakumei (Meiji Restoration and French Revolution), 
Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1988.
7 Nihon Son Bun kenkyukai, Son Bun toAjia  (Sun Yatsen and Asia), Tokyo: Hako shoin,
1993. (based on the International Academic Symposium in Tokyo in August 1993), Zhang 
Yufa, Son Chusan no O-Bei keiken no Chugoku kakumei ni taisuru eikyo (Sun Yatsen’s 
Revolutionary thought influenced by the experience from Western countries), p.225, translated 
by Fujii Hiroshi. An investigation by the British Intelligence showed that Sun visited the 
libraries sixty eight times between 3 December 1896 and 24 June 1897.
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George's Our Land and Land Policy and Progress and Poverty, then very 
popular.8
During his stay in Paris in 1905, Sun employed a French scholar 
named Ulysse Raphael Reau, a graduate of the Paris Oriental School, as his 
secretary.9 Sun and Reau had long discussions, which may have influenced 
Sun's ideas about the French Revolution, and probably also shaped his views 
on democracy. Sun was favourably impressed by the working of democratic 
governments. However, after studying them, he came to the conclusion that a 
representative government alone would not solve China's problems. 10 Sun's 
attention was also drawn to the work of Rudolf Steiner, notably his 1920 
book The Threefold State. In this work, Steiner explains that the expansion of 
the people's national rights can be analysed according to three interconnected 
parts: the national economy, privilege and the inner spirit. 11
Sun's travels brought him into contact with political ideas from Europe 
as well as from America. In San Francisco in 1904, he first came across the 
famous threefold doctrine of Abraham Lincoln - government “Of the People, 
By the People and For the People.” Sun was apparently highly impressed by 
this phrase, as it was clear and simple and had similar implications to his own 
slogan. Lincoln's phraseology was similar to the three terms in the classical 
Chinese text shujing (The Books of History) : zhengdeJE^M (right
virtue), liyong (Utilisation) and xiaocheng^M* (enriching the well-being
8 Henry George, Our Land and Land Policy (1871) and Progress and Poverty (\ 897), both 
books sold over 100,000 copies within three years. Author’s edition published in San 
Francisco: W.M. Hinton and Co., March 1879.
9 Zhang Yufa, p.238.
10 M.N.Roy, Revolution and Counter -Revolution in China. Calcutta: Renaissance, 1946, 
p.256, with reference to his footnote 7.
11 Nihon Son Bun Kenkyukai, Son Bun to Ajia, Nakamura Tadashi, “Son Bun to aru Swiss no 
gakusha” (Sun Yatsen and Swiss Scholar), pp.279-283; Steiner's book was published in the 
Japanese language, during the Japanese Democracy period - Taisho - Sun was very interested 
in the Japanese Democracy Movement.
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of the masses). Sun may therefore have felt a resonance in Lincoln's words of 
traditional Chinese ideas, and this may be echoed in his own conception of 
Nationalism, Sovereignty and Welfare,12
Speaking in Canton in 1924, Sun maintained that in China the slogans 
of the classical French revolution (liberte, egalite, fraternite) should be 
replaced by Minzu , Minquan and Minsheng It should be 
remembered that the etymological meaning of the Chinese term Minzu is in 
fact not people's nationalism, but people's clan-feeling, referring to the 
traditional Chinese family and clan system. This idea of clan-feeling is the 
keystone through which the Chinese secret societies founded their 
legitimacy, and the same sentiment was cultivated by the Blueshirts.
Although Sun Yatsen had succeeded in leading his people to 
Revolution, he had failed to instil in the great number of Chinese people the 
feeling of an all embracing nationalism that would have been necessary to 
make the revolution and the Guomindang a profound success. For the larger 
part they remained limited to their own local or provincial traditional sphere 
of influence. The transition to the “modem” era could then not be made by 
the majority of the Chinese people. This strong feeling of nationalism was 
successfully cultivated by the Nazis in Germany and the Italian Fascists. The 
influence of nationalism upon Fascist doctrine has been so strong in Europe 
that Fascism and Nationalism have sometimes been regarded as virtually 
interchangeable terms. There are, of course, strong similarities between 
certain aspects of many Fascist and nationalist movements.
12 Zhang Yufa, pp.228-229, see his footnote 21. When the Tongmenghui was founded, in 1907 
in Tokyo a sort o f political programme to supplement the original slogan was proposed, which 
included, establishment of a Democratic Republic on the American model. They wanted the 
hated Manchus to go, but were not sure that monarchy as an institution could altogether be 
dispensed with. Nor were they willing to depose Confucius for Abraham Lincoln, whose 
doctrine of government O f the People, For the People and By the People, was then the political 
“summum bonum” for Sun Yatsen.
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In most circumstances the nationalist feelings of the Chinese people, 
the majority of whom lived in the countryside, was expressed in their 
clannishness. This was, of course, one of the aspects characterising 
traditional secret societies that the common Chinese people knew the best. 
Herein may also lie one of the reasons why the Blueshirts failed to command 
support among the people. While it is true that Blueshirts Fascism differed 
from European Fascism in that it did not develop from the grass-roots level, 
the fact that it embodied many of the features of a secret society rendered it 
inherently exclusive, and therefore closed to the majority of the Chinese 
populace.
Sun’s phraseology was translated into English as: People's
Nationalism, People's Sovereignty, and People's Livelihood. Another 
translation sometimes cited, Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism, 
translates Sun's ideas into terms readily understandable by a European 
readership, but departs substantially from the meaning of the original. 13
Although undoubtedly influenced by foreign political concepts, the 
intellectual origins of the Three Principles of the People may also be traced 
back to indigenous ideas current among Chinese thinkers at the turn of the 
century. Therefore the significance of Chinese influences should not be 
underestimated when evaluating the evolution of Sun's philosophy. Among 
those who may have exerted some influence over Sun's thinking were the late 
Qing Dynasty reformers, Kang Youwei Tan Sitong HSUrI and
13 Roy, p.272.
N  Scholar and reformer, bom in Nanhai, Guangdong province in 1856. A Metropolitan 
Graduate o f Imperial Examination under the Qing regime, 1895. He was proscribed and 
ordered to be decapitated, but fled abroad for many years and returned to China after the 
establishment o f the Republic. Founded the Society of Worship of Confucius and advocated 
the adoption o f Confucianism as state religion, a faithful royalist and he played important part
in the attempted monarchy restoration movement in 1917. He was ordered to be arrested, but 
later pardoned. He died at Qingtao, 1928.
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Liang Qichao iK-JIS15, all traditional Confiician scholars. 16 Prof. Nomura 
Koichi mentions that Liang Qichao’s concept about ‘nation’ is discussed in 
Liang’s Xinminlun §Jr K fir (The Theory of New People - Nation) . 17 The 
core of his arguments is that a ‘nation’ should be formed by the own people.
Sun's concept of Welfare may well have been influenced by what he 
knew of the foreign ideology of Communism, but it was probably also 
shaped by the indigenous Chinese ideas of Tan Sitong's renxue (study o f 
humanity), wherein datongzhuyi meaning Great Harmony, can also
be explained as Welfare. The concept of datongzhuyi, indeed starts with 
Moralism, 18 but another influential idea referred to by Tan Sitong was the 
theory in the Zhuangzi ftti1 describing that each person possesses his own 
freedom and expressing that there exists equality between all people. This 
idea may have served as the basis for the concept of people's sovereignty. 19
16 Liang was born in Xinghui xian, Guangdong Province in 1869. He studied under Kang You 
wei at the latter’s private school called Wanmu caotang and became the most prominent o f 
Kang’s pupils. Liang became a provincial Graduate in 1889. The combination of the two 
names Kang and Liang is generally known in China to mean the central figures of the reform 
movement which was responsible for the famous reform decrees of 1898. Preceding the reform 
movement, Liang started the first Chinese daily newspapers in Beijing.
16 The ideologists, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, were great scholars. In contrast to them, 
Sun Yatsen was remarkably sterile in original thought.
17 Nomura Koichi, pp. 144-45.Liang Qichao published in Yokohama, in 1902, this article 
about Xinminlun in the Xinmin congbao 0r Ps HI IS. (Liang's periodical published in Japan and 
also distributed in China).
18 Ojima Sukema, Chugoku no kakumei shiso (Revolutionary Thought in Modem China), 
Tokyo: Chikuma sosho, pp.93, 103-104.
19 Ojima Sukema, pp.47-48.
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C. Sunism and Blueshirt Fascism
Zhi nan x in g y i yu  zhen zhi li xing
[To understand is difficult, but to act is easy, knowledge is inseparable from  action]
Sun Yatsen^O
The last two words o f the saying may have been used for the Blueshirts' name:
Li xing she
After his death, Sun Yatsen left China with an uncertain political
heritage. The ideas he espoused were drawn from a wide variety of sources
and never really amounted to a solidly worked out formal theory of the state,
politics or government. However, Sun’s views on nationalism may be
precisely defined thus:
Sun sought to awaken among the Chinese the spirit o f  collective identity, 
a consciousness o f  belonging that would make the interest o f  each the 
interest o f  all. For Sun, national survival required a mix o f contem porary 
science and traditional teachings7-1
Faced with a mounting Communist threat as well as increased pressure 
from Japan, the Guomindang needed a somewhat stronger sense of political 
direction than Sun's cosmopolitan liberalism could offer. The challenge of the 
party leadership in the Nanjing period was to translate Sun's ideas into a 
meaningful, coherent and practical ideology of power.
Sun Yatsen’s reflections on the theory on “Knowledge” and “Action”, 
probably written in 1918-1919, had evolved from a feeling of disappointment 
and bitterness about the lack of results the revolution had brought the 
Chinese people. Sun asked himself why Xinhai geming ^  ^  (the 
Revolution of 1911) had failed. While the revolution aimed at the salvation 
of the country and the Chinese people, the suffering of the people had grown
20 Gan Guoxun, p.l 16; see also, TB, 2057, and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 110-111; It was in the 
years 1918 to 1920, when Sun had no hope of returning to Canton to regain his position of 
command in the Canton Directorate, that he elaborated on his theory, knowing is more difficult 
than doing. This was also known as “The Theory of Psychological Reconstruction.”
21 Chang, p.31.
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worse. Sun blamed the party members for having no faith in the revolution. 
His conclusion was that their lack of faith could be ascribed to their way of 
thinking: “for they are dominated by the doctrine that Knowledge is Easy and 
Action is Difficult.” 22
This theory was first expressed in the Shang Shu ±  f t  a classical of 
great prestige, by Fu Yue during the Yin Dynasty (1324-1265 B.C.), and had 
struck deep roots in the minds of the people.23 Nevertheless, Sun considered 
this theory anathema to his effort to make the revolution a success. He 
believed it was the lack of knowledge which lay at the bottom of all the 
inaction of the Chinese people. Therefore, Sun Yatsen changed what he saw 
as “that formidable dictum of Knowledge is Easy and Action is Difficult” 
Zhixian xinghou ftl f t  Jp, into the counter-dictum “Knowledge is Difficult 
and Action is Easy " Zhinan xingyi JP lg£ f}  J| . 24 In doing so, Sun tried to 
shake his people from their lethargy, and let them forget their superstition in 
the theory of “Knowledge is Easy and Action is Difficult.” Sun was 
convinced that this was the only way to save China. This theory, appraised as 
Sunism, also placed Chiang Kaishek in the forefront of his political 
programme. The emphasis on action was something that suited Chiang, for 
being a military man he was himself a man of action, and party philosophy 
continued to lay pressure on the knowledge-action thesis.25 David S. 
Nivison writes concerning this: “In developing his argument, Chiang stressed
22 Hu Shih and Lin Yu-Tang, China’s Own Critics, A Selection o f  Essays, Beijing: China 
United Press, 1931, pp.44-46. See also, Chuan Yunlong, Zhongguo zhixingxueshuo shuping 
(The Review of Chinese Knowledge and Action Studies), p. 183.
23 David S.Nivison, “The Problem of “Knowledge and Action” in Chinese Thought since 
Wang Yang-Ming”, p.l 13, in The American Anthropologist; Studies in Chinese Thought,
Arthur Wright (ed.), The American Anthropological Association, vol.55, no.5, memoir no.75, 
December 1953.
24 Hu Shih and Lin Yu-Tang, pp.47-48. See also, Chuan Yunlong, p. 186.
25 Chiang Kaishek, “A Philosophy of Action”, in China Quarterly, vol.V, Summer 1940, nr.3, 
pp.355-376. See also, and Chiang Kaishek, China’s Destiny, pp.l 13, 158, 185, 187, 260.
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Neo-Confucian virtues and made constant use of traditional philosophical
vocabulary and hallowed text.” 26 It was obvious that Chiang Kaishek’s had
a great preference for this subject and therefore the idea may well have
served in creating the Blueshirts, which as we have seen also comes into
expression in the name Lixingshe. Was it furthermore a coincidence that
Chiang in 1932, the year the Blueshirts were established, delivered a lecture
on the subject “Stages in the Development of Revolutionary Philosophy” in
where he suggested the term philosophy o f action?27
The Sunist theory is reminiscent of Western descriptions of Fascism as
“the unity of thought and action.” Sun’s theory, however, raised the criticism
that the fundamental error was, as Hu Shi M writes: “to regard
“Knowledge” and “Action” as two distinct and independent things.” 28 A
marked characteristic of Chinese thinking is that they often dualise their
concepts. However, Sun himself may not have meant to emphasise such a
strict division, but merely to allow the people to interpret things in a different
way. The real meaning of Sun Yatsen had been to convince the Chinese
people that while action was within the ability of everybody, only the chosen
few were truly capable of knowing - of understanding. With this approach he
hoped that his followers would not hesitate to take action and leave the
thinking to others, in other words “follow the Leader.”
Action was also the Blueshirts’ keynote, and during a speech in
November 1933, Liu Jianqun, one of the figures with the most ideological
influence in the formation of the Blueshirts, declared:
Necessity is truth; action creates theory...Thus in China at the present 
tim e, the question is not whether the Three Principles o f  the People are 
good or bad, but how  to carry out the Three Principles o f  the People 2^
26 Nivison, p. 139.
27 Chiang Kaishek, “A Philosophy of Action”, p.355.
28 Hu Shih and Lin Yu-Tang, pp.54-58.
2^ Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.41.
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His emphasis was on action, and how to carry out the Three Principles 
of the People with the help of the Blueshirts. This was no empty rhetoric. Liu 
did not seek merely to use Sun's ideas as a camouflage for the institution of 
Fascist rule, he saw the two as entirely compatible.30 The Blueshirt 
ideologists outlined three reasons for the necessity of Fascism; (1) as a 
weapon to carry out the Three People's Principle; (2) Fascism was the best 
way to get rid of Communism and to unite China; (3) they considered 
Fascism to the best instrument to establish an authoritarian leadership and to 
help the Guomindang to recover its original spirit.3 1
In a publication He Zhonghan specified Chiang’s views on this 
point.32 In connection with Fascism, the Three Principles of the People were 
seen as the “ism” to save the country. It contained three truths for China’s 
national, political and economic equalities. Capitalism and Communism were 
not, the concluded, the truth to save China.
There was without doubt a revisionist trend within the right wing of 
the Guomindang. The origins of this intellectual current can be traced back to 
the formation of the Sun Yatsen Study Society in 1924-25, on the Whampoa 
campus, by a group of anti-Communist students. These students, nationalist 
and anti-Communist as they were, sought to develop a body of right-wing 
thinking within the traditions of Sun.33 The leading members of this group,
30 Lincoln Li, p.62. During a meeting on 7 March 1932 between Chiang and the Whampoa 
cadets who established the Blueshirts, a saying o f Sun Yatsen was quoted by Chiang and 
written on a blackboard: Zhi nan xing y iy u  zhen zhi li xing, "To understand is difficult, but to 
act is easy, knowledge is inseparable from action. "The last two words of the saying may have 
been used for the Blueshirts' name Lixingshe.
3  ^ Su Youci, “Faxiside xiaolun” (General Introduction to Fascism), Shehuizhuyi yuekan, 
vol. 1.3, 1933, pp.530-531.
32 He Zhonghan, “Zhuyi de renshi” (Understanding Isms), Qiantu zazhi, vol.2-2, Shanghai, 
1934.
33 Tien, p.51.
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often referred to as the Whampoa Clique, were He Zhonghan, Yang Yichi, 
Feng Ti, Zheng Kuoqing and Deng Wenyi. The organisation developed Sun's 
principles in the direction indicated in Dai Jitao's #f£ $  P§J works: 
Sunwenzhuyi zhi zhexuejichu (The Philosophical
Foundations of Sun Yatsen), and Guomin gemingyu Zhongguo guomindang
(The National Revolution and the Guomindang in
China).
After the Northern Expedition the Sun Yatsen Study Society was
replaced by the Whampoa Alumni Association. The secretary of this
association was Zheng Kuoqing and its president was Fan Yujiang. It was
this Whampoa Clique, influenced by the ideas of Dai Jitao, which formed the
core of the Blueshirts after 1932. The flow of essays from the pens of right-
wing writers within the traditions of Sunism was of central importance to the
construction of a coherent ideology for the new movement.
One such essay, written by Mao Guanshan appeared on 4
October 1932, shortly after the formation of the Blueshirts. It was published
in Shanghai in Zhou Liuying's JrHSH Shehui xinwen rK (The Society
Mercury). This essay expressed Mao's vision of the nationalist revolution in
China and its relationship with Fascism. He argued that three principle
examples of revolution in the world - the French, the Russian, and the
Turkish - could offer very little to China as models of political progress.
Because of its characteristics, he contended, only through a Fascist revolution
could China be saved, emphasising the success of Italian Fascism:
Fascism  is not reactionary like the com m unist claimed. Fascism  is the 
only instrum ent a dying country can use for its own salvation. Italian 
Fascism  is substantially the strongest, bravest and m ost active expression 
o f  the national spirit. W ithout the boundary and the lim its o f  the 
economy, it succeeded in a backward Italy as well as in an advanced 
Germany. The Fascist m ovem ent is not solely a product o f  Europe, It 
also developed in Asia as well as in America. It is the magic weapon to
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save the Chinese nation from the fate o f  dying. It is compatible with the 
Three Principles o f  the People and the National Party 3^
A month later, in November 1932, a second essay authored by Zhou 
Liuying the editor of Shehui zhuyi ^±#±H(Academy of Socialism) was 
published. In this essay, entitled “Fascism and Chinese Revolution”, he 
argued that the origins of Chinese Fascism actually lay at the end of the Qing 
Dynasty, and were based on the “Iron and Blood Spirit” of the Zhongguo 
geming tongmenghui (Chinese Revolutionary Comrades
Association) of which Sun Yatsen was a founder. Zhou strongly urged the 
Chinese people to fight against the foreign invaders, but held that Sun's ideas 
alone could not save China.35 Instead, Zhou's proposed that Sunism and 
Fascism should work together, in a partnership of the civilian and the 
military, in the Pen and the Sword ( Knowledge and Action.)
D. In Defence of Dictatorship
The right wing's attempt to remould Sunism in the image of European 
Fascism did not go unchallenged. Chiang's opponent Hu Hanmin i® 1  S  
criticised Fascism forcefully in the Sanminzhuyi bi-monthly magazine 
{Sanminzhuyi banyuekan H K i  IS f t  fll). He argued against the 
existence of factions within the Guomindang, including such organisations as 
the Blueshirts and accused those who held Fascist ideas related to Sunism, 
such as Zhou Liuying and other right wing members, of wanting to dominate 
the party through Fascism and institutionalise a dictatorship. Hu also claimed 
that Fascist ideology represented an extremely narrow conception of
3^ SHXW, vol. 4-17, Mao Guanshan, “Guomindang yu faxisidi yundong” (Guomindang and 
the Fascist Movement), 1933.
35 Yamaki Yoshiko, “Chugoku ni okeru fasici shugi o megutte” (China and Fascism), 
Chugoku kankei ronsetsu shiryo, vol.41-14, 1972, p.215.
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nationalism, and that the widely held view which saw Chinese Fascism as no 
more than a pragmatic means towards the salvation of the nation was shallow 
and inadequate.
Hu's accusation that the Blueshirts would be used as a means of 
asserting a personal dictatorship finds an echo in internal party documents, 
some of which argue for precisely the kind of personal rule which he feared.
The dictatorship we foresee is not personal dictatorship, it is a 
dictatorship which should not be personified by one person, but 
organised dictatorship, democratic dictatorship which is ruled by the 
law  .36
Mostly, these arguments stressed that dictatorship should be seen in a
transitional way as part of a political evolution, and not as a permanent
political system. They believed that it was an extension of the kind of
political tutelage that was advocated in Sun's ideology, and was entirely
consistent with the Three Principles of the People.37 Parliamentary
democracy was thought to be unsuitable for China, because “people are
completely alienated from politics, the situation now is that people in fact do
not care about politics.” 38
The appeal of a dictatorship advocated by Whampoa students soon
caught the attention of several Chinese commentators outside the relatively
restricted worlds of the Guomindang party and the military. The Peking and
Tientsin Times of 5 August 1933 carried an article entitled “From Party to
Personal Dictatorship: Chinese Fascism and Chiang Kaishek”, which gives
also details of the Blueshirts programme and policy.
Although once denied by M arshal Chiang Kaishek, it has been known 
for some tim e both in the N orth and the South that China's virtual
3^ SMA, Q99-15, Di wucihuiyi (Guomindang’s Shanghai Department Documents o f the Fifth 
Conference), September 1932, pp. 10-17.
37 SMA, Q99-15, pp. 10-17.
38 SMA, Q99-15, Xin zhongguo jianshe xuehui jingji zhengce dagang (Outline of the 
Economic Policy o f the Association for the Construction o f New China), pp.52-54.
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dictator is no longer going to hide his light under a  bushel, but is 
determ ined to establish Fascism in this distracted and disunited realm. 
Democracy de facto as practised in Europe or de oratione as evidenced 
in China, are to go by the board and autocracy and dictatorship are to 
take their place.3^
The article then enumerates the guiding principles of the Blueshirts.
Thus there was a growing consensus on the right of the party, strongly
advocated by the Blueshirts, that dictatorship was the most suitable political
form for China. During a meeting for Guomindang officials held in honour of
his return from Italy, Liu Wendao flJjtJl40 addressed the audience in the
following words:
Dictatorship only works when the leader is good, in Europe it works out 
for M ussolini and Hitler as they are good leaders. Also China has such a 
good leader, 'C hiang Kaishek', he can be compared with M ussolini and 
w ith Zhuge Liang ^E.4 * Chiang has the aspiration and the courage 
to reconstruct our country as he is personally concerned about China's 
fate. N ow  China is still in the period o f  political tutelage, and people's 
training and education has not yet been completed. In this period 
'politics o f  a good man is necessary. The task o f every Chinese person is 
to help Chiang Kaishek, whether we are educators or businessm en, we 
all have the responsibility to help him. Only then is China's recovery 
possible 4^
Under a dictatorship it would prove easier to maintain social order and 
to start the political construction which China so urgently needed 43
39 PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, 14 August, 1933, p.469. Enclosure no.2 in despatch to Foreign 
Office. Extract: Peking and Tientsin Times, 5 August, 1933.
4^ During the 1930s Liu Wendao was Chinese Ambassador in Berlin.
4 * A statesman and strategist in the period o f the Three Kingdoms (220-265), who became a 
symbol of resourcefulness and wisdom in Chinese folklore.
4^ SMA, Q99-15, pp.22-24. Guomindang's "Internal" Documents, 9 September 1932, A 
meeting held as a welcome back party for Liu Wendao from Italy.
43 SMA, Q99-15, pp.22-24.
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E. The Lushan Conference
In order to determine the way forward for the Blueshirts, a conference
was held at Lushan44 on 21 August 1933.45 Chiang used the conference as a
forum to argue not only for tighter internal organisation of the Blueshirts, but
also for the advantages of untrammelled dictatorship:
The conference decided to establish Fascist cells in the Kuom intang 
headquarters in “loyal” military units and in schools and universities and 
to entrust this w ork to W u Hsin Yah [W u Xingya] and Pan Kung Chia 
[Pan Gongjia] in Shanghai; Chiang Chi Chung [Jiang Zhizhong], C hief 
o f the General S taff o f  the W uhan M ilitary Headquarters and 
Com m anding Officer o f  the Arm oured Trains Detachm ent o f  the Central 
M ilitary Headquarters, in Hupeh [Hubei]; H u Chun Han [Hu Zhonghan],
C hief o f  the Political Training D epartm ent o f  the Kiangsi M ilitary 
Headquarters, in Kiangsi [Jiangxi]; Kang Chih [Kang Zhi], m em ber o f  
the Hunan Provincial Bureau o f  the Kuom intang, in Hunan, and Tseng 
Kwang Ching [Zheng Guangqing] in Szechuen [Sichuan].4*>
Chiang told the assembled military and Blueshirts leaders at Lushan 
that: “The most important task is to rejuvenate our already dead 
revolutionary spirit!” Berating the Guomindang as a “lifeless skeleton”, 
Chiang praised, in contrast, the rising Fascist parties in Italy and Germany, 
whose revolutionary spirit had guided them to total control of their nations 47 
Chiang's voice was only one in a growing chorus criticising the Guomindang
44 Tien, p. 125. In 1933 Chiang had set up a training camp in Lushan to standardise the 
command system and to try to eliminate the regional diversity. In 1935 the training camp was 
moved to Emei shan (Sichuan), because of the coalition between the Guangdong and Guangxi 
militarists against Chiang. The camp was returned to Lushan in 1937.
45 NA, SMP. D4685, August 1933. See also, PRO, FO. 371/17142 xc 930, (464-465).See also 
FOH, J l, nr. 2301/318, Blueshirts, Peking, 26 September, 1933.
46 NA, SMP.D4685. See also, PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, (464-465). Present at the 
conference at Lushan were; Chen Lifu, member of the C.E.C and Chief of the Organisation 
Department, Zeng Kuoqing ‘ffMfff* member of the C.E.C and special delegate of the 
Guomindang in Sichuan, Wu Xingya member of the standing Committee of local 
Guomindang Headquarters and Chief of the Social Bureau, Fan Gongzhan $ § - 2 ^  member of 
the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Guomindang Headquarters and Chief of the 
Education Bureau, and many others.
47 Kirby, p. 155.
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and raising the question of whether China, like Germany and other nations, 
would best be served by a strong dictatorial government.
Once they had been formed, the Blueshirts did not simply adopt the 
ideas of the Sun Yatsen Study Society, but continued to develop the 
revisionist direction taken by Dai Jitao. Eventually, they actually elaborated 
their own Three Principles of the Nation, which narrowed the meaning of the 
Three Principles down to a specifically Fascist idea which mainly dealt with 
the military organisation of Chinese society:48
1) National Defence a. Strengthening defence b. Reform o f the M ilitary
c. Expansion o f  the airforce.
2) U ltra N ationalism  a. Spiritual b. M aterial
3) Socialist State a. Social services & reform  o f  management
(administration) b. rapid developm ent o f  transport 
infrastructure.
In other words, there is a smooth and unbroken surface or contiguity 
stretching across Sun’s Principles and those of the Blueshirts. Sun's ideas 
were not in any sense Fascist or proto-Fascist - on the contrary, they were so 
general that they could encompass any sort of political programme of any 
ideological character. Hence, at the same time as the Blueshirts were 
developing and defending one version of Sun's political legacy, the 
Communist Party was using the very same Principles in its own propaganda 
and arguing that only a revolutionary socialist programme could bring about 
their fulfilment. There was no need for either Communists or Fascists to 
abandon Sunism. It fitted easily with the substance of their own political 
perspectives. 49
48 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kcmsuru shiryo, (Materials on the Blueshirts), pp.3-4.
49 Yamaki Yoshiko. Internally the Blueshirts were divided and did not have a unanimously 
clear idea about the way Chinese Fascism should go. It often happened that members of the 
CCP, when released from jail, were asked to become members of the Blueshirts, while also 
some members o f the Qing Bang(Green Gang) and the Hong Bang (Red Gang) became 
Blueshirt members.
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Some Blueshirts did indeed go so far as to call for openly abandoning 
the ideas of Sun Yatsen. For example, in January 1934 a number of cadres 
announced during a conference that their view of Sunism had changed. They 
now thought that “We should give up democracy and Sunism and replace it 
by Fascism in order to promote Chiang's dictatorship. We should abolish the 
teachings of Sun, and extend military education with the purpose of creating 
a new Fascist society.” 50
Thus, while on the surface of its party propaganda the Guomindang 
insisted that it remained consistently faithful to the Three Principles of the 
People, and while the Fascist ideas emerging in the early 1930s could be 
made to fit in comfortably with the old Sunist slogans, some people in the 
organisation saw the opportunity for a clean break in ideology as a positive 
opportunity. These ultra-enthusiasts never won the day however, and Chinese 
Fascism was able to grow and flourish within the generous confines of the 
existing party ideology.
F. The View of Fascism by Various Guomindang Factions
The relationship between the Blueshirts and the central command of 
the Guomindang was often complex and confusing. In order to give some 
insight in to the question of to what extent the aims of the Blueshirts departed 
from the Guomindang as a whole, a short explanation about the internal 
structure of the Guomindang is necessary.
The Guomindang in the 1930s consisted of a number of factions, all of 
which were bound to Chiang Kaishek by personal or patron relationships. 
The allocation of power was determined primarily by personal influence. 
Three dominant factions were obliged to Chiang. The C.C.Clique, the
50 Yamaki Yoshiko, p.212, quotation from Sanminzhuyiyuejian (Monthly Sanminzhuyi),vol.4- 
5, Nov 1934.
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Whampoa Clique (from which the Blueshirts developed) and the Political 
Study Clique. It was in name only that the President of the Executive Yuan 
served as prime minister, commanding the work of the subservient ministries 
of foreign affairs, finance, education, commerce and so on. Despite the 
formal positions that Chiang Kaishek held over the regime as a whole, he 
exercised that authority with minimal concerns for formal chains of 
command. As a result of Chiang’s predominance over the regime and of his 
preference for ignoring formal chains of command, the government, as a 
policy-formulating and administrative organisation, became enervated. The 
civil government thus always remained subordinate to the interests of Chiang 
and the military, and it never became a driving force of its own.
As a political party, the Guomindang remained underdeveloped even 
more than the governmental administration as a result of Chiang Kaishek’s 
approach to transform the revolutionary movement into a military 
authoritarian regime.
The Guomindang consisted of many factions of which the largest were 
generally the most influential in policy making. In practice Chiang Kaishek 
controlled them all. The relations among these several factions were 
complex, while each supported Chiang Kaishek as leader of the regime. At 
the same time, their dealings with each other were sometimes stretched to its 
limits causing excessive pressures between the members. Jealousy and 
struggle for power was common place.
The Blueshirts often viewed the other cliques as corrupt civilian 
politicians, and were particularly hostile towards the C.C.Clique. The 
political, educational and intelligence operations of the two factions 
overlapped, thereby generating intense friction. Mostly ideological and 
policy differences were not the main cause of this friction. The fundamental 
issue was, however, one of power and position.
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Chiang’s attitude to this was always to “divide and rule”, thus assuring 
his supremacy, and preventing either one of them from becoming 
powerful.51
Outside Chiang’s direct control stood two other Guomindang factions, 
led by rival applicants to the legacy of Sun Yatsen: the Reorganisation Clique 
of Wang Jingwei, which was still part of the Nanjing government; and a less 
well-defined grouping around Hu Hanmin, who had associated himself with 
the virtually autonomous Southwest Political Council of Guangdong and 
Guangxi. The outlooks of these groups on dictatorship and Fascism remain 
relevant to this discussion.52
No other faction matched the adoration of Blueshirts and the 
Whampoa Clique for Fascism. No other faction shared their aspiration for 
such a radical solution to China’s problems. The C.C.Clique’s advocating of 
Fascism was much more modest. Its chairman, Chen Lifu, was also 
concerned with problems of order and control. For instance, the leadership 
principle and the recruitment of youth were given priority. Zhu Jiahua, an 
important figure in the C.C.Clique and later in the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps 
had also introduced the German advisers to Chiang Kaishek in 1927. 
Although the C.C.Clique lacked a precise ideological approach, most of its 
top figures agreed that the reformation of Chinese society should be executed 
along the lines of traditional Confucian morality.
The Political Study Clique had a very different standpoint on Fascism 
and its relevance to China. Its approach to Fascism was pragmatic rather than 
ideological. The influence of this clique on Guomindang politics should not 
be underestimated, because a growing number of its members came to hold
51 Lloyd E. Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927-1937”, p.21, in The 
Nationalist Era in China 1927-1949, with contributions of L.Eastman, J.Ch’en, S.Pepper, and 
L.Van Slyke.
52 Kirby, Germany and Republican China, pp. 158-166.
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high government positions in the mid-193Os. Yang Yongtai, of the Political 
Study Clique, became Chiang’s secretary-general in the Headquarters of the 
Military Affairs Commission in 1932. He remained one of the most powerful 
political figures in the nation until his assassination in 1936.
The Wang Jingwei Reorganisation faction was identified with the Left 
wing of the Guomindang. After 1931 Wang co-operated in an uneasy way 
with Chiang Kaishek, as head of the Executive Yuan he was nominally in 
charge of the government, but the real power resided with Chiang’s Military 
Council, i.e. Chiang himself. Wang did not favour Fascism and was against a 
dictatorship for the Guomindang, but his views became more positive after a 
sojourn in Germany in 1936. The well-known publicist and editor of 
People's Tribune Tang Liangli was identified with the clique of Wang 
Jingwei, and became an important mouthpiece. Tang’s journal stressed the 
social character of the Nazis in a way that was more compatible with Wang’s 
ideas. The resemblance between the concept of Sun Yatsen’s People’s 
Livelihood and Nazism was discussed.
Hu Hanmin opposed Fascism and criticised the Guomindang for trying 
to transform China into a Fascist country. Hu’s criticism was vested mainly 
in his personal contempt for Chiang Kaishek. One of Hu Hanmin’s followers, 
Liu Luyin, expressed his views concerning Fascism and concluded that there 
existed in some way a relationship between European Fascism and Sim 
Yatsen’s Three Principles of the People.
In summary, of all the factions within the Guomindang, it was from 
the Whampoa Clique i.e. the Blueshirts that the most positive promotion of 
Fascism came. Their initiative was stimulated by Chiang Kaishek. In a less 
radical way the C.C.Clique followed many of the ideas advocated by the 
Blueshirts. It is possible that their motivation for Fascism was induced by 
Chiang Kaishek. Although many of its members influenced Guomindang 
politics, the approach to European Fascism of the Political Study Clique was
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pragmatic. Wang Jingwei was reluctant to use Fascist ideas for China’s 
reconstruction until he had visited Europe in 1936. After that time his group 
emphasised the social features of Fascism as a tool for change in China. 
Primarily due to his opposition to Chiang Kaishek, Hu Hanmin represented a 
different view of Fascism.
G. The Blueshirts’ Programme
The Blueshirts' programme held that the nation was supreme and 
sacred. The only duty of a Blueshirt member was to pledge himself to protect 
the national interest: “all members are responsible for national affairs and 
must sacrifice everything for the sake of the country.” 53 The range of their 
activities and the breadth of their goals encompassed the mix typical of 
Fascist movements elsewhere - ultra-nationalism, dictatorship, opposition to 
individualism and democracy, state domination of the economy, totalitarian 
control of culture, militarisation of society, and the use of secret police 
against political enemies.54 The Fascist axiom of obedience to an absolute 
leader was an essential part of the Blueshirts ideology. Their ideal was a 
community demonstrating absolute co-ordination between the will of the 
leader and the actions of the people.
The Shehui xinwen published Blueshirt views on the cultural 
development of China and the Chinese people. One report claimed: “The 
National Party never developed a cohesive cultural policy. Up to now this 
policy only proved destructive instead of constructive and creative in 
character. The cultural policy of the National Party should include the
53 NA, SMP. D4685, 20 June, 1933, by the head of SMP section S2, P. Givens, Fascistic 
Movement in China.
54 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.43.
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following points: party education, govemmentalisation of the press,
intermittent propaganda, and individual cultural development.” 55
In addition to these ideas, it was explained that “in the present 
situation, China needs a unified culture, and China needs an independent 
national culture for the future development of the Chinese revolution. Two 
aspects must be considered. Vertically, from an historical view, present day 
China should carry out the culture of the Three Principles of the People, and 
horizontally, from its social aspect, present day Chinese culture must include 
two elements: firstly, state extremism and national extremism, and secondly 
science. It is foreseen that present cultural control includes five parts: control 
of religion, education, arts, the press and social groups.” 56
The Blueshirts' programme was thorough and comprehensive. It 
covered every phase of military and political endeavour, and aimed at 
conferring dictatorial powers on Chiang. It planned to place political affairs, 
defence forces and the financial system of the country on a sound basis and 
to eliminate radicalism of all descriptions. In order to attain all these aims, the 
Blueshirts planned to reform the Chinese educational system.57 Starting at 
primary school, part of the time at school was to be spent on military 
education, where nationalism was to be accentuated zealously.
There was no consensus among foreign observers at that time as to 
whether the Blueshirts would be able to implement their programme 
comprehensively. Though their organisation was efficient, reports show that
55 SHXW, vol. 4-13, “Guomindang de wenhua zhengce pipan” (Criticism of the 
Guomindang’s Cultural Policy), 1933.
56 SHXW, vol. 4-22, “Guomindang de tongzhi wenhua yundong” (The Guomindang 
Movement to Control Culture), 1933.
57 Colin Mackerras, “Education in the Guomindang Period, 1928-1949”, pp. 157-159. In Ideal 
and Reality, Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949, by D.Pong and 
E.S.K.Fung, (eds.); see also, Israel, p. 191.
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soon after their establishment there was already a lack of unity.58 The 
Shanghai Branch of the Blueshirts in particular suffered some serious 
setbacks. However, in China, particularly in organisations of this kind, this 
was not unusual: the maintenance of cohesion between civilian and military 
factions was often fraught with difficulties. This problem was not unique to 
the Blueshirts.
The overtly Fascist nature of their programme is clear from internal 
Guomindang documents, which reveal that Fascist policies and practice were 
discussed in detail.59 Having determined their main objective as being to 
instruct the Chinese people in Fascist ideas and to control public opinion, the 
documents disclose that a new Society, the New China Reconstruction 
Academy Association (Xin Zhongguo jianshe xuehui #Jr T5 IS I t  ^  # ) , 
was formed in Shanghai on 19 June 1932 for that purpose.
This new society was to assist the Guomindang government with the 
planned indoctrination of the Chinese people with Fascist ideas, and with the 
control of public opinion.60 The Association published monthly periodicals, 
and a series of books on a variety of subjects, including historical materials 
on issues such as constitutional government, state managed economies, and 
the electoral systems and education systems in different countries.
According to Guomindang documents, the chairman of the 
association, was Huang Yanpei (Huang Kegian) , 61 who had been
deputy leader of the 1911 Revolution and who was Chiang1 s sworn brother.
58 NA, SMP. D4685,20 June 1933.
59 SMA, Q99-15, It could not be established whether these documents were produced by 
Blueshirts or by Guomindang officials outside the Blueshirts organisation.
60 SMA, Q99-15, pp.24-25.
6  ^ Educator and member of the Democratic League of China, bom in Shanghai. During the 
first revolution, 1911-12, he was chief of the educational bureau under the Tatu o f Jiangsu. He 
was given the honorary degree of Doctor of Philosophy by St.John’s University, Shanghai, and 
was a member o f the National Defence Committee, 1937.
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The Association enjoyed the approval and full support of Chiang, and was in 
addition financed by the Guomindang.62
Aside from the work of this Association, the Blueshirts had a wealth of 
study materials through their other publications. The journal of the Central 
Military Academy at Nanjing, the Huangpu yuekan (Whampoa
Monthly), treated a variety of topics such as: Democracy and Dictatorship, 
Dictatorship and the Leader, The Political Thought of Fascism, The Political 
Organs of Fascism, Dictatorial Government under Mussolini, German 
Dictatorship under Hitler, and Dictatorial Government in China.63 Through 
Fascism, the Blueshirts tried to militarise the nation, and through 
militarisation to unite China in order to “save the nation from ruin.” The 
name Jiuwanghui (Association to save the Nation from Ruin) was often used 
for the Blueshirts when dealing with official affairs.64 The overtly and 
consciously Fascist character of the Blueshirts is clearly revealed by the fact 
that under the leadership of Deng Wenyi, He Zhonghan and others, the 
Blueshirts published over one hundred works on Fascist ideas and practices 
in Germany and Italy.65
H. Reorganising the Army
Stringent control over the army was considered as crucial to improving 
its functioning, and it was decided that to meet this goal an assault force 
within the army was necessary. Guomindang documents mention that:
62 SMA, Q99-15, pp.24-25.
63 Kirby, p. 163.
64 PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, (437), 17 July 1933, and NA, SMP. D4685,20 June 1933. The 
name Chuwanghui [Jiuwanghui] (Association to save the Nation from Ruin), was used when 
dealing with official affairs.
65 Chen Shaohe, Heigang lu (Record o f Internal Secret), Hong Kong 1973, p.44.
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The soldiers are poorly equipped and they are not loyal to the 
governm ent, they try to escape whenever it is possible. Therefore it is 
necessary to organise an assault force within the army to bring the 
soldiers into line. This assault force is intended to be the reliable force o f 
the government. The assault force is a “special task force”, and therefore 
will only be employed, for instance, to attack certain strong positions o f 
the enemy, or w hen there are certain incidents in the country. In the case 
o f  there being an incident in the country, the assault force first has to 
deal w ith the revolt o f  the people, secondly with the revolt within the 
Guom indang army, and thirdly to combat the Com m unist troops. As 
such the assault force may be compared with Hitler's Schutzstaffel (SS) 
or the Party's Vanguard Arm y.66
Political instruction in the army, notwithstanding a significant number 
of German advisers working as instructors6? at the Military Academies, was 
essentially a Chinese preserve.68 More importantly, it was a Blueshirt 
preserve, and a dominant figure in the Blueshirt oligarchy, He Zhonghan, 
who headed the Central Political Training Office. In addition, after the failure 
in 1933 to defeat the Communists in Jiangxi by military means alone, Chiang 
changed his strategy and coined the slogan: “Seven parts political, and three 
parts military” (Qifen zhengzhi sanfen junshi^c f t  H f t  W- (0- His
earlier strategy had emphasised the military. To support this new strategy a 
“Special Task Force” - Biedongdui 5 ® ^  - was formed. It was in fact a front 
organisation for the Blueshirts headed by Kang Ze fli another prominent 
Blueshirt. This task force had among its duties political propaganda within 
the military services.
The success of military reorganisation can be seen from the 
increasingly high proportion of the party’s membership which came from the
66 SNHA, 773/711, “Guomindang Documents”, Manuscript of the Military Committee of the 
National Government, September 1938, no.13588. These documents were for internal use only.
6? Lincoln Li, p.65. The entire unit was given thirty days training in intelligence work
conducted by a German adviser, and a special scheme in which seventeen hundred commission 
officers o f the rank of colonel and below were given the latest German military training by 
three German advisers.
68 Kirby, p.61.
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armed forces. In 1930s the membership of the Guomindang, especially 
military members, gradually increased every year. Compared with other 
sections, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, the members of the military 
achieved up to 63% of all members.69 
This is shown by the figures below :
Year 1932 1933 1934 1935
Province & Citv members 32.0% 30.4% 31.2% 30.8%
Overseas members 8 .8 % 8 .0 % 7.4% 6 .2 %
Military members 59.2% 61.6% 61.4% 63.0%
I. Fascism and Economic Policy
Liu Jianqun's 1931 essay “A Few Ideas for the Reform of the Party” 
had identified the major threats to the Republic as deterioration of the 
national economy; increasing rural poverty resulting from natural calamities 
and government inaction; and aggression by the Western powers and 
Japan.70
Thus, from the outset, the men who were instrumental in forming the 
Blueshirts were aware of the need for an important economic dimension as 
part of their programme to transform China radically. Essentially, they 
espoused the sort of etatism which sought to give the state a leading role in 
planning production and distribution of goods in order to break through the 
innumerable local barriers which hampered balanced development - lack of 
capital, lack of skills, lack of infrastructure, lack of productive capacity, and 
lack of developed markets.
69 Ikeda Makodo, Chugoku gendai seijishi (The Political History of Contemporary China), 
Tokyo: Holitsu bunkasha, 1962, p.313.
70 Hatano Kanichi, Chugoku kokuminto tsushi (The General History of the Guomindang), 
Tokyo: Daito shuppansha, 1943, pp.464-465. See also, TB, 2057, pp.2-5.
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The Blueshirts recognised that government intervention was 
indispensable in China's economic construction. They foresaw that the 
government would have to resort to extreme policies to intervene in people's 
economic life, to guide private enterprise and people's consumption. 
According to the Blueshirts this could only be done under Chiang's 
dictatorship. The example of the recovery of Germany after World War One 
was impressive, associated with the rise of Hitler and his National Socialist 
Party.7!
Many Blueshirt publications about China's economic policy addressed 
the policies needed to build up a state controlled economy. They 
recommended that heavy industries such as steel, automobile, airline, 
railway, chemical and defence should be run by the state.72 Furthermore, 
they suggested that the state should control international currency exchange 
in order to stabilise the exchange rate. International air transport should be 
run by the government and domestic airlines should be run by Chinese 
entrepreneurs rather than by foreigners. Private enterprises should receive tax 
benefits as a means of encouraging them to put their profits into expanded 
production. Economic development was to be enhanced through such 
initiatives as the Farmers Bank and producers' co-operatives. The distribution 
of profits to share-holders was to be limited. In order to control people's 
consumption, tax would be imposed on luxury goods.73
The two political prem ises o f  the im plem entation o f  economic control 
are, first o f  all, revolutionary targets which are decided by progress; 
second, the strong but flexible political institutions. The aim s o f  the 
economic control in China: (1) develop the domestic production; (2)
71 SMA, Q99-15, p. 19.
72 SMA, Q99-15, pp.54-64.
73 SMA, Q99-15.
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resist foreign aggression; (3) strengthen state power; (4) establish the 
economic foundation for the people's livelihoods.7^
The high level of state intervention in the economy which the 
Blueshirts wanted could only be envisaged under a form of government 
which involved centralised control. Dictatorship of a specifically Fascist 
character was thus much more than a political means of achieving unity. It 
was also the necessary prerequisite for economic transformation. The Fascist 
dictatorship in Italy was, for instance, praised as an economic model for 
China:
One o f  M ussolini's slogans was, Order, Authority and Justice, Belief, 
Obedience and Struggle. These six words were the key to his success.
Out o f  these six words the m ost im portant one is authority. W ithout 
authority there w ould be no justice, w ithout justice there would be no 
belief and, without belief there is no obedience and struggle. So, 
authority is the m ost fundamental factor in Italy's success.76
Summing up the Blueshirt view of the radical change necessary in 
China's society, the Blueshirt publication Shehui xinwen stated that “Fascism 
is the only tool of self-salvation of nations on the brink of destruction. There 
is no solution for China other than imitating the Fascist spirit of violent 
struggle as in Italy and Germany.” 76 In other words it was not merely a 
question of dictatorship, but of Fascist dictatorship.
7^ SHXW, vol.5-11, “Shishi jingji tongzhi di zhengzhi wenti” (Political Problems in 
Implementing Control o f the Economy), 1933, p. 178.
76 SMA, Q99-15, p.21, Guomindang Internal Documents, 9 September 1932. A Meeting held 
fo r  the welcome back from  Italy o f  Liu Wentao.
76 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, pp.40-41. See his footnote nr. 20, “Guomindang yu fa 
hsi ssu ti yun tung” (The Kuomintang and Fascism), Shuhui xinwen,vo\A, 21 A, 24 August,
1933.
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4.2 The Implementation of Blueshirt Fascism
The range of the Blueshirts’ activities was very broad. Chiang Kaishek and 
most leaders of the Blueshirts were interested in Fascism largely for 
instrumental reasons. They were impressed that the Fascist parties in Europe 
had so quickly and successfully transformed divided and weak states into 
unified and powerful nations. They therefore sought to learn from the 
practical techniques that these Fascist regimes had employed.
This approach is also clear from both Womende xunlian RIPTOSJ® 
(Our Training), a training manual of the Fuxingshe and from a speech Liu 
Jianqun delivered in November 1933, shortly before he assumed the post of 
secretary-general of the Lixingshe. This speech was titled “Fuxing Zhongguo 
geming zhi lu” (The Road to Reviving the Chinese
Revolution) . 77 Eastman explains that “these authoritative publications make 
explicit that the exigent task confronting China at the time lay not in arguing 
ideological subtleties, but in implementing the ideology already in their 
possession. For the Lixingshe, therefore, ‘action’ not theory was all- 
important.” 78 This conformed to the ideas of Sun Yatsen and Chiang 
Kaishek.
However, the choice for action by the Blueshirts often escalated into 
violent action, and especially violence was answered by violence. Repeatedly 
was heard that “power alone was the measure of success.” 79 This opinion to 
use violence in name of the nation was also repeatedly found in the 
Blueshirts periodicals Qiantu and the Shehui xinwen.
77 Eastman, “A Review Article” p.41. See also his footnotes 54 and 55.
78 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.41.
79 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.47.
190
Chapter Four
A. The Activities of the Blueshirts
The Blueshirts tried to realise their goals through a comprehensive 
programme of modernisation and the imposition of order with an emphasis 
on education and on cultural control. Military training in schools, the Boy 
Scouts80 and among the adult masses was promoted.81 Fascist propaganda 
was strongly concentrated at schools or special groups. The impression was 
that the Blueshirts did not care what kind of group or school it was, as long as 
it served their goal of temptation and inspiration by Fascism. This technique 
immediately spread out like a spider’s web.
The press was reformed. He Zhonghan was the guiding genius behind 
these reforms in the press and he expressed his views as follows: “Journalism 
in itself needs to have a conception of morals, for innovation of unlawful 
customs. The main importance is the censorship of Journalism. For our 
propaganda, XINWEN - News is the most efficient publication, but also 
film and radio are important for our propaganda.” 82 The Blueshirts founded a 
variety of mass-media, opened bookstores, published periodicals, while
80 N C D N (North China Daily News), “China's Scouts Progressing, Nanking's Enthusiasm”, 11 
November, 1933.
81 PRO, FO. 371/17142 xc 930, (472), 24 August, 1933. See also, NA, SMP, Special Branch, 
D4685, 20 June, 1933.
82 Qiantu, vol. 4-9, 1936. An address made by He Zhonghan on 7 and 8 May entitled “The 
Policy of Journalism and the Nation’s Benefits” in which....He argued about the Control of 
Journalism, because it was connected to the Nation’s benefits.
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propaganda work was performed by publishing newspapers,83 journals and 
books.84
Between 1932-1935 approximately two hundred different periodicals 
with publications about Fascist propaganda were supervised by the 
Blueshirts.85
Despite all the effort that the Blueshirts put in this propaganda work, 
the message about Fascism they tried to spread among the Chinese people 
was often not received. Most people did not really understand the arguments 
and phrases used in the articles, and the influence that was exercised by 
Blueshirts’ Fascism as a political ideology remained therefore limited to a 
small group. In contrast to this propaganda the violence used by the 
Blueshirts was something that was better understood and feared by a large 
group of people.
In reference to European journalism, He Zhonghan said that in 
“Russia, after the Revolution, the mass media came from private control 
under government -managed -nationalised control. In Italy, it is under control
83 NA, SMP. D4685, 20 June 1933. In the part about Propaganda Policy, the following 
newspapers are mentioned as 'Society organs'; Zhongguo ribao(China Daily News), Pingming 
wanbao(Common People's Evening News), Renmin wanbao(People’s Evening News), Wenhua 
zhoubao(Culture weekly), Renmin zhoubao(People's weekly), and Zhengzhi pinglun(Political 
Review). See also, PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, (443), 24 August, 1933, In Shanghai there 
were nine Guomindang and Blueshirts newspapers for propaganda. The document includes a 
list of the newspapers' names.
84 Yang Shubiao, Jiang Jieshi zhuan (The Biography of Jiang Jieshi), Shanghai: Tuanjie 
chubanshe, 1989, pp. 199-201. Bookstores opened by the Blueshirts for instance were: Bati 
shudian it- IS, Wenhua shuju i t  -0M , Qiantu shuju gy Jii I f  JU, Xin Shengming 
shudian §fr 'pfr ilr /£ , Zhengzhong shuju IE 4^  H  Hil, Xinguang shuju ilr JUl, Xinken 
shudian H  H  JS, etc.
85 Yang Shubiao, pp. 199-201. A few examples are: Faxisitizhuyi yundong lun M  i  H  
M Mb ft (Theory o f the Fascist movements), Faxisizhuyi zhi zuzhililun I f  $T ±  H £
J1 f t  (Theory on organisation of Fascism), Faxisidizhuyi zhi jingjijichu &  H  I f  f  ±  i  
M  $1 iS  $1 (The basics on an economy for Fascism), Faxisidi zhi nuchao
(The raging tide of Fascism), Faxisidi j i  qi zhengzhi ^  ^  to  (Fascism and
politics), Faxisidi jiaoyu  tfe I f  ^  W (Fascist education), Faxisizhuyi yanjiu &  I f  4E
i§  (Research on Fascism).
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of the Party or it is government- managed. In Germany, after Hitler came to 
power journalism was brought under Party control.” 86 Hence, censorship 
was the issue and He Zhonghan5s contemplation was often published in the 
Blueshirts periodical Qiantu:
Besides technology and organisation, there is little we can borrow from 
the press policies o f Britain, the United States and France, who are 
suffering under the system o f  democracy. However, we can learn a lot 
from the press policies o f  Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia, who rule 
the country through the party, although their ideology is based on 
different “ism s.”
There are five issues concerning press policies and laws. (1) Journalist 
acts as civil servant; (2) Journalists act as complete organisations which 
advocate the welfare for the journalists; (3) Em phasis on the training o f 
the journalists; (4) Emphasis on both inspection and propaganda; (5) The 
Publicity Departm ent o f  the central government controls the power o f  
the press.8^
In this regard it is interesting to note that about one year earlier, around 
January 1935, a reorganisation in the management of three major Shanghai 
newspapers and one news agency was ordered by the Guomindang 
government - presumably by Chiang Kaishek. The newspapers included the 
China Times, the China Press, the China Evening News, together with the 
Shuh Shih [Shushi?] News agency.88 The director-general, Zhang Zuobing, 
was forced to resign at the end of 1934, and proposed was that Du Yuesheng 
among others would fulfil an important role in the new organisation of the 
newspapers.89 These reorganisations may have been initiated in the wake of
86 Qicmtu, vol. 4-9,1936.
8? Wang Jiahong, “De Yi Su-E xinwen de zhengce yu xinwen fazhi bijiaolun” (The 
Comparison of the Press Policies and the Press Laws among Germany, Italy and Soviet 
Russia), Qiantu zazh i, 4-9.
88 MAE, “E”, Asie - Oceanie,nr. 245, box nr.529, Reorganisation de Journaux Chinois.
89 Zhang Zuobing’s main associate Hollington Tong (Dong XianguangHMJfc), who was 
chief-redactor and managing director of the China Press had temporarily, from January 1935 
up to the middle of June 1935, taken over Zhang Zuobing’s functions. The final 
reorganisations were to become effective in June 1935, and included a number o f important 
people to be appointed in the management of the newspapers and agency. A major position 
would be given to Du Yuesheng.
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the murder on 13 November 1934 of Shi Liangcai, the director of the 
Shenbao ^  who had continuously attacked Chiang on his appeasement 
policy.90
The Blueshirts also set up, or took over control of, a variety of police 
and public security units. These units, some of them secret, were used to 
enforce Blueshirt supremacy within the party and obedience to Chiang 
Kaishek in society as a whole. Some of these units became feared for their 
ruthlessness and violent action against their opponents. This violence was not 
only directed against Communists, Japanese and political rivals, but were 
also “aimed against persons in the party or government who did not measure 
up to the standards of this revolutionary elite.” 91 It took some time for them 
to make their presence felt and for the public to become aware of their 
existence.
As the Blueshirts were a secret organisation, reports of their activities 
in the newspapers were mostly a mixture of rumours, leaks and
suppositions.92 Press dispatches from provincial cities occasionally brought 
to light the work of the Blueshirts in Nanjing, Hankou and Guangzhou.93 
The first report of their activities in Shanghai appeared in the press on 13 
November 1933, describing how members of the Society had been
distributing pamphlets advocating Fascism and denouncing Communism 94
90 The murder o f Shi Liangcai was attributed to the Blueshirts.
91 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.47.
92 NA, D.4685, 8 July, 1933; Miscellaneous Mainichi, “Shanghai Settlement Police and 
Blueshirt Society”; NCDN, 20th June 1933, “Blueshirts for China”; China Forum, July 1933, 
and Siao kungpao, 12 August 1933, “Blueshirts to assassinate opponents.”
93 Yen Yinglu, “Can China become Fascist,” China Critic, 14 June 1934; “Blue Clothes 
Society”, Peking and Tientsin Times, 1 August 1933; “Blueshirts said at work in Canton”, 
Hankow Herald, 16 August 1933, and “Cantonese obstructionists”, 10 September 1933.
94 “Chinese Fascism comes into the open”, Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, 17 
November, 1933.
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Between 1932 and 1936 there was a concentration of Blueshirt activity 
in Shanghai. The activities of the Blueshirts in Shanghai consisted of the 
following: firstly reporting on the general situation in the city, watching over 
the thoughts and activities of civil and military leaders and leaders of public 
bodies who might come under suspicion of being anti-Chiang and/or pro- 
Communist elements or harbouring such sentiments, and secondly the 
vigorous suppression of Communism. Until his death in 1936, Wu Xingya 
was chief of the Bureau of Social Affairs in Shanghai. On instructions from 
Nanjing, he established the Shanghai Youth Strength Society {Shanghai 
qingnian lishe ±  ^  t} f t)  which in reality was the counterpart of the
Blueshirts in Shanghai.95
Blueshirts members were sometimes also sent abroad specially to 
study science and technology with the final goal of returning to China and 
producing explosives and poisons.96
B. Anti-Communist Activities
Since their foundation the Blueshirts had a strongly and explicitly anti- 
Communist orientation 97 Early members included men such as Teng Jie and 
Deng Wenyi who had founded the Zhonghua wenhua xuehui 
(Chinese Cultural Association), an extreme anti-Communist body. Before the 
formation of the Blueshirts, this group had remained in close touch with
95 NA, SMP report D4685, 9 December 1940, Memorandum on the Blue Shirt Society.
96 TB, 2196, Ranisha no kainen to sono tokumu kosaku ni tsuite ; Yu Lexing went to
France to study science and technology.
97 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo, (Materials on the Blueshirts: Chiang Kaishek's 
Double Policy), An important Japanese Government report, issued in 1935, p.29. Two sub­
sections describe the Blueshirts old and new members in conflict with each other.
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Whampoa graduates in order to co-ordinate their activities.98 It is quite 
possible that in the first instance foreign observers, including Japanese, may 
have confused this Association for the Blueshirts.
The Purge of 1927 had by no means eliminated the Communists, and 
by 1932 there was a coherent and well-organised area of CCP control in 
Jiangxi which had proclaimed itself the Chinese Soviet Republic. The 
crushing of this entity and the suppressing of Communism was therefore an 
urgent priority of the party leadership. Through military assaults on 
Communist strongholds and a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the 
peasantry on the fringes of Communist-dominated areas the Blueshirts took a 
leading role. In June 1932 a more conservative policy described as “Three 
Parts Military and Seven Parts Political” was initiated. Part of this struggle 
involved inculcating among the peasantry a respect for Sun's Three Principles 
of the People. However, the CCP used nearly the same method, first 
explaining the Principles to the peasants, and then teaching them how the 
Guomindang failed to apply them 99
To direct their anti-Communist activities more effectively, the 
Blueshirts in October 1933 set up a special task force - the Biedongdui 3}iJ #j 
He. 100 Its members were sent into areas controlled by Communists with 
special instructions, including organising the population into a “Communist- 
Annihilation Volunteer Militia” (Baoweituan #f HI). In fact this became 
an extension of the Biedongdui itself. 101 The Biedongdui’s instructions also
98 The exact date o f establishment of the Chinese Culture Association is not mentioned, 
possibly late 1931.
99 William Wei, Counterrevolution in China, The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet 
Period, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1985, pp.50-52, and pp.65-76.
100 Wei, p.79. See also Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, pp.70-74.
101 TB, 2057, pp.146-150. See also, Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, pp.72, 89-90, with 
reference to his footnote 8. Fighting against the Communists was, however, not exclusively a 
Blueshirt preserve, as before the Blueshirts' foundation there existed the Anti-Bolshevik Corps 
(ABCorps). This corps was formed in 1925, following the death of Sun, by a group of young
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were to improve the welfare of the people in the areas taken by the 
Communists, with emphasis on education. Also, in almost every big city, 
certain members of the Blueshirts worked in close co-operation with the local 
police in order to fight against the Communists.
The importance given to the anti-Communist struggle may be seen 
from the fact that, in 1934, at Chiang's suggestion, the Blueshirts moved their 
Headquarters to Nanchang so as to be close to the front line of the struggle 
against the Soviet Republic. Prioritising the anti-Communist struggle also led 
Chiang to remove some of the more established leaders of the organisation 
and replace them with younger, more loyal and more militant men, many of 
whom had just returned from the Soviet Union, where they had studied and 
researched the Red Army and the Soviet Secret Police, (the GPU). The name 
of this Blueshirt section was Dangzhengjun sheji weiyuanhui 
or Committee for Guomindang Military Planning. 102
Communist influence was not confined to remote rural areas. Since 
1927 the CCP had been underground in the cities, but even after the purge, 
the headquarters of the party remained in Shanghai. The Blueshirts therefore 
set up a special organisation to destroy them in this important city. “The local 
Dangbu received a secret order from the C.E.C. of the Guomindang in 
Nanjing, ordering the formation of a Shanghai Municipality Comrades 
Association for the Elimination o f Communists” 1° 3 The instructions were 
that:
A Standing Com m ittee o f  the following three persons with W u Kaisien
[W u Kaixian] as C hief Secretary, has been appointed: General Yang Hu,
Guomindang members. Chen Guofu was a short time associated with the ABCorps until the 
C.C.Clique was formed in 1927. Under Wang Lixi's leadership the ABCorps became a highly 
cohesive organisation. Its activities extended to every district in Jiangxi, and reached even into 
Anhui and Nanjing.
102 t b ,  2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo, p.29.
103 n a ,  SMP. D4685,27 May, 1934. Blueshirts’ Fascist Activities in Shanghai: Kuomintang 
Forms a Shanghai Municipality Comrades Association fo r  the Elimination o f  Communists.
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C hief o f  the Paoantui [Baoandui]. Chen Soo [Chen Su], Pang Kungtsuh 
[Pang Gongzi], Nanking's Special Political Officer in Shanghai. The 
organisation will be divided into 90 sections covering Greater Shanghai.
Each section will consist o f  five m em bers including a leader.
Appended to the document was a copy of the rules and regulations, 
and an application form for future members for the Association.
General Rules
1)The object o f this Association is based upon the principle o f 
m aterialising the National Revolution o f  the Three Principles o f 
the People.
2)The title o f  this A ssociation is Shanghai M unicipality Comrades 
Association fo r  the Extermination o f  Traitors.
The six chapters which follow these general rules concern membership, 
organisation and duty, conditions and secrecy. An appendix advises that “the 
committee reserves the right to amend or alter these rules when necessary.” 
With the view to successfully suppressing the local Communist 
influence in the city, two sister organs of the Shanghai Youth Strength 
Society (Shanghai qingnian lishe ±  'M W ^  %t) were at the same time
established by the Blueshirts also under the sponsorship of Wu Xingya. 
These were the Middle Vanguard Society (Zhongfengshe ^  f±), the 
mission of which was to supervise student activities in local middle schools, 
and the Shanghai Municipality Mutual Aid Society(Shanghaishi hushe ±
Tp TL ?±), which task was to direct movements of youths among local 
Guomindang members. 104
The Blueshirts were successful in finally driving the CCP out of 
Shanghai within a year of their formation, and their campaign of terror 
against trade unionists and other suspected Communist sympathisers ensured 
that the CCP was unable to regain a foothold in the city. However, following
104 NA, SMP. D4685 S.l Special Branch report by D.I.Sih Tse-liang, 20 January 1937, 
Kuomintang Control oxer Local Chinese Youths ’ Movement, and S.l report Special Branch by 
C.D.I. Kuh Pao Hwa, 3 October 1940, Youth Organisations o f  the Kuomintang Formerly 
existent in Shanghai.
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the death of Wu Xingya in August 1936, the Shanghai Youth Strength 
Society was dissolved while the two other organisations definitely ceased to 
exist in Shanghai at the end of 1937. This was a consequence of the 
withdrawal of the Chinese armed forces from the Shanghai area. 105
C. Anti-Japanese Activities
The second main sphere of Blueshirt activity, at least in the 
organisation's early years, was organising anti-Japanese activities all over 
China. The main source of information for these activities are the records of 
the Japanese Secret Services in China, 106 according to which the Blueshirts 
worked in close co-operation with the numerous existing anti-Japanese 
National Salvation Associations. Internal sources, however, confirm the 
extent of anti-Japanese activities. An official Blueshirt publication claimed 
that, in the spring of 1933, in Wuhan, its agents killed over 40 “traitors”, 
accused of collaborating with the Japanese. 107 The Blueshirts always labelled 
their victims as “traitors”, but this was possibly just a pretext for their 
actions. In the Shanghai area too, anti-Japanese actions were numerous and 
many murders were committed by the Blueshirts or related groups. 108
105 n a ,  SMP. D4685, Special Branch report by G.J.Bennett, 9 December 1940, Memorandum 
on the Blue Shirt Society: General survey o f  the Blue Shirt Society.
106 TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to han Man ko nichi katsudo no jitsurei (The organisation of 
the Blueshirts and examples of anti-Manchuko and anti-Japanese activities). See also, Parks 
M.Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, Cambridge 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 226-230: The Blueshirts involvement in anti- 
Japanese activities in northern China is explained.
107 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.31, quoted in footnote 17 of the article Womende Xunlian 
(n.p. 1936, p. 14).
108 NA, SMP. D7667, S2, Special Branch, 10 December, 1936, Anti-Japanese Incidents: The 
murder o f  Japanese in the International Settlement: (1) On 9 November 1935, a Japanese 
sailor was murdered on Darroch Road, (2) on 10 July 1936 a Japanese civilian was murdered 
on Chi Mei Road, (3) on 23 September 1936, a Japanese sailor was murdered on Haining Road 
and (4) on 11 November 1936, a Japanese civilian was murdered on Baikal Road.
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The invasion of Manchuria meant that an important focus for anti- 
Japanese activities was the north of the country. Parks M.Coble devotes 
considerable attention to the Blueshirts’ activities in North China, 109 noting 
that the pace of the Blueshirt campaign increased sharply from 25 July 1934, 
after Xu Huizhi ^ # ; £ 110 was made head of the organisation's North East 
Bureau. 111
The Blueshirt campaign against the Japanese in northern China was 
indeed extensive. Chiang sent members of the Blueshirts' so-called Blood and 
Iron Corps,112 to engage in acts of terror. At the same time, the Blueshirts 
directed an anti-Japanese boycott and a press campaign. Assassination 
squads, including some composed of Koreans, operated in Tianjin and 
attempted to infiltrate Manchuria. 113 Japanese reports contain a long list of 
specific assassinations and attempts attributed to Blueshirt agents. These 
sweeping charges were echoed in the Japanese press both in Manchuria and 
in China proper. 114 Furthermore, demands by Japan for the abolition of the 
Blueshirts, made during the negotiations of June 1935, illustrate Japanese 
concern.
109 Coble, pp.226-240.
110 Government Official, bom in Hebei in 1900. Studied at the Whampoa Military Academy 
and graduated from the first class, staff officer o f 10th Division of 2nd Army, 1925. Chief of 
Political Training Department of 65th Division, 1932. Section chief o f Administrative and 
Disciplinary Department of National Military Council, 1934. Police commissioner of Wuchang 
and Anhui Police Headquarters, 1935-37, and chief of administrative and disciplinary 
Department of Chiang Kaishek’s Provisional Headquarters in Xi’an, Baoding and Wuchang, 
1937.
111 TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to han-Man ko-Nichi katsudo no jitsurei, p.33.
112 NA, SMP, D4685, 20 June, 1933.
113 Coble, p.227.
114 BA, 09.02, nr.2323, Deutsche Botschaft China, M.Kubota “Blueshirts attempt stranglehold 
on China”, The Manchurian Daily News, 9 November 1935; Kokutsu (News Agency), 
“Blueshirts to remove anti-Chiang men. Secret orders to keep watch over pro-Japanese
leaders”, Shanghai, 20 January 1936.
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Shortly after their establishment, possibly in August or September 
1932, the Blueshirts formed a Northern Branch in Tianjin. The appointed 
leader of this branch was Liu Butong fllT'f^ ] ,115 who directed the Blueshirts 
in extreme anti-Japanese activities. However, presumably due to Liu 
Butong’s “left wing” label, he was replaced later that same year by Jiang 
Bocheng By early 1933, Jiang Bocheng had been appointed the
Deputy of the Political Training Section of the Guomindang’s Military 
Department. 116 This position was later to be held by Liu Jianqun. 
Meanwhile, control over the whole Northern branch of the Blueshirts 
remained in the hands of Jiang Bocheng. One of the founding members of the 
Blueshirts, Zeng Kuoqing © Stlf , 117 took over Liu Jianqun’s post in Tianjin 
in April 1934. With Zeng Kuoqing's arrival as Deputy of the Political 
Training Section in Tianjin, the heyday of the Blueshirts’ activities in this 
area commenced. It was also the beginning of close co-operation between 
nucleus members of the Guomindang Government and the Blueshirts, 
resulting in increased power in North China.
In June 1934, He Yingqin He Guiguo fpJSIH118, Lu Tangping
HUFF, Shen Yinran Zhang Ji Sllg, 119 Zeng Kuoqing and Wen
116 University professor and government official, bom in Andong in north China in 1905. 
Received his education in China and abroad. Liu was a research fellow o f London University, 
England. Upon return to China he was appointed professor of Fudan University and Law 
College of Shanghai. Member of the Guomindang and member of the Legislative Yuan and 
professor of the University of Nanjing. Author of “History of Public Finance of Taxation.”
116 TB, 5540, Oniwa Katsuhito, Ranisha wa odoru (Actions o f the Blueshirts), pp.2-3.
117 Member o f the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang and director of Party 
Affairs in Sichuan 1896. Graduated from Chao Yang University in Beijing and the Whampoa 
Military Academy in Canton, 1924. Guomindang representative to the Headquarters o f the 
Independent 13th Division of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army, 1927. Secretary of the 
Military Department of the Guomindang Central Military Academy in Nanjing, 1928. Special 
Commissioner o f Party Affairs attached to the Beijing Branch, Military Affairs Commission,
1934.
118 Commander of 57th Army, bom in Yongxian, Guangsi, 1896. A graduate o f Japanese
Military Officers College, Tokyo, instructor at the Baoding Military Officers’ College and the 
Mukden Military Training School with the rank of Colonel.
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Linzheng K R f ,  founded a new branch in Beijing, the so-called Huabei 
zongzhibu IfcltlSinP the Northern China Headquarters. The Blueshirts tried 
to expand their control over the five Northern provinces, of Hebei, Shanxi, 
Shandong, Chaheer and Suiyuan, their predication being “Anti-Japanese for 
the Salvation of China.” 120 The members of this new branch were labelled, 
especially by the Japanese, as first class assassins.
The withdrawal from Hebei province of the Blueshirts and the Office 
of the Guomindang's Third Corps of the Military Police was triggered by the 
assassination by Blueshirts of the presidents of two pro-Japanese newspapers, 
namely Bai Yuhuan of the Chenbao H #  and Hu Enzhuan of
the Guo Quan m® . 121 The two presidents were killed in the Japanese 
concession in Tianjin, and it was suggested that the two were quite close to 
the Japanese army there.
Only the Guomindang’s Third Corps of the Military Police withdrew 
from Hebei as a result of Japanese aggression. It appeared that the Blueshirts 
did not withdraw, but went undercover and worked in disguise as a kind of 
Bang Kf society. Before the Xi’an Incident in early 1936, Chiang Kaishek 
was worried about the reliability of Song Zheyuan ^cS tc , 122 the army
119 Veteran Guomindang member and revolutionary, bom in Zhili. Went to Japan at the age of 
18, where he studied political science and economics at the Waseda University in Tokyo.
While in Japan, he made acquaintance with revolutionary leaders including Sun Yatsen, Huang 
Xing J t J I  and others. Later at Shanghai, he assisted in publications openly attacking the 
Manchu Government. In 1924 elected member of Central Executive Committee o f the 
Guomindang. Member o f the joint council of the Central Executive Committee and Central 
Supervisory Committee o f the Guomindang in 1927.
120 TB, 5540, pp.4-5.
121 TB, 5540, pp.4-5.
122 Army Officer, bom in Lening district, Shandong 1885, received his training at an army 
training institute. Commander o f 26th Mixed Brigade, and Commander of the 11th Division. 
Military Governor o f Jehol, and Field Commander of the Fourth Route Army of the Second 
Group Army. Commander of the 28th Division. Chairman of Chahar Provincial government 
and concurrently commander o f the 29th Army, 1931-35.
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leader of the Twenty Ninth Route Army. He suspected Song of secretly being 
in contact with the Japanese. Therefore, Chiang's opinion was that he 
certainly needed the Northern Branch of the Blueshirts, and he endeavoured 
the reconstruction of this branch, especially in the cities of Jinan, Tianjin, 
Beijing and Zhangjiakou. 123
However, close examination of contemporary intelligence reports, 
including Japanese ones, shows that the Blueshirt threat to Japan in North 
China had been greatly exaggerated, not least because anti-Japanese actions 
by a host of other organisations appear to have been routinely attributed to 
the Blueshirts by the Japanese. For example, one organisation which 
maintained a very active profile in the north was the Beijing Anti-Japanese 
National Salvation Association (Beiping kang Ri jiuguo hui i t  T  tiL 0  tk HI 
# ) , controlled by followers of Zhang Xueliang and supported by the Young 
China Party, which extended its operations into Manchuria. It should also be 
recalled that many of the acts of sabotage and resistance to the Japanese were 
increasingly led by the CCP. 124
Whatever the original intentions of the Blueshirts' anti-Japanese 
campaign and how vigorous it may have been, it did not last very long. 125 
The Shanghai Times of 21 January 1936 ran the story “Blueshirts to suspend 
Anti-Japan Activities.” 126 The story reported that anti-Japanese activities by 
the Blueshirts would cease for one year, pending the election of Chiang 
Kaishek as President of China. The newspaper furthermore reported that in
123 TB, 5540, p .10.
124 Coble, p.229.
125 NA, SMP. D3753-1, containing reports from 4 March 1935 to 25 April 1935. The reports 
mostly from newspaper translations are all about measures taken by the Chinese government 
to suppress the anti-Japanese activities.
126 NA, SMP, D4685. “Blue Shirts to suspend Anti-Japan Activities”, Shanghai Times, 21 
January 1936.
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an address delivered before the graduating class of the advanced course of
the Nanjing Military Academy on 26 December 1935, Chiang had stated:
W hile I believe in opposing Japan, I am  not making m y sentiments 
public because o f  the international situation. Should the state o f  affairs 
in the world change, I shall not hesitate to rise and fight Japan. 127
In fact, Chiang consistently argued for securing internal unity before 
turning to face the external enemy - a line which he was to pursue in the face 
of all opposition until the Xi’an Incident forced him into alliance with the 
CCP against the Japanese Empire. Although, after the war with Japan started 
in August 1937, gradually most organised activities of the Blueshirts in the 
Shanghai area disappeared, anti-Japanese terrorism continued. As Wakeman 
writes, “both official and unofficial organs continued throughout 1937 and 
1938 to attribute anti-Japanese terrorism to the notorious Blue Shirts, whom 
they took to be co-ordinated by former police chief General Cai Jingjun 
HlfrlpL128 in his disguise as head of the Moral Endeavor Society 
(.Lizhishe) .” 129 Hence, the Blueshirts were held responsible for different sorts 
of anti-Japanese activities in the Shanghai area after the Sino-Japanese war 
started.
D. The Secret Services and Dai Li
Of all the Blueshirts’ activities, the one which instilled almost 
universal fear and hatred among the Chinese people was called tewu # 8 - or
127 NA, SMP, D.4685.
128 p0iice Commissioner, bom in Canton, 1892. Graduated from the Whampoa Military 
Academy, and was director o f the general Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission at 
Nanchang. Commissioner o f Public Safety of Shanghai Municipality, around 1935.
129 Frederic Wakeman Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 
1937-1941, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p .18. See also Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, about the relationship Chiang Kaishek had with various secret societies, the Lizhishe is 
mentioned as a society with the appearance of a military club, p.90.
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Special Services, an euphemism for intelligence and terrorist operations. 130 
The man responsible for overseeing this aspect of the Blueshirts activity was 
Dai Li one of Chiang's most trusted lieutenants. Dai Li has sometimes
been described as “The Chinese Himmler”, because of his feared 
interrogation methods and ruthless attitude towards the opponents of Chiang 
Kaishek.
Before entering the Whampoa Military Academy in 1926, Dai Li 
already had connections with Chiang, having worked in his private secret 
service during the early 1920s in Shanghai. 131 It was during his period in 
Shanghai that Dai Li gradually built up his contacts with other leading 
figures in the Guomindang, such as Dai Jitao and Chen Guofu. 132
Dai Li was taken under the special patronage of Dai Jitao, as they had 
the same surname and were both coincidentally also from Chiang Kaishek's 
native province of Zhejiang. As they were fellow-countrymen, Dai Jitao felt a 
special emotional link with the young Dai Li.
In the spring of 1926, at the age of twenty-nine, Dai Li went to 
Guangdong, then still the seat of the Nationalist government, and enrolled in 
the Whampoa Academy's sixth class. He never finished the course work at 
Whampoa, but was nevertheless granted a diploma by special dispensation.
When Chiang Kaishek went into retirement in 1931, according to a 
1939 SMP report, Dai Li, with the assistance of Zheng Jiemin JfjtyfPci133 and
130 John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws o f  the Dragon, New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1992, p.92. The Chinese term 'tewu'(Special Service) has a very broad meaning, combining the 
Anglo-American concepts of'intelligence', 'secret intelligence’ and 'security' with the concept 
of'Special Operations'- that is, paramilitary operations ranging from reconnaissance missions 
to assassinations.
131 Yu Zidao and Qu Youwei, “Lixingshe shulun”, Jindaishi yanjiu. Zhongguo kexueyuan 
jindaishi yanjiusuo, Beijing, June 1989, p.223.
132 Dai Li worked for the Gelaohui (a secret society), and previously had worked with He 
Zhonghan, at the same time that He's brother, He Qingyan, was Chiang's security guard.
133 Army Officer, bom in Wenchang, Guangdong province in 1899. In 1925 he entered the 
Whampoa Military Academy. In 1926 proceeded to the Sun Yatsen University in Moscow for
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other Whampoa students, established a secret service and collected 
information concerning the movements and activities of Chiang's opponents, 
including newspaper extracts and criticisms. They compiled a very long 
report containing valuable information, which was submitted to Chiang when 
he was reinstated in 1932. As a mark of his appreciation, Chiang appointed 
Dai Li to the Military Affairs Commission (of which Chiang was President), 
and authorised Dai to form a secret service section. 134 in September 1932 
Chiang also appointed him chief of the second section of the Bureau of 
Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs Commission, popularly 
known as the Juntong. ^ 5
When the Blueshirts were founded in March 1932, the organisation 
included an intelligence section, of which Gui Yongqing SbjcSf was initially 
appointed head. However, as Gui held key positions in the army and was too 
busy, shortly afterwards Dai Li took over his position as head of the 
intelligence section of the Blueshirts. 136 One of the key functions of this 
secret service section was to organise political assassinations of Chiang's 
enemies. They performed this task so assiduously that Dai Li's agents were 
soon suspected of being everywhere, and each new assassination and 
abduction was readily attributed by the press and by the public to his 
organisation. These so-called Iron and Blood Squads or Iron and Blood
further studies, on returning to China in 1928 became the “aide de camp” to Chiang Kaishek, 
appointed secretary to the Commander of the Fourth Army, 1929. Member of the General 
Staff, 1932. Studied military strategy in Europe, 1934-35, returned to China and published his 
“History of Wars in Europe”, 1935. Chief of the Second and later the Third Bureau o f the 
General Staff, 1935-36.
H 4 NA, SMP. S2, D7657, 24 April, 1939.
135 NA, SIF 226 13W3.3/34/A, 182, Box 51,263,21 May 1946. A report made by the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary o f War, Strategic Service Unit, Chungking detachment in 1946; see 
also, Lincoln Li, p.66.
136 Lincoln Li, p.65. See also, his footnotes 103 and 104.
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Corps (Tiexuedui UMlUc) were later absorbed by the more formal Military 
Bureau of Investigations and Statistics of the Military Council, the BIS. 137
The first of Blueshirts’ murders was, in all probability, the 
assassination of Ying Xiuren MMX,  who was a friend of the well-known 
Chinese writer Ding Ling T ^ - 138 On 14 May 1933, Ying Xiuren, alias Ding 
Jiu T X,  was found dead, most likely murdered by Blueshirts. Ying had been 
living at the house of his friend Ding Ling. Pan Zinian (alias William
P.M.Fung), a professor at Shanghai Arts College and a close friend of Ding 
Ling, had been living there too. Both Pan Zinian and Ding Ling were 
members of the Chinese Society for Civil Rights, and both were mysteriously 
kidnapped, apparently by the Blueshirts. Later Pan was found in detention at 
the Bureau for Public S afe ty . 139
The most important crime attributed to the Blueshirts in Shanghai was 
the murder of Yang Qian which took place soon after the killing of
*37 Kirby, p. 149; The phrase Blood and Iron stems from Bismarck. Bismarck's policy of 
Blood and Iron, was elevated in Chinese to an "ism" - Blood and Ironism - (Tie xue zhuyi), 
and was seen to lie at the centre of Bismarck's success. On the far right, Blood and Ironism 
could be a catchword for a radical militarisation o f the Guomindang under the aegis of the 
Blueshirts; one name originally considered for it was the Chinese Kuomintang Blood and Iron 
Corps; see also, Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, pp.60-61. Zhongguo guomindang tie xue 
tuan, while Dai Li's Special Service Department within the Corps was often called the Blood 
and Iron Squad - Tie xue dui.
138 Woman writer, bom in Hunan province in 1905, studied at the Pingmin Girls School 
founded with Chen Duxiu’s encouragement. Entered Shanghai University, Department of 
Chinese Literature in 1924. Arrested as a Leftist writer in May 1933, and detained for about 
two years, then released under surveillance in Nanjing. Left Nanjing in November 1936, and 
went to Xian fu, where she arranged to join the Chinese Communist movement in Shaanxi.
139 poH , 1866/191, 26 June 1933, Political and Military information The Blueshirts, and FOH 
2780/295, 14 September 1933.
140 Yang was General Secretary of Central Research Council, bom in Jiangxi, 1893.
Graduated from Cornell University and Harvard University with MA and MBA degrees 
respectively. Joined the Guomindang before the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and 
participated in the 1911 Revolution, served as secretary to Sun Yatsen, when Sun was elected 
Provincial President of China at Nanjing. General Secretary and concurrently director o f the 
economic research section o f the Social Science Department of the Academia Sinica. 
Assassinated by gangsters in Shanghai 18 June 1933, allegedly for his activities in connection 
with the China League for Civil Rights.
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Ying Xiuren, outside the Academia Sinica141 on 18 June 1933.142 Yang 
Qian, (alias Yang Xingfii was Secretary of the Chinese Society for
Civil Rights, 143 vice-president of the Academia Sinica, and an opponent of 
Fascism. Yang Qian had denounced the wave of terror which the Blueshirts 
had brought with them, and had in particular spoken out against the 
“disappearance” of Ding Ling and her friend. Indeed, he had even gone so far 
as to accuse the leading Blueshirt Ma Shaowu (alias Shi Jimei) of this
crime. 144 The aftermath of the murder showed that as well as enjoying 
patronage from the highest levels of the Guomindang, the Blueshirts also had 
agents with considerable courage. Rather than risk revealing the secrets of the 
Blueshirts, one of Yang's assassins, closely pursued by the Police, committed 
suicide in order to avoid falling into their hands. 145
The murders and disappearances grew in frequency and in boldness. 
On 13 November 1934, Dai Li's group murdered one of China's leading 
publishers, Shi Liangcai whose newspaper, the Shenbao had
141 The Academia Sinica was the Highest Institution of Advanced Study and Research in 
China, founded by Cai Yuanpei.
142 FOH, 1866/191, 26, June, 1933, Political and Military information The Blueshirts ; 
2780/295,14 September, 1933. The Bureau for Public Safety was a euphemism for a Blueshirts 
Police Office.
143 Ding Ling and Cai Yuanpei founded the China Society for Human Rights, also called the 
China League for Civil Rights. Members o f the League included Lu Xun, H.Isaacs, Agnes 
Smedley, Lin Yutang, Chiang Menglin, Li Zhi, Zou Taofen and Hu Shih. The primary purpose 
of the League was to fight Chiang's insidious campaign to portray all his opponents as 
Communists. One o f Cai Yuanpei's closest associates at the Academia Sinica, the politically 
active Yang Qian, was murdered by the Blueshirts.
144 FOH, Shanghai, 26 June 1933, nr. 1866/191, Political and Military information, The 
Blueshirts and Shanghai, 14 September 1933, nr. 2780/295, 14 June 1933, Ma Shaowu was 
killed in the International Settlement, apparently by Communists. See also, NA, SMP, D4685, 
Ma Shaowu and his successor were both assassinated by CCP members.
145 BA, 0902, nr.2235, Deutsche Botschaft China, (32), 24 September 1934, nr. B.316, 
Akt.P.0.7, nr. 5726/34.
146 Managing director of Shenbao Daily News, Shanghai. Bom in Nanjing in 1879, received 
the degree o f BA by Imperial Examination when he was 20 years of age. At the age o f 25 he 
gave up scholastic endeavours and studied sericulture at the Zhejiang Sericulture College and
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betrayed “leftist” tendencies. 147 In Tianjin in May 1935 one of Dai Li’s men 
assassinated two newspaper editors in the Japanese concession for advocating 
an independent North China. 148 The most dramatic and politically significant 
attack was the attempt on the life of Wang Jingwei, former leader of the Left 
Guomindang and Chiang's main rival for leadership of the party. This attack 
was attributed to the Blueshirts in a report from the Special Branch of the 
SMP. 149
The attempt on the life of Wang Jingwei occurred on 1 November 
1935, during the opening of the 6 th Plenary Session of the Guomindang in 
Nanjing. Wang was then President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. The attempt was made when Guomindang leaders were 
posing for a group photograph. Chiang, although present at the meeting, 
decided not to take his seat next to Wang Jingwei, as he said he was suffering 
from toothache and wanted to stay inside. 150 Two reasons for the attempted 
murder were put forward, the first being that Wang Jingwei was very pro- 
Japanese, the second that he had betrayed his former supporters.
It would appear that the plot was organised by a man known as Wang 
Yaqiao jEiStt, who was a Qing Bang member. 151 Wang had been active in 
the formation of volunteer units in Shanghai, during the Sino-Japanese affair 
of 1932 and it was at this time that he became acquainted with Zhang Zhilian
graduated soon afterwards. He was one of the most prominent persons among the local gentry 
o f Shanghai in educational, social and philanthropic societies.
147 FOH, 3662/365, 19 November 1934, Murder o f  Shi Liangcai.
148 TB, 5540, pp.4-5; see also Coble, p.228.
149 NA, SMP. S2, 18 November 1936.
150 As far as it is known, Chiang had false teeth, which makes his excuse rather suspicious.
151 Brian G.Martin, “The Origin o f the Green Gang and its Rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920”, in 
East Asian History, nr.2, December 1991, p.83. See also his footnote 61, “Reported 
assassination o f Wong Yaojao.”
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organiser of the Blood and Soul Groups in this area.152 Under 
Wang’s direction, his followers murdered Zhao Tieqiao SliKISf, the managing 
director of the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company,153 carried out 
an attempt on the life of T.V. Soong, Minister of Finance, and plotted an 
attempt on the lives of members of the League of Nations Commission who 
were in Shanghai after the Manchurian Incident.154 The pattern of these 
attacks was very simple - liberals, human rights activists, opponents of one- 
party rule and dictatorship - anyone, in short, within the political, cultural, 
legal or media worlds who might speak out against Chiang and his 
increasingly authoritarian rule.
£. The Blueshirts* Death List
In July 1933, the Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury published an 
article containing a death list for assassination by Fascists (for the full list of 
names on the death list see Appendix 2). According to the newspaper, “a 
mysterious document purporting to emanate from the secret Blue Gown, or 
Chinese Fascist organisation and containing orders for wholesale 
assassinations has been circulated, both in Shanghai and in Canton.”155
152 Zhang Zhilian was one of the five leaders of the Five Sages Mountain (Triadgang) 
founded in 1929. He was a leading follower of Du Yuesheng in the 1930s. The Blood and Soul 
Group (for the Extermination of Traitors) was an organisation founded early 1932 to agitate 
anti-Japanese feelings and enforce boycotts against the Japanese. The organisation was 
controlled by Du Yuesheng.
153 The background to this murder centred around a serious dispute between Zhao Tieqiao, the 
government appointed Commissioner for the reorganisation of the China Merchant’s Steam 
Navigation Company, and Li Guojie, the former Chairman of the same Company. Both men 
had accused each other of misuse of funds and of corruption.
154 NA, SMP. D7667. “Anti-Japanese Incident.” Wang Yaqiao, without any doubt one o f Du 
Yuesheng’s men, had probably also been a Blueshirts member, however, this could not be 
confirmed.
155 NA, SMP, D4685,25 July 1933, The American controlled Shanghai newspaper Evening 
Post & Mercury, published a death list. See also, PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, 24 August 1933, 
p.467.
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The Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury article openly linked Chiang 
with the Blueshirts and asserted that the name Blueshirts stood for the secret 
assassination of opposition leaders and for alliance with Japan, in total 
disregard of Chinese administrative integrity and territorial sovereignty.
Simultaneously, the China Forum, a magazine edited by Harold 
Isaacs, received an identical copy of the deathlist saying that it came from an 
anonymous source.156 The China Forum described it as a list of people 
destined for the same end meted out to Yang Qian, which included the names 
of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Among them was Kang 
Sheng j ^ £ 157, under his alias Chao Yun, and the list extended in a broad 
sweep across the Chinese political scene, as far as Hu Hanmin, political 
leader of the anti-Chiang opposition in the Guomindang. This document was 
signed with the character “/zwa” which apparently stood for the ruling 
organ of the Blueshirt organisation. The list was dated 15 June 1933, i.e. one 
day after the murder of Ma Shaowu, the well-known Blueshirts chieftain158 
and three days before the murder of Yang Qian.
A SMP report reveals that:
An attache case dropped by M a Shao W u w hen he was assassinated, was 
picked up by the M unicipal Police and was found to contain, among
156 NA, SMP, D4685. Advance proof o f an article to appear in the China Forum was obtained 
(25 July 1933), including the list of names of those to be assassinated. Isaacs said he did not 
know the source o f the document sent to his office, but that his investigation and inspection 
had convinced him personally of its authenticity.
157 John Byron and Robert Pack, p.l 10. The third name on the death list - dated 15 June 
1933, the day after Shi Jimei's assassination- was Zhao Yun, another Shanghainese version of 
Zhao Rong, Kang's 'nom de guerre.1 Dai Li's Blueshirts had recognised Kang's importance in 
the Communist movement in Shanghai.
158 NA, SMP. D4685,25 July 1933. See also, Byron and Pack, p .109, 14 June 1933, four 
Communist assassins shot and killed the head of the Shanghai Bureau of the Investigation 
Section(Blueshirts section), Shi Jimei-also known as Ma Shaowu, Lu Keqin and Zhou 
Guangya- as he alighted from a car in the heart of the International Settlement. Shi a former 
Red Squad agent, had defected to the Guomindang and won the reputation o f being the most 
effective Investigation Section agent in Shanghai. He had masterminded a number of schemes, 
including the kidnapping of Ding Ling.
211
Chapter Four
other articles, the following papers: - (1) Analysis o f Organisation o f  
Chinese Communism. (2) The present Political Situation and Special 
W ork. (3) List o f  Individuals o f Radical Tendencies. The contents o f 
papers I and 2 give a general idea o f  the policy towards radicals by 
which the inner circle o f  Chiang Kaishek ‘s supporters was guided last 
June, and the list o f  names is largely m ade up o f  individuals whose 
elim ination from political activities would undoubtedly be received as 
good news by the same group. It is certain that the Blue Shirt Society 
would not have been willing at that tim e to sanction the rem oval o f  these 
people by assassination, because o f  the publicity against them , they m ust 
finally have dispelled any such intention which may have been 
entertained. 159
This information brings to light that the deathlist fell into the hands of 
the SMP through Ma’s murder who immediately “leaked” this information 
regarding the Blueshirts to the press. Official reports to the British Consul- 
General on this subject, however, were received more than one month after 
the murder of Ma.
News of this deathlist resurfaced once again on 12 August 1933, when 
the Xiaogongbao / J ^ # ,  a mosquito newspaper of Japanese origin, published 
an article entitled “Blueshirts preparing to assassinate opponents” (Chinese). 
According to the article:
The Shanghai Evening New s & M ercury published the other day an 
article containing a secret order o f  the Blueshirt Society and a list o f  
names o f  distinguished persons to be assassinated. However, the identity 
o f  the assassination gang is not known. O f late, w ild rum ours o f 
assassination have been in circulation. Last night, this paper secured the 
following assassination schemes o f  the Blueshirt Society, disclosed by a 
local m em ber o f  the Society:- fifty seven persons (a list o f  whose names 
is not available), divided into 14 corps, are engaged in the assassination 
service in Shanghai, under the leadership o f  Tai Li [Dai Li] and Zau 
Yungshing [Zhao Yongxing tK M]- The headquarters o f  these 14 
Corps are:-
1) Six Corps in the French Concession.
2) Five Corps in the International Settlement.
3) Three Corps in Chinese controlled territory. *60
159 PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, enclosure nr.l in Shanghai despatch to Peking nr.226, 31 
August 1933, by the SMP date 26 August 1933.
160 NA, SMP. D4685, 14 August 1933.
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The article claimed the assassins were mostly disguised as rickshaw 
coolies, hawkers or fortune tellers, and said they posted themselves in the 
same district as the persons destined for assassination.
The deathlist was almost certainly a deliberate leak designed to cow 
Chiang’s opponents and build up the Blueshirts' reputation for ferocity. By 
the time the list was produced, the Communists had already been driven out 
of Shanghai and the Soviet Republic was crumbling, so the only opposition 
Chiang faced was from liberal intellectuals outside the party and disgruntled 
faction leaders within it. Threatening to kill the leaders of the CCP was an 
idle menace, but placing liberal, humanitarian opponents on the same list was 
an attempt to intimidate them into silence. There is no evidence that the 
Blueshirts tried to work through their list in any systematic way after it had 
been leaked, and the political importance was not so much in the list itself as 
in the leaking of it.
4.3 The Attempt to Create a Mass Base: The New Life Movement
If the Blueshirts were to remain a highly elitist force, its leaders were aware 
of the importance of building a mass organisation to support it. Their studies 
of successful Fascist movements elsewhere pointed to this necessity.
In Japan the total sum of active members of Fascist movements 
(general patriotic organisations) amounted to 250,000, and some 400,000 
members of other organisations related to the ultra-nationalistic movements - 
i.e. 650,000 altogether.I61 Italian Fascists numbered 350,000 in a population 
of about 30 million (ratio 1:90). In Germany, between 1932-33, NSDAP 
membership grew from 108,000 to almost 1.5 million, and between 30
161 Tanin and Yohan, pp.273-275.
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January 1933 and the end of 1934 increased by almost 200%. The growth of 
the Hitler Youth was enormous, and in 1933-34 the membership increased 
from 108,000 to nearly 3.6 million.I62 The SA men amounted to about 
70,000 in 1923, while by 1930 there were 100,000. From 1930 their numbers 
grew quickly to over 300,000 men.163
One characteristic of these regimes was the distinction between 
ordinary party membership and membership of specific organisations such as 
the SA, the SS, the Hitler Youth or the Fasci di Combattimento. There was, 
of course, a substantial overlap between these organisations - membership of 
one of them almost always entailed party membership, but ordinary party 
membership did not necessarily mean anything more than a passive 
adherence to the ideology of the ruling party. The mass-organisations were 
useful both in recruiting new party members and in focusing them in specific 
areas of work and activity which translated ideology into something 
meaningful in their everyday lives.
China during the early Nanjing period had no such movement. 
Between the elite Blueshirt organisation and the mass membership of the 
party there was a gulf of apathy and inactivity, not to say outright political 
confusion. New members were constantly added to the party's membership 
registers, but lapsed ones rarely taken off. With regional warlords signing up 
their entire armies as individual members, and with the severe ideological 
divisions which existed between the different wings of the party, the entire 
structure of the party was moribund. Once Chiang had established his 
personal dictatorship the formal, democratic-centralist structures of decision­
162 Karl Dieter Bracher, The German Dictatorship, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, pp.294- 
295.
163 Carsten, p. 14. See also, Jane Caplan, “Theories o f Fascism”, p. 139 and Gunter 
W.Remming, “The Destruction of the Workers’ Mass Movements in Nazi Germany”, p.218, 
in, Radical Perspectives on the Rise o f  Fascism in Germany, 1919-1945, M.N. Dobkowski & 
Isidor Wallimann (eds.), New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989.
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making which had been introduced by the Soviet advisors fell into disuse and 
the party became a functionless appendage of the “Generalissimo's” personal 
rule.
Analysing the examples of successful Fascist movements elsewhere, 
the conclusion was not lost on the Blueshirt leaders: a successful dictatorship 
needed the underpinning of a mass movement, formed through vigorous 
propaganda work. A good ratio for such an organisation was around 1:200, 
as this was sufficiently large to have a nation-wide impact, but sufficiently 
exclusive for members to be attracted by greater privileges and for the 
ideology of the movement not to be watered down. It was with the successful 
mass movements of other Fascist regimes in mind that the New Life 
Movement (Xinshenghuo yundong § \ w a s  set up.
The New Life Movement was inaugurated at the Blueshirts' 
headquarters in Nanchang in 1934. From 18th-21 st March, Chiang Kaishek 
gathered one hundred key central and provincial leaders in Nanchang, and 
launched the movement, with a great burst of publicity.164
The intention of the Blueshirts leaders was to incorporate Blueshirt 
members into the mass organisation of the New Life Movement of up to 2 
million members sharing their goals and ideology.165 The reality was rather 
different: in the first year of their existence, the Blueshirts managed to recruit 
only about 1400 members across the whole of China, divided into twenty- 
one branches. There were also offices abroad in Berlin, London, Paris, 
Vienna, Hanoi, Moscow, Washington and Tokyo.166
164 T.Hollington Kong, Chiang Kaishek: Soldier and Statesman, London: Hurst & Blackett, 
1938, pp.544-554.
165 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru chosha, p. 105, March 1936.
166 TB, 2196, pp. 129-130.
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Despite this proliferation of branches, and although by 1937 there 
were no fewer than 300,000 Blueshirts in the organisation, the goal of 2 
million members was never fulfilled. The New Life Movement as a whole 
was not as successful as the founders, including Chiang, had expected at the 
start.167
A. The Objectives of the New Life Movement
The principal aim of the movement was the social regeneration of 
China, through the promotion of clean and tidy habits and an unselfish 
consideration for others. Respect for each other and the desire to prevent the 
exploitation of one people by the other were the two factors that are at the 
heart of the movement.168 It promised, furthermore, a “New Life” through 
“Old” methods. In contrast to the Blueshirts, The New Life Movement was 
open in nature, and all Chinese had access to it.
The main objectives of the movement were:
1. Noblesse Oblige (Nobility obliges)
2. Production in favour o f  the people's wealth
3. M ilitarisation to strengthen people.16^
According to a speech given by Chiang Kaishek at the Whampoa 
Military Academy titled “Carrying on the New Life”:
The aim  o f  the N ew  Life M ovement is that all our ordinary com patriots 
become healthy and m odem  citizens. In order to achieve this goal, one o f  
the first things to gain is a strong physique. Only then you can becom e 
mentally strong and healthy, and then you can learn the skills to
167 “New Life Idea Fails Expectation: Much Display but Few Concrete Results”, NCH , 26 
February 1936, "Chiang said, the results accomplished were not as satisfactory as expected. 
Despite the fact that 100,000 last year were active in the movement."
168 ’’Various Phases o f New Life, and Why the Movement is so often Misunderstood by the 
Intelligentsia; Its effect on Common people”, NCDN, 17 December 1934.
16^ Ishimaru, pp.255-266.
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strengthen your country in order to defend your country from the 
oppression and the invasion o f  foreign countries. 170
Chiang's interest in the personal behaviour of Chinese citizenry 
was not a sudden impulse. It was the natural culmination of his entire life, 
beginning with his own home training. In this context, it should be 
remembered that it was Chiang who succeeded in “inspiring something of the 
spirit of the English ‘round-heads’ in the Whampoa cadets, thus spurring the 
Northern Expedition to its success.”171 Possibly Chiang wanted to see 
himself as a strong military leader, a Chinese Cromwell. Furthermore, the 
original idea for the New Life Movement may have come from the 
Promoting Morality Association (Jindehui j f f i i # ) ,  founded by Wang 
Jingwei during the early Republican period. This association’s characteristic 
was also more like a Moral Reform Movement.172
Feng Yuxiang S i # 173 wrote about the New Life Movement in the 
following terms:
The fundam ental necessity for the rejuvenation o f  our nationalism  and 
salvation o f  our country is talent. There is a great need to m obilise the 
people’s spirit, which is essential. Therefore, we need, first o f  all, to 
promote the spirit, and the best way to promote the spirit is the New Life 
M ovem ent.174
1711 Chiang Kaishek’s speech, Lixingxinshenghuo, Huangpoa Military Academy.
171 Tong Hollington Kong, Sho Kaisheki (Biography of Chiang Kaishek), pp. 141.153-154, 
translated by Terajima Tadashi & Okuno Masami: The spirit of the New Life Movement was 
originally inspired by Cromwell’s “Roundheads” from the 17th century English Civil War. 
Chiang Kaishek delivered a speech to students at the Whampoa Military Academy about this 
spirit, and the idea was put forward by Chiang as the basis for the New Life Movement.
172 Hatano, p. 198.
173 Retired army commander, bom in Anhui, 1880. Attended the Beiyang Military School at 
Tianjin at age of 16, but left in 1898 before graduation, joined the army and became a company 
commander. He was elected member of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang 
and member of the Central Political Council, 1929. Was relieved o f all his political and 
military appointments by the Nanjing Government for revolting against Nanjing, 1929.
174 GA, 483,48, Feng Yuxiang, Manuscript by Calligraphy, Jiuguo bi xicm shixing xin 
shenghuo yundong, (In order to Save the Nation the New Life Movement has to be carried out 
First).
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The town of Nanchang, where the Movement had been founded, 
henceforth became a sort of model town for the embodiment of New Life 
values. New buildings were erected on the sites of ruined and dilapidated 
houses, streets were widened, straightened and connected, a number of 
schools were opened, highways were constructed, and parks were laid out for 
the benefit of the people. Various other towns copied the model of Nanchang, 
but when the administration moved to Nanjing, it seemed beyond the power 
of the regime to transform the character of so large a city. Also in Shanghai 
the Movement was promoted by most important officials, like General Wu 
Dezhen, the mayor of Greater Shanghai, who was assisted during a mass 
meeting to encourage the Movement, by Pan Gongzhan ffi ^  M (education 
commissioner), Wen Hong’en (Public safety commissioner), and Dr. Li 
Tingen, (health commissioner).175
B. New Life Movement and the Remoulding of the Confucian Message
Notwithstanding the name New Life, the movement taught the age old 
message of duty - to home and family, and to the country. National 
conscience and social co-operation were, accordingly, held to rest upon the 
four ancient Chinese virtues: li fit (courtesy), yi (obligation to everybody), 
lian 0  (honesty and respect for the rights of others), and chi (magnanimity 
and honour). Chiang said that these four virtues had in ancient times made 
China a mighty nation, and now they were to serve as a basis for the New 
Life Movement.
According to its theorists, many of them Blueshirt members, it was as 
a result of materialism and a steadily growing contact with the “poisoned
175 “Shanghai's New Life Movement, Campaign Week Inaugurated in Schools, Acceleration 
Society's Activities”, NCDN, 10 April 1934 and 5 June 1934.
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civilisation” of the West, that China had lost touch with these virtues, which
in ancient times were the foundation of her moral strength.
A significant departure from traditional Chinese values was, however,
to be found in the New Life Movement’s policy towards women. A
Women's New Life Movement came into existence, and the Association of
the Women's New Life Movement in Nanjing enjoyed the advantage of
having Madame Chiang Kaishek as chair person of the organisation.176
Therefore many changes may have been brought about through the influence
of Madame Chiang Kaishek. One of the principles of the New Life
Movement was that man and woman were equal, and it was advocated that
women should act as wise and sensible wives in order to build up a healthy
and perfect modernised home (family).
Freedom of marriage was advocated, in the sense that man and woman
should be free in their partner choice.177 This approach was for Chinese
conception quite modem, but in general it was difficult for women to be
treated the same as men in Chinese society. On comparing the principles of
the New Life Movement to women with the treatment of German women
during the Nazi period, it is found that the Nazis were a male oriented
organisation, and a minor role was assigned to women. Women, for instance,
were not admitted to the party leadership, while National Socialism sought to
contain the emancipation of women and reduce her role to biological and
family functions.
In line w ith the anti-urban, anti-m odem  ideology o f  National Socialism, 
this generally was understood to m ean m otherhood, housework, and at 
best “wom en” professions. The introduction o f  the so-called household 
year, m arriage credits, and child bonuses was part o f  the anti-
176 T ’ang Leang-Li (ed.), “Women's Part in the New Life Movement”, The People's Tribune, 
vol.14, nr. 3, Shanghai, 1 August 1936, pp.169-172, “Feminism and feudalism do not mix, and 
now that the last traces o f the feudal system in China are rapidly passing away, it is only proper 
that the voice of feminism should begin to make itself heard in this land.”
177 JFMA. 19451-12, Chugokuni okeru shinseikatsu undo ikken, pp. 1-11.
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em ancipation campaign. However, under pressure o f  the circum stances 
w om en from 1936 on, in the beginning especially unm arried women, 
were reabsorbed into the labour process. 178
The general emphasis of the New Life Movement on self-reliance and
traditional values was a powerful echoing of the values advocated by Sun
Yatsen, and indeed during celebrations of the second anniversary of the New
Life Movement, Sun was quoted:
So com ing to the root o f  the matter, i f  we want to restore our race's lost 
standing, besides uniting all into a great national body, we m ust first 
recover our national m orality - then, and only then, can we plan how to 
attain again the national position we once held. 179
Chiang was convinced that the masses must be brought into line, no 
matter how, and the traditional Confucian value of loyalty to superiors 
became one of the central ideas most avidly expounded by the New Life 
Movement. The movement appeared to be quite successful at the outset - 
members were even teaching the New Life morals to overseas Chinese.180 
Yet despite the Blueshirts' efforts, they were never able to construct the kind 
of mass base of support which was typical of Fascist movements in Italy and 
Germany. Thus, the attempt to form a mass base for the Guomindang through 
the New Life Movement failed,181 and any analysis comparing the Blueshirts 
with Western forms of Fascism must therefore take this failure into account.
The New Life Movement represented the Guomindang’s effort to 
overcome public alienation from the government, to mobilise the public not
!78 Bracher, pp. 116-117,421.
179 “J h e Second Anniversary o f The New Life Movement.” The China Critic, February 
1936; In Nanking an official ceremony was held on 19 February 1936, in the auditorium of the 
Officer's Moral Endeavour Association. Over 5000 government officials, party members, 
representatives of various organisations were present.
180 FOH, Political messages, J 1, nr. 581, Yew Life Movement at Chinese Schools in the Dutch 
Indies, 18 August 1936.
181 J.W.Phillips, “Blue Jackets in China, A Study in Colonial Fascism”, in China Today, 
November 1934.
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only to support the state but also to help in its reform. An analysis of the New 
Life Movement shows that in the political intent and goals it bore a strong 
resemblance to European movements described by the generic term Fascist, 
both in its counterrevolutionary attitude and in its design for the total 
mobilisation of society in the service of the State.182 Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to continue this analogy to the mass mobilisation methods employed 
in the New Life Movement. The emphasis of the Guomindang was on 
control. From the beginning it was obvious that Chiang’s goal was 
“controlled mobilisation”, rather than the unbridled release of hostility 
against internal and external enemies. The ideology of the movement lacked 
the tone of hostility or myth making that impenetrated Fascist and Nationalist 
Socialist writings. Such control by a government was possibly a consequence 
of the fear of undermining its own foundations by an unruly mass movement. 
The difference was that, unlike its European counterparts, the New Life 
Movement was initiated not by a radical right movement trying to gain power 
but by the government itself.
An article by Ying Mengyuan $1 refers to the reason why Chiang 
actually was reluctant to built up a mass movement. According to Ying, it 
seems that at the beginning of 1931 Chiang had decided that the Fascist 
ideology of Western countries such as Italy and Germany was not as such 
suitable for China.183 This observation is remarkable, especially in the light 
of Chiang’s approach to Fascism after 1932, but is typical of Chiang’s 
attitude.
One of the main reasons for this decision, as Chiang explained, was 
that the Chinese youth, or the Chinese people in general, were at the time
182 Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations o f the New Life Movement: A Study in 
Counterrevolution,” Journal o f  Asian Studies, vol.34-4, 1975, p.947.
183 Ying Mengyuan, Jiang jia  wang chao (Jiang’s Dynasty), Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian 
chubanshe, 1980, p. 127.
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quite interested in Western thought and goods. His fear was that once they 
had absorbed these Western ideas a revolt was possible and the people would 
no longer respect their own leader. This viewpoint represents a good example 
of Chiang’s approach to the New Life Movement in 1934.
There was a certain element of Confiicianist thought behind the New 
Life Movement. On the 12 February 1931 Chiang Kaishek made a speech at 
the Nanjing zhongyang junxiao j^ j M ^  W ® (Nanjing Central Military 
Academy) about Confucius, especially emphasising his concept of Daoli i t  
M (reason).184 While it is clear that Chiang Kaishek paid attention to 
Confucian Thought, this begs the question: was Chiang a real Confiicianist or 
was it just convenient to him to control his people?
Confucianism has deep roots in the Chinese way of life and thinking. 
It dictated for centuries the Chinese way of life and even today it exerts its 
influence. This was not the case with Fascism, which was not a grass root 
ideology, either in Europe or in China. The ideas of Confucius are basically 
concrete ideas, concerning the relationship between the ruler (heaven) and 
the ruled (earth). That people should always obey their superior or elders is 
the basic structure of Confucian theory. The politicians of the Guomindang 
realised that obedience of the people was needed to meet their political 
world. They thought that the structure of Confucian ideology was suitable 
for their active policy. This re-evaluation of Confucianism indicated, in the 
first place, a recognition of the advantage of Confucian values for the 
Chinese people and, in the second place, the Chinese people did not need a 
special reason to accept Confucian values. Although Chiang Kaishek’s 
Nanjing Government advocated modernisation of the Chinese nation, Chiang 
was thinking of traditional values and concentrated on the re-flourishing of 
Confucianism. It must be borne in mind that Confucianism has often been
184 Ying Mengyuan, p. 127.
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used as a tool by the literati for modernisation purposes. The New Life 
Movement was built on an ideological mixture of classical Confucian tenets, 
a Christian code of ethics and military ideals.185
It is sometimes suggested that the idea for the New Life Movement 
came originally from Madam Chiang (Song Meiling), this suggestion was 
perhaps initiated through her friends who were familiar with her missionary 
activities. Therefore, when people heard or read about the New Life 
Movement through the mass media their idea was often that it exposed a 
similar concept as the Western YMCA. Especially among the Chinese 
literate, more than among common Chinese people, there was quite often the 
misunderstanding that the New Life Movement was related with a kind of 
oriental YMCA.
Despite all the effort to make the New Life Movement a success and to 
build up a mass movement, it proved to be abortive. It never attracted the 
support of the rural elite or the masses. It never generated enough impetus to 
transform itself into an authentic mass movement.
The paramount reason for the failure of the New Life Movement was 
its irrelevance to the lives of the people it sought to attract. Nationalist leaders 
found out too late that the support of traditional values met little resonance 
with the needs of the common people and the ideas of rural elite. The 
incapacity of the movement to attract the support of the rural elite, was due, 
in part, to its changing character. It no longer defined its status necessarily in 
terms of an adherence to Confucian ideology, especially since the incentive 
of the civil service examination no longer existed.186
185 Takeuchi Hiroyuki, Chugoku no jukyo teki kindaika ron (Confucius’ Theory for China’s 
Modernisation), Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1995, pp.300, 328.
186 Kauko Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty, pp.46,49. See also 
Nobutaka Ike, “War and Modernization”, pp. 189-209, in Political Development in Modern 
Japan, by Robert E.Ward (ed.). The Chinese elite was traditionally chosen by means of 
competitive civil service examinations. In these examinations the applicants were tested for 
their knowledge of the Confucian classics and the great body of commentaries on the classics
223
Chapter Four
“New Life” Confucianism must have seemed particularly meaningless 
to men preoccupied with political and social survival. The New Life 
Movement’s assertion that the material wants of the masses would eventually 
be met through spiritual regeneration must have seemed absurd to the 
impoverished.
The fundamental flaw of the New Life Movement for the larger part 
was its assumption that immaterial triviality alone would satisfy the socio­
economic needs of the people.187
C. The New Moral Order
The New Life Movement was meant to rejuvenate the Chinese people. 
Out of a total Chinese population of 450 million, only around 100 million 
were believed to be literate. In other words, techniques and materials had 
become modernised, but the people's mentality and education was still 
retarded.188 In response to this problem, the New Life Movement developed, 
under Zhu Jiahua's responsibility, a Reformed Education Policy, and 
mounted campaigns to improve general standards of behaviour and weed out 
superficial Westernisation.189 As part of this initiative, the newspapers often 
published all kinds of New Life regulations. An example of these regulations 
may show why the New Life Movement has sometimes been regarded as a 
futile and somewhat comic effort to regenerate the nation by reviving the
which had been built up over the centuries. The nature o f the examinations was such that only 
those who had assiduously studied the classics since early childhood could hope to pass them. 
In 1905 the imperial examinations were abolished, and as a substitute for the Confucian 
classics, “new learning” (i.e. modem western scholarship) became popular.
187 Wei, pp.78-80.
188 Ishimaru, pp.255-266.
189 Zhu Jiahua, “The New Life Movement, An Exposition of its Aims: China's Reformed 
Education Policy”, NCDN, 25 March, 1934.
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morality of Confucianism, and by prescribing quantitative rules of personal 
conduct:
The penalty for spitting on the street is ten yuan.
Perm ing your hair is not allowed, straight hair is the best...
Pedestrians should keep to the left-hand side.
The rules were sometimes so strictly interpreted by police authorities 
that, according to them, smoking on the streets was not allowed.190 
Billboards were placed in the streets of the cities appealing to unemployed 
people “When you have no work, you must find something to do.”191
The New Life Movement was often misunderstood by the 
intelligentsia, because it was too simplistic. It should therefore not be 
forgotten that it was meant for everybody - the farmer, the man from the 
small village, and for the man in the street, for the rich and the poor.192 On 
the surface the New Life Movement was remarkable for the absurdly 
exaggerated anticipation of its proponents, who held the serious -if self- 
serving- connotation that the key to China’s national salvation lay in hygienic 
activities to purge the unhealthy habits of body and mind of the Chinese 
people.193
Intellectuals outside the direct administration of the Guomindang and 
the Blueshirts failed to understand the demands of the New Life Movement. 
While these intellectuals understood little about the Fascist motives behind 
the Movement - indeed they were likely to be anti-Fascist in outlook - they 
were schooled in the Confucianist reasoning with which Chiang Kaishek
190 “New Life Canons Enforced, Police stop smokers on Nanking Street”, NCDN, 27 April 
1934.
191 “New Life Movement, Hangchow Slogans”, NCH, 24 April 1935.
192 “Various Phases o f New Life, Why the Movement is so often Misunderstood by the 
Intelligentsia; its Effect on Common People.” NCDN, 17 December 1934.
193 Dirlik, p.945.
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attempted to imbue the movement. Intellectualising about this Confucianist 
standpoint would also have failed to clarify the situation. This is because the 
demands of the New Life Movement were either too basic or too exaggerated 
to be taken seriously on a purely intellectual level. The obvious lack of a 
coherent theoretical basis for the movement invested it with failure even at 
the very outset. This point was not, however, appreciated by the self-serving 
ideologists within the Guomindang.
D. The Moral War Against Communism
While proscribing hairstyles may appear ridiculous and futile, there 
was much more to the New Life Movement than a tirade of invectives against 
undesirable personal habits. The construction of a neo-Confucian social order 
in Nanchang was seen as a key factor in throwing a sort of sanitary moral 
cordon around the Chinese Soviet Republic.
The fluid borders of the soviet region and the extensive propaganda 
work of the CCP had turned peasant discontent into political disaffection in 
many areas, prompting anxieties in the Guomindang leadership. In particular, 
Chiang himself felt that the Red Army’s success in recruiting from the 
peasantry made stringent controls necessary.194
During the years 1933-35, when Communist operations were centred 
in Jiangxi, the Blueshirts attempted to control and win back the masses in 
areas of Communist influence and to enforce the blockade of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic. To this end, cadres were despatched into the countryside to 
organise peasants in zones recently recaptured from the Communists. On 
arrival, they organised the entire population into a BaojiaS95 system
194 TB, 6017, p.8
19  ^Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny, pp. 13 5, 167. Bao Jia : A system of mutual 
responsibility. See also Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, New York: Grove Weidenfeld,
1968, pp. 64-65, according to Snow, baojia literally means “guaranteed armour.” The baojia
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f t  ¥  SIS! and launched a “social survey” as a means of weeding out 
Communists and other undesirable elements.196
In order to ensure that the Communist influence was erased forever, 
the cadres began to educate the peasantry in the values which Chiang 
considered to be the most appropriate for the rebirth of the nation. It was the 
propagation of these values which was the raison-d'etre of the New Life 
Movement.197
It is somewhat paradoxical that Chiang preached the moral virtues of 
the New Life Movement with such vigour, yet was never able to weed out the 
corruption of even his closest associates. Indeed, the Blueshirts, who were the 
backbone of the New Life Movement, were certainly some of the greatest 
recipients of graft and bribes in China. The New Life Movement highlighted 
many of the key contradictions of the Blueshirts Movement. The Blueshirts 
were closely linked with the underworld smuggling rings of the Qing Bang, 
and are known to have consolidated their position in Sichuan, following the 
removal of the capital from Nanjing, by taking over the local opium cartels. 
Yet one of the major campaigns of the New Life Movement was to eliminate 
opium-smoking.198
One of the offshoots of the New Life Movement was the formation of 
the Voluntary Labour Service Corps (Laodongfuwutuan §§• Wj M H) in the
system was a method of controlling the peasantry which was widely imposed by the 
Guomindang and the Japanese. One bao was made up of approximately ten jia . The combined 
baojia was held collectively responsible to the district magistrate, for any offence committed 
by any member of the roughly hundred family unit. As a measure for preventing the 
organisation of peasant protest it was almost unbeatable. Among the functions of the bao jia  
was the collection o f taxes for the maintenance of the militia; and Tejima Hiroshi, Chugoku 
rodo undotsushi, pp. 348-349; Chiang Kaishek revived the Bao Jia system, and used it as a tool 
to educate and control people.
196 Eastman, p.72, see his footnote, nr 141.
197 “New Life in Szechuan” ; NCH, 27 March 1935, The personal visit of Chiang Kaishek to 
the province should inspire enthusiasm, his primary object is to clear out the Reds.
198 “The New Life and Opium”, NCDN, 1 November 1934.
227
Chapter Four
summer of 1934, which was a form of moral corvee designed to extract the 
maximum of forced labour out of the army, the party organisations, the 
schools, women, or any other group.199 Everything was to be utilised; moral 
and physical strength as well as material. With such a huge mass of people 
working for the goals of unity and strength announced by the leader, it was 
hoped that the country would be able to stand firm against aggression.
In another attempt to harness every drop of energy from the embattled 
population, and as a supplement to the New Life Movement, in April 1935 
Chiang also instituted the People’s Economic Reconstruction Movement 
{Fuxing dazhong de jingji fJC M j c S M I  §|).200 Its aim was ostensibly to 
improve the standard of living of the people through utilisation of all the 
natural resources of the country. It also claimed to aim at the abolition of 
unemployment by creating new fields of labour. The two movements, the 
New Life Movement and the People’s Economic Reconstruction Movement, 
would, according to the firm belief of their founder, raise China to a great 
power of the first order.
The New Life Movement was also part of Chiang's effort to counter 
the demoralisation which was setting in among his officers, and an attempt to 
elevate the struggle against Communism onto a higher plane than merely 
bayoneting recalcitrant peasants in one village after another. In strengthening 
the ideological beliefs of his military, Chiang saw the Movement as a means 
of ensuring their loyalty to his programme of pacification before tackling 
Japanese aggression. Chiang defended his policy of appeasement during a 
conference:
199 Dirlik, p.951; see also Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.33, Chang, p.5, and Ch’ien Tuan- 
sheng, p.47; Corvee labour was actually a system used at various times from the early years o f 
the empire down to the latter part o f the Ming. It was especially complicated during the Tang 
Dynasty. Corvee labour was used regularly on major public works.
200 Dirlik, pp.978-979.
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He predicted an approaching Second W orld W ar, a conflagration which 
w ould occur by 1936 or 1937. The new war, asserted Chiang, presented 
China w ith a  golden opportunity. I f  it entered into the conflict united,
China could emerge revived and transform ed from weakness to strength.
I f  China entered in a weakened and divided state, it would be destroyed. 
Internal unity m ust come first.2® *
Chiang thus still faced a formidable political challenge in maintaining 
his foreign policy. The political threat was not so blatant as the Fujian 
Rebellion202 or Feng Yuxiang's Anti-Japanese Allied Army, but the danger 
was just as real. Chiang had to maintain the morale of his army and his 
political supporters. He had to convince them that a policy of patience and 
accommodation with Japan would serve the national interests. The New Life 
Movement was of critical importance in securing these political ends.
4.4 Conclusions
The popularity of Fascist ideas in China cannot be explained by a 
sociological analysis which is concerned only with identifying which of the 
country's social strata were most threatened by Communism. There was no 
disgruntled lower middle class, as there was in Germany, which had seen a 
half-century of steady rises in prosperity wiped out by hyperinflation. Nor 
was it the case that China's producers were eager to embrace an ideology of
2°1 Coble, p .153, with reference to his footnote 12; Speech of 18 March, 1934, Chiang Tsung- 
tongyen-lun hui-pien, vol.l 1, pp.140-141. On the Nanchang conference itself, see KWCP, 
vol.l 1, nr.l 1, March 19 1934 ; KWCP, vol.l 1, nr. 12, 26 March 1934, coverage in “Da-shi shu- 
ping”; and Shen-bao nian-jian, 1935, p.D-32; and Keiji Fururya, Chiang Kaishek His Life and 
Times, p.580. That Chiang had not changed his earlier views is proved by his diary notes. 
Chiang noted in his diary: The Second World War is drawing nearer and nearer every day. 
What sacrifices we must be prepared to make during the war and what sort o f position China 
might occupy in the post-war world are questions about which we should make a detailed study 
beforehand. (Entry of 28 January 1938)
202 The 19th Route army had made western Fujian a thirdforce stronghold. They had cleared 
out local war-lords and forced Chiang Kaishek to accept their nominee as governor. They had 
pursued a vigorous reform programme which included abolition of excessive local taxes and 
experimental land reform. But the corvee and forced levies they imposed had created 
opposition. Moreover they were Cantonese guest soldiers. Their popularity was already fading 
when they launched the rebellion.
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“delayed industrialisation” emulating Germany and Italy. China had, in fact, 
very few indigenous manufacturers in the early 1930s, and many of these 
would have preferred open collaboration with the Japanese in order to bring 
about order and stability, rather than throwing in their lot with a slightly 
bizarre experiment in Chinese Fascism.
The specific form which Fascism took in China was much closer to the 
Japanese than to any European model. The social and political climate of 
China in 1932 was quite unlike the period just after the First World War in 
Europe, when the Fascist movement started in Italy and the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party was founded.
In Italy and Germany these organisations started as authentic 
movements of the working and lower middle classes. In China, as in Japan, 
it was initiated by the Chinese military elite. Certainly in China the 
popularity of Fascist ideas never reached the heights attained in Italy and 
Germany. While skilful use of modem propaganda methods brought Hitler 
and Mussolini into the hearts and homes of millions of their fellow 
countrymen, Chinese Fascism never really became much more than an 
ideological conceit of the military and the political elite. It was in the 
intellectual circles within the Guomindang, many of them deeply 
conservative and many others, like Dai Jitao, a former CCP member, who 
believed Fascism could open up a pathway towards their ideal of a modem 
nation.
The history of the Blueshirts was the history of their attempts to 
translate the mechanism for creating this ideal into a practical organisational 
form. Chinese admirers generally took established Fascist regimes as their 
models, not nascent Fascist movements. In so doing they saw existing 
political systems of concentrated powers and not the often anarchic, social- 
revolutionary forces that preceded them and helped drive them to power. The 
Blueshirt movement was an attempt to draw on the lessons of Fascism in
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Europe, and to push a disorganised, demoralised and backward China as 
quickly as possible down the path to modernisation.
The Blueshirts were not greatly interested in ideological debate, but in 
this, they differed little from Fascist movements in Europe itself. Fascism in 
all its forms was essentially about the exercise of power, and it replaced the 
analysis of state power so beloved of European liberals with a “Fiihrer”- 
philosophy which was consciously anti-intellectual and anti-analytical. Thus, 
the mere fact that the Blueshirts did not evolve a systematic theory of how to 
apply Fascism in China does not indicate that they were not Fascists.
The activities in which the Blueshirts engaged - anti - Communist 
purges, anti-Japanese populism and assassination of political opponents - are 
classically Fascist. Chiang tried through insidious campaigns to portray all 
his opponents as Communists. Chiang's attempt to achieve his aims by a 
combined effort which balanced the violence of the Blueshirts with the New 
Life Campaign was also classically Fascist. Where the Blueshirts eliminated 
opponents, the New Life Movement tried to mobilise supporters; where the 
Blueshirts were brutal enforcers, the New Life Movement tried to lead by 
exhortation.
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Chapter Five 
The Blueshirts’ Dependence on the Qing Bang
5.1 The Guomindang's Dependence on the Qing Bang
It is tempting to consider the Qing Bang (Green Gang) as a sort of 
Mafia, as Eastman clearly does when he writes of the “Mafia-like Shanghai 
Qing Bang.”1 This comparison is probably more valid with reference to the 
Mafia in their traditional homelands in southern Italy than to the modem, 
urban Mafia of the United States. Just as the Italian Mafia had real social 
roots in local communities, and took on a number of functions including that 
of a benevolent society, so the Qing Bang had roots in particular localities 
and professions as well as in historic secret societies. Perhaps Christopher 
Duggan's description of the Mafia comes closest to what the Qing Bang were. 
“The Mafia”, he noted, “was not a secret society, but a way of life or an 
attitude of mind.”2
The Mafia, unlike most Chinese secret societies, used the structure of 
the family as a concrete basis of recruitment. The Chinese societies, 
especially those of the Triad type, were not structured on the family, although 
they evoked the ideology of the family generally, and that of the fraternity, 
specifically.
Before discussing the origins of the Qing Bang, it should be noted that 
close co-operation between it and the ruling Guomindang was a central 
feature of the political landscape during the Nanjing period. Although the 
national capital was upstream at Nanjing, Shanghai was the powerhouse of
1 Eastman, Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927-1937, p . l .
2 Christopher Duggan, “Preface ”, Fascism and the Mafia, New Heaven: Yale University 
Press, 1989.
232
Chapter Five
China's nascent capitalist development, as well as the most important point of 
contact with the Japanese and the Europeans. Chiang Kaishek recognised the 
key importance of this city, not least because of its role in securing finances 
for him. Chiang also had strong personal links both with the city and with the 
leadership of the Qing Bang - between 1912 and 1922, Chiang Kaishek had 
spent much of his time in Shanghai. The relationships he developed with key 
figures in finance and the underworld remained unchanged during the period 
in which Chiang Kaishek won control of the Guomindang and turned 
towards Fascism. During the early years of the Nanjing period the Qing Bang 
was at the height of its power as an independent organisation, and at the 
height of its influence over the Guomindang. Unlike the Blueshirts, however, 
the Qing Bang, in common with traditional secret societies, actually had no 
military power. It was precisely during this period that Fascism first appeared 
in Nationalist China. Du Yuesheng i t  M %L? the powerful Qing Bang leader 
in the Shanghai area had already expanded his influence beyond the 
traditional spheres of the secret societies. Those activities inevitably brought 
the Qing Bang in conflict with the Blueshirts.
This Chapter will address the nature of this relationship, and examine 
how closely the Blueshirts were linked with the Qing Bang and other 
important Bang societies. Principally, it will look at how the Blueshirts drew 
in and incorporated existing members of established Bang, and how they co­
operated with them in their work. Many scholars have already examined the 
activities of the Bang societies, especially during the 1920s. This Chapter
3 Banker and public welfare worker, bom in Pudong, Shanghai, 1884. Received his education 
under private tutors, and entered business at Shanghai at an early age. Member of the 
Supervisory Committee o f the Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. President, 
Zhongwai Bank, Tongwai Bank, director, Commercial Bank of China. Founder and chairman 
of board o f directors of the Chengshih Middle School, Shanghai. Director o f the Chartered 
Stock and Produce Exchange, Ltd., Shanghai.
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seeks to widen the scope of debate by bringing together information from 
Chinese, Japanese, British and American sources.
A. W hat were the Bang?
Before beginning a discussion on the Qing Bang and their connection 
with the Blueshirts, some explanation concerning the terms used will be 
helpful. The original meaning of the character bang W was “help” or “aid” or 
“assist.” It is debatable why western scholars first started to translate the 
word bang as “Gang.” One Chinese researcher has translated bang as 
“Bands”, the Green Band (Ch’ing - pang).4 Band, however, would be a more 
appropriate translation of the characters dai or dui |gc.
Many researchers use the term secret society to describe the Bang, and 
therefore conflate them all too readily with the genuine secret societies mimi 
shehui This rendering however derives mainly from the Japanese
translation himitsu shakai rather than from Chinese sources, and the
term “secret society”, with all its ambiguities, is really not a suitable 
translation for the term Bang. In contrast to western scholars, certain 
Japanese scholars have glossed the term as “Guilds”,5 and this explanation is 
the one which probably comes closest to the heart of what the Bang societies 
were about. Bang societies are not strictly comparable with gangs in the 
western sense of the word. The Bang societies have a long history in China 
and were involved in economics, religion, artistic patronage and many other 
areas of activity which were rarely of any interest to most “gangs” in the 
West. In the mutual support which they provided their members, as well as in
4 Ch’en Yung-fa, “The Wartime Communists and their Local Rivals: Bandits and Secret 
Societies” - Select Papers from the Centre fo r  Far Eastern Studies. No. 3,1978-79, p .13.
5 Negishi Tadashi, Shanghai no girudo (Shanghai’s Guild), Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha, 1951; 
see also John Stewart Burgess, Ph.D, The Guilds o f  Peking, Colombia University Press, 1928, 
pp. 15-16. The spelling ‘guild’ and ‘gild’ are both used, which is purely arbitrary.
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their involvement in such a wide variety of activities in society, the Bang 
were more like the medieval guilds of Europe than any modem criminal 
association.
The point is important since all possible translations of the term Bang 
are heavily value-laden, and a basic misunderstanding of the term may well 
lead to distorted perspectives of research, especially in the 1930s in 
Shanghai.
Another terminology that is often subject of misunderstanding is the 
name she %t, also used in Lanyishe and Lixingshe i.e the Blueshirts. At the 
end of the Qing dynasty the terms for the traditional generational status of the 
Bang societies were in descending order of seniority, the Da jz, the Tong IS, 
the Wu tS and the Xue JM  This traditional generational status terminology, 
indicating the position within the society, remained in use until 1949. 
However, a much more general term came into vogue namely the she 
generational status. This generational status group (zibei ¥  M) was adopted 
by all members who were accorded that particular rank in the society, and 
was not only used by the Qing Bang but also by the Hongmen p^ .7 
Similarly, just as mistranslating of the term Bang leads to misunderstandings 
about the nature of the Guilds, mistranslating of the term she may lead to a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Blueshirts.
Smaller organisations which were formed under the umbrella of the 
Qing Bang often called themselves she, such as the Zhichengshe* MMtt,
6 Sakai Tadao, Chugoku minshu to himitsu kessha (Chinese People & the Secret Societies), 
Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1992, pp. 153-154. See also Brian G.Martin, “The Origins of the 
Green Gang and its Rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920,” East Asian H istory , 2 (December 1991), 
pp.67-86.
7 Sakai Tadao, pp. 153-154. The Hongmen (Hong League) or Hong Family (Hongjia), 
otherwise known as Heaven and Earth or the Triad societies (Sanhehui), became in the late 
Qing dynasty the most powerful group o f secret societies in central and south China.
8 Sakai Tadao, pp. 153-154. The original name of the Zhichengshe was Tongdengshan |W] 
llj. In the name we find the traditional generational status Tong IS. Before the Japanese- 
Chinese war o f 1937, Bai Zihou S  who came from Sichuan province was its leader. Bai
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Minxingshe f^Jli}±9 and Fuxingshe H H tt .10 Furthermore the well-known 
Qing Bang boss of Shanghai, Du Yuesheng, organised in November 1932 a 
society with the name the Hengshe fa t t .11 By 1934 the members of this 
Society had increased to 223, and among them were, politicians, government 
and military officials, and industrialists. The fact that so many smaller Bang 
societies were called she may have led the Japanese to misunderstand the 
nature of the Lanyishe or Lixingshe [Blueshirts], whom they assumed, 
because of their name, to be not a political organisation of the Guomindang, 
but merely another “gang.”
Secret societies have always influenced Chinese history, and have 
existed in China throughout recorded history. Collectively, they constitute 
one of the institutional backbones of Chinese society. Historically, their 
influence has always been widespread and their ramifications have extended 
into every branch of Chinese life, especially politics, religion, commerce, 
trade unions and the criminal underworld. The societies were often of a 
Buddhist or Daoist origin, but their main objective by the nineteenth century 
was to safeguard the common people against oppression by corrupt
Zihou was also one o f the leaders of the Sichuan Paoge (a reactionary gang from Southwest 
China with connections to the Gelaohui.) Bai Zihou was also quite an important person in the 
Shanghai Hong Men Societies During the war with Japan and after the war when its 
headquarters was in Chongqing the leader of Zhichengshe was Zhou Xunyu jnl
9 Sakai Tadao, pp. 154-155. The leading members of the Minxingshe were, Liao Haicheng JjJ 
'M, Liao Songbai 0  ^  Wang Yucheng 3 i H  M  and Ren Hanqing jJEp, who were 
all followers of Bai Zihou.
Sakai Tadao, pp. 154-155. After Bai Zihou died the Minxingshe members formed a new 
organisation the Fuxingshe, while Ren Hanqing became the chief leader.
11 Watanabe Jun, “Seibo, Unga seikatsusha shudan no dairyu” (The Group of Boatmen's Life : 
Qing Bang), Rekishi tokuhon (Readers History), March 1988, p. 153. The Hengshe tU tt  
(Endurance Club) was registered in the French Concession founded in November 1932, but 
formally inaugurated 25 February 1933. Du Yuesheng was a member of the rather low Wu 
generational status group. This, however, did not prevent him from exercising authority over 
Qing members who belonged to the generational status group preceding his own. It may, 
notwithstanding Du’s power over higher ranking people, have led to the introduction o f the 
status group she, which was a more general indication.
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officialdom. The most important of these organisations were the Triads or 
Hongmen league.
The secret societies in South China generally called themselves hui #  
while those in the North usually called themselves jiao f t .12 The Hui was a 
secret political brotherhood with a religious tendency, whilst the Jiao were 
secret religious associations with a more nationalistic character. The one 
aspect they had in common, was on anti-Manchu sentiment.13 In China, 
many peasants undoubtedly joined Bang societies because the writ of 
constitutional authority did not run in the villages remote from the cadres of 
state power. They banded themselves together to resist the authority of the 
local landlords and officials, and to protect their own economic and social 
interests.
Scholars such as Max Weber favour an analysis of the Bang which 
sees them as generally lacking strong political connections and primarily 
reflecting loyalties to family and region.14 These ties of blood and common 
origin were traditionally much more important than political programmes or 
ideologies, and they were generally directed to securing economic benefits 
rather than challenging the authority of the Imperial governor by entering the 
domain of politics.
Towards the end of the Qing Dynasty, this began to change, as the 
revolutionary organisations began to draw on the organised manpower of the 
Bangs. In Zhejiang province, for instance, the revolutionaries made contact
12 Hui has the same meaning as Banghui it represents the lower class of farmers or 
common people's Bang groups. During the Qing Dynasty it was officially also called Huifei 
# H .  For instance, Tiandihui or Gelaohui Jiao or also Jiaofei i f f i ,  is the
group of religious sect for example, Qinglianjiao pf jUifc, Bailianjiao E=l jHt&.
13 TB, 5090, Manshu kyu sina ni okeru chika himitsu dantai ni tsuite, pp. 193-198; see also,
TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to hanMan koNichi katsudo no jitsu  rei. See also Immanuel 
Y.Hsii, The Rise o f  Modern China, p. 128.
14 Fei-ling Davis, Primitive Revolutionaries o f  China, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1977, pp.72-74, who quotes Max Weber’s, The City, p. 14.
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with various Hongmen groups.15 Sun Yatsen, for example, used the 
Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society), the Tongmenghui
(Revolutionary Alliance) and others, politicising them to an extent which 
clearly marked them out from more traditional Bang organisations.
B. The Qing Bang
During the first decade of the 20th century the Bang societies 
reputedly controlled more than 700 salt-smuggling craft and commanded 
over 10,000 followers in the lower Yangtze region. Smuggling had become 
their economic mainstay, and this experience would later prove valuable 
when they expanded out of the salt business into much more profitable trade 
in opium.16
One of the most influential Bang societies was the Green Gang or 
Qing Bang, which dominated central and eastern China in the first half of this 
century, with the port of Shanghai as the main centre of its activities.17 The 
weakening of central control in the Republican period and the laxity of legal 
sanctions against it allowed it to widen its mass base with relative ease. The 
Qing Bang reached the peak of its strength in the period 1920-1950, when 
China's political parties were deeply divided and the city of Shanghai was 
frequently under the control of warlord armies or foreign powers. During this 
period, the Qing Bang was the effective master of the city.
The link between Chiang Kaishek and the Qing Bang was by no 
means the first one between political leadership and the Bang societies, for
15 Mary Backus Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai 
and Chekiang, 1902-1911, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp.128-139.
16 Brian G.Martin, “The Origins of the Green Gang and its Rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920 ”,
East Asian History, p.75, nr.2, December 1991. See also Rankin, p.137.
17 Chao Wei-pang, “A Chinese Secret Society, The Rise and Growth of the Ching Pang.” The 
China Review, October-December 1934, vol. 3.4, pp.35-36.
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Sun Yatsen himself had established such links much earlier. After the 
Revolution of 1911, the modernist wing of the young intelligentsia was 
fundamentally hostile to China's past, but more conservative elements wanted 
to control the drive towards modernisation within the bounds of traditional 
Chinese social institutions. Linking new political organisations with 
established Bang networks was one of the ways in which this more 
conservative trend sought to anchor reforms securely in the realities of 
everyday Chinese life.
Sun's programme was to reform and modernise China under a period 
of political tutelage, during which the nation would entrust itself to the 
“political guardianship” of the Guomindang. The way to secure this 
supremacy was to link up with established Bang organisations, which had 
deep roots in Chinese society and enjoyed the trust of the common Chinese. 
This philosophy was adopted and developed by Chiang Kaishek, and it was 
the basis for the Fascism which appeared in China during the 1930s. The 
emergence of the Blueshirts was only a new means of securing the political 
subjugation of the people in ways which the Bang societies had hitherto 
failed to achieve.
Throughout the period of Sun's leadership, there was an internal battle 
between intellectual revolutionaries and pragmatic power politicians, the 
latter gradually gaining the upper hand. In the final years of the Qing 
Dynasty, Sun and Huang Xing MM had tried, unsuccessfully at the time, to 
woo the Qing Bang into forming an alliance with them. Nonetheless, it is 
known, especially in the area of Shanghai, that the revolutionaries managed 
to mobilise the assistance of a number of leaders of the local “Red [Triads] 
and Green [Qing] Gangs.”18 Furthermore, as Mary Backus Rankin writes, in
18 Mark Elvin Mark, “The Revolution of 1911 in Shanghai”, Papers on Far Eastern History, 
29 (1984), pp. 152-153. See also Rankin, p.204.
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the first few days after the 1911 Revolution Chen Qimei had “skilfully 
consolidated his position as military governor of Shanghai with aid from both 
merchant-gentry and secret society Green and Red Gang allies.”19 Although, 
Chen Qimei’s activities were centred around Shanghai, he had also some 
influence on revolutionary movements in his native Zhejiang province.20
In addition, after the 1911 Revolution, the Northern Warlords 
(Beiyang junfa zjb #  I f  managed to induce a number of Qing Bang men 
to support them, and with the assistance of this group, dominated the lower 
Yangtze valley for upwards of a decade.2! jn 1 9 2 4  the Guomindang regime 
in Canton, which was preparing itself for the Northern Expedition, began 
courting the Qing Bang again in order to secure its acquiescence in the 
establishment of Guomindang rule in the Shanghai region. All in all, it is 
clear that Sun could not have led the national revolution to success without 
the secret societies and their activities within the revolutionary units.
C. Chiang Kaishek, Shanghai Business and the Qing Bang
Chiang Kaishek came from Zhejiang province, and since local 
loyalties were so important in Chinese social life, his origins continued to be 
of central importance throughout his life. There was a group of businessmen 
called the Zhejiang Magnates {Zhejiang - Jiangsu caifa 
which had its origins in the Ningbo Bang a guild with close ties to
one of the sects of the Qing Bang.22 These businessmen had come to 
dominate the banking and finance sectors of Shanghai's economic life, and
19 Rankin, p.l 19. Chen Qimei is one o f the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) heroes.
20 Rankin, p.l 19.
21 Chao Wei-pang, p.35.
22 Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government 1927-37, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980, p.23, see his footnote, Shanghai tung-she, (ed.), 
Shanghaiyen-chiu tzu-liao, in Shanghai, 1936, pp.289-290.
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they thus derived maximum benefit from the rapid economic expansion 
which Shanghai experienced between 1895 and 1920. Because of their 
power, the Ningbo Bang attracted groups of capitalists from neighbouring 
areas, until they had eventually extended their web of personal relationships 
to form the Zhejiang magnates. This group commanded most of the business 
organisations of Shanghai, including the General Chamber of Commerce, the 
Shanghai Bankers’ Association and the Native Bankers' Association. In 1923, 
for example, 86% of the membership of the Shanghai General Chamber of 
Commerce originated from Zhejiang.23
Chiang Kaishek's Zhejiang connections proved very important 
following the failure of the second revolution in 1913, when he was nearly 
reduced to beggary in Shanghai. He managed to use his local connections to 
secure for himself the lowly post of paiban (clapboard man) in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange,24 which began functioning in Shanghai in around 1916.25 
The seemingly insignificant job of “clapboard man” belies the level of 
education required in order to do this work correctly. Around the same time, 
Chen Qimei (SKU (revolutionary military governor of Shanghai in 1911, 
who became Sun Yatsen’s chief lieutenant) introduced Chiang Kaishek to the 
Qing Bang boss Huang Jinrong (Pock- marked Huang)26 and his
right-hand man Du Yuesheng. Generally this is taken to be the origin of
23 Coble, p.22, see footnote, The China Annual, 1944, pp.434-453 : Wu Cheng-hsi, Chungkuo 
te yinhang, p. 127.
24 Yang Shobiao, p. 13.
23 Wang Fumin, Chiang Kaishek shengping (The Life o f Chiang Kaishek), Shanghai: Tuanjie 
chubanshe, 1989, pp.31-32.
26 Merchant leader and welfare worker, born in Shanghai, 1868. Proprietor o f the Great World 
(amusement centre), Crystal theatre, and Chinese Grand Theatre o f Shanghai. Well-known for 
donation towards flood relief and other charitable causes. Huang was decorated by the Chinese 
Government, for generous contributions.
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Chiang's connection with the Qing Bang.27 However, another account tells 
that Yu Qiaqing j j i f n  j® P  28, member of the Ningbo Bang, introduced Chiang 
Kaishek to Huang Jinrong.29 Which of the two men actually introduced 
Chiang to the Qing Bang boss has not been established, but both sources 
agree that Chiang’s connection with the Qing Bang dates from that moment. 
However, according to Pichon Loh, it was during the period of the 1911 
Revolution and its aftermath that Chiang Kaishek developed relations with 
the Qing Bang bosses in Shanghai.30
In any case, Chiang's entry into the world of finance in Shanghai was 
of political importance to the Guomindang, since Sun was desperately trying 
to gather financial support for a new wave of revolutionary activity. At the 
time, he was concentrating most of his efforts on Japan, where an unnamed 
political organisation provided him with funds which were actually spent on 
helping to found the Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporation. The conclusion 
appears to be that the Guomindang was acting as a secret conduit for
27 Yokoyama Hironori, “Shokaiseki to Shanghai koeki jo ”, (Chiang Kaishek and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Corporation), Chugoku kenkyu geppo, 1, 1992, p. 17. See also, Wang Fumin, 
Chicmg Kaishek shengping, p.32.
28 During the 1911 Revolution Yu Qiaqing had provided major military support for the 
revolutionary forces in Shanghai. He had also promoted the rise of Chiang Kaishek and 
participated in the anti-Japanese boycotts of the 1930s, as well as having close contacts with all 
the leaders o f the Qing Bang. He was known as a business leader and public welfare worker, 
bom in Ningbo, Zhejiang, 1865. Entered business in Shanghai at an early age, and became 
managing director of the Sanpe Steam Navigation Company, the Shanghai Chinese Produce 
Exchange and several other companies in Shanghai. Was elected president o f the Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai 1925, and co-director of Shanghai-Wusung 
Special Administrative Area 1925. Chairman of the Chinese Ratepayers Association in 
Shanghai 1926, and elected Chinese councillor of the Shanghai Municipal Council 1929.
29 Yokoyama Hironori, p. 19, see his footnote 19.
30 Pichon P.Y. Loh, The Early Chiang Kaishek: A Study o f  His Personality and Politics, 1887- 
1924. New York: Colombia University Press, 1971, p.26. Chiang Kaishek followed the 
example o f his mentor Chen Qimei and also developed relations with the Qing Bang bosses in 
Shanghai. These links date from the time Chiang commanded one of Chen Qimei’s “Dare -to- 
Die” Corps, which was sent from Shanghai to assist in the liberation of Hangzhou. See also 
Rankin, pp.214-217.
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Japanese capital to penetrate Shanghai, and that it expected to reap the 
benefits when profits began to accrue to the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Corporation.
Chiang's business activities in Shanghai lasted until 1922, and his 
relationship with the Qing Bang and the Shanghai business world continued 
to grow closer. Qing Bang appointees such as Du Yuesheng, who became 
manager, and Yu Qiaqing, who became chairman, began to fill senior posts 
in the organisation. Chiang rose along with them, becoming a middle-level 
manager.31
After Chiang became Guomindang leader, he continued to cultivate his 
links with the Qing Bang. He was thus a man who took on many different 
roles, and presented different faces to different people. To the students of the 
Whampoa Military Academy he was “Dean”, to the people of Zhejiang 
Province, he was “Chairman”, to the Bang, he was the “Big Dragon Head”, 
and to the ordinary people, he was a “New Emperor.”32
D. Connections Between the Guomindang and the Qing Bang
Many highly-placed members of the Guomindang elite were members 
of the Qing Bang.33 Among these were (warlord) generals such as Li Jinglin 
& M # , 34 and Zhang Zhijiang WiZ. t t 35 who was a close supporter of Chiang
31 Yokoyama Hironori, p.22 ; see his footnote 36, Wei Baizheng, “Shanghai zheng quan wu 
pin jiao yi suo yu Chiang Kaishek” (Shanghai Stock Exchange and Chiang Kaishek).
32 Yokoyama Hironori, p. 19 ; Li Ao, Chiang Kaishekyan j iu  (The Research o f Chiang 
Kaishek), vol.3, p.294.
33 Ch’en Yung-fa, “The Wartime Communists and Their Local Rivals: Bandits and Secret 
Societies,” in Selected Papers from the Centre fo r  Far Eastern Studies, no. 3, 1978-79, p.20.
34 Bom in Zhili, in 1884, attended the middle school of Zhili province and later the Baoding
Military College, entered the military service in 1900 and soon rose to the rank of major. Li 
joined the Nationalist and was appointed pacification Commissioner for Zhili and Shandong 
provinces, retired for a while after the resignation of Chiang Kaishek, 1927; adviser to Zhang 
Xueliang, 1930.
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Kaishek; and politicians as Finance Minister Zhang Yinghua 1  ^  J  ,36 In 
addition, the Guomindang Ambassador to the USA, Dong Xianguang If 
i t  [Hollington K. Tong]37 and the leader of the Postal Workers’ Union in 
Shanghai who was later the CCP Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Chu 
Hsuchfan [Zhu Xuefan] 7k  <5 38 were also members.
Of the Qing Bang bosses in Shanghai, Du Yuesheng was especially 
successful in expanding his network of power and influence. It was 
particularly through his new society, the Hengshe f l  ?± (Endurance Club), 
founded in November 1932, that Du managed to incorporate important 
Guomindang politicians, military officials, industrialists and financiers into 
his organisation. The Hengshe was different from Du’s Qing Bang, but 
formed an integral part of it. However, the members were neither admitted 
into the Qing Bang nor were not instructed in its secret language.39
The Qing Bang was the largest and most powerful secret society that 
had a relationship with the Guomindang. During the Nanjing period, the 
Qing Bang played an important role in securing the Guomindang's authority
33 Native o f the Yanshan district of Zhili Province where he was bom in 1881. After serving in
various branches o f the Army in the North, he was appointed Military Governor of the Chahar
District and later Tupan o f the Northwest Frontier force. Participating in the defence of the 
district to the north o f Beijing against the Fengtian forces, following the withdrawal of Marshal 
Feng Yuxiang from Beijing. When Feng retired from the Guomindang and spent a year in 
Russia, Chiang Kaishek assumed command of the Guomindang and was largely responsible for 
the masterly retreat from Kalgan across Mongolia into Gansu and Shaanxi.
3^ Retired government officer, bom in Zhili, in 1886, studied at the Tianjin Anglo Chinese 
College; received his advanced education in Manchester, England.
37 Journalist, bom in Ningbo, Zhejiang in 1887, studied at the Lowrie High School, Shanghai 
High School and the Anglo-Chinese College, Shanghai.
3 8 Labour leader, bom in Shanghai in 1905; Shanghai Law College, Chairman of the Shanghai 
General Labour Union, leader of the Shanghai Postal Workers’ Union; Delegate to the 
National People’s Congress.
39 Brian G.Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937, 
California: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 180-182.
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in its main powerbase, the lower Yangtze valley. It is assumed that Chiang 
made his first contacts with members of the Qing Bang in 1911 during his 
stay in Shanghai.40
The relationships which he was to build up there were to stand him in 
good stead many years later, at a particularly critical time in his political 
career. The point at which Qing Bang assistance became vital to Chiang was 
in 1927, when the Northern Expedition had triumphantly swept up from 
Canton (Guangzhou), seizing Nanjing and going on to take Shanghai. In 
many areas through which the advancing Nationalists had passed, the 
workers and peasants had spontaneously risen ahead of them and the army 
arrived to find that the job of turning out the henchmen of the local warlord 
had already been done for them. The General Strike which was organised in 
Shanghai indicated to Chiang that he risked losing control of the revolution 
which he had just won, and he therefore sought to curb the power of the 
unions and of the Communists both inside and outside the Guomindang. The 
result of this was the Shanghai Massacre, which was managed operationally 
by the Qing Bang on Chiang's behalf.41 It was the Qing Bang which 
mobilised armed strike-breakers to occupy the key points of the city, 
delivering it effectively into Chiang's complete control, and destroying in a 
few days the dangerous influence of the Communists within the party.
The Qing Bang members replaced Communist militants in the 
factories, where labourers working in the industries in the coastal cities such 
as Shanghai and Tianjin looked for protection and support against the foreign 
factory owners, mostly Japanese, who only exploited the Chinese workers. 
This protection and support could only effectively be found in an
40 Pichon P.Y. Loh, The Early Chiang Kai-shek. A Study o f  his Personality and Politics, 1887- 
1924, p.24.
41 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Policing Modern Shanghai”, The China Quarterly, September 
1988, nr.l 15, p.418.
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organisation with the power of the Qing Bang, so the organisation grew 
rapidly.
The price which Chiang had to pay the Qing Bang for this timely 
intervention is not known, but it is certain that the Bang grew and prospered 
in the lower Yangtze region during the Nanjing period.
As a result o f  this coup de m ain , m uch has been made o f the great debt 
that Chiang subsequently owed Du Yuesheng and the Green Gang. But 
although the Green Gang bosses were given military titles w ith the rank 
o f m ajor-general in M ay 1927, D u Yuesheng and Chiang K aishek’s 
interests were far from iden tica l4^
In the core area of the Nationalist government in the 1920s and 1930s, 
the Qing Bang leaders effectively acted as intermediaries between the 
bankers and Nationalists of Chiang, and as a sort of control mechanism on 
the workhorse in the large industrial areas.
On the one hand, they took over many of China’s largest industrial 
enterprises, while on the other, they continued to expand their empire of 
street rackets in the poorest areas of the cities. One hundred thousand 
rickshaw pullers paid a percentage of their meagre earnings into the hands of 
gangster owners.43 The Qing Bang’s men dominated official labour unions, 
intervening in every industrial dispute. Paradoxically, it is mostly through 
disagreements between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang that the extent of 
their relationship with each other becomes clear. While they were co­
operating, things ran smoothly and quietly, and it was only when disputes 
broke out that matters otherwise hidden came out into the open.
The relationship between the organisations was one which extended to 
all levels of the Guomindang, and was by no means confined to the personal
4^ Wakeman, p.419, referring to his footnote 54; for an impressive list of Du’s official titles, 
see Shanghai Shi Nianjian Weiyuanhui (comps), Annual Mirror o f  Greater Shanghai, p.X-25.
43 Wakeman, p.419.
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interests of the party leaders.44 A good example of personal relationship is 
that of Du Yuesheng and Chiang Kaishek. Du was rewarded for his “service” 
to the Guomindang during the bloody coup against the Communists in 1927, 
with his appointment by Chiang as a nominal Councillor with the rank of 
Major-General.45 Du was later appointed to leading positions in the world of 
banking in Shanghai, for example President of the Zhongwai Bank, and he 
also achieved a prominent position during an important reorganisation of 
Chinese newspapers.46
The Bang societies drew in bankers, businessmen, politicians and 
party officials and found them positions within their ranks. Moreover, most 
of the policemen and detectives of the French Concession and the 
International Settlement were members of the Qing Bang,47 as were Chinese 
municipality military officers in the local garrison commander's headquarters, 
officers of the Bureau of Public Safety, minor politicians and Guomindang 
labour leaders. At the lowest level of society, the lumpen proletariat of the 
shanty towns both supported the Guomindang and mobilised at the behest of 
the Qing Bang.
The particular complexities and ambiguities of Shanghai lent 
themselves very well to the hegemony of the Qing Bang during the Nanjing 
period. Large parts of the city were outside direct Chinese jurisdiction, and 
therefore attracted commercial, criminal and political elements which sought
44 Jean Chesneaux, Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. 
Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1971, p. 164.
45 Brian G.Martin, “The Origins o f the Green Gang and its Rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920, ” 
p.85. The article shows a photograph of Du Yuesheng at the age o f forty in the military 
uniform o f Major-General.
46 MAE, 529, "E" - Asie-Oceanie, Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 
Reorganisation de journaux Chinois, Peking, 15 July, 1935.
47 Brian G.Martin, “The Pact with the Devil”, in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and Wen-hsin Yeh 
(eds.), Shanghai Sojourners, Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1992, pp.270-271.
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to make a base for themselves in an area beyond the reach of Chinese legal or 
military sanctions. Thus there was the Qing Bang “King” of the French 
Concession underworld, Du Yuesheng, who led activities ranging from 
labour agitation and intimidation to kidnapping and murder.48 In other parts 
of Shanghai, the loose structure of interlocking webs of influence and 
authority which were collectively known as the Qing Bang extended into 
every comer of the city’s life.
The Qing Bang link was important to the Guomindang in enabling it to 
exercise authority in Shanghai and in the provinces. In the city, the 
Guomindang had difficulty controlling capitalists, many of whose banks, 
businesses and factories were located in the foreign concessions outside its 
jurisdiction. Where the Nanjing government could not venture, the Qing 
Bang could boldly go. Methods such as coercion, extortion and kidnapping 
were used to bring recalcitrant businessmen into line. At the same time, the 
remnants of the CCP continued, after 1927, to exert considerable influence 
on the labour unions. The Qing Bang was indispensable in working against 
this influence, particularly in the form of the armed combat force formed by 
the bosses out of Shanghai members to fight the CCP union, known as the 
Zhonghua gongjinhui (China Reform Federation Society)49
Outside the city, the two most important Guomindang guerrilla forces 
in the Yangtze delta, the People's Self-Defence Army and the National 
Salvation Army of Loyalty and Righteousness, depended heavily on the 
Bang for recruits.50 The Reserve Brigade of Suqian, Northern Jiangsu, was
48 PRO, FO 371/17142, xc 930, British Consulate General, 9 November, 1933. Extract from 
Shanghai Municipal Police report, 6 November 1933.
49 Watanabe Jun, p. 153. Professor Watanabe is currently lecturer o f Modem Chinese History, 
Komazawa University in Tokyo, I visited him in August 1994 and Prof. Watanabe offered me 
an original copy o f the article.
50 Ch'en Yung-fa, p.26.
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also formed primarily from Qing Bang members. Here the Guomindang 
appears to have been mobilising the enormous reserves of surplus manpower 
for its own political purposes. Furthermore, when the Guomindang expanded 
its direct control over the area to the north and south of the Yangtze, the 
relationship with the Qing Bang once more proved beneficial to both 
parties.51
As a result of Chiang's links with the Qing Bang, and of their ruthless 
methods of bringing both capital and labour under his authority in Shanghai, 
the Qing Bang's influence on the city and the Guomindang grew ever 
stronger. Criminal elements demanded rewards for their services, and this 
fuelled the mood of speculation and corruption which was already prevalent 
in Shanghai.
The large influx of rural migrants into the Shanghai in the first decades 
of the century, and the consequent increase in criminal activities, posed 
serious problems of social control for the municipal police authorities. 
Shanghai was divided into the Chinese City, the International Settlement and 
the French Concession, and each area had its own administrative, legal and 
police systems. There was little or no co-operation between the three separate 
authorities, or indeed between their civil administrations or judicial systems.
These conditions allowed Bang members to flourish. They could set 
themselves up in one jurisdiction and conduct armed robberies, kidnapping 
and narcotics deals in the other two. They could then safeguard themselves 
by bribing or infiltrating the police officials of each area. Indeed, Bang 
members formed the core of the Chinese detective squads in both the 
International Settlement and the French Concession. For example, the Chief 
of the Chinese Detective Squad of the Shanghai Municipal Police in the 
1920s was Shen Xingshan it??ULl, who was also leader of the Qing Bang
51 NIDS, S 15 - 4/99, Shina no himitsu seiryoku seibo, kobo. (The use of the secret power of 
the Qing Bang and Hong Bang in China), Hatano budai, November 1938, no pagination.
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organisation known as the Big Eight Mob {Da ba gu dang In the
French Concession, the Chief of the Chinese Detective Squad was none other 
than Huang Jinrong. There also existed a significant community of interests 
between the French authorities and Du Yuesheng and his Qing Bang.53
After the occupation of Shanghai by the Japanese in November 1937, 
two sorts of anti-Japanese activities began: suburban guerrilla resistance 
movements and urban political terrorism. Both were, to some extent, 
organised by Dia Li who, after the war broke out in August, went to 
Shanghai and in co-operation with Qing Bang leader Du Yuesheng 
supervised the guerrilla activities in the Shanghai area.54
In 1937, some of Dai Li's closest associates were current or former 
policemen. These included Cai Jingjun HS/jp. ex-Commissioner of Police, Ji 
Jianzhang ex-Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps, and
Wang Zhaohuai ex-Chief of Intelligence of the Wusong-Shanghai
Defence Headquarters. Furthermore, Yao Jianai former police
inspector, was responsible for the setting-up of Blueshirts front labour unions 
in early 1937.55
E. Qing Bang Co-operation with the Japanese and the Communists
Connections with the Qing Bang were not restricted to the 
Guomindang. For example, co-operation between provincial Qing Bang
5^ Brian G.Martin, “The Origins of the Green Gang and its Rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920," 
p.84. See also, Paul Maurice, “The Ching Pang: A Chinese Secret Organisation”, in China 
Today, 3-10, December 1937, p. 188.
53 This relationship is described in a study by Brian G.Martin, “The Relationship between the 
Green Gang and the Shanghai French Concession Authorities, 1925-1935”, in Frederic 
Wakeman, Jr. and Wen-hsin Yeh, (eds.), Shanghai Sojourners, pp.270,285-287.
5^ Wakeman, The Shanghai Badlands, pp. 18-19.
55 NA, SMP, D 7657. General Tai Lieh [Dai Li] founder of the Chinese Blue Shirts Society.
24 April, 1939, by Tan Shao Ling.
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societies and the Japanese during the war of resistance is well documented. 
After the war with Japan had started in 1937, co-operation between the Qing 
Bang and the Japanese - and also with the Communists - became obvious, 
especially in those provinces occupied by the Japanese. William T. Rowe 
attests to this relationship by writing: “In Hankou then we have the Qing 
Bang - or an organisation calling itself that - functioning openly during the 
occupation, not only recognised but also financially underwritten by the 
occupation authorities.”56 This co-operation may in some way be explained 
by the independence of the Bang societies. Their goal did not always parallel 
that of either Guomindang or “the authorities” in general. They were more 
concerned with protecting their people and saving their own interests.
The above findings of a relationship between the Qing Bang (and other 
secret societies) and the Japanese is confirmed by Ch’en Yung-fa tR #  
[Chen Yongfa].57 In the occupied areas the Japanese recruited the help of 
two secret societies, including the Qing Bang. Chang Yiqing [Zhang Yiqing], 
a Qing Bang leader from North China, whose tie with Japanese intelligence 
can be traced to before the war, was assigned responsibility by the Japanese 
for organising Qing Bang members in central China into pro-Japanese 
organisations. It certain that a certificate issued by these organisations was 
better than an ordinary citizenship card in dealing with the Japanese security 
personnel. As a result, many common people joined the Qing Bang just to 
obtain a membership certificate from the Japanese-sponsored Qing Bang 
organisation.58 Along similar lines, Wang Jingwei also relied on various
56 William T.Rowe, “The Qing Bang and Collaboration under the Japanese, 1939-1945: 
Materials in the Wuhan Municipal Archives”, in Modern China: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 
Vol.8, nr.4, October 1982, pp.491-499.
57 Ch’en Yung-fa, “The Wartime Communists and Their Local RivalsiBandits and Secret 
Societies,” in Selected Papers from the Centre fo r  Far Eastern Studies, n o .3 ,1978, pp.28-29.
58 Ch’en Yung-fa, pp.28-29.
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secret societies with these tendencies during his puppet regime under the 
Japanese.59
That the Communists, and extraordinarily also some Blueshirts, were 
co-operating with the Japanese during the wartime period in Shanghai is 
documented by Elizabeth J. Perry. She writes: “To be sure, the radicals were 
not without rivals during the wartime period. Wang Hao, the Blueshirt 
instigator of the 1936-37 strike collaborated with Japanese occupation forces. 
So did some Communist elements within the silk weavers’ movement.”60
5.2 The Period of Symbiosis - the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang
By the time the Blueshirts were formed in 1932, close economic and political 
links had already existed between the Guomindang and the Qing Bang for 
more than five years. The Blueshirts emerged in a social and political 
environment in which such co-operation was more the norm than the 
exception. The Blueshirts thus became one more interest group in the 
complex web of competition and co-operation which regulated the 
relationships between the political, economic and social order of the 
provinces under Guomindang control and especially of the city of Shanghai.
During the first few years of their existence, the Blueshirts co-operated 
readily with the Qing Bang. This was because the Qing Bang provided them 
with two essential things - economic support and the means of harnessing the 
population of China to the Guomindang's increasingly corporatist political 
machine. Drug traffic and dealing were until then for the greater part a Qing 
Bang monopoly, however, the Blueshirts were trying to win their share at the 
cost of the Qing Bang. The Blueshirts initially used the Qing Bang to
59 Chesneaux, pp. 184-186.
60 Elizabeth J.Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics o f  Chinese Labor, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993, pp.208-209.
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suppress people, but finally stepped in themselves as drug dealers. An
example of this practice is the close co-operation between the Qing Bang and
the Blueshirts in Hankou as described in a report of the British Consul
General in Tianjin:
The first working o f this gang in Hankow [Hankou] occurred last spring 
w hen the N isshin Kisen Kaisha compradore was shot for dealing with 
the Japanese.... But, although it is not known how many shared the same 
fate, the names o f those who are known make it difficult to ignore the 
surm ise that these terroristic acts were not inspired by anti-Japanese 
m otives but were in reality an endeavour to break the power o f the 
opium  clique whereby the traffic in opium  m ight become a “Chiang” 
m onopoly. Having accom plished their objective in Hankow, the “C h’ing 
Pang” [Qing Bang] are reported to have moved up-river. By this time a 
second body o f  Blueshirts had been trained and they were sent to 
Hankow, to take over A 1
For their part the Qing Bang bosses were aware of the political power 
represented by the Blueshirts and tried to take advantage of this situation. 
Throughout the Nanjing period, the Qing Bang continued to practice its 
oldest pastime of smuggling. It controlled the flow of arms, opium and other 
high-value commodities into the city of Shanghai and other areas in its 
sphere of influence, and grew very wealthy on the proceeds. Of all their 
activities, opium was of central importance in the relationship of the Qing 
Bang bosses with the Guomindang regime, just as it had been in their 
relations with the warlord regimes.62 The Guomindang was almost 
permanently in financial crisis, and was never able to raise enough money 
from taxation to support its military expansion and the Bolshevik 
Extermination Campaigns against the Chinese Soviet Republic. The revenue 
from the Yangtze black market was therefore the only source of money 
readily available to it, and the symbiosis between the Party and the Qing
6  ^ PRO, FO 371/18088 xc 1697, Blueshirt Activities: summary o f  Hankow position, very 
confidential, pp. 162-165. British Consulate General, 11 December 1933.
62 Brian G.Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937, 
p.134.
253
Chapter Five
Bang was in large measure a means of securing a steady creaming-off of 
funds from illegal trading into party coffers.
Although the most profitable item of illegal trade was opium, from the 
beginning of the Nanjing period in 1927, the official policy of the 
Guomindang had been to eradicate opium consumption as quickly as 
possible. All trade became the legal responsibility of the Opium Monopoly 
Bureau, and all opium addicts were supposed to register with the bureau. 
This policy was in fact less an attempt to eradicate opium than to monopolise 
it, so that the profits could be split between the Guomindang and the Qing 
Bang. When Zhang Xiaolin 3H ® #  was appointed head of the Opium 
Monopoly Bureau, he immediately subcontracted a private company run by 
Qing Bang leaders to handle the monopoly sales.63
An illustration of the close co-operation which prevailed between the 
Guomindang and the Qing Bang was the so-called “Teapot Dome Scandal.” 
In 1928, a steamer en route from Hankou to Shanghai was stopped and 
searched by the police from the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, who 
discovered that it was carrying opium on the orders of the Wusong-Shanghai 
garrison commander Xiong Shihui. The Mayor of Chinese Shanghai Zhang 
Dingfan, who had been informed about the dispatch of this consignment, 
decided to take the opportunity presented by the incident to settle accounts 
with his political rival, Xiong Shihui. He informed the government in 
Nanjing and accused Xiong of having violated the government’s anti-opium 
regulations, making sure that the Shanghai newspapers covered the news 
extensively. The case compromised the government to such an extent that a 
special commission, headed by Zhang Zhijiang, a follower of Chiang and 
Chairman of the National Opium Suppression Committee, was arranged to 
investigate the affair. The committee’s report only blamed a few scapegoats,
63 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937, 
p.38.
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but ignored the wider circumstances of the question. This incited the anger of 
Zhang Dingfan who resigned as Mayor of Chinese Shanghai.64 This opium 
scandal was a serious matter both for Chiang Kaishek and also for the Qing 
Bang. Their active participation in the distribution of the disputed opium 
consignment was given exaggerated attention in the press, and they feared 
that it would undermine their relations with key political and military figures 
in Shanghai as well as in Nanjing. Therefore, the Qing Bang bosses 
themselves also joined in the general disapproval of the scandal and the 
demands for sentences for those involved.
The Qing Bang and the Guomindang were not alone in smuggling 
opium. After their invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese increasingly 
developed activities in opium and heroin manufacturing and smuggling in the 
areas under their control. This was done under Japanese military protection. 
These activities brought them into conflict with the Qing Bang and with the 
Blueshirts. Reported by a Japanese source was that the morphine business 
increased also. Morphine arrived in Shanghai and Talian via Kobe.65 Also 
Japanese pharmaceutical companies got involved into the production of 
morphine in Japan, companies as Hoshi seiyaku, Dai nippon seiyaku and 
Sanko seiyaku are mentioned.66 The morphine was transported to China and 
there sold . However, the Japanese produced the heroin mainly in Manchuria 
and North China , as heroin was easy to manufacture even in small factories. 
The areas and production sites were protected by the Japanese Army. A 
correspondent of the North China Daily News in Tokyo gives a report written
6 4 FOH, 1601, Opium Combat in China, A-dossiers 1919-1940, 6 December 1928, Peking, 
Opium schandaal te Shanghai, Afd. V.Z. nr. 40058.
65 Eguchi Keiichi (ed.), Ni Chu sensoki ahen seisaku,(The Opium Police During the Sino- 
Japanese War), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1985. As stated by Iwamura Seiin, former officer of 
the Japanese Embassy in China.
66 Eguchi Keiichi.
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by a friend who made journey through Manchuria in 1933.67 This friend 
observed ; “not only in provinces like Yunnan and Sichuan, but also in the 
North areas as Jehol and Manchuria planting and smuggling of opium has 
increased the last years. In Manchuria this friend reports there are “fields and 
fields full of poppy.”68
This smuggling by the Japanese in north China was of course used by 
the anti-Japanese Salvationist groups for strong criticism on the Guomindang 
government. During 1936 the relationship between China and Japan seemed 
to have reached the point for a general collapse, although Chiang Kaishek 
tried everything to delay war with Japan.
In 1933, a correspondent of the Journal de Shanghai noted that opium 
was freely available in Shanghai, and that in order to circumvent the law, it 
was sold under the guise of a “pharmaceutical paste.” The correspondent 
noted the “pharmaceutical” boxes, bearing seals with the inscription “special 
taxes from Jiangsu province.” This semi-official co-operation between the 
Guomindang and the Qing Bang certainly cost a great deal to the dealers and 
vendors of opium, and the money which accrued to the Guomindang was 
largely used to meet the cost of the anti-Communist campaigns.69 The 
amount of money earned from the opium trade was substantial, and also the 
Blueshirts got their share, for example the financial contributions Chiang 
made to them amounted monthly 60,000 yuan from the special opium tax.70
67 FOH, A-dossiers 1919-1940, box 1601, January 1934, nr. 374/49 (4158), Opium Combat in 
China.
68 North China Daily News, 15 November, 1934 “Opium Traffic in North China, Chinese 
Delegates’ Charges against Japanese. ” The delegates declared that enormous quantities of 
opium were being brought from Jehol and were sold in the vicinity of Tianjin.
69 FOH, A 194/241, 15 July 1933, and 10 October 1933.
70 TB, 2057, p.68.
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An example of suspected co-operation between the Blueshirts and the 
Qing Bang took place in October 1932. A Bang led by Wang Degui iW U , 
Xiao Hubei / J ^ d t  and Lin Fa seized a consignment of opium which 
was being landed. It appears that the Shanghai Municipal Police colluded in 
the raid in return for a small share of the opium. Notably, the consignment of 
opium was received on the jetty by a Chinese man wearing a blue uniform, 
and the driver of the getaway van was told when to drive off by another man, 
similarly dressed.71
The Blueshirts' role in the relationship between the Party and the Bang 
was important,72 since they were able to use armed force to assist the Qing 
Bang in destroying any rival Bangs which attempted to break the monopoly, 
and since they were the Guomindang's primary political vehicle for 
suppressing Communism. They were thus at one and the same time the 
party's means of securing its share of the opium profits, and the party organ 
to which a very high proportion of those profits was devoted.
The co-operation in smuggling and racketeering was often 
indistinguishable from related political activities. The Bang warfare between 
rival opium traders in Shanghai was ferocious, and the gang members were 
frequently involved in political assassinations as well as in attempts on the 
life of their underground rivals. For example, Wang Yaqiao, a native of 
Anhui, shot and killed Xu Guoliang Chief of the Wusong-Shanghai
Constabulary in 1924.73 This murder was the result of a dispute between the 
military forces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu about the sale of opium - a dispute 
which grew so serious that the two armies were at war with each other. At the
71 NA, SMP, file nr. unknown, 29 October 1932, “Opium Robbery at North Honan Road, 
Soochow, by superintendent Quale.”
72 PRO, FO, 371/17142, xc 930, (434).
73 NA, SMP, D7667, S2. 11 December 1937.
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time, Wang Yaqiao was a small-time gangster, engaged mostly in kidnapping 
and armed robbery, but in 1926 he came to the fore once again in connection 
with the activities of the Labour Union in the Western Districts.74 As 
described in the previous chapter, Wang Yaqiao was also connected with the 
attempt on the life of Wang Jingwei. His accomplice in this murder attempt 
was Zhang Yuhua S K U , who also confessed to being involved in the 
Nakayama Incident.75 Another perpetrator mentioned in this attempt on 
Wang Jingwei’s life and the Nakayama incident was Yang Wendao, who had 
strong Blueshirt connections.76 Yang was the chairman of a mutual aid 
association affiliated to the Hongmen Triad, an anti-Japanese secret society 
based in Shanghai in the 1930s. Chiang Kaishek personally intervened on 
Yang’s behalf when he was arrested on suspicion of murdering the Japanese 
military officer Nakayama. Despite being released by the police, thanks 
partly due to a campaign in the press, Yang’s position within the military was 
a powerful one. This worried Chiang, who attempted to arrest Yang on some 
charge or another. Wise to this, Yang effected his escape to Hong Kong.77
This close interweaving of underworld and political activities led to a 
blurring of distinctions in many foreign reports between the Blueshirts, who 
were primarily and explicitly a political organisation, and the Qing Bang, 
who were not. The violent attacks which the Blueshirts mounted on their 
political enemies were not always easily distinguishable from gangland
74 Wang Yaqiao (Wong Yahjao), is also mentioned by Brian G.Martin, in his essay, “The 
Origins of the Green Gang and its rise in Shanghai, 1850-1920” ; Wang Yaqiao, a Green Gang 
member and a professional assassin, was Shanghai’s equivalent of “Murder” Inc.
75 TB, 7556, Shina himitsu kessha no shin jo se i; Konichi terou tsushin toshite miru, (The 
Chinese Secret Society’s New Circumstances, and terrorism against the Japanese), p.34; The 
Nakayama Incident in November 1935 surrounded the murderer of a Japanese first class 
marine in Shanghai. The man accused of having been the murderer was Yang Wendao, who 
was said to have had connections with the Eighteen Route Army and the Blueshirts.
76 TB, 7556, p.34.
77 TB, 7556, p.48.
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murders - nor did the Blueshirts wish them to be. Foreign commentators 
therefore sometimes tended to mistake the Blueshirts for no more than 
another “gang” or secret society - as a sort of Mafia rather than as a Fascist 
organisation.78
The relationship between the Qing Bang and the Blueshirts seems to 
have lasted as long as the Blueshirts were an organised force in the 
Guomindang. While the Blueshirts ceased to exist as an organisation in 1938, 
the fate of the Qing Bang after the Nanjing period is rather more difficult to 
fathom out, although a number of contributing factors may be suggested. The 
first and most obvious of these it that with the move of the capital upriver 
first to Wuhan and then to Chongqing, the Guomindang moved away from 
the area in which the Qing Bang had its traditional powerbase.
Secondly, the extremities and deprivation of the war period ruined the 
industrial base of the lower Yangtze, depriving the Gang of their lucrative 
base of extortion and racketeering.
Thirdly, with millions of people fleeing west as refugees, many others 
killed or taken prisoner, it appears that the personal networks on which Qing 
Bang authority were built up were undermined or broken. Lastly, The United 
Front which the Guomindang was obliged to form with the Communists in 
1937 may have made the previous level of co-operation between the party 
and the Bang impossible.
What is clear is that the Qing Bang never succeeded in wielding the 
same kind of influence over Chinese politics as it did in the Nanjing period. 
Nonetheless, there are many examples of co-operation between other “gangs” 
and the Blueshirts. In Suqian, Jiangsu province, for example, Liu Shanchen, a 
Blueshirts member and leader of the Qing Bang, had control over about
78 PRO, FO, 371/18088 xc 1697, (162-164).
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10,000 members of Big Swords and Small Swords Societies.79 In central and 
north China, a number of the Zaijiali ^  S I  or At-home societies had both 
strong connections with the Qing Bang and also good relations with the 
Blueshirts. The Blueshirts, when expanding there activities to Manchuria 
used frequently the local Zaijiali members.80 The origins of the At-home 
societies can be traced back to the Gelaohui If  ^  H-, itself a branch of the 
Tiandihui ^  M #  (Heaven and Earth Society). The Gelaohui was established 
in the early Qing dynasty. An association of handicraft workers, farmers, ex­
soldiers and vagrants, the Gelaohui was primarily an anti-Manchu 
organisation. The aims of the At-home societies were much broader than this, 
but their main base remained in Manchuria. By 1932 the Zaijiali wielded a 
great deal of power in Manchuria, as in the course of their existence many 
upper class Chinese had joined it. For example, politicians, governors, 
military men, but also political refugees coming from other parts of China.
Frederic Wakeman has shown how co-operation between the SMP and 
the Blueshirts was conducted through Qing Bang influence.81 Both the SMP 
and the French Concession Police (FCP) routinely exchanged daily and 
weekly intelligence reports, which were sometimes also shared with the 
British, French and American consuls, as well as the offices of the national 
capital. The Chinese Detective Squad within the SMP, which was composed 
mainly of Zhejiang and Jiangsu natives who could understand the Shanghai 
dialect and deal with local criminals, had regular connections with the FCP 
and the Public Security Bureau of the Chinese municipality. Such
79 Ch’en Yung-fa, p.28.
89 TB, 5090, Manshu oyobi shina ni okeru chika himitsu dantai ni tsuite (Secret Groups in 
Manchuria and China), pp. 192-193.
81 Frederic Wakeman jr., “Policing Modem Shanghai”, The China Quarterly, September 
1988, nr.l 15, pp.436-437.
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connections naturally led to fears over security leaks, especially as these 
connections were also linked to Chinese gangs and syndicates.
The Public Security Bureau had been infiltrated by Blueshirts from 
1932, primarily through Dai Li’s secret police. Indeed, Dai Li’s men assumed 
command of the Special Service Group (tewuchu #  jH) in 1934 with 
relative ease. Dai Li’s attempts at buying over Chinese police in the 
International Settlement were, however, largely unsuccessful. Owing to the 
vigilance of British Intelligence and the Chinese superintendents in the 
Special Branch, Dai Li never gained control of the SMP detectives. 
Nonetheless, this did not prevent Dai from using Qing Bang connections to 
develop contacts within the SMP. The FCP was a much easier organisation 
for Dai’s agents to infiltrate. This was because the detective squad was 
controlled by the Qing Bang, and Dai was therefore able to receive all the 
necessary assistance from Du Yuesheng.
A co-operation between members of Du Yuesheng’s own secret 
society, the HengsheP emerged in 1937 after the Sino-Japanese War had 
begun. Du ordered members of his society, who were working in military 
hospitals as first-aid helpers, to join the anti-Japanese movement. In 
exchange, Du promised them positions as soldiers at Xinchangzhen iff 
and Nanhuixian f t  E  H. This is believed to have been the start of a closer 
co-operation between Du Yuesheng and the BIS (Military Bureau of 
Investigations and Statistics of the Military Council).83
In relation to this, in 1937 Du founded the Sujiang M 21 (2 1  M, $T '21) 
Xingdong weiyuanhui ff #J S  it # (Action Council), which acted as a Qing
8^ Watanabe Jun, p. 153.
83 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, Zhonguo banghui shi (The History o f the Chinese Secret 
Society), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, p.630.
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Bang organisation within the BIS.84 This organisation within the BIS was 
supported by the Zhengchengshe IE ?±, an organisation founded in early 
1910 in Shanghai by Paoge tfi IF, a Sichuan secret society affiliated to the 
Gelaohui. However, the foreman of the Paoge, Bai Zihou E=l IP  H ,  was 
seriously ill before the start of the Sino-Japanese War and was therefore 
replaced by Zhou Xunyu J!0 iS -f, a member of the BIS and also a tewu.
A. Qing Bang Labour Unions
In examining political co-operation between the Qing Bang and the 
Guomindang it is important to bear in mind what Chiang Kaishek's 
objectives were. He had adopted Sun's idea of state-initiated and state- 
controlled industrialisation as the best way to achieve equitable growth, and 
to avoid the class conflicts which had beset industrialisation in Europe and 
North America.85 This idea was strongly nationalist and strongly corporatist. 
It actively sought to prevent the formation of class distinctions in society.
The rapid industrialisation of parts of China posed major problems of 
social control for the Guomindang regime. As peasants came in off the land 
or the urban poor were drawn into the new factories, an industrial working 
class was in the process of being created. In this, China was sharing the same 
experience as all other countries undergoing industrialisation. In China, 
however, as most of the early capitalists and factory owners were foreign, 
there was a distinct Chinese working class before there was a Chinese 
bourgeoisie similar to those which existed in the advanced capitalist 
countries. In the throes of intense and disruptive social transformations, the
84 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, p.631. Paoge : Member of a reactionary gang in Southwest 
China, before liberation.
85 Tim Wright, “The Nationalist State and the Regulation of the Chinese Industry in the 
Nanjing Decade”, in David Pong and Edmund S.K.Fung (eds.), Ideal and Reality, Social and 
Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949, New York: University Press of America, 1985, 
pp. 128-129.
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Chinese industrial workers faced their foreign bosses alone, without any 
distinct leadership. Chinese industrial workers were thus at the forefront of 
the nationalist conflict, and could therefore be radicalised fairly easily.
Ready to exploit this radical potential was the CCP, which had a 
distinct advantage over its Western counterparts. Whereas Communism had 
emerged as a political force in the West as a product of industrialisation, in 
China, it was present as a political force from the very beginning of the 
industrialisation process. The Communists were at work from the moment 
they joined the Guomindang in 1924 to the massacre of 1927, trying to 
increase working-class militancy, and to build trade unions in the coastal 
cities, demanding the right to determine China’s own destiny, and ultimately, 
to split the Guomindang itself along class lines.86
In order to put his national-corporatist programme into effect 
therefore, Chiang had to maintain the strictest control over the working 
population of the provinces and Shanghai, because as in any country which 
faces the immediate task of economic development, the problem of labour 
control was a crucial one.
The general strike in Shanghai of 30 May 1925 in protest against the 
shooting of nine Chinese by the foreign police paralysed the city. This was 
followed by the dramatic events of March 1927 known as the Shanghai 
Massacre. Shanghai workers seized the city in a combined general strike and 
armed insurrection, and delivered the commercial and industrial metropolis 
to Chiang's army. After that Chiang then felt strong enough to dispense with 
and dispose of the Communists and their allies, and turned his guns with 
Qing Bang help against the labour movement.87 Thereafter any signs of
86 Tejima Hiroshi, p.9.
87 Walter E.Gourlay, “Yellow Unionism in Shanghai: A Study o f KMT Technique in Labor 
Control, 1927-1937”, in Papers on China, vol.7, from the Regional Studies Seminars, Harvard 
University, May 1951, p. 104.
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resurgent Communist activity were eradicated as soon as they appeared. The 
Guomindang had justified its reorganisation by the relevant charge that the 
workers had been used in the past by the Communists to further the plans of 
Moscow.
The techniques adopted by Chiang to solve labour uprisings seemed 
remarkably similar to those used by Mussolini in 1922. The system 
Mussolini used for ending labour conflicts had at that time been discussed at 
length and commented upon favourably in Western countries such as 
England and the United States, and Chiang was without doubt familiar with 
the story. One of the points of Mussolini’s five-fold programme was the 
“Reorganisation” of the unions by means of attacks by his Black Shirts 
against union headquarters involving the murder of leading union officials.88 
Chiang then had a willing and capable ally in the Qing Bang whose 
membership has been estimated at anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000.
The Qing Bang was a pre-capitalist form of organisation, which drew 
in members from all social classes. It controlled large sections of especially 
the Shanghai labour force directly or indirectly, and it represented the easiest 
way of securing the loyalty of the workers to the Party. It was, paradoxically, 
both a remnant of the old feudal China, and an embryonic corporatist 
organisation typical of 20th century Fascism. The struggle to control and 
mobilise industrial labour in Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s thus took the 
form of a battle for power between the class-militant CCP and the cross-class 
Qing Bang. Since Du Yuesheng had an implacable hatred of the Japanese, 
Qing Bang-organised labour took as much of a leading role in the anti- 
Japanese boycotts of 1928, 1931 and 1932 as did the Communist-led 
sections.89
88 Gourlay, pp. 105-106.
89 Jordan, p.32.
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In the 1930s the Blueshirts were the political shock-troops whose 
mission was to maintain this control and suppress this subversion, but they 
would have found it difficult to carry this out had they not been able to work 
within and alongside the Qing Bang. The Blueshirts entered labour politics in 
1932 in a climate of extreme hostility to foreigners, especially the Japanese, 
who had just invaded Manchuria and had attacked Shanghai in the beginning 
of 1932 in order to protect their own interests. The Blueshirts set about 
harnessing this hostility to a Guomindang political agenda. They laid plans 
for boycotts of Japanese textile factories, strikes, and the assassination of 
CCP leaders (a list of over 100 CCP targets was circulated to Blueshirt 
members). The Qing Bang was able to supply labourers from neighbouring 
provinces to the factories in Shanghai. The Blueshirts probably assisted in the 
selection of people with anti-Communist sympathies, so as to control the 
labourers. The Communist influence in the Shanghai factories declined, 
especially after 1932.
Chiang Kaishek had carefully guarded against labour revolts by 
assuring that union leadership would be safely in the hands of the 
Guomindang. In effect that meant that union posts had to be filled by 
appointments from above. In May 1931 twelve key people in the 
Guomindang government’s Department of Communications, the Central 
Postal Administration and the Shanghai Post Office joined in May 1931 the 
Qing Bang and became followers of Du Yuesheng. The purpose according 
Zhu Xuefan’s account, was “to use his membership in Du’s Green Gang 
group to strengthen his own control over the Postal Workers’ Union and to 
enhance his standing as a major figure in the Guomindang’s trade union 
organisation.”90
90 Brian G. Martin, pp. 167, 169. The key people named are Lu Jingshi, Zhu Xuefan, Zhang 
Kechang and nine others.
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As mentioned, Chiang Kaishek wanted to guard against labour revolts 
by assuring that union leadership would be safely in the hands of 
Guomindang, that is, preferentially Blueshirts representatives.91 However, 
they unfortunately did not have many capable people of performing such a 
function. At this point the Qing Bang stepped in and assisted with favour in 
this task. With their help the Blueshirts exerted strong and far-reaching 
control over the workers. All the powerful workers in Shanghai were gang 
members or Blueshirts related. The programme of the Guomindang was 
intended to keep labour obliging as a political factor, and to promote 
harmony in industrial relations.92 This goal was met for the greater part. 
There were strikes among the labourers, but most of these strikes originated 
in protests against pay cuts, lay-offs and so on. There were hardly any 
political strikes.
Elizabeth Perry has provided a description of the work of the 
Blueshirts in co-operation with the Qing Bang in the Shanghai unions during 
the period 1932-37 93 She writes :
In W est Shanghai, W ang Hao a m em ber o f  the Peasant-W orker Section 
o f the Shanghai Guom indang, established in January 1937 a  District 
Three Silk W eavers' Union. W ang was a follower o f  Qing Bang labour 
leaders Lu Jingshi and Zhu Xuefan, who were in turn top lieutenants o f  
Qing Bang chieftain Du. W ang was also a m em ber o f  the Blueshirts.
Since m ore than a few  silk weavers in Shanghai had received training 
from the Blueshirts, W ang was able to draw  on the connection to
develop a following among the w orkers W ang's m ission to organise
the silk weavers w as part o f  a concerted program me by his backstage 
bosses, Lu Jinghsi and Zhu Xuefan, to develop a base am ong labour in 
preparation for the upcom ing National Assembly elections.9^
91 Gourlay, p. 120.
92 Gourlay, p.121.
93 Elizabeth J.Perry; “Strikes among Shanghai Silk Weavers.” A contribution to Frederic 
Wakeman, Jr., Wen-hsin Yeh (eds.), Shanghai Sojourners, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992, pp.332-334.
94 Perry, pp.332-334, Yijiusanqi nian sichou da bagong, (The great silk-weavers strike of 
1937) 1982, in the Archives o f the Shanghai Number Four Silk-Weaving factory, pp. 1-2;
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And as one silkweaver recalled:
W e w orkers did not realise at that time that unions were part o f  a 
Guom indang plot to drum up m ass votes for its N ational Assembly. All 
we knew  was that organisation would give us strength. This fellow 
W ang, I understand, was a m em ber o f  the Blueshirts. But he had a leftist 
dem eanour and was really trusted by the workers, who saw that he ate 
plain noodles, rode a bicycle and lived in m odest circum stances.95
As a result of such methods, by the end of the Nanjing period, the 
Blueshirts were in a position to exercise control over Shanghai in a direct 
way that was quite without precedent.
B. Conflict Between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang
The relationship between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang was, 
however, far from being a simple matter of co-operation. As the Guomindang 
consolidated its authority over China, and as the Blueshirts grew stronger and 
more organised, the relationship was frequently interrupted by outbursts of 
violent conflict as the Blueshirts struggled to secure more power and 
influence for themselves in Shanghai and other parts of the country.
One of the first indications that the Guomindang was no longer always 
prepared to work through the Qing Bang, but was looking for ways to work 
around them, came in November 1934. Du Yuesheng learned that Chiang 
Kaishek, T. V. Soong96 and Kong Xiangxi ?L#i?&97 had bought a huge
Zhang Yuezhen, interview transcript in the archives of the Shanghai Number Four Silk- 
Weaving Factory, 1982/10/4.
95 Perry, pp.332-334.
96 Government official, a native of Guangdong, bom in Shanghai. Received his early
education at St.John’s University, Shanghai, following which he went to the US, and entered 
the Harvard University, graduating in 1915 with a BA. Later graduated from Columbia 
University with an MA. Upon returning to China in 1917, he joined the Coal and Iron Works 
Ltd., as secretary o f the company. At the time of the organisation o f the Nationalist 
government he served as Director of the Department o f Commerce. In the fall o f 1928 he
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amount of silver, which they intended to export secretly to Britain.98 In order 
to find out exactly what was going on, and to disrupt the export by provoking 
internal jealousies, Du informed Shi Liangcai, editor of Shenbao. Chiang 
attempted to bribe Shi to keep quiet, but he unwisely refused, and was 
assassinated by the Blueshirts as a result.99 Shi’s murder occurred on a 
highway outside Shanghai.
The Shi assassination, however, involved a much broader dispute 
between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang in Shanghai. The Blueshirts 
apparently tried to gain control of the labour movement and opium revenue 
from the Qing Bang. Starting in autumn 1934, encounters continuously 
developed at the Shanghai docks between members of the Blueshirts and the 
Qing Bang of Du Yuesheng. This, however, was just one side of the story. 
The Blueshirts were also anxious to extend their control into the news media 
and endeavoured to buy into the Shenbao and Xinwenbao. The editor of the 
Shenbao, Shi Liangcai, was encouraged by Du Yuesheng not to give in to the 
Blueshirts demands.100
joined the Nanjing government as Minister of Finance and vice-president of the Execution 
Yuan.
"  Business man and banker. Retired government official. Bom into a prominent banking 
family in Daiguxian, Shanxi. The 75th direct descendant of Confucius. Following the Boxer 
Rebellion, he went to study in the US, where he became a follower of Sun Yatsen. Graduated 
from Oberlin College in 1906, and received his MA from Yale University in 1907. Became a 
member o f the Central Political Council of the Guomindang.
98 TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to hanman koichi katsudo no jitsurei, pp.30-31.
99 TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to hanman koichi katsudo no jitsurei, pp.30-31.
100 Coble, Facing Japan, p.216 with reference to his footnote 98. Shi Liangcai (a prominent 
Shanghai, newspaperman) director of the Shen bao, was murdered on 13 November 1934. See 
also, FOH, J1 nr. 3662/365, Murder o f  Shi Liangcai, Shanghai, 19 November. There is every 
reason to assume that political motives were the reason for Shi’s murder, and that the 
Blueshirts were involved. See also, TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to han Man ko Nichi katsudo 
no jitsu rei, pp.29-31.
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The reason for Du’s generously given protection was simply because 
the Qing Bang boss in Shanghai had aspirations to take over the newspapers 
himself, or at least to become influential in the newspaper business.101 
Despite Du’s protection, however, Shi was murdered.
Political conflicts also arose as the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang 
competed to extend their influence further and further beyond the Yangtze 
valley.
It was found, however, that the grip obtained by the “C h’ing Pang”
[Qing Bang] had to be broken, or that there w ould be a danger o f  the 
Blue Shirts having little prestige left. This resulted in a  round up and the 
execution o f  “terrorists” on the m iddle o f  the river in the summer. The 
“C h’ing Pang were naturally furious, and as repercussions several 
Government police officials in Shanghai were shot, and the elaborate 
precautions for the safety o f  T.V. Soong on his return to China; both due 
to fear o f  revenge on their part.103
Although negotiations with the Qing Bang had started, the former 
perfect allegiance was never reached again. In fact, Chiang was trying to 
make Wuhan the principal Blueshirt stronghold.103
Moreover, in May 1932, the Blueshirts penetrated the Manchurian 
Zailijiao organisation.104 This group possessed a strong, though not
openly-exercised political influence in Manchuria. Consequently, Blueshirts 
and Zailijiao members formed a committee and worked together.
In May 1934, however, the Qing Bang founded their Northern Branch 
in Manchuria, despite the efforts of the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique to
101 MAE, “E”, Asie-Oceanie, nr.245, Box nr.529, pp.212-218, Reorganisation deJournavx 
Chinois.
102 p r o ,  FO 371/18088 xc 1697, Blueshirt Activities: summary o f  Hankow position, very 
confidential, pp. 162-165. British Consulate General, 11 December 1933.
103 PRO, FO 371/18088 xc 1697.
104 Zailijiao: leam something 'inside', which means to become mentally strong, like monks. 
This group practised stoicism (asceticism), and was a very similar group to the Zaijiali, their 
members including governors, businessmen and farmers.
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block this initiative, for both were afraid that the Qing Bang would become 
too powerful. The Qing Bang leaders sent a special trained group to the 
Department of Manchuria Guidance, which created a slogan of five 
characters Sha ren Manzhouren A  $3 M A, which means “Kill The 
Manchurian.”105
The production and smuggling of drugs by the Japanese in Manchuria 
after 1932 only offered the prospect of greater profits to the winner of the 
conflict between the Qing Bang and the Blueshirts, thus prompting them to 
fight each other even harder. It may seem that the smuggling of drugs by the 
Japanese had nothing to do with the Blueshirts, but the influence it had on 
Blueshirts’ activity in north China was significant.
Blueshirts branches were also formed in other provinces such as 
Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Charhar. In their 
efforts to establish cells in the provinces, the Blueshirts found often strong 
opposition from the various cliques or secret societies in the area.106 The 
various gangs were of the opinion that the province should be governed by 
them.107 However, the Guomindang and the gang units were frequently 
fighting side by side against the CCP. One such example is in the northern 
part of Sichuan province where the gang of Huang Qingyuan I t  fi; worked 
together with Guomindang units to repel the Red Army successfully. Such 
co-operation was not always so natural. In March 1935 part of Huang 
Qingyuan’s gang planned to found in the mountains in Huwei a separate 
society with the name Huweishan lirenshe j® fK ill ffij C  (the strictly 
enforce society ) with Chen Tianbao |  ^  f  as its president. Chen was
105 TB, 5090, p. 17.
106 NA, D4685, January 1935, Expansion o f  the Organisation o f  the Blue Shirts Society, 
Translation o f the Jiangnan Chenbao, a Japanese newspaper in the Chinese language.
107 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, pp.566-567.
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looking for expansion of his power among the gangs. In the wake of this 
split, other gang members, like Liu Xian §!) Lai Huashan $£ ilj, Luo 
Jinguang H  &  jg, Tang Dengcheng Jgr ^  $c, Xie Yongzhi Uf ft! Leng 
Kaitai H  also formed a new society with the name J ia o  g o n g  z i  w e itu a n  
M 3% § % B the Voluntary Army to purge the CCP corps.
All in all the Guomindang army and its officials (and possibly 
Blueshirts members) were often mixed up in serious struggles with the gangs 
in Sichuan province. In 1935 Liu Xiang §!j #0, then chairman of Sichuan 
province, was even opposing the Gelaohui. This opposition went so far that 
in early 1937 an order by the Guomindang called for the practical and strict 
admonition rule for the Gelaohui in the thirteen provinces. People were 
warned - especially school teachers, members of the B a o jia  f t  technicians 
and all kind of rank and file people in departmental offices - that under no 
circumstances were they to become members of the Gelaohui. People who 
already were members were immediately to withdraw from the society.108
From the moment that the Guomindang established offices in the 
provinces, they mainly concentrated on anti-Communist activities. It was 
expected that the Bang societies would co-operate in these activities. This co­
operation was at best patchy.
In 1930, Yang Qingsan Hilj a core member of the Hongmen 
became director of the Investigation section (Z h e n jic h u  ®  M  J8 )  in Hankou. 
The main responsibilities of this section were concerned with anti- 
Communist activities. The section arrested important CCP members such as 
You Sunxin j t  #  Sr ; the CCP secretary in Wuhan. Their activities are 
comparable on many levels with the secret intelligence operations of the 
agents of Dai Li.109 Furthermore, in Hebei, the P a o g e , under the leadership
108 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, pp.570-571.
109 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, p.572.
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of Liu Huiqin §!) M ifc and his subordinates, used its members for anti- 
Communist activities.
When Xian Tiewu H IS -§• was appointed vice-chief of Zhejiang 
province in 1935 he ordered Weng Guanghui U  i t  W in Hangzhou ]'H to 
form among Qing Bang members a spy ring called the Baojia zhentan 
xunlianban ^  M ^  f  II (Baojia Espionage Training Class). After the 
men had been trained, they were to become active in anti-Communist 
activities in the province.
Their record of achievement was the investigation of the farmers’ 
revolt in Yongkang tR Jit, Dongyang % H and Chengxian % JH, and the 
killing of the revolt leader, who was a Communist member. HO
That the Blueshirts developed activities in other large cities like 
Nanjing, Hankou and Guangzhou was clear from press dispatches.111 For 
instance, it was reported that on 13 November 1933 “members of this 
[Blueshirts] society made their first debut by staging mass meetings and 
raising riots, while they were distributing pamphlets, advocating Fascism and 
denouncing Communism.”112
Around the beginning of 1933, a Blueshirts’ branch was established, in 
Tianjin with Ren Tianmu i i  ^  as chairman. It seems that Ren’s group 
developed a relatively friendly co-operation with the Qing Bang in that area 
and within a short time the group had expanded into six groups.113
1111 Zhou Yumin, Shao Yong, p.575.
111 Yen-Ying Lu, “Can China Become Fascist?”, The China Critic, 14 June 1934, vol.2, 
no.24, pp.560- 564. Press dispatches cited in the article are from Peking and Tientsin Times, 7 
August 1933, “Blue Clothes Society”, from the Hankow Herald, 16 August 1933, “Blue Shirts 
Said at Work in Canton”, and from the Hankow Herald, 10 September 1933. “Cantonese 
Obstructionists.”
112 “Chinese Fascists Come into the Open”, Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury 17 November 
1933.
113 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru shiryo (Materials on the Blueshirt Society), p. 17.
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Chiang Kaishek also expanded the Blueshirts’ activities in various 
provinces.114 This expansion was viewed, with considerable gravity by 
General Liu Wenhui of the semi-independent Sichuan province. Meanwhile, 
in Shandong, as a direct reaction to this, a Guomindang member, Zhang 
Weizong, was assassinated. Members of the Blueshirts had stealthily 
penetrated into the semi-independent provinces. The policy in Shandong, 
Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shansi, Charhar and other provinces was to form 
so-called “Guomindang Affairs Re-Organisation Committees.” Blueshirts 
units were also established in order to carry out this policy. The new local 
members of the Blueshirts were sent to the various organisations in order to 
attempt to secure controlling power. The assassination of Zhang Weizong 
resulted from the local people discovering his real objective and uncovering 
the Blueshirts’ policy. In Shanxi province the units of General Yan Xishan 
were also opposed to the Blueshirts and drove away the members directing 
the Committee. In Sichuan, Wu Guoguang, a prominent Blueshirts leader, 
established a general Headquarters which was opposed by various Cliques, 
among which may have been the Qing Bang.115
Reliable information reveals that Chiang Kaishek dispatched members 
of the Blueshirts to Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai and other districts to 
keep watch on the attitude of Chinese officials and civilians towards Japan. 
The Commissioner of the Shanghai Bureau of Public Safety was usually 
appointed and recommended by Mayor Wu Dezhen. However, the practice 
was abolished following the appointment of Cai Jingjun, a follower of 
Chiang Kaishek, as commissioner of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau. 
Cai’s appointment was made by the National government without the
114 NA, D 4685, Expansion o f  the Organisation o f the Blue Shirt Society, January 1935. A 
translation of the Kiangnan Tsen Pao (Jiangnan Chenbao), a Japanese newspaper in the 
Chinese language.
1 NA, D 4685, January 1935. Translation from the (Jiangnan chenbao).
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recommendation of Mayor Wu Dezhen. General Cai was a prominent 
member of the Blueshirts. Similarly, Guan Jingling, a member of the 
Blueshirts, was appointed as Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Safety in 
Beijing.116
Political differences between the Qing Bang and the Blueshirts also 
arose around the question of dictatorship. Both the Blueshirts and their 
erstwhile allies the C.C Clique were enthusiastic supporters of the notion of a 
dictatorship, while the Qing Bang remained opposed to it. They feared that a 
dictatorship would be strong enough to dominate or crush them, and they 
were quite satisfied with the status quo. Pursuant to their political objectives, 
the C.C Clique and the Blueshirts began to look around for new allies, and in 
August 1936, they held a meeting in Shanghai with the leaders of the 
Hongmen Triad, which was part of the Hong Bang (Red Gang). This 
appears to have been an exploratory meeting to see whether the Hong Bang 
could be developed as a counterbalance to the ubiquitous influence of the 
Qing Bang, but there is no record of this meeting having been followed 
up.11?
5.3 Conclusions
The relationship between the Blueshirts and the Qing Bang cannot be 
considered outside the already existing network of relations between the 
Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek and the Qing Bang. This relationship had been 
established by Sun Yatsen. Linking new political organisations with 
established Bang networks was one of the ways in which Sun sought to 
anchor reforms securely in the realities of everyday Chinese life.
116 NA, D 4685, 19 March 1935. Translation from the (Jiangnan chenbao).
117TB, 7556, p.34.
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The co-operation of the Qing Bang with government authorities was 
not one restricted to the Guomindang. The relationship that existed in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s between the Qing Bang and the French 
Concession authorities in Shanghai is well-known. Although not as obvious 
as the community of interests that existed between the French and the Qing 
Bang, it is likely that the other foreign administrations may also used the 
Qing Bang. Despite the aversion of the Qing Bang leaders to the Japanese, 
there also existed a form of co-operation between them, especially in the 
provinces after 1937 during the war of resistance. This same thing can be 
said of the co-operation between the Qing Bang and the CCP.
During the 1920s Chiang Kaishek depended heavily on Qing Bang 
support in order to secure his power base in the lower Yangtze valley, and 
this dependence was at once necessary and irksome to him. Chiang Kaishek 
may have been aware that continuous co-operation with the Qing Bang, 
rooted in Chinese culture, would become a bothersome factor for the 
modernisation programme he envisaged.
By the early 1930s Chiang was secure enough to launch the Blueshirts 
as a political force, intending that they would be the means of extending and 
deepening his authority, and of establishing the kind of classless state- 
capitalist society which he envisioned.
The purpose of infiltrating was to subdue labour both politically and 
economically. There is no doubt that in the political sphere labour was 
subdued. Indeed, certain similarities exist between the policies of Chiang 
Kaishek and those of Mussolini. Yet so-called “yellow unionism”, as it 
developed in China, bore little resemblance to Fascist unionism as 
established in Italy. The difference is worth noting. Fascist unionism was 
both bureaucratic and dynamic. A conscious effort was made to educate, 
indoctrinate and orient labour to play a part in the new order of Fascism. 
Individual workers were constantly encouraged to become leaders of Fascist
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unions and a place was made for such leaders in the party hierarchy. Through 
these leaders the working class was directly linked to the State. Instead of 
being de-politicised, the workers were politicised in a very carefully 
controlled manner and thus the Party had the elements of a mass base in the 
factories. In contrast to this Chiang’s solution was bureaucratic with nothing 
dynamic about it. Yellow unionism was controlled and administered with a 
minimum of labour participation. The leaders came from outside the ranks of 
labour- a situation unthinkable in Italy. It is also unthinkable that Mussolini 
would have permitted himself to share the control of the workers with a 
Qing Bang.118
For around two years, the Blueshirts worked relatively easily within 
the framework of existing Party-Qing Bang relations, but by 1934 it had 
become clear that their purpose was not to coexist with the Qing Bang, but to 
absorb it. The Qing Bang, commanded by Du Yuesheng, was strongly anti- 
Japanese, whereas the Blueshirts, especially after 1934, were fully committed 
to Chiang Kaishek and his appeasement policy.
In this sense, the Blueshirts may be considered the “Bang of the 
Party.” They were supposed to defeat and subsume existing Bangs, secret 
societies, labour unions, cartels and smuggling rings within a single, party- 
directed organisation. Controlling Communists and labour organisations was 
of paramount concern to the Blueshirts. They would thus monopolise all 
sources of black-market income and take control over all forms of social 
organisation. They were to replace the feudal cross-class Bang organisations 
with the modem cross-class Fascist organisations.
Had the Guomindang's authority not disintegrated in Shanghai in 
1937, it is possible that the Blueshirts might have achieved these goals at 
least in part. However, after only six years in existence, they were formally
118 Gourlay, pp. 128-129. That Mussolini took harsh measures against the mafia is described 
by Duggan, pp.95-120.
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closed down, and the Bang were able to reassert themselves during the days 
of chaos in which the Japanese took control of the Shanghai area and great 
parts of China. The Blueshirts were eventually the losers in their dispute with 
the Qing Bang.
277
Chapter Six
Chapter Six
The Metamorphosis of the Blueshirts into the Youth Corps
The Blueshirts existed for only six and a half years, from March 1932 to June 
1938. They were summarily disbanded when the Extraordinary Congress of 
the Guomindang, held at Wuchang in March 1938, ordered the abolition of 
all "small" intra-party organisations. This meant, at least implicitly, the end of 
the Blueshirts as a separate organisation. This was, however, never made 
explicit. At this congress Chiang Kaishek proposed the foundation of the 
Sanminzhuyi qingniantuan (Three Principles of the People’s
Youth Corps), envisioning it as subsuming all the competing youth factions 
within the Guomindang.
This Chapter examines the reasons why the Guomindang and Chiang 
Kaishek needed an all co-ordinating youth organisation at that particular 
time, and the relationship that existed between the establishment of this youth 
organisation and the dissolution of the Blueshirts. As there was not one sole 
reason for the disbandment of the Blueshirts, their dissolution may be related 
to other events: such as the Xi’an Incident, the United Front with the CCP, 
and the huge and frequent student demonstrations.
This Chapter attempts to unravel the mystery surrounding the sudden 
disappearance of the Blueshirts, and proposes that this probably occurred due 
to its complete integration within other groups. The reorganisation of the 
Blueshirts followed the Xi’an Incident at the end of 1936, which led the 
Guomindang to form a United Front with the CCP in 1937, shortly before the 
Japanese launched the war against China. It was almost certainly pressure 
from the CCP which then forced Chiang to consider the dissolution of the 
Blueshirts.
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This Chapter also discusses the reasons for the formation of the 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, formally inaugurated in July 1938 to succeed the 
Blueshirts. It considers to what extent the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps 
resembled the German Hitler Youth, as German documents reveal that the 
demand for material about the Hitler Youth by Guomindang leaders 
increased unmistakably after the proposed formation of the Youth Corps. 
Lastly, it discusses whether or not the disappearance of the Blueshirts meant 
the end of Chinese Fascism, or whether the ideology lived on in new 
organisations.
6.1 Apparent Disbandment of the Blueshirts
By 1938 the disbandment of the Blueshirts was almost predictable. For 
upwards of four years Chiang Kaishek had worked tirelessly to overcome 
factional conflicts within the Blueshirt organisation and other Guomindang 
factions. However, these were, if anything, growing worse.
The optimism which had suffused the party after the success of the 
Northern Expedition soon evaporated, and the bitter struggles with the 
Communists and the Japanese opened up one rift after another in the 
makeshift coalitions of interests which held the Guomindang and its internal 
organisations together. Formed in part to take the Guomindang beyond these 
constant squabbles, the Blueshirts had ended up being not the solution, but 
part of the problem. Ultimately, these disputes, particularly those with the 
C.C.Clique, made the Blueshirts more trouble than they were worth to 
Chiang. The Xi’an Incident provided the occasion - or possibly the excuse - 
for beginning their liquidation.
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A. The Internal Struggle
Long before the Xi’an Incident, it was clear that the Blueshirts were 
not meeting Chiang’s original expectations. One of the reasons for this was 
that the endemic factionalism of Guomindang politics had spread into the 
Blueshirt organisation itself. As early as 1934, a leading member of the 
organisation wrote of his concern in a letter to his fellow member Liu 
Jianqun as follows:
Com pared to the tim e when our organisation was initially formed, it has 
lost its power, and we have lost our confidence. We have no more 
dreams and hopes for the future. It is therefore necessary to revive the 
spirit we possessed, in order to revive the nation - unite for the Party and 
the country. Frankly speaking, the reason why the spirit o f  the Lixingshe  
now differs from  the past is because some o f  our leading comrades have 
lost their warm  and true friendship for each other. The leader [Chiang] 
has now gradually ceased to be in sympathy with the organisation. 1
By the mid-1930s China was united, except for the Japanese occupied 
territories, but the Blueshirts' internal problems were never resolved and they 
were involved in increasingly fratricidal conflicts with the C.C. Clique. 
Towards the end of 1936, these struggles had made the Blueshirts largely 
ineffective, and the organisation had almost entirely lost its former ability to 
influence the party, government or army.2 As a consequence, Blueshirt 
members lost much of their enthusiasm and devotion for their organisation. 
In addition, in the struggle for power and authority both in Shanghai and in 
certain rural areas, the Blueshirts clashed frequently with the Qing Bang. In 
these struggles, the Blueshirts were ultimately unable to gain the upper hand.
Furthermore, the Blueshirts’ attempts to control and manipulate the 
important labour unions and student movements had not brought the results
1 Deng Yuanzhong, p.492. The content is actually nearly the same as that given in TB, 2057, 
pp.22-27; Chiang Kaishek’s Instruction in Jiangxi, 1934, during the Blueshirts’ second 
Plenary Meeting.
2 Gan Guoxun, pp.9-10.
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Chiang anticipated. Despite the Blueshirts’ best efforts, the CCP was still 
winning wider and wider support among students, rank-and-file soldiers and 
nationalist youth. All these problems were leading Chiang to the conclusion 
that he needed a new organisation to take in hand the tasks which he had 
originally assigned to the Blueshirts.
B. Chiang Kaishek's Strategy towards Japan 
Before the Xi’an Incident
In their political work, the Communists tried to mobilise the people 
around the slogan Kang Ri J/lB (resisting the Japanese). For its part the 
Guomindang, and especially Chiang himself, always used the weaker term 
Pai Ri j#B (reject the Japanese). The implicit meaning of these two 
expressions is quite different. Wang Jingwei, although a well-known 
supporter of pro-Japanese policy, once expressed himself similarly during his 
speech on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Central 
Government, saying : "My posture to the Japanese is Kang Ri not Pai Ri."3 
Chiang, on the other hand, continued to use the weaker term Pai Ri. 
Therefore, even this slight difference in terminology indicates Chiang's 
placatory approach to Japan.4
In the face of Chiang’s weaker line, the Communists were successfully 
inciting young people with the idea that the Guomindang dared not fight 
Japan. This was an important part of their ability to mobilise and organise 
young people around a programme of radical nationalism. The formation of 
the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was, in large measure, an attempt by the 
Guomindang to recapture the ground lost to the CCP in its mobilisation of
3 Speech Wang Jingwei made on 3 May, Shunbao, 4 May 1937.
4 As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Sun and Chiang had strong Japanese connections, which 
may also in this case explains Chiang's attitude.
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youth. Chiang's apparently weak line against the Japanese was also the 
reason for one of the most remarkable events in modem Chinese history - the 
Xi’an Incident.
C. The Xi’an Incident
On 12 December 1936, Chiang was kidnapped from his temporary 
headquarters about fifteen miles from Xi’an. As soon as the leader was made 
prisoner, Zhang Xueliang5 informed Zhou Enlai of Chiang's capture.
Zhou in turn asked the Kremlin for advice on how to proceed, for many CCP 
members wanted to execute Chiang.
Recent information, however, reveals that actually Zhang Xueliang 
himself had given this instruction to Liu Guiwu f f f iS .6 The dairy and letters 
of Liu Guiwu, which were in the possession of his daughter, brought to light 
that Zhang had ordered Liu to kill Chiang Kaishek on his arrival in Xi’an. 
Zhang had informed Liu that his order was of course top secret, but the 
execution had to be carried out no matter what. Three days later Zhang re­
called his first order to Liu, saying that the situation had changed and 
Chiang’s murder was not longer necessary. Zhang Xueliang explained that 
Chiang was of more value to them alive for Chiang must be persuaded to co­
operate in order to fight against the Japanese.7
5 Bom in Liaoning, vice Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, Navy and Air Forces of 
China and Commander-in-Chief of the North-eastern Frontier Defence. Upon the outbreak of 
the 2nd Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924, he was promoted Commander o f the 1st Fengtian Army 
and rendered exceptional services at the Great Wall.
6 Liu, a military man from North China, was unfortunately killed in action during the Sino- 
Japanese War.
7 Nihon keizai shimbun, 15 August 1995. Liu Guiwu’s daughter used Liu’s diary and letters to 
reveal this information to the Chinese newspaper, Zhongguo funii in August
1995. The Japanese Nihon keizai shimbun in turn took the information from this Chinese 
newspaper.
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The Comintern also regarded Chiang as having a key role in achieving 
Chinese unity against Japan. A message from Moscow [Stalin] was sent 
stating that everything was to subordinate to wining Chiang over to a united 
front.8 Stalin now considered the interests of the CCP of minor importance to 
those of the Comintern. Following consultations with Moscow, three CCP 
representatives came to Xi’an and had several meetings with Chiang during 
his imprisonment.9 On one occasion, Zhou Enlai is said to have alluded to 
the fact that Chiang's son, Jiang(Chiang) Jingguo MMSb, was enjoying good 
treatment while staying in the USSR,10 saying; "it is time to come back to 
China for your son, he has already stayed long enough in Russia [Jiang 
Jingguo had gone to Moscow in 1927], and I will help you to ask Moscow
8 Ishikawa Tadao, Chugoku kyosanto shi kenkyu, (Study o f the Chinese Communist Party), 
Tokyo: Keio tsusin, 1959, p.228. Zhang Guotao, a former CCP member, commented on the 
Xi’an Incident; During the Xi’an Incident Stalin sent a telegram to the CCP, that was discussed 
by top members o f the CCP. Zhang Guotao became in 1938 a Guomindang member. He was in 
1950 interviewed in Hong Kong by Robert C.North. See also Werner Meissner, Philosophy 
and Politics in China; The Controversy over Dialectical Materialism in the 1930s, London: 
Hurst & Co., 1986, pp.37-40.
9 Nakanishi Tsutomu, Nishizato Tatsuo, Chugoku kyosanto minzoku toitsu sensen, (The 
Nation's United Front of the Chinese Communists), Kyoto: Daiga tou, 1946, p.l 15. The three 
representatives were: Zhou Enlai, vice-president o f the Military Council, Ye Jiangying, chief 
of staff of the Eastern Front Red Army, and Jin Pangxian, chairman of the Northwest Branch 
Soviet Government.
10 Nishikawa Takeshi, Shu Enlai no michi (Zhou Enlai’s Way), Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 1976. 
See also, Tong Hollington Kong, Sho Kaisheki (Biography of Chiang Kaishek), translated into 
Japanese, p.557. Chiang's eldest son, Jiang Jingguo, was in Russia during the Xi’an Incident, 
and his second son, Jiang Weiguo, received training by the Nazis in Germany, 1936-38; and, 
William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command A History o f  Communist Military Politics, 
1927-71, London: Macmillan, 1973, p.266. Jiang Jingguo studied at the Military and Political 
College in Leningrad, where his classmates included Fu Zhong, Li De and Xiao Qingguang; 
and also, W.C Kirby, Germany and Republican China, p. 180. The education Chiang urged his 
son, Weiguo, was that o f the German military, Chiang even risked the potential political 
embarrassment of having his son - in a German uniform - accompany the first German troops 
to invade Austria (March 1938) and participate in the occupation o f the Sudetenland. See his 
footnote; Interview General Jiang Weiguo, Taibei, 22 March, 1978.
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for his safe return.” This hint may have been a factor in persuading Chiang to 
reach an accommodation with the Communists.11
The outcome of these talks appeared to be a very good bargain for the 
CCP and the material results of co-operation were not long in appearing. In 
January 1937, Chiang received a request to support the CCP's army 
financially. Chiang responded promising 200,000 or 300,000 yuan every 
month to be spent on military purposes.12 In February the same year, Chiang 
stated that "the most important part of the unification is fulfilled not through 
formalities, but through the will and spirit to co-operate, and to practice in 
modesty the Sanminzhuyi, and not only to use it as ‘Red’ propaganda.” The 
Communists declared in their turn that Sun Yatsen's Sanminzhuyi was the 
ideology that China needed in order to cope with Japanese Imperialism,13 
and proclaimed resistance to the end beside the Central Government.14
By far the greatest concession which the CCP managed to secure from 
Chiang at Xi’an concerned the Blueshirts. They had developed primarily as 
an anti-Communist force. It is no surprise therefore that one of the conditions
11 Qi Gaoru, Jiang Jingguo d ey i sheng (Chiang Chingkuo's Lifetime), Taibei: Zhuanji wenxue 
zazhishe, 1991, pp.7-23. Jiang Jingguo left Moscow on 25 March 1937 and came back to 
China. He became in April 1937 a regular Guomindang member, then 28 years old. In 1938 he 
was appointed Head o f the Youth Corps' Central Office. See also Parks M.Coble, Facing 
Japan, p.354. Zhang Guotao, in his memoirs, states that a reconciliation between the 
Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party would clear the way for a reunion between father 
and son, and Jiang Jingguo was permitted to leave Russia in March 1937.
12 Yang Shubiao, p.313. In January 1937, Chiang received a telephone call from Ku Jiutong 
on behalf o f Zhou Enlai.
13 Ch'ien Chungjui [Qian Junrui] et al.(ed.), Jiuwang shouce (Handbook of the Duties of the 
Citizen in the War of Resistance), Shenghuo shudian faxing, 1939. Actually for the first time 
edited 27 November 1937. The same information is to be found in the Dagongbao o f 23 
September 1937.
14 From August 1937, participation in the Government was somewhat widened by the 
formation o f the Supreme National Defence Council, with a 25-member Advisory Council 
composed o f representatives from a number of political groups, including the CCP. In July
1938, this body was expanded and its name was changed to the People's Political Council 
(PPC).
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laid down by the CCP negotiators at Xi’an for a United Front was the 
disbandment of the Blueshirts. The precise terms agreed regarding the 
disbandment were never made public, but implicit in these terms was the 
condition that the anti-Communist activities by the Blueshirts should be 
halted.
On 26 December 1936, the day following his release, Chiang 
broadcast a statement from Luoyang. He announced that although he had 
refused to sign the terms proposed, he would accept those which were 
beneficial for China and would carry out his promise. He professed “fidelity 
to promises, determination in deeds.” A commentary on this declaration, 
made by Mao Zedong contained the following:
O f Chiang's statement, one section is worthy o f  my admiration: Fidelity 
in promises, determination in d eed s...W e  regard his order for 
withdrawal o f  his troops as evidence o f  his ability to observe with 
fidelity the following terms he prom ised to fulfil. 16
The results were immediately noticeable. In January 1937 the 
Government suspended its Communist-suppression campaign,16 and the 
Blueshirts’ activities were thereafter to concentrate primarily on 'pro- 
Japanese Chinese elements.' As remarked by Edgar Snow: “The Special 
gendarmes of the Blueshirts continued their espionage on Communists, but 
kidnapping and torture ceased.”17 On 21 February 1937, the C.E.C. of the 
Guomindang adopted a resolution entitled “Eradication of the Red Menace”
16 Mao Tsetung, “Fidelity to promises”, China Today, vol.3, nr. 6, March 1937, pp.69-70, 
written comment of Mao Zedong on a broadcast by Chiang. In addition the well-known six 
CCP demands were published in the newspaper.
16 W.F.Elkins, “Fascism in China: The Blue Shirts Society 1932-37”, Science and Society, 
Vol.XXXIII, 1969, p.433. See also Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, The United Front 
in Chinese Communist History, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p.89; On 6 January, 
1937, the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Xi’an was quietly abolished.
17 Snow, Red Star Over China, p.398.
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(Genchu hongse kongbu fll ® ffc), which despite its militant title, was
in fact an offer to give the Communists a chance to make “a new start.”18
D. The Challenge to the Blueshirts
Several aspects of the Xi’an Incident had important consequences for 
the Blueshirts. In the first place, it created the first opportunity for the hatred 
which many Chinese felt for them to be expressed openly. These emotions 
were also noticed by W.F. Elkins, who writes "for the first time in China 
since the period of 1924-27, people were free to think as they pleased, and 
talk as they pleased."19
Prior to the Xi’an Incident there had been a substantial Blueshirt 
presence in the city. This was because a few months earlier some 1,500 of the 
Third Gendarmes had arrived in the city. This was a so-called special service 
regiment of the Blueshirts, commanded by Chiang's nephew, General Jiang 
Xiaoxian who was credited with the abduction, imprisonment, and
killing of hundreds of radicals.20 They had established espionage cells 
throughout Shaanxi province, had undertaken suppression of the popular 
anti-Japanese movement which had made great headway, and had begun to 
arrest and kidnap alleged Communist students, political workers and soldiers.
Revenge was wreaked during the Xi’an Incident when Blueshirt 
leaders in Xi’an were either shot dead or put under military detention.21 One
18 Furuya, p.525.
19 Elkins, p.433.
20 R.A.Howell, “Sian Points the Way”, in China Today, vol.3, nr.6, March 1937, pp.72-77. 
See also Snow, p.378.
21 Deng Yuanzhong, pp.570-571.
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of the first officers captured was Jiang Xiaoxian. When the Northern 
revolutionary army realised who he was, they shot him dead on the spot.22
Secondly, the Blueshirts felt partly responsible for the unexpected turn 
of events, as they had agents deployed at the Headquarters of Zhang 
Xueliang.23 If their much-vaunted secret services had been better-informed, 
it is possible that they could have prevented the kidnapping of Chiang 
Kaishek. Just a few days before Chiang's kidnapping the Blueshirts, in co­
operation with the Xi’an police, drew up a list of people suspected of pro- 
Communist sympathies, and arrested them.24 Since these arrests did nothing 
to deter or prevent Chiang’s capture, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the Blueshirts were arresting the wrong people. From the point of view of an 
organisation devoted to the personal safety of their leader, the Xi’an Incident 
must have represented an unmitigated disaster.
Thirdly, the actions of the Blueshirts during the Xi’an crisis may well 
have been important factors contributing to their demise soon afterwards. 
They consistently urged the use of military force against Chiang's kidnappers 
while he was being held. Far from trying to negotiate his leader's release, 
Deng Wenyi, the Blueshirts' secretary-general at that time, was worried that 
Zhang Xueliang would take Chiang away by aeroplane to Xinjiang or 
possibly to the Soviet Union. Therefore, on his own initiative, Deng 
instructed the Central Army commanders in North China to prepare their 
troops to surround and attack Xi’an.25
22 J.M. Bertram, Crisis in China, The Story o f  the Sian Mutiny, London: Macmillan, p. 133; see 
also T.A.Bisson, Japan in China, London: Macmillan, 1938, p. 167.
23 Deng Yuanzhong, pp.570-571; see also Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism in China, 1924- 
1949, p.74.
24 Nakanishi, Nishizato, p. 115.
25 Deng Yuanzhong, pp.568-590.
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N anking [Nanjing] rushed troops to Tungkwan [Dongguan]; and a 
num ber o f towns were bombed. A fleet o f  Government planes roared 
low over the roofs o f  Sian [X i’an], and the sound o f  their engines cannot 
have been very reassuring to Chang's [Zhang] prisoner (Chiang). After 
those hours on the hill side above Lintung [Lindong], some o f  Chiang's 
worst m oments m ust have been in captivity, when he - like the rest o f  
Sian - waited for the first air-raid.26
At the same time, the pro-Japanese faction led by He Yingqin, the 
Guomindang Minister of War, also planned to invoke a military solution 
against Xi’an. It was revealed that He Yingqin, Wang Jingwei and 
H.H.Kong, while anticipating the events, even tried to set up an anti- 
Communist and pro-Japanese faction.27 Although this ultimately came to 
nothing, it must have been a salutary experience for Chiang to realise just 
how many of his associates wanted him out of the way.
Under such extreme circumstances one might have expected Chiang to 
rely ever more heavily on his most trusted cohorts, the Blueshirts. However, 
Chiang was left with a most unfavourable impression of the wisdom of the 
Blueshirts1 leadership and their effectiveness in action. He held the 
Blueshirts, and to a lesser extent the C.C.Clique, responsible for his capture, 
for his not being informed about what was going on in Nanjing, and for their
26 Bertram, p. 151; see also, Lucien Bianco, Origins o f  the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 147. Nanjing Government planes attacked Zhang's 
armies thirty miles from Xi’an; fortunately for Chiang, a snowstorm kept the planes from 
bombing the city where he was being held.
27 Nakanishi, Nishizato, p.l 18. See also, Frederick Spencer, “Sian and National Unity in 
China”, in China Today, February 1937, vol.3, nr.5 ; The pro-Japanese clique in Nanjing, 
consisting of the former Anfu clique, the Zhengxue clique (see China Today December 1936, 
p.28), the Wang Jingwei clique, and He Yingqing, had made good use of Chiang's detention in 
Xi’an to consolidate their influence in Nanjing. However, despite their junior standing in the 
pro-Japanese community, they showed particular energy to instigate civil war and block any 
peaceful settlement o f the X i’an situation. He Yingqing, the present Minister of War in 
Nanjing, established the close relations with Japanese authorities through the conclusion o f the 
He (Yingqing) - Umetsu agreement. Not very popular, particularly in China's Northern 
provinces.
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inability to take measures to stop it. Furthermore, Chiang was of the opinion 
that they should have been more concerned about his safety.28
In the period following his release, Chiang had time to reflect on the 
intense hatred people felt towards the Blueshirts, as well as the 
ineffectiveness in dealing with precisely the kind of situation at which they 
were supposed to excel. Their actions during the crisis had revealed them to 
be more than incompetent - they were overreaching themselves to the extent 
that Chiang no longer felt secure himself.
Chiang therefore lost no time in taking measures against them. He 
assembled the core leaders of the Blueshirts, and discussed with them the 
future tasks of the organisation.29 He ordered them to reorganise the 
Blueshirt movement throughout China, suggesting that it should henceforth 
restrict its activities to the Southwest.30 Here, presumably, it would be safely 
isolated from the main theatres of conflict in the north of the country, and 
would also be well out of the way of the areas in which the CCP was in 
control.
In 1938 Guomindang documents describing the Communists’ 
activities revealed that the middle school teacher Li Tiyuan ^  % had
organised an anti-Lixingshe group.31 When the Guomindang discovered this, 
the activities of Li Tiyuan and his group were cautiously investigated. They 
found that the main activities were restricted to Guizhou province, while their
28 Deng Yuanzhong, p.622.
29 TB, 5540, pp.10-11.
30 It explains possibly once more Chiang's double policy; on the one hand he agrees with the 
Communists to unite and fight against the Japanese, while on the other hand he remains 
suspicious about the CCP, and continues to develop anti-Communist policies.
3 1 SNHA, document nr.726/161/1487, by the Central Members of the Guomindang, 10 
December 1938. Unfortunately no date for the foundation of this anti-Lixingshe group was 
given.
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goal was to sabotage the “Fascist” Lixingshe. The belief of this anti- 
Lixingshe group was apparent: China faced an extremely difficult period, and 
all effort should be made to unite in fighting against Japanese Imperialism. 
There was no room for an authoritative Fascist organisation like the 
Blueshirts. In the end this anti-Lixingshe group became a relatively strong 
organisation, and may have contributed to the decision for the Blueshirts to 
disappear from public view.
E. The Special Case of Dai Li
The changes which Chiang Kaishek set in motion in 1937 had a clear 
direction. The three main functions of the Blueshirts were being split up. The 
anti-Communist struggle was no longer politically expedient, so the 
Blueshirts' work in this area was now redundant. Work on the moral and 
political regeneration of China, which had been carried out under the 
auspices of the New Life Movement, was to be hived off into a new 
organisation, the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps. The only part of the Blueshirts' 
work which was still of value to Chiang was the secret service.
The secret service of Dai Li was kept out of the reforms of 1937. In a 
large measure, this was due to the personal loyalty and extraordinary bravery 
shown by Dai Li during the crisis. He had retained the confidence of Chiang 
by risking his own life to join him at Xi’an and challenge the negotiations.
Dai Li was very depressed about the Xi’an Incident, and blamed 
himself for its occurrence. On 22 December, before he went to Xi’an together 
with Madame Chiang, Song Meiling ^  31 to plead for Chiang's release, 
he gathered his commanders and said: "If my mission fails to bring our 
Master Chiang back safely, I must commit suicide. I hope, nevertheless, that
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everybody will remain dedicated to our revolution."32 When Dai Li arrived 
in Xi’an he observed billboards and banners with the text "Kill Dai Li now." 
He responded to demonstrators he encountered by saying "An ancient 
Chinese proverb is: ‘One can die for his Master’. Now at this moment our 
leader is in danger, therefore I am here to be at his side, and if I was afraid to 
die I would not have come to Xi’an."33 Dai Li was quartered in the basement 
floor of Zhang Xueliang's residence, from where he wrote a letter to Chiang: 
"I came to Xi’an to save my Master's life, but I now will be put to death soon. 
However, in the knowledge that I die for my Master I do not fear death."34 
Finally, on 25 December, he was released together with Chiang and all his 
other followers. The thoughts Dai Li expressed and his attitude in this 
critical situation were based on his Confucian background.
Such loyalty was rare under any circumstances, but in the 
Guomindang it was almost unbelievable. Chiang Kaishek saw in Dai Li a 
follower whom he could not simply demote or ignore, and in his 
reorganisation of the Blueshirts, he was determined to preserve a key place in 
the new structures for his loyal lieutenant.
F. Student Power and Chiang Kaishek's New Stratagem
One of the key considerations in Chiang's reforms of 1937-8 was to 
move away from the kind of vanguard elite organisation, which the 
Blueshirts represented, towards a more mass-based institution which would 
harness popular nationalism. In particular, Chiang wanted to draw on the
32 Gu Seng, Dai Li Jiangjun yu  Kang Ri zhanzheng (Dai Li Chief of National Intelligence and 
the Resistance War against Japan), Taibei: Huaxin chuban, 1975, p.33.
33 Gu Seng, p.33.
34 Gu Seng, p.33.
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enormous power of student nationalism which had been alienated from the 
party by the excesses of the Blueshirts. This nationalism would form an 
important part of his drive to win radical and dedicated new cadres into the 
Guomindang - and away from the Communists. In the 1920s and 30s, the 
student movement in China was part of daily political life, influencing the 
decisions of leaders, playing a significant role in the effort to free China 
from her semi-colonial position and to modernise her social and economic 
organisation.35 Both the Guomindang and the Communists worked to harness 
and direct student nationalism and radicalism into an organised political 
force. In the 1930s, the Communist party proved particularly successful at 
this.36
The Japanese challenge in the 1930s undermined the Guomindang's 
credibility as an effective defender of Chinese nationalist interests, the 
criticism of Chiang and his appeasement policy was almost as sharp as the 
condemnation of Japan. When Chiang arrived in Xi’an on 4 December 1936, 
a crowd of people was waiting for him, not only members of the Communist 
party, but also students and ordinary civilians. In particular, the group of 
young students appealed to Chiang's nationalistic feelings to start fighting 
against the Japanese.
Between 18 September and 9 December 1936, six enormous 
demonstrations marched through the streets of Xi’an. On 9 December, three 
days before Chiang was kidnapped, thousands of students marched from
35 Iwamura Michio, Chugoku gakusei undoshi (The Chinese Student Movement), p. 156 ; Lin 
Yutang, in his article “The History o f Chinese Journalism”, states that in a time of peace 
student power is not appropriate, but a country in war or when a government is corrupt, student 
protests and revolts are quite normal.
36 Van Slyke, pp.66-67. Until the beginning o f 1936, the student movement remained more or 
less fragmented and uncoordinated, but on 30 March 1936, representatives from sixteen cities 
assembled in Shanghai to found the first national student union since the days o f the Northern 
Expedition. Peking and Shanghai emerged as the guiding centres of the movement.
292
Chapter Six
Xi’an towards his suburban headquarters at Lintong IS® to appeal for 
immediate resistance to Japan and an end to the civil war.37
Chiang ignored the demonstrations completely, and even ordered the 
arrest of several students.38 However, if he was not prepared to listen to the 
students before his kidnapping, he was certainly interested in harnessing 
student nationalism after his release. He appreciated that student nationalism 
was for the greater part based on emotions and was thus highly volatile. He 
understood, too, that students' readiness to sacrifice all was only a 
momentary response. He realised that if he could command and discipline 
these nationalist and self-sacrificing instincts, he would have a formidable 
political force at his command.
In 1936, Qiantu, a prominent Blueshirt periodical, published an 
inquiry into the Student Nationalist Movements.39 Its conclusion was that: 
"From now on the only right way for the Student Nationalist Movements is 
founded on three principles, which are the basis for China's salvation. These 
principles are: 1. the effort to study 2. to gain physical strength 3. to maintain 
one's health."
It is conceivable that Chiang and his subordinates when they were 
discussing the formation of a new youth organisation for the Guomindang, 
came up with the name Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, initiated by the Qiantu 
article about the three principles for the Student Movements.
The public - and particularly those elements into which Chiang wanted 
to tap - became aware of his plans at a large demonstration at Zhongshan 
Park in Hankou on 9 February 1938. Nearly 30,000 students had gathered to 
protest against the Japanese invasion. The organisations present included the
37 Israel, pp.170-171; see also Van Slyke, p.74, and Bertram, pp.107-108.
38 Iwamura Michio, p.l 10.
39 Qiantu, vol.4-2,1936, an article about the Student Nationalist Movement.
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Q in g n ia n  x in g d o n g d u i  (the Youth Activity Corps), the H u b e i
x u e s h e n g h u i  (Hubei Student Union Association), the W u h a n
x u e sh e n g h u i  (Wuhan Student Union Association), the G u a n g x i
x u e sh e n g ju n  (Guangxi Student Union Army), the Z h o n g h u a
to n g z iju n  (the Chinese Boy Scouts), and many more.
The demonstration was organised by Peng Wenkai and the
main issue was the summons to China’s youth to unite under the leadership of 
the Guomindang and Chiang Kaishek, and to fight for the revival of China.40 
Chiang's answer to this was the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps. He saw this new 
organisation as filling an important gap. The New Life Movement attempted 
to teach the Chinese people to bring more discipline into their lifestyle 
according to the teachings of Confucius, while the Blueshirts aimed at the 
militarisation of society. What was lacking was a well structured organisation 
to guide and mould Chinese youth according the teachings of Sun Yatsen.
G. Chiang Kaishek's Defiance of Nazi Germany
The dissolution of the Blueshirts and the withdrawal of the German 
advisers by the Nazi Government were almost simultaneous, and was 
followed closely by German recognition of Manchukuo in February 1938. 
During that period, the friendship that existed between China and Germany 
underwent a change, initiated by Nazi interest in Japan.
As discussed in Chapter Two of this study, the German advisers were 
not directly involved in the formation of the Blueshirts, although they were 
influential in orienting the leadership of the Guomindang towards the far 
right in general. Their sudden departure from China in June 1938 may 
nevertheless have been connected with the disbandment of the Blueshirts. In
40 Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao zhangpian (Series o f Chinese Historical Materials), 1937, 
vol.44, p.393.
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the light of the political developments in Germany and Japan, the presence of 
the advisers in China had become increasingly anomalous by 1937 for 
Germany. Japan, which had just signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with 
Germany, was able to point to the absurdity of the Reich advising a Chinese 
government which was not only hostile to Tokyo, but had, after the Xi’an 
Incident, formed a coalition with the CCP. From that time, Japanese pressure 
on the German Government to withdraw its advisers increased.41 Finally, in 
May 1938, von Ribbentrop, Germany's Foreign Minister, ordered the 
immediate withdrawal of all German advisers.42 Trautmann, Germany's 
ambassador to China, who had negotiated until the last moment to postpone 
the withdrawal, left his post at the end of June 193 8,43 while the German 
advisory mission under the leadership of General von Falkenhausen left 
Hankou on 5 July 1938.
It was no coincidence that the Blueshirts were disbanded almost 
simultaneously. Though no concrete evidence proves a causal relation 
between the two events, there are many inferences to suggest it. Chiang was a
41 BA, 09.02, nr.2477, Deutsche Botschaft China, Telegram from Dirksen, German 
ambassador to Japan, to Trautmann, German ambassador to China, 2 November 1937.
Nr. 104/7515/37. According to a message from the Japanese embassy in Berlin, received at the 
Japanese General Staff in Tokyo, "The “Fiihrer and Reichskanzler” has instructed the German 
Minister of War to order the withdrawal of all military advisers from China". However, the 
message was identified by Trautmann as "not authentic."
42 BA, 09.02, nr.2477, nr.3104/3953/38,24 May, 1938. Trautmann, in a last effort to postpone 
the withdrawal, telegraphed to Berlin: "That the advisers be gradually withdrawn." However, 
von Ribbentrop's answer to this request was brutally clear, threatening Trautmann and the 
advisers;" You an old official should know that orders must be obeyed. Withdrawal is due to 
Hitler's anxiety that Japan win an early victory." Von Ribbentrop ordered the advisers in China 
immediately to go to Japan and assist their German colleagues in Japanese service. 
Disobedience would cost them their citizenship, and endanger their families by being put in a 
concentration camp.
43 NCH, Hankow, 26 June 1938, “German Ambassador Highly Praised.” The newspaper 
article mentioned that: “The German Ambassador Dr.Trautmann, upon instructions from 
Berlin, is leaving today. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Chingwei, as well as 
numerous high Chinese officials, appeared at the station to take leave o f the Ambassador.”
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master in playing a double policy. He was alarmed by the change in political 
attitude of the German government to China, and aware of increasing 
Japanese diplomatic pressure on the Germans to withdraw their advisers from 
China. Considered in this context, the disbandment of the organisation has a 
particular importance.
In the first place, it was a placatory gesture to the Japanese, despite the 
war, to suggest that China finally gave in to their wish to disband the anti- 
Japanese Blueshirts. On the other, hand Chiang was strongly displeased by 
the German attitude, and showed this by the dissolution of the Fascist 
Blueshirts, so breaking off the connections that had remained.
Relationships between the two countries still existed, notwithstanding 
the withdrawal of the advisers and the German Ambassador.44 This was 
substantiated by the “restricted”, but still very important, continuation of the 
HAPRO-barter agreement between the Guomindang and HAPRO,45At 
nearly the same time Zhu Jiahua, as President of the Sino-German Cultural 
Association, discussed continuation of "cultural" co-operation in an interview 
on 30 December 1938 with journalists of the “Transocean News Service” and
44 Kirby, p.249. However, after the withdrawal o f the advisory mission a few German advisers 
were still in China. These consisted essentially of five German military advisers who remained 
to serve Chiang despite all threats from von Ribbentrop. These were representatives of Otto 
Wolff and the trading firm Carlowitz, the journalist' Wolf Schenke (see part 2 of this chapter), 
the German charge Dr.Bidder, HAPRO representative Ludwig Werner, and Chiang's 
bodyguard Walter Stennes. See also, NA, RG 226, OSS E 182, Box 11/73, 15 August, 1945. 
Stennes is reported to have come to China during the 1930s after having been forced to leave 
Germany by Hermann Goring. Some time after coming to China Stennes made peace with the 
Nazi regime and during the war acted as an agent for Nazi intelligent organisations in China. 
Stennes was Chiang's bodyguard from the summer o f 1934 to the summer o f 1940. In 1941 he 
lived in Shanghai in the Park Hotel (Headquarters of all Nazi activities there). After the war 
Stennes was caretaker o f Chiang’s house at nr 7 Rue Francis Gamier at Shanghai.
4 5 Zhu Jiahua dang’an (Institute of Modem History Academy Sinica), in Taibei, Revision of 
Barter Agreement discussed on 4 October 1938, between the National Government o f China, 
represented by Dr.H.H.Kung, Minister o f Finance and HAPRO (Handels Gesellschaft fur 
Industrielle Produkte), under instructions of the German Ministry o f Economics, represented 
by Dr.H.H.Woidt. A report of thirty pages, containing details about arms and ammunition 
deliveries by HAPRO, and metal ores and fats and vegetable oils by China. Secretary during 
the negotiations was L.T.Chen of the Central Bank of China.
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“Deutsche Nachrichten Btiro”, stressing the importance of this co-operation 
to the advantage of both China and Germany.46
In order to determine whether the dissolution of the Blueshirts meant 
the end of Chinese Fascism, it should be remembered that Chinese Fascism 
was idiosyncratic in nature. Although it was also inspired by European 
Fascism, it largely resembled Japanese Fascism, but had distinct Chinese 
interpretations. The conclusion can be drawn that Chinese Fascism continued 
to exist, albeit in a more modest form than before. The Sanminzhuyi Youth 
Corps may in some way be interpreted as the outward manifestation of 
Chinese Fascism.
6.2 The Creation of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps
The reasons for the establishment of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps may also 
help to explain why the Blueshirts were disbanded.
A. The Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps and the Hitler Youth
In considering models for its youth movement the Guomindang 
seriously examined movements in other countries, for instance the French 
Physical Culture Youth (Culture Physique de Jeunesse de France) and the 
British Boy Scouts. More political examples, such as the Komsomol, the 
Italian Fascist Youth and, most importantly, the Hitler Youth, were also 
considered.47 The Blueshirts published an article in Qiantu concerning the 
detailed investigation of the Italian Youth Corps, the Balilla E M fi.48 This
46 Zhu Jiahua on Sino-German Cultural Co-operation. Chongqing, 30 December 1938.
47 TB, 5011, Kokuminto no seinen undo to sanminshugi seinendan (Guomindang's Youth 
Movement and the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps).
48 Qiantu, vol.3-2, 1935. See also, Cassels, Fascist Italy, pp.66-67. The Italian Fascist Youth 
Corps included, except the Balilla, youth organisations for boys of fourteen to eighteen years
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youth corps was for boys of eight to fourteen years of age, and was set up by 
the Department of Education with Mussolini as its President. The goal of the 
Italian Youth movements was to improve young people's spirit and 
efficiency, and to teach them organisational methods.
Whatever other models it may have drawn upon, general historical 
opinion has been that the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps followed Fascist 
principles related to the Hitler Youth.49 Phillipe Jaffe, in his commentary on 
Chiang's book China's Destiny,50 certainly noticed the similarity, writing: 
"Another important development during this period was the establishment of 
the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, which Chiang praised so highly. This 
organisation, bearing a marked resemblance to the Hitler Youth, is the 
principal means by which the Guomindang hierarchy seeks to impose its 
doctrines and its control on the youth of China."51
To what extent the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps actually resembled the 
Hitler Youth is still a matter of debate. After the 1938 Extraordinary 
Congress, Guomindang representatives started to approach German officials 
with requests to provide information regarding the organisation and structure
old, named the Avantguardisti, and for those between eighteen and twenty-one year, called the 
Giovani Fascisti.
49 Kirby, pp. 177-178. See his footnote: The opinion that the San Min Chu I  Youth Corps had 
Fascist elements was shared by T. White and A.Jacoby, Thunder out o f  China, and by the
German Ambassador to China, Trautmann, Nachlass Trautmann, DZA, B1.243, cited in 
Drechsler, 40-41. "The corps was a good example of Chiang's synthetic approach, of reforming 
the national formula by extortion, education, and control."
59 Some periodicals and books compare Chiang Kaishek's China's Destiny with Hitler's Mein 
Kampf stressing the Fascist relationship between the two countries and the fact that both 
leaders were dictators. However, this comparison is irrelevant as the books were written from 
different viewpoints and for different reasons. See also, NA, SIF, 226, 13W3,3/34/A, Entry 
182, Box 51, 263, YKB.3769, Interview with Chen Lifu, 6 March, 1946. In this interview Chen 
Lifu points out that: "The Nationalism of the Kuomintang has not been the same as that of 
Hitler." He states that "Our Nationalism merely seeks equality between our own nation and all 
others among all the various ethnic groups within our nation.”
51 Chiang Kaishek, p.302.
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of the Hitler Youth and the N.S.D.A.P. For instance, Lautenschlager, a 
German diplomat in China, was asked by the Chinese officials to supply 
materials. In connection with this, he wrote to the Foreign Office in Berlin on 
16 May 1938:
The newly appointed General Secretary o f  the party, form er M inister o f 
Transport Chu Chiahua [Zhu Jiahua]52 ? educated in Germany, has 
contacted me in regard to the plans to change the Kuom intang 
[Guomindang] to the model o f  the N.S.D.A.P. Furthermore, another 
German-educated representative o f  the Kuomintang, Dr. Chang Liang- 
jen  [Zhang Liangren], former chairm an o f  the German-Chinese Culture 
Association, visited me with the same request.53
Concerning the formation of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps 
Lautenschlager commented:
To conclude with, in com bination with the planned reorganisation o f  the 
Kuom intang to the model o f the N.S.D.A.P. a Chinese youth movem ent 
is in formation. Under consideration at the m oment is organising this 
m ovem ent under the guidance o f  two German-speaking generals Hsu 
Pei-ken [Xu Beigen] and Kwei [Gui Yongqing] on the model o f  the 
Hitler Youth. I had exchanged views with both generals, who initially 
contacted me. I advised them  to discuss the m atter with W olf 
Schenke, 5 4 who was active in the RJF (Reichs Jugend Fuhrung), and is
52 Zhu Jiahua studied geology in Berlin, and was involved in engaging Max Bauer to come to 
China. His record of service in the Guomindang leadership was impressive - Zhu Jiahua had 
been Minister of Education (1932), Minister of Communications (1932-35). Served as 
Governor o f Zhejiang province after 1935, and was intermediary during the negotiations 
Chiang had with General von Seeckt. Although General Chen Cheng formally held the post of 
Secretary General of the Youth Corps, he was too busy, therefore Zhu Jiahua served as acting 
Secretary General from 1939-40, and became Head of the Organisation Department of the 
Guomindang between 1939-44.
53 BA, 09.02, nr.2286, Reorganisation o f  the Kuomintang to the model o f  the N.S.D.A.P: 
establishment o f  a Chinese Youth movement to the example o f  the Hitler Youth. Message to the 
Foreign Office in Berlin, by diplomat Lautenschlager (it mentioned that the German 
Ambassador was informed), Hankou, 16 May 1938, Deutsche Botschaft nr.371, Aktz. 
1517/3773/38. Lautenschlager, in his capacity as 'Ortsgruppenleiter' of Foreign organisation of 
the N.S.D.A.P. in Nanking, transmitted the message also to the country group leaders of the 
N.S.D.A.P. in Shanghai.
54 NA, RG 226 OSS E l82, Box 11/73, 15th August, 1945. Wolf Schenke was officially known 
as the correspondent for the Volkische Beobachter. He was an assistant to F.H.GIimpf, and a 
leader of the Hitler Youth. Schenke, Glimpf and K.Leverentz all worked under the direction of 
Major R.Weise, head of the Tokyo Office of DNB (Deutsche National Bund). In 1941,
Schenke was active in Shanghai as an agent of the Gestapo.
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now working as correspondent o f  the Volkische Beobachter in Hankow 
[Hankou].55
Another German despatch reports the establishment of the 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps:56 On 18 June 1938 Chiang Kaishek announced 
the founding of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps. His speech is reminiscent of 
the German National Socialist conceptions for the corps. Chiang stated that: 
“The Youth is the guarantee of the Revolution. They represent the New Life 
of the Nation."
Chiang stressed in this speech that the main task of the Youth Corps 
was resistance against the Japanese invasion, the accomplishment of the 
national reconstruction programme, and the continuation and realisation of 
China's national revolution. He emphasised that, in order to accomplish this 
task, the Youth of China should be united and educated in a joint programme. 
Chiang furthermore gave utterance to his fears that China's existence and his 
life-work was being threatened by Japan, and that he wanted to see it 
guaranteed for the future. Most importantly, the ideology Chiang seemed to 
have in mind for the Youth Corps, was reflected by his words: “Our Youth 
will not be allowed to follow the example of Youth organisations of other 
countries, who admit the existence and development of various political 
convictions and movements.”
The Germans appear to have transmitted the requested material, 
including a substantial report translated from German into Chinese,
55 BA, 09.02, nr.2286, Despatch to message nr.371 by the Embassy in Hankow 16th May,
1938. Aktz. 1517/3773/38, Reorganisation o f  the Kuomintang to the model o f  the N.S.D.A.P: 
Formation o f  a Chinese youth movement towards the example o f  the Hitler Jugend. N.S.D.A.P. 
foreign organisation, country group China, area group Nanking. Hankow, 12 May 1938.
56 BA, 09.02, nr.2286, Establishment o f  a Youth Corps by Marshall Chiang Kaishek. German 
Embassy, Hankou, 24 June, 1938, Aktz. 1514/4474/38. The message nr.371 o f 16 May 1938 
Aktz. 1517/3773/38, mentions the enclosing of a newspaper article from the Central China 
Post of 23 June 1938. Unfortunately this article was not found in the material supplied by the 
archives.
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containing information about the "Constitution of the German Youth."57 The 
report describes in extension the Stellung der Jugend in Partei und Staat 
(Position of the Youth in the Party and State), and mentions details about the 
structure and organisation of the Hitler Youth. The Guomindang officials had 
also contacted Wolf Schenke, as is confirmed by a letter Schenke sent to a 
government official in Berlin.58
B. One Faith, One Party, One Will
At the Extraordinary Congress of the Guomindang, held at Wuchang 
from 29 March to 1 April 193 8,59 Chiang declared to the opening session:
The form o f  the party persists, but the spirit o f  the party has almost 
completely died out. M ost o f  the m em bers appear dejected, their living 
is soft, they lack enthusiasm, and their work is slothful. They seek ease 
and pleasure, and are struggling for pow er and fighting for their selfish 
interest....How can they be revolutionary party m em bers?^9
The words repeated those of Liu Jianqun in his essay “A Few Ideas for 
the Reform of the Party” written at the end of 1931, when plans were
57 Zhu Jiahua dang’an, The Constitution o f  German Youth. Containing material on German 
Youth Organisations between May 1935 to May 1956. It could unfortunately not be 
determined when and by whom this material was transmitted. As mentioned, Zhu Jiahua was 
acting secretary-general of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps in 1938.
58 BA, 09.02, nr.2286, Letter of Wolf Schenke, Hankow, 1 September 1938, to “Kamerad” 
Stadler, the Head o f Borderregion- and Foreign Office of the RJF (Reich Jugend Fuhrung) in 
Berlin.
59 TB, 5011. See also, K. Furuya, pp.596-598, see also, Omura, “Kokuminto linji daihyo no 
gadaru mono” (The Relationship between the Guomindang's Extraordinary Session and the 
Guomindang), Manchu Critics, April 1938, p. 12, see also, Milton J.T.Shieh, The Kuomintang 
Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969, pp. 178-179. The Extraordinary Congress was held 
in Wuchang. However, Guomindang's Headquarters, after retreat from Nanjing was then in 
Hankou, moreover several other more informal meetings by the Blueshirts were held in 
Wuhan.
60 Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds o f  Destruction, Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937- 
1949, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, pp.89-91, see his footnote, Chu Tzu-shuang, 
Chung-kuo-min-tang li-tz'u ch'iian-kuo tai-piao ta-huiyao-lan (Successive national party 
congresses of the Chinese Kuomintang, an anthology), pp.70-71, 74.
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developed to found the Blueshirts. However, Chiang was now preparing the 
Guomindang for the abolition of all existing parties and the formation of a 
new party of national unity.61 China must have “one faith, one party, and one 
will”, Chiang declared62- an expression strongly reminiscent of Hitler's 
nostrum Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fiihrer (One People, One Empire, One 
Leader).
Before the war with Japan, in 1937, there had already existed plans to 
establish a Youth Corps,63 but it was not until March 1938, when the 
Extraordinary Congress met in Wuchang, that Chiang's proposal to create the 
corps was officially adopted. Chiang proposed the foundation of the 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, which he envisioned as subsuming all the 
competing factions within the Guomindang. As a consequence of this 
decision the abolition of all "small intra-party” organisations, including the 
Blueshirts and the Blue and White Society (Qingbaishe) of the C.C.Clique, 
was announced. Chiang hoped that, within the Youth Corps, all members 
could set aside their differences and work together.
Chiang realised that success in his national resistance and 
reconstruction programme depended in large part upon the willingness of 
Chinese youth to support it. Chiang made his goal clear: he particularly 
wanted to reach and influence China's students. Therefore he placed great
61 Shieh, pp.178-179. See also, K.Furuya, p.597. The People's Political Council (PPC), was 
formed as a result of decision o f the Congress. It was a consultative body representing diverse 
political groups, sometimes referred to as China's wartime Parliament, and was inaugurated on 
17 July 1938. Zhou Enlai was made one of the 17 members of the Presidium of the 
Extraordinary National Congress of the Guomindang in March 1938. He also was appointed 
Vice-Minister o f the Political Training Board o f the National Military Council, a position he 
held until 1940.
62 Kang Ze, “San min zhu yi qing nian tuan cheng li de jing guo” (The Founding o f the 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps), Wen shi zi liao xian pian, vol. 14.40, pp. 199-200. See also, Gan 
Guoxun, p.77.
63 Kang Ze, p. 197.
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emphasis on the role the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps had to play, and on the 
duty of all young Chinese to join that Corps:
A fter the beginning o f  the W ar o f  Resistance, I imm ediately organised 
the San M in Chu I  Youth Corps to serve the urgent needs o f  the youth o f 
the country, to open a new  life for the Kuomintang, and to serve as the
source o f  a new  m otivating force for the Chinese nation Can you not
see that a country o f  four hundred and fifty m illion people in the present 
great age, w ith Sun Yatsen's Three Principles o f  the People as its guiding 
revolutionary doctrine, cannot be subjugated.64
C. The Youth Corps’ Founders
Initially four men were involved in the idea of creating the 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, these men were Chen Lifu, Liu Jianqun, Kang Ze 
and Chiang Kaishek. They had regular meetings to discuss the creation of the 
youth corps, reminiscent of the many informal meetings prior to the 
formation of the Blueshirts.
Their first meeting took place the middle of September 1937 at 
Chiang's country house in Nanjing. On that occasion, Chiang said to his 
audience: "Now the war with Japan has begun, we do not need the relatively 
small secret organisations any more. What we urgently need now is a large 
organisation."65 Chiang realised the necessity of having an organisation that 
every Chinese could join, especially youth, and he instructed Kang Ze to 
draft a plan accordingly.
During the second meeting Chen Lifu had invited people from the 
Blueshirts and the CC.Clique to join the session. At this meeting the 
disbandment of the Blueshirts and the Qingbaishe was announced, and 
Chiang asked Chen Lifu to speak a few words. Chen Lifu partly repeating the 
words Chiang spoke during the first meeting, said:
64 Chiang Kaishek, China's Destiny, pp.216-218.
65 Kang Ze, p. 197.
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In war we need regular armies to face the enemy's regular forces, but we 
also need special forces to conduct guerrilla warfare. The Blueshirts and 
the Blue and W hite Corps (Ching paishe  [Qingbaishe]) are like the 
special forces. W hile regular arm ies do battle, our special forces recruit 
patriotic youths to assist them. Our regular arm ies have now  started to 
fight, and the special forces are no longer needed and m ust be disbanded. 
W hatever our actions we will only follow the orders o f  Chiang. W e have 
no special m ission o f  our own.66
Kang Ze and Liu Jianqun proposed to form a new organisation with 
the name Sanminzhuyi qingnian tuan,67 while Chen Lifu suggested including 
more words, and also mentioning the Guomindang. He proposed the name 
Zhongguo-Guomindang Sanminzhuyi qingnian tuan (China - Goumindang 
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps). Finally the shorter name was agreed upon by all 
present.
Once agreement had been reached among these core leaders, Chiang 
organised a further meeting in January 1938 at Chiang's official residence in 
Hubei. The result of the four men's sessions was laid before the top 
leadership of the party. Not all those present were enthusiastic about the idea, 
but Chiang countered their complaints by declaring that, if necessary, he 
would even change the name of the Guomindang as it was for the sake of 
China's well being.68
66 Chen Lifu, The Storm Clouds over China, The Memoir o f  Chen Lifu, 1900-1993, Stanford: 
Hoover Institute Press, 1994, Sidney Chang, Ramon Myers (eds.), p. 143.
67 Gan Guoxun, p.78. According to this source, Kang Ze suggested actually the name 
Zhongguo qingnian tingshendui meaning “The Chinese Dash Forward
Youth Corps.” While the name Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was suggested by He Zhonghan.
68 Gan Guoxun, pp. 199-200. The reason why Chiang spoke these unconcealed threatening 
words, could be explained by the conditions made by the Communists during and after the 
Xi’an Incident. One o f their demands was that the Guomindang should change its internal 
policy.
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D. Indoctrination of Youth in the Sanminzhuyi
During a speech Chiang delivered on 16 June 1938 to Chinese youth, 
Chiang said the following;
The goals o f  the Youth Corps are indissolubly linked w ith the survival o f 
the Chinese people. The youth are the pioneers o f  our revolution, and the 
N ew  Life for China. At the beginning o f  our revolution we were anti- 
Qing Dynasty, and in 1926 we were anti-W arlord, the m ajority o f  our 
m em bers were youths. Therefore now  I emphasise again the important 
task which has been reserved for youth. 69
In creating the Youth Corps, Chiang hoped to provide a framework 
within which supporters of the revolution and the war of resistance could 
work together in a common effort. Chiang, appointed commander of the 
Youth Corps, stated that its purpose was, in the first place, to achieve success 
in “Resistance and Reconstruction”70 by organising and disciplining Chinese 
youth. Secondly, Chiang aimed to centralise the new revolutionary force of 
the people, and thirdly, to achieve the early realisation of the Sanminzhuyi.71 
General Kang Ze assisted in the training of the Youth Corps members.72
The impact of western ideas and foreign culture on Chinese society 
was increasing, a development not particularly welcomed by the majority of
69 TB, 5011, This information is similar to the one in German source. See also, BA, 09.02, 
nr.2286, Aktz. 1514/4474/38, Establishment o f  a Youth Corps by Marshall Chiang Kaishek. 
German Embassy, Hankou, 24 June 1938. In connection with the message nr.371, 16 May 
1938, Aktz. 1517/3773/38.
70 PRO, FO 371/22082 nr.2763, p.182, British Embassy Shanghai, 26 August 1938, which 
contains a translation o f the "Plan of the Kuomintang for the Campaign o f Resistance and 
National Reconstruction." Article 31 mentioned; Training shall be given to the country's youth 
so as to enable them to serve in the war zones and in rural districts; see also, Milton J.T.Shieh, 
The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969, New York: St. Johns University 
Press, 1970, pp. 187-192.
7  ^ Shieh, p. 176, China's domestic policy is in keeping with her foreign policy. The Highest 
guiding principle being the Three Principles of the People, both China's internal and external 
policies stem there from.
72 Gan Guoxun, p.78. Prior to the dissolution o f the Fuxingshe, Chiang instructed Kang Ze to 
draft a plan which would unite rival factions in the party and those in the Lixingshe.
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the Guomindang leaders. In order to cope with this problem Chiang proposed 
to transform the Sanminzhuyi of Sun Yatsen into something similar to a 
religion, like Buddhism or Christianity. Educating Chinese youth from an 
early age in the Sanminzhuyi was intended to stop foreign influences on the 
Chinese people.
Furthermore, in order to attract youngsters away from Communist 
youth corps, the new organisation's attention had to focus on the rural 
areas.73 At that time, especially in the Northwest Yan’an area, the 
Communists were active in recruiting youngsters often at the very young age 
of ten. Furthermore, the youth was enthusiastic about the spirit of the Red 
Army. After the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was established the CCP, 
questioned the Guomindang's decision to their formation, declaring that it 
should not mean that all China's youth had to join the corps, as had been 
ordered by the Guomindang leadership.74
The Youth Corps was formally inaugurated on 9 July 1938, and its 
headquarters was set up in Wuchang.75 The Corps was initially created for 
youth between the ages of 16-20 years, in order to organise, instruct and train 
them for China's “Resistance and Reconstruction” during the war with Japan, 
based on the teachings of Sun's Three Principles of the People. It was meant 
to be a sort of “nursery” for future Guomindang members.76 Regular 
Guomindang party members had to be at least twenty years old, while the 
Youth Corps gave the Chinese youth the opportunity to apply for
73 TB, 5011, pp.3-4.
74 SNHA, nr.726/161/1487, by the Central Members Organisation of the Guomindang, 10 
December, 1938. It was ordered that also all non-Guomindang youth organisations were 
required to register with the government in May 1938.
75 Gan Guoxun, p.78.
76 TB, 5011, pp.3-4.
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membership from the age of sixteen. Prospective members needed two 
references from Guomindang members. The average period necessary for 
training was one year, while in order to become a Guomindang party member 
one had to be in the Youth Corps for four years. The Extraordinary Congress 
also abolished the system of probationary membership in the Guomindang, 
so that youth could henceforth enrol directly in the corps, and later 
automatically become well-trained Guomindang members.
Chiang's expectations for the new organisation were lofty. He declared 
in 1938, for instance, that “I regard the life or death, the survival or 
destruction, of our nation and the people as hinging entirely upon the 
formation of this Youth Corps.” He continued “the youth are the 
revolutionary vanguard and the new life of the nation. There is no social 
progress or political reform that does not depend upon the stimulus of youth 
as its primary force.”77 Despite the critical situation in China, through the 
war with Japan, spirits were high and people felt united in their resistance 
against the Japanese. In the wake of the establishment of the Youth Corps 
one year later on 12 March 1939 the “National Spirit Mobilisation 
Movement” - Citizen Pact - was launched as part of an effort to control the 
people.
E. The Blueshirts in Disguise
To declare the dissolution of the Blueshirts was easier than to enforce 
the order. The problem Chiang faced was what to do with the remaining 
Blueshirts members, especially with the members outside the elite core group 
of the Blueshirts, who represented a large number of people. Apart from 
anything else, Chiang needed the experience of the core group of “old”
77 TB, 5011, pp. 1-11.
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Blueshirts in the new organisation he was planning, and it may therefore be 
assumed that he actually never intended to discharge them. Chiang instead 
planned for the former Blueshirts to be reorganised into the Youth Corps.78 
The Blueshirts leaders, once they were confronted with their dissolution, met 
at Wuhan to discuss the future, and one of the results was that many former 
Blueshirts now became Youth Corps members.
From the very beginning several top leaders of the Youth Corps from 
the very beginning were former Blueshirts. On the executive committee of 
the Youth Corps, five members were of the Thirteen Princes of the 
Blueshirts.79 Although members of the C.C.Clique also tried to muscle in on 
the new organisation, the most important positions were soon taken by 
former Blueshirts. Chiang himself was President of the Youth Corps, as he 
had been of the Blueshirts, while in name his deputy was General Chen 
Cheng (SIS,80 but in practice Zhu Jiahua was delegated to fulfil this role. The 
names of Dai Li and Huang Renlin 1Nttl* were also mentioned as vice- 
presidents. Leading cadres in the Youth Corps were Chen Lifu, Ye Chuchang 
Huang Jilu gi81 and Liu Jianqun, while Kang Ze became Head of 
the Youth Corps' Organisation Department.
78 Gan Guoxun, p.78.
79 TB, 2196, Ranisha no gainen to sono tokumu kdsaku ni tsuite, pp.37-40.
89 Bom in Qingtian, Zhejiang, 1900, In 1925, as a Whampoa cadet, he was one o f the founders 
of the "Sun Yatsen Study Society." In 1933 became Head of the Officers Training Corps at 
Lushan. Chen Cheng headed various Communist Suppression Campaigns (Jiangxi 
Commander). Was also kept prisoner at Xi’an, at that time he was vice-minister o f War, and 
Commander o f the Communist Suppression Forces in four provinces. In 1938 Chen was 
Director of the Political Department o f the National Military Council. Also in 1938 Chen was 
Wuhan garrison Commander, this was an elite army.
8  ^ He was University President and Government Official, bom in Sichuan, 1899. Graduated 
from Fudan Middle School, Shanghai, 1917. Attended Keio University, Japan, 1917-19, went 
to the United States and studied at Ohio University, 1919-21. Received his MA from 
Columbia University, 1922. Did research work at University of Toronto, Canada, where he 
became editor o f Shenhua ribao, a Guomindang newspaper in Canada 1923. Returned to China 
in 1924 and attended the National Congress of the Guomindang which was presided over by
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The Corps leader in Hankou was Shi Tiankai, and in the Communist 
controlled North of China the Youth Corps branch was represented by Han 
Dai with Li Shouwei ^tF$£82 and Ma Yuanfang ® 7ujj£83 as deputies. 
An important leader, then secretary of the Military Affairs Commission of the 
Guomindang, was Tao Baichuan BUWJll. Chiang chose Tao as he had great 
influence in educational circles in Wuhan.84
The Blueshirts’ control of the Youth Corps' organisation took a few 
years, but operations of the Corps were soon largely headed by cadres 
identified with the former Blueshirts, and during the later years of the 
separate existence of the Youth Corps, their influence dominated.85
There is evidence to show that although the main structure of the 
Blueshirt organisation was dismantled inside China, special intelligence tasks 
were still entrusted to active Blueshirt units both overseas and at home.
Sun Yatsen. Participated in National Political Conference, 1936. Vice-Minister, and Minister 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1937.
82 Li’s nick name was Li Dawei ^ ^ 1 ^ ,  and his real name was Li Shoulian Jf|, therefore 
who ever reported his name may perhaps been mistaken. Government Official, bom in 
Linyuan, Jehol, graduated from Central Political Institute (now University of Political Science) 
Nanjing, engaged in party and political work in various parts of the country, fought for three 
years in the War of Resistance against the Japanese; instructor of Southeast Training Corps; 
member o f Jehol Provincial Government and commissioner of Civil Affairs; organised and 
director of Administrative Personal Training Corps o f Jehol, has written “ The Foundation of 
New Administration.”
83 Government official and educator, bom in Changzhou, Jiangsu, 1901. Graduated from 
Jiangsu Provincial College of Law and Politics. Later he was sent to Japan to study Japanese 
municipal education by Jiangsu Provincial Government. Upon returning to China he became a 
secretary-general of the Ministry o f Information and Overseas Chinese Affairs of the 
Guomindang. In June 1940, was arrested in Shanghai by Japanese and puppet authorities and 
confined in Nanjing for three years and two months.
84 TB, 5011, pp.37-40.47.
85 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp.126-130. The Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps in 1947 merged with the 
Guomindang, and ceased to exist as an independent organisation.
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Branches outside China may have been active under the name Blueshirts as is 
shown by two articles in newspapers from Thailand.86
Evidence that the Blueshirts survived their apparent disbandment 
inside China is given by a Japanese source.87 It is mentioned that the 
Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique comprised about half a million members in 
their heyday. After the Sino-Japanese war, in 1945, these two organisations 
merged and were re-named Guofangbu baomiju I H ^ p ( S e c r e t  
Intelligence Bureau of the Department of National Defence).
It should be assumed, however, that this information concerns the 
secret service of the Blueshirts and the C.C.Clique, and not the entire 
organisations of both. This supposition is confirmed by Chinese material.88 
An article by Shen Zui fctif discloses that the Baomiju was formally founded 
on 1 July 1946, at 22 Matajie in Nanjing. The article explains that the 
Baomiju was a reorganisation of the Junshi weiyuanhui diaocha tongjiju
- Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) of the 
Military Affairs - consequently Dai Li's secret service, founded after Dai Li's 
death. The sudden death of Dai Li confronted Chiang with the need to find a 
successor for his most trusted lieutenant, and finally a member of the Canton 
faction Zheng Jiemin SJ5 ^  ^ 89 became Head of the Bureau. At the 
Extraordinary Congress of the Guomindang in March 1938, the abolition of
86 MAE, Asie- Oceanie, “Un nouvel attentat de L'association des Chemises Bleues” (A new 
murder attempt by the Blueshirts), Thia Mai du 24 Juin, 1939; and Siam N ik o m , 27 Juin,
1939.
87 Tejima Hiroshi, Chugoku rodo undo tsushi, (The History o f the Chinese Labour 
Movement), p.348.
88 Shen Zui, “Guofangbu baomiju naimu”, Wenshi ziliao xuanji (this series is the most 
qualified historical materials in the PRC),vol.6.22, pp.204-217.
89 NA, SIF, RG 226 13W3, 3/34/34/A, Entry 182, Box 51, 263, YKB-4209, Subject: Current 
Political Machinations, source: an official at the Ministry o f Information, date: 31 March, 
1946; Chen Chiehmin may now replace Dai Li.
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all “small” intra-party organisations, including the Blueshirts and the
Qingbaishe (Blue and White Society) of the C.C.Clique, was announced.
However, documents from the National Archives in Washington, describing
the formation of a new Chinese Government in 1946, frequently report the
presence of the C.C.Clique and the Army Clique, particularly the Whampoa
Clique (a synonym for the Blueshirts), and their major influence on the
negotiations.90 The conclusion is altogether justified that the Blueshirts still
existed after the war with Japan. Further, possibly more convincing evidence
is provide by special branch reports of the SMP. In November 1941,
translations of various Chinese newspapers reveal “The Organisation of the
Blue Shirts Society” in Shanghai. These newspaper reports that:
There are eight executive detachments o f  the Blue Shirt Society in 
Shanghai. Each detachment has several squads. A large squad has a 
responsible chief, a  vice-chief and several members undertaking 
intelligence work and comm unications.9 1
6.3 Conclusions
Information, even in Chinese sources, is not always complete. For example, 
The Guomindang 90th Yearbook (Zhongguo Guomindang jiushi nian dashi 
nianbiao +  reports the foundation of the
Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps on 6 April 1938. It also records the establishment 
of the Blueshirts 1 March 1932. Remarkably, the yearbook does not refer to
90 NA, SIF, RG 226 13W3, 3/34/34/A, Entry 182, Box 51,263, 21 March 1946. Subject:
Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, sub-source:
This part of the report is based on newspaper reports as well as on talks with members of the
Guomindang Central Executive Committee, leaders of the Communist Party and Democratic
League and editors of several Chongqing newspapers.
9  ^ NA, SMP special branch, D4685, 29 November 1941, “The Organisation o f Blue Shirt 
Society”, Afternoon translation o f 28 November 1941 of the following newspapers: Central 
Daily News, Guomin Daily News, Bing Bao, New China Daily News, Guobao. It is possible 
that these publications refer to the Blueshirts in Shanghai before the war with Japan in 1937 
began.
311
Chapter Six
their disbandment in 1938. That this information was not catalogued in such 
a prominent work is possibly intentional, knowing that the Blueshirts 
organisation was never actually dissolved.
The disbandment of the Blueshirts cannot be attributed to one solitary 
reason, but was the result of a combination of factors. It was not only the 
disunity within the Blueshirts that caused their dissolution. It was also not 
simply the quarrels between the various Guomindang factions that made the 
Blueshirts disappear. Moreover, it was not solely the discovery that an Anti- 
Lixingshe group had been formed by the Communists to sabotage the 
Blueshirts. All three factors were important reasons for Chiang Kaishek in 
justifying the decision to disband the organisation. The Blueshirts 
unquestionably failed to meet the expectations Chiang had during their 
foundation, and their shortcomings were painfully exposed by the Xi’an 
Incident.
It was, however, also not exclusively the Xi’an Incident that caused 
the break up. The Communists' demand for the Guomindang's anti- 
Communist campaigns to cease could only finally be satisfied a year after the 
Xi’an Incident, when the Blueshirts were formally wound up.
Chiang still needed the Blueshirts, and possibly found the time not yet 
ripe for drastic action. Even after the United Front with the Communists was 
formalised, in July 1937, and the war with Japan had commenced, the 
Blueshirts still survived.
Plans had long existed to create a new youth organisation under the 
guidance of the Guomindang, but these early talks in 1937, did not yet 
include the disbandment of the Blueshirts. The main reasons leading to the 
decision to disband the Blueshirts organisation were the continuation of the 
war which Japan fought against China, and the loss of technical and material 
support from the Nazis in 1938.
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Without the formation of a united front with the CCP after the Xi’an 
Incident, the Japanese would probably not have taken the drastic decision to 
launch a full scale war against China at that particular time, and the history of 
the Blueshirts might have taken a different course.
Once the Japanese had started their attacks, it became increasingly 
clear that they would continue their effort to conquer China by force. 
Additionally, as a consequence of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan 
and Germany, the German advisers were withdrawn from China. The war 
had already cost China a considerable loss in men, material and territory, and 
the Government had to reconsider its position. Chiang realised that China had 
to rely on its own internal strength, and therefore unification was of vital 
importance.
The Blueshirts, and especially its nucleus - the Lixingshe - formed an 
educated and well trained hard core composed mostly of military men, who 
had for the greater part served the interest of Chiang Kaishek rather than the 
interest of China and the Chinese in general. What was needed now, 
especially in the context of the Guomindang's war programme of “Resistance 
and Reconstruction”, was a large predominating organisation centred around 
China's youth, with the Sanminzhuyi as their guiding principles. Within this 
setting there was no room for the Blueshirts.
Although the Blueshirts may have disappeared from public view, in 
practice actually only their name was gone. Chiang had never intended to 
give up the organisation which he had so carefully built. In essence they still 
existed, primarily through integration with the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps, 
the members of which they tried to inspire with their ideals. Moreover, 
Blueshirts secret cells in all probability continued to exist independent from 
the Youth Corps. The disbandment of the Blueshirts was a strictly political 
move typical of Chiang. He wanted to strengthen his personal position with 
the founding of the Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps.
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The Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was at the same time a counter-balance 
organisation against the various Communist Youth organisations. Chiang 
hoped to steal the fire of the Communists who had been very successful at 
recruiting youth. The Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was less overtly anti- 
Communist, which represented Chiang's new found rapprochement with 
Communist inspired Chinese Nationalism.
The Sanminzhuyi Youth Corps was modelled on successful youth 
movements in other countries, most obviously resembling features of the 
Hitler Youth. The Guomindang was impressed by the structure, technical 
skills and efficiency the Hitler Youth organisation possessed. This was 
largely the same reason that interested Chiang in Western Fascist 
organisations and ideology at the time the Blueshirts were founded.
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Chapter Seven 
Re-appraising the Blueshirts as a Fascist Organisation
To investigate reason where things begin;
To study the hidden motive when the m ind firs t stirs.
Chiang Kaishek. 1
At the beginning of the 20th century, China faced an increasing crisis of 
modernity. In this, China was by no means alone, as the experiences of other 
countries as diverse as Japan, Russia, Turkey and Egypt clearly illustrate. In 
each of these countries, long-established social, political and economic 
structures had reached the point where they were no longer viable. The 
paradox that confronted intellectuals and politicians in each of these countries 
was that the very forces that provoked this crisis were the only ones that 
represented any hope of getting out of it - economic transition, land reform, 
industrialisation, popular political representation and cultural transformation. 
All of these forces came under the same general heading of “Westernisation.” 
The challenge facing the leaders of each country was to develop a response to 
Westernisation which would enable their country to steer a way through the 
severe dislocations which threatened its stability. For their part, the leaders of 
the Guomindang sought harmony between Western and Chinese culture.
Between 1890 and 1950 China was socially and politically unsettled. 
Throughout this period the country's leadership tried to build a compromise 
between Chinese tradition and Western technique, which appeared to 
represent the only chance for the survival of a distinctive Chinese nation. On
1 Chiang Tsung-t 'img yen-lun hui-pien [Zongtong yanlun huibian], (An edited collection of 
President Chiang Kaishek), Chiang Tsung-t’ung yen-lun hui-pien pien-chi wei-yuan-hui (ed.), 
24 vols, Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chu [Zhengzhong shuju], 1956.
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one occasion the high official, Zhang Zhidong 51 found the courage to 
write:
“ To know the West without knowing China is to break one's heart.
To know China without knowing the West is to be deaf and dumb.” 2
The means of making this uneasy compromise work throughout the 
earlier part of the 20th century was to accept ideas from the West only as a 
“technique”, leaving the core of Chinese philosophy and world-view intact. 
The strategy was to “adopt the Western body but preserve our Chinese soul.” 
In a sense, this was precisely the strategy followed by Chiang Kaishek when 
he turned to Fascism in the 1930s. While adopting the “technique” of 
Fascism, Chiang Kaishek was actually seeking to reinforce the philosophical 
core of Confucian values which had always underpinned Chinese political 
theory.
The reformer Liang Qichao, without considering that the 
modernisation process in European countries covered a period of about 300 
years, mentioned that in Japan the process of modernisation took just 30 
years. Liang inferred that China should be able to undergo this process of 
modernisation within three years.3 This was a challenging remark and, of 
course, not very realistic, for the process of modernisation in China needed 
time to develop. Furthermore, the method by which Chiang Kaishek sought 
to develop and modernise China in the 1930s, that is by impulse of Fascism, 
proved to be unsuitable for a country with a Confucian background. This idea 
of development concurs with the second phase of “spontaneous activism” 
mentioned by O’Sullivan in his description of Fascism. This development
2 Zhang Zhidong, Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (The Complete Papers o f Zhang Zhidong), 
Beijing, 1937. From his “Quanxue pian” ^  ^  (Exhortation to learning).
3 Takeuchi Hiroyuki, p. 172.
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proved to be a veritable “cult of action” for the Chinese people who had been 
brought up with Confucian values.4
For a parallel, one might consider the process by which Buddhism 
developed in China. Buddhism originally came to China from India in about 
the 1st century A.D. Its entry to China along the trade routes from central 
Asia, initiated a four-century period of gradual assimilation. The Chinese 
developed Buddhism according their own situation and during this period 
integrated Buddhism during this period within their culture and beliefs. This 
process took a long time and the assimilation of Buddhism encountered 
resistance from, for instance, both Confucianism and Taoism, coupled with 
opposition from government.
However, just as in Europe the Fascist movements of the 1930s found 
their basis in the Christian religion, in China and Japan the European 
phenomenon of Fascism was integrated with the traditional values and 
philosophy of Confucianism and the Buddhist religion.
The immense influence that Confucius had exercised over the Chinese 
people for over two thousand years resulted from an acceptance of the 
common stock of beliefs and moulding them into a coherent system of ethics 
and politics. Three points of Confucius’ teachings were paramount: firstly, 
the emphasis which was placed upon the principle of leadership and the force 
of example; secondly, the enormous importance which was attached to filial 
piety; and thirdly, the insistence upon correct behaviour.
These points had inspired generations of Chinese leaders, guiding their 
actions and moulding their characters. The career and achievements of
4 O’Sullivan, pp. 113-114. “It was in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the idea 
arose that a successful activist movement could never rely upon the spontaneous political 
enthusiasm of the masses. It must concentrate, instead upon activating the masses entirely from 
above... The activist style of politics, in a word, now began to acquire the ‘directed* character 
which was later to find its supreme expression in the Fascist ideal of perfect and unquestioning 
submission to the will o f a leader.”
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Chiang Kaishek also, proved that the transforming influence of Confucian 
teachings and the example of great leadership were as vital and operative as 
at any time in the preceding three thousand years of China's history.
The interpretation of traditional virtues served as the philosophical 
basis for the New Life Movement, which was in fact an attempt to renovate 
China's moral life in harmony with traditional principles. The genuine 
objective of the New Life Movement was to counter Communist ideology. In 
the course of the struggle against the Communists, Chiang had realised that it 
was not so much military power as the political temper of the people that held 
the key to the success of his campaigns. However, the New Life Movement 
inspired few Chinese, and within a short space of time lost most of its 
attraction. Chiang expressed that the “new life” was in essence a military life, 
thereby stressing the disciplining, not the participation, of the populace. If 
Chiang had been in a position to incorporate a more overtly nationalistic 
charisma into the movement, than perhaps it could have developed into an 
important factor in organising his regime.
The Guomindang government's failure to deliver promised economic 
and social change meant that, throughout the Nanjing period, it also 
experienced a continuing loss of support. This ranged from mere political 
cynicism and flirtation with Communism on the one hand, to outright 
rebellion in Fujian on the other. In its efforts to restore lost support, and in 
the absence of a concrete social and political programme that was realisable 
in the short term, the Guomindang relied on the population's strong belief in 
an established order founded on a glorious past, and based its claim to 
legitimacy on traditional and conservative grounds. It is in the context of this 
general political climate that the Blueshirts Society must be located.
The Nanjing government was all but terminally weak, and seemed in 
effect to have the choice of enforcing its will by violence on recalcitrant and 
disloyal areas or else watching them drift away from its authority altogether.
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The formation of the Blueshirts represented the peak of the attempt to 
introduce order and control into a demoralisingly chaotic political 
environment. In his desire to find a proven model for radical authoritarian 
transformation of a political system, Chiang and his associates came across 
the Fascist model of other countries, like Japan, Italy and Germany. Fascism 
is a product of Western countries that developed, among other things, in 
reaction to Marxism and to Communism. In its historical context Fascism 
came into being in a direct reaction to Communism after the October 
Revolution in Russia and after World War One, before which Marxism as a 
socialist theory was already in existence.
Ernst Nolte has explained in his definition of Fascism that “without 
Marxism there is no Fascism.”5 Considering this, one may argue that Fascism 
in China during the 1930s had its basis in the same anti-Communist and anti- 
Marxist approach as European Fascism. However, the social and political 
context of China was quite different to that of Europe. The Guomindang 
readily co-operated with the Chinese Communists and with the Comintern 
until 1927. Anti-Communism, if at all present, did not appear to hinder this 
partnership. After 1927 Communism presented a clearer and more immediate 
threat in China than it in fact did in many European countries. Moreover, this 
anti-Communist posture did not come directly from the common people, but 
was initiated and activated from above.
Another important factor was that China lacked a powerful, well 
established and militant working class. The country's social formation was to 
oblige the Communist Party to abandon the orthodox Leninist model for the 
formation of a mass-proletarian party in favour of a party of the mass 
peasantry. It was precisely the same lack of a “mass-society” in the Western
5 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces o f  Fascism; Action Francaise-Italian Fascism-National Socialism, 
pp.20-21. See also Ernst Nolte, “The Problem of Fascism in Recent Scholarship”, in Henry 
A.Tumer Jr.(ed.), Reappraisals o f  Fascism, New York: New Viewpoints, 1975, p.31.
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sense which made it impossible to transplant the Fascist model into China 
intact.
Throughout the Nanjing period, Chiang Kaishek doggedly refused to 
deviate from his insistence on the need firstly to pacify the country, secondly, 
to end the Communist insurgency and, thirdly turn against the Japanese. 
Chiang's policy of appeasement or “first internal pacification, then external 
resistance” (rangwai bixian annei J i  ^  f* j)  met with strong
disapproval throughout China and made it difficult for him to draw fully 
upon Chinese nationalism as an element for political unification. If Chiang 
had been capable of winning over the backing of the student demonstrators, 
the Salvationist supporters, and the politically active common Chinese 
people, he might have been able to strengthen his government and military 
with a lot of competent people. Until the United front with the CCP in 1937, 
Chiang was unable to work seriously towards this. Within the Guomindang, 
Chiang Kaishek’s power was restricted, furthermore also the Guomindang 
did not enjoy an unlimited power within China.6
A belief that the Blueshirts were primarily concerned with the struggle 
against Japan requires an explanation of why Chiang deliberately set up an 
organisation to further an end directly contrary to that of his most cherished 
political belief. Clearly, the formation and activities of the Blueshirts only 
make sense within the context of an explicit and militant anti-Communist 
policy.
Chiang endeavoured to build up a strong coherent national 
government able to unify China, through a right-wing, authoritarian regime
6 Hatano Kanichi, Gendai shina no seiji to jinbutsu, pp.54-55 : Chiang Kaishek’s power was 
limited, for China had twenty-four provinces, o f which only seven provinces (Jiangsu ZLM, 
Zhejiang MJfOl, Anhui Hubei Hunan Hebei Henan were under 
Chiang Kaishek’s control. Guangdong Guangxi JlfM, Fujian$!2i| and Guizhou j(;# | 
were nearly semi-independent provinces, while Shandong i l l  j|C , Shanxil i l M  and Sichuan H9jl| 
were controlled by Warlords.
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that was based on his military power. He was, however, sceptical of the 
recruitment of mass political movements. Consequently, this animosity 
played a significant role to disadvantage throughout his career. He may have 
inherited this scepticism to mass mobilisation from Sun Yatsen, who was 
well known to be indifferent to mass activity during most of his career.7
The Blueshirts were aware that many of the Guomindang's difficulties 
were attributed to its poor record on mass mobilisation and its neglect of 
basic “grass roots activities”, for abandoning the work of mass mobilisation 
meant that the people were left to Communist influence. The Blueshirts 
therefore developed a programme of mass mobilisation, but did not see the 
full advantage of their work.
When Manchuria was handed over to the Japanese without a fight, 
Chiang lost considerable support from important Chinese groups and 
politicians. Clearly, the Blueshirts came into being as a direct result of this 
contention, rather than the threat exercised by the Chinese Communists. The 
Guomindang had been confronted by their resistance activities as early as 
1927. The invasion of Manchuria once more demonstrated how vulnerable 
China was. It induced the idea of forming a well-disciplined and organised 
group as a means, in first instance, of militarising Chinese society. Military 
education from an early age, starting at primary school, was a new 
phenomenon in Chinese society.
What did the Blueshirts mean to the Republican period? It is easy to 
sum up a whole list of ideas, activities and reforms generated by the 
Blueshirts. However, the cornerstone of their policy was political unification, 
and national and territorial integration. More significant and important to the 
Blueshirts was that this was the first time in Guomindang history that a well- 
structured group of well-educated people ranged around one leader,
7 Sow-theng Leong, “Sun Yatsen's International Orientation, The Soviet Phase, 1917-1925”, in 
Sun Yatsen, His International Ideas and International Connections, J.Y.Wong (ed.), p.80.
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supported him and promoted his ideas. Although the Blueshirts did not 
represent the whole Guomindang, their influence was diverse and they were 
supposed to be everywhere, organising, controlling, spying and revising.
The Blueshirts were, above all, devoted to Chiang. They made it 
possible for him to remain in power. Chiang, for his part, did not want to be 
openly committed to them, although each understood the extent of their 
dependence on the other. This situation actually never changed, not even 
during the war with Japan or afterwards.
Chiang Kaishek was not a demagogue like Mussolini or Hitler, he 
lacked, for instance, their rhetoric gifts. However, having received a military 
education, he had other qualities. It is therefore justifiable to conclude that, 
without the Blueshirts’ support and protection, Chiang would not have 
survived as the leader of the Republican period. The Legislative Yuan in 
Taiwan nowadays has five factional groups. Among these groups is the so- 
called United Caucus Clique (Lianhe zuotanhui pai I f 'q  W), which
is a coalition of the following groups already existing before 1949: graduates 
of the Whampoa Military Academy, members of the Sanminzhuyi Youth 
Corps, members of the Fuxingshe and the followers of Zhu Jiahua.8 This 
United Caucus Clique is the largest and most important faction since the 
1950s in the Legislative Yuan. This indicates that support for Chiang 
Kaishek by groups and people related to the Blueshirts continued after the 
war with Japan, and also after the Guomindang left mainland China.
A Chinese Fascist ideology developed under the influence of Blueshirt 
ideologists. In the beginning, these Blueshirts ideologists emphasised the 
obvious example and propagated Italian Fascism, for until then that was the 
most successful regime. This “trend” of Italian Fascism found followers in
8 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, Political and Social Change in the Republic o f  China, 
Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1989, pp.147-148.
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important Guomindang leaders, for example Liu Wendao, the Chinese 
ambassador and others who had paid visits to Italy, like Zhang Xueliang. 
J.S.Barnes’ book the Universal Aspects o f Fascism, was widely cited in 
China at the time. It states:
Fascists in each country m ust m ake Fascism their own national 
movement, adopting symbols and tactics that conform to the traditions, 
psychology and tastes o f  their ow n land.9
Mussolini praised Fascism as “a purely Italian phenomenon in its 
historical expression, but its doctrinal postulates have a universal 
character.”10 With that description, the Chinese ideologists felt quite 
comfortable with a free interpretation and use of the term “Fascism” in the 
Chinese context.
The economic relationship with Italy, however, never met that with 
Germany. Especially after the rise to power of the Nazis, the focus for 
inspiration about Fascism turned for the larger part to Germany. 
Relationships with Germany were structured foremost through Chinese 
intellectuals dealing with economic development in the Guomindang regime 
and not primarily through militarists. In practice, this meant that China’s 
army and industry were modernised with the assistance of the Germans, 
while hardly any direct influence of this aid was felt in Chinese society at 
large. The ideological influence of Germany remained restricted to quite a 
few Chinese.
Until 1910, many Chinese students studying abroad went to Japan. 
After 1920, this trend changed and the numbers of students studying in 
Europe and the USA increased. This contributed to the fact that Fascist 
movements became well known among Chinese literati. Therefore, the
9 Quoted in Michael R.Godley, “Lessons from an Italian Connection”, In David Pong and 
Edmund S.K.Fung (eds.), p. 101.
10 James S.Bames, The Universal Aspects o f  Fascism, London: 1929, in the “Preface.”
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sizeable number of Chinese officers who studied abroad, many of them in 
Germany and Italy, but also France, may have contributed to European 
Fascist influence in China.
Fascism was fashionable in those days, and in that respect the 
Blueshirts were no exception. The ideology they were propagating, however, 
was alien to the Chinese people. It therefore proved difficult to draw their full 
support. Only a few Chinese could read or write. This was one of the reasons 
why Fascist propaganda failed in large part to influence the people. Also, 
very few people in China in the 1920-30s had an understanding of what 
Fascism actually meant. They often took it to mean a kind of absolute rule or 
dictatorship, which is indeed a preposterous statement, especially as there 
were many absolute rulers in history who were clearly not Fascists. In fact, 
Fascism did not suit China then. China was far behind the rest of the world as 
far as economic development was concerned. There were also no underlying 
forces in China looking for a way to take over the government by means of a 
Fascist regime. China had, as a matter of course, to resist Imperialism. She 
had a strong determination to shake off the yoke of foreign aggression and to 
fight for her economic and political independence.
All in all, the Guomindang's experiment with Fascism was doomed to 
fail, simply because the circumstances did not meet the conditions required 
for Fascism, like they did in Europe or in Japan. The short trend that Fascism 
enjoyed in China illustrates the difficulties in transferring political concepts 
from one nation to another. Chinese Fascism did not contain a form of 
racism, like in the Nazi ideology, and it should be seen more as a kind of 
clannishness. This was a more general phenomenon in China and not one 
restricted to Chinese Fascism. It was more in similarity with the Chinese 
secret societies. The Blueshirts, and the Chinese in general, were xenophobic, 
an emotion which at the time was strongly directed towards the Japanese.
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The precise degree to which there was an influence of traditional secret 
societies on the Blueshirts is difficult to estimate, but there were undoubtedly 
strong similarities between the two phenomena. The analogy is determined 
from the secrecy that surrounded the establishment of the Blueshirts in 1932, 
and the way they operated during the course of their existence. One may cite, 
for instance, The recruitment of members, the organisational features and the 
way the members kept in touch with each other.
Secrecy was a condition to be met in all cases, members of the 
Blueshirts having to swear unconditional loyalty to the society and to be 
prepared to sacrifice their life, liberty and rights in the interest of the society. 
The names Lanyishe U S t t  (Blueshirt Society) and Lixingshe A f f t t  
(Implementation Society) contain within them the term she fct, which was 
one of the traditional generation status-groups within the Qing Bang. A 
particular characteristic of secret societies is that they could disguise 
themselves as open associations, like friendship clubs, or maintain both their 
existence and their functions in strict secrecy. This specific trademark of the 
secret societies was frequently used by the Blueshirts .
Chiang drew on the experiences of various constituencies within the 
Guomindang when founding the Blueshirts. Students who had studied in 
Japan had been influenced by the Japanese Fascist movement. They brought 
to the ideological melting pot ideas flavoured with the typical Japanese 
military and extreme nationalistic thought of the Black Dragon Society. The 
way the Blueshirts seemed to function in Chinese society paralleled the 
methods of the Black Dragon Society in Japan. Following Chiang’s visit to 
Japan in September 1927, Whampoa graduates, many of whom were to 
become Blueshirts, were systematically sent to Japan for further training.
It is moreover conceivable that when the Blueshirts were established, 
by individuals with a military background in Japan, this was done with the 
Japanese Black Dragon organisation very much borne in mind. In a historical
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way there is a strong connection between both the Japanese Black Dragon 
(action) and Black Ocean (knowledge) Societies and the Chinese Blueshirts 
and C.C.Clique. The ideas developed by the Japanese secret societies were to 
some degree used and further perfected by the C.C.Clique and the Blueshirts. 
The concept of duality of thinking has been a procedure in China for 
centuries and the Japanese had borrowed the same idea and modelled it into a 
practical instrument. Hence, in a broader sense, one may say that knowledge 
or theory which was developed in China was adopted by the Japanese and 
moulded into a practical methodology by them. In that respect, the analogy of 
“knowledge and action” continues, China representing “knowledge” and 
Japan “action.”
The Blueshirts, however, did not need to look at the Japanese secret 
societies for traditional features, such as oaths and secrecy, but they sought 
their spirit and military way of organisation, something that was lacking in 
the traditional Chinese secret societies. The connection of the Guomindang 
with the Black Dragon Society goes back to the relationship Sun Yatsen and 
more generally the revolutionaries had with it. It seems that Chiang wanted to 
renew this contact when he visited Toyama Mitsuru, the founder of the Black 
Dragon and a friend of Sun while in Japan.11 Was Chiang in some way 
looking for help from Toyama? Was it a coincidence that Chiang resigned in 
1927 and visited Japan to contact, among others, Toyama, and from 1928 
Whampoa students were sent to study in Japan? Whatever the connection 
may be, the Blueshirts had a strong and unmistakable tie to the Black Dragon 
Society.
The founders of the Blueshirts had borrowed organisational 
characteristics from the Japanese Black Dragon and Black Ocean Societies. 
The Black Dragon Society also functioned as a centre for the creation of legal
11 Wilson, p.47.
327
Chapter Seven
organisations, a function which to some extent paralleled the way the 
Blueshirts operated in Chinese society. While both organisations remained 
ostensibly secret, their memberships strove to find outlets through the 
establishment of legal organisations. Many of the men in key positions in the 
Japanese Government and in the bodies directing Japanese intelligence 
activities were known to have been members of the Black Dragon Society or 
of one of its affiliates. This situation closely mirrors the activities of the 
Blueshirts in China and suggests a parallel between the two organisation
One of the reasons why the Blueshirts failed to implement Fascism in 
China was that the Chinese secret societies and Fascism were actually 
incompatible. The mentality of Chinese secret societies and Fascism did not 
match, for Fascism needed to flourish in the open, not in secret. Fascism 
sought to appeal to the masses in a way that made the people conscious and 
proud of their nationality.
The fact that the Blueshirts may have been organised along the lines of 
a secret society may also be better understood against the background of 
Chiang's policy, especially the remark made to Hu Zhengzhi #1 
president of the Dagongbao in 1933: “When people exactly know the
truth, it is much easier for my political opponents to destroy this 
organisation.”12 Chiang did not want to admit openly his and the Blueshirts' 
advocacy of Fascism. Another reason for these emphatic denials of a 
connection with Chinese Fascist organisations is possibly due to Chiang’s 
fear of losing the considerable financial support of other countries like the 
USA. The Japanese did quite the contrary, by intentionally referring to the 
Lixingshe from the very beginning of their investigations as the Blueshirts. 
Through the connection with a Fascist-minded organisation with the name
12 TB, 2196, Ranisha ni kansuru chosa (An Investigation o f the Blueshirts). Issued by the 
Research Division o f Foreign Ministry, marked "secret” 1936, p.40.
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“Blueshirts," the Japanese tried to harm Chiang’s and the Guomindang’s 
reputation in the eyes of nations friendly to China.
There were differences between Fascism in Japan and China. For 
instance, in Japan, early Fascism was given shape by civilian Fascist 
movements and later taken over by the military. In China, Fascism started 
with the military, i.e. the Blueshirts, who in turn tried to form a Fascist 
society. Clannishness played an important role within the oriental form of 
Fascism, be it in Japan or in China, and this can be traced back to the 
relationship that existed between members of secret societies. Connections 
between people from the same province or city was of significance. Having 
the same relations or knowing the same people was also meaningful. For 
example Chiang Kaishek and the main core of the Blueshirts came from the 
same province (Zhejiang) and many members also had a connection with 
Japan, or had met each other in Japan. The same concept counts for Japan, 
where Uchida and Toyama also came from the same place, Kushu, and were 
both sons of former Han’s 81 lower class Samurai.
A strong point of Japanese Fascism was that it was able to win the 
support of the believers of the state religion Shinto, for among this believers 
were many young soldiers, and they were eager to absorb the Fascist ideas. 
The idea to involve many young soldiers inspired, for at that time Japan had a 
compulsory military service, and the number of soldiers with a religious 
(Buddhist) background increased. In China, which had no compulsory 
military service system or an overt religious presence with the army, the 
situation was different.
The technique used by the nucleus of the Blueshirts - that is, working 
within the Guomindang organisation without being recognised - was to their 
advantage. In this way most of the bureaucracy could be avoided and they 
felt free to act without being limited by procedures.
It is not entirely clear how the Blueshirts managed to finance their
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costly organisation. For the years between 1926 and 1936, a total of 3,758 
days, the Guomindang engaged in thirteen civil war campaigns, and of the 
Guomindang’s total income, 92.22 % was spent on the military budget.13 
However, it is obvious that the main stream of money came from, or was 
indirect connected with, Chiang Kaishek. The opium special tax revenue was 
a huge source of income to the government, and the Blueshirts had their 
share of this tax income.
Methodological differences still play an important role in interpreting 
the ideology of the Blueshirts. This is clearly evidenced in recently published 
books about the Blueshirts in mainland China and Taiwan. These books 
contain a strong political bias, especially the sections concerning Chiang’s 
financial manipulations in connection with the Blueshirts.
In 1934, Chiang analysed China’s situation with respect to Japan, and 
concluded that the Chinese had in fact over-estimated their power. One of the 
reasons for this was that information about Japan was often second hand in 
nature. Another, possibly the most important reason, was that the Chinese 
judged Japan from an emotional rather than a rational standpoint. Actually 
most Chinese were not really anti-Japanese at hearts. The Japanese, on the 
other hand, had under-estimated the Chinese. They supposed that China was 
still hopelessly divided and that the Guomindang was not beyond the phase 
of a revolutionary movement. Another important mistake the Japanese made 
in their assessment of the Chinese people was not to recognise that the 
Chinese nation was bound together by Sunism. The Chinese could be anti- 
government, but people were hardly anti-Sun Yatsen, which counted for both 
the CCP and the Guomindang.
13 Lee Chihtang (Tian Chin Yung Pao’s president), Nanjing Se Fu no Hi Sei, The 
Kuomintang’s Government’s Staff Policy, p.2, Guowen zhoubao, vol. 13-6, p.50.
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Chiang was a master in double policy, which he showed many times 
both in his attitude to the Japanese and the CCP, and also in negotiations with 
Western countries. This attitude of Chiang played also a significant role in 
his approach to Fascism and the Blueshirts.
Many scholars writing about Chinese history have drawn attention to 
this period, but most of them echo the current opinion that the Blueshirts tried 
to imitate European Fascism. The two scholars who analysed the Blueshirts 
more thoroughly than others, Maria Hsia Chang and Lloyd E. Eastman, 
arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions to this question.
In summary, Eastman’s final comments on this question amount to: 
“Opinions on whether the Blueshirts were a Fascist organisation or not will 
inevitably differ. But it is crystal clear that - however committed the 
Lixingshe leadership may at one time have been to Fascism as an explicit 
method of national revival - overt and direct Fascist influence on the 
Lixingshe was short-lived.”14 In his earlier works on the Blueshirts, Eastman 
provides less nuance and depicts the Blueshirts as a Fascist organisation 
largely influenced by the Nazis. He emphasised the influence the German 
military advisory commission had on the development of Fascism in China, 
mentioning the German advisers Bauer and Kriebel as the spiritual 
forerunners of Nazism. Eastman structures the development of Fascism in 
China around this premise.
This thesis concludes that the direct influence of the Nazis on the 
Blueshirts through the military advisory commission in China, especially in 
1928-31, was minimal. In this respect, it departs from the findings of 
Eastman. Most of these early advisers were German civilians and at the time 
anti-Nazi. The first stay in China of Kriebel, who was a Nazi, was too short 
to be of great influence on the Chinese officer corps. After 1934, the Nazi
14 Eastman, “A Review Article”, p.43.
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influence on the Chinese officer corps may have gradually increased, but 
never to the extent that it dominated. The Chinese managed their own 
organisations and did not allow any foreign control.
Maria Chang has been too inclined to take paper declarations at face 
value, and to assume that the Blueshirts genuinely strove to put into practice 
the ideals to which they dedicated themselves. The political context in which 
these documents were produced, and how they served to rally individuals to 
the existing political programmes of the Guomindang leadership must be 
borne in mind. By translating the name Fuxingshe rather poetically as “The 
Renaissance Society”, and by discussing the Blueshirts’ declarations rather 
than their activities, Chang leaves the reader with little idea of the real 
political world of China in the 1930s. There is nothing in her analysis to 
suggest that the Nationalists were conducting systematic extermination 
campaigns against the Communists in Jiangxi, or that these succeeded in 
finally driving the Chinese Communists on the Long March. Her account 
ignores the relationship with the Qing Bang, and the political assassinations 
that were a key part of the Blueshirts activities. It is only when placed in the 
context of the Blueshirts' activities that their declared aims can be judged.
It is certain that the ideas of Fascism could not ultimately be 
reconciled with Sun Yatsen’s desire for democracy. Sun's system, where the 
party government was designed to be democratic in structure, differs from 
Fascist rule, which overtly takes the form of a personal dictatorship. The 
Fascist dictatorship seems to be an end in itself and not a means of realising 
an ideally democratic government as foreseen by Sun's ideas.
Though Fascism represented a new force, it proved to be a principle 
incapable of general application. China notably lacked the underlying forces 
necessary to prepare the way for its realisation. In these circumstances, the 
Blueshirts represented an unsuccessful experiment with Fascism, both for the 
Guomindang and for Chiang.
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An address made by Chiang to the People’s Political Council in 1938 
attested to the fact that democracy was worthy of (re)consideration. He 
possibly realised that it was never too late to change one’s views. He stated:
Twenty seven years have passed since the founding o f  the Chinese 
Republic. During this period, there have been a num ber o f  so-called 
popular assem blies, but no real democracy or constitutionalism . Besides, 
the num erous corruptive practices that unfortunately accom panied these 
earlier assem blies had directly or indirectly plunged the nation into 
unusual chaos and weakness. As a result our country today is being 
subjected to oppression and hum iliation by our enemies. O f course, the 
People’s Political Council is not a parliam ent, but you should rem ember 
the past m istakes o f  party politics as a constant warning, and at the same 
tim e strive hard for the laying o f  a firm basis for the realisation o f  a truly 
democratic form o f  government in this country.15
It is possible that Chiang felt the opportunity was ripe to talk about 
democracy again. The Blueshirts had been “disbanded” and a Youth Corps 
representing all Chinese youth had been founded. However, Chiang’s 
rhetoric, and that of his immediate followers, failed to be translated into 
action. Although Chiang may have spoken of democracy in October 1938, 
documents from Germany and the Zhu Jiahua Archives prove that in May 
1938 as acting secretary of the Youth Corps, Zhu asked for - and received - 
materials on Nazi organisation and the Hitler Youth. Chiang’s motives are 
again called into question. A war was going on and the Guomindang had 
been forced into an uneasy alliance with the CCP in order to fight the 
Japanese. Chiang seemed nevertheless to be planning his own political 
agenda which departed from CCP co-operation. 16
Nevertheless, the answer to the question of whether the Blueshirts 
were Fascist has to be posed within the context of the working definition of 
Fascism given earlier. The organisation initially came into being due to the
15 China Today, vol.5, nr.l, October 1938, “Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek Speaks for 
Democracy”, p.9.
TB, 6020, Tekika Mikataka? (Enemy or Friends?), pp. 18-30.
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threat posed to China by foreign invasion and as the result of the menace of 
social revolution on the part of the Chinese Communists. From the outset the 
organisation therefore espoused a militantly anti-Communist policy. It 
rejected materialism, liberalism and advocated a revival of traditional 
Chinese values. The Blueshirts were built up by the ruling class, that is, the 
right wing elite within the Guomindang. They tried to get a firm grip on 
Chinese society as a whole by organising labour unions, establishing youth 
organisations and setting up cultural societies. Furthermore, military models 
of organisation, particularly through the youth movement, were imposed 
upon Chinese society as a whole.
This thesis has shown that the Blueshirts fall well within the working 
definition of Fascism arrived at in Chapter One. Therefore, the Blueshirts can 
be considered as a Fascist organisation, albeit representative of an 
idiosyncratic form of Fascism. That their leaders always denied the existence 
of the Blueshirts and their own membership of the organisation, is in sharp 
contrast to European Fascist movements.
An assessment based on the primary sources employed in this study, 
many of which have not been used before, justifies the conclusion that the 
Blueshirts were Fascists - or at least tried to create a Fascist society in China. 
It was arguably the propaganda, publications and activities of the Blueshirts, 
rather than their own Fascist ideology in itself, that led to them being labelled 
Fascists. This view is supported in the documents of the many foreign 
observers living and working in China in the 1930s. The re-assessment of the 
Blueshirts as a Fascist organisation should be apprehended in political rather 
than in analytical terms. That Chiang Kaishek and the leaders of the 
Blueshirts mostly denied their preference for Fascism in public is 
unimportant for, conversely, these denials merely determined their Fascist 
label.
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Appendix 1
Chiang Kaishek and his secret societies 1
The name of the 
Society o r Group
The name of the 
main leader
Foundation and 
Organisation
Activities of the 
Society or Group
The Blueshirt Society 
Lanyishe
C.C.Clique
Xingying fiimi julebu
nm'i
President :Chiang 
Kaishek M 'fr 'E
Leader: Chen 
Brothers
Nucleus members: 
Luo Jialun, H  'fifr 
Xu Enzeng, %  JUL iff 
Yu Jingtang, &  #
Leader: Yang 
Yongtai,
Nucleus member: 
Wang Shihe 3 i lt£ 
ffl, Deng Wenyi §P 
JC H , He Chuhan fnj
Commander of all 
networks
Mainly connected 
with the Organisation 
Department and 
Central Police 
Academy
In Nanchang its main 
members were found
The centre of 
activities for all 
secret societies
The party offices in 
each province had 
over 15 members
Supporting Chiang 
Kaishek checking all 
societies and groups
Gancheng tonglian 
hui
Lizhishe
Tongweishemm±
Huangpu
tongxuehui
Leader: Chen Cheng
Nucleus member: 
Wang Jingjiu
Song Xilian
Leader: Wang 
Lizhang '/£ aL 
Nucleus member:
Luo Ming H  0^
Leader: Xiong Shisuo
M
Leader: He 
Zhonghan f t  
Chief: Yan Bailing
l i t
Three different 
divisions
Below the divisions 
other branches were 
established in many 
places
basic ground for its 
activities is Jiangxi 
province
Graduates from 
Whampoa Military 
Academy, every year 
was represented.
military influence
Military Club 
The leader, Wang 
Lizhang and Chiang 
Kaishek had a special 
connection
Centre is in Jiangxi 
but gradually 
extended power to 
Hunan and Hubei
Combined activities 
with the Blueshirts. 
This group spread out 
over many places 
especially in big 
cities.
1 TB, 2196, Ranisha no soshiki to hem man konichi katsudo no jitsu rei.
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Appendix 1 continued
Chiang Kaishek and his secret societies
The name of the 
Society or Group
The name of the 
main leader
Foundation and 
Organisation
Activities of the 
Society or Group
Xianbing ganbutuan
Zhongyang j unxiao 
shisheng yanjiuhui
Hexi {pjj^
(He Yingqin's 
connection)
Leader: Gu Zhenglun 
^  I E  jfo, Main 
member:
Ji Zhangjian *
Leader: Zhang 
Zhizhong to ^  
main member: Shi 
Guozhen US HI
Leader: He Yingqin
Basically a training 
place for the Military 
Police
Surrounding Chang 
Jiang. Control of the 
opium sale via black 
routes.This money 
was used to support 
Chiang Kaishek.
Wanxi
(Anhui connection)
Zhexi
(Zhejiang
connection)
Xuxi,
(Xu Tingyao's 
connection
Huang ling ma gua
Leader: Chen 
Tiaoyuan H  7U
The leader of Xu 
Tingyao H  fg and 
the Seventeenth 
Route Army
Only the students of 
the first to the third 
class of the 
Whampoa Military 
Academy
Current staffs from 
the Central Army
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Death List
NA, SMP, Special Branch, File nr. D4685, 25 July 1933. The American 
controlled Shanghai newspaper Evening Post & Mercury, published a death 
list; and PRO, FO 371/17142 xc 930, 24 August, 1933, p.467.
List of names:
Chen Shaoyu Chinese Communist Party leader, 
(Wang Ming's alias)
Chin Panhsien Chinese Communist Party leader 
(Jin Banxian)
Chao Yun Chinese Communist Party leader, 
(Kang Sheng's alias)
Liah Chensen Chinese Communist Party leader 
(Liang Zhensen)
Li Chusen 
(Li Zhusen)
Chinese Communist Party leader
Hu Hanmin Leader of the Right Guomindang(anti-Chiang)
Hsiao Fuchen 
(Xiao Fuzhen)
Canton (Guangdong) politician
Hsiang Hanpi 
(Xiang Hanpi)
Kwangtung (Guangdong) Army
Teng Tsayu 
(Deng Zayou)
Canton politician
Tsou Lo Canton politician, President of Sun (Zou Luo) 
Yatsen university
Li Chisen 
(Li Zhisen)
Kwangsi (Guangxi) General
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Chen Chitang 
(Chen Zhidang)
Li Yangchin 
(Li yangqin)
Yu Hanmo 
(Yu Hanmo)
Hsiang Hanoin 
(Xiang Han?)
Huang Jenfan 
(Huang Renfan)
Feng Lunkwan 
(Feng Lunguan)
Li Chungjen 
(Li Zhongren)
Pei Chungshih 
(Pei Zhongshi)
Huang Chilu 
(Huang Zhilu)
Chen Eugene
Kwangtung Warlord 
Kwangtung Army commander 
Kwangtung Army commander 
Kwangtung Army commander 
Kwangtung Army commander 
Kwangtung Army commander 
Kwangsi General 
Kwangsi General 
Hu Hanmin follower
assistant of Huang Chilu, now with the South 
West Political Council.
Chang Fahkwei Kwangsi General, onetime “Ironsides’
(Zhang Fagui) commander
Teng Chailiang 
(Deng Zhongshi)
Kwei Chungshih Hu Hanmin follower 
(Gui Zhongshi)
Ling chimang 
(Ling Jimang)
Lin Yichun
Canton politician
Kwangtung Provincial Government member
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Chen Lienpeh 
(Chen Lianbei)
Hu Molan
Chen Chien 
(Chen Jian)
Tang Mosin 
(Tang Moxin)
Fan Tiny in
Chen Chaoya
Peh wenwei 
(Pei Wenwei)
Hsun Kewu 
(Xun Kewu)
Chang Chipen 
(Zhang Jiben)
Chang Tifan 
(Zhang Difan)
Ho Shihchen 
(He Shizhen)
Chen wei
Chen Mingshu
Chiang Kwangnai 
(Jiang Guangnai)
Tsai Tingkai 
(Cai Dinggai)
Chang Yen 
(Zhang Yan)
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank compradore,
Hu Hanmin's daughter
C.E.C. of the Guomindang, former 6th Army 
commander
Former Szechuan military leader
Onetime subordinate of Chiang Kaishek 
C.E.C. of the Guomindang 
C.E.C. of the Guomindang
Szechuan (Sichuan) military leader
Former Chekiang Provincial chairman
Kwangsi politician
Hu Hanmin follower
Hu Hanmin follower
One time 19th Route Army commander
Chairman of Fukien (Fujian) Province
Commander of 19th Route Army
19th Route Army divisional commander
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Tang Chesu 
(Tang Zhesu)
Wang Lishih 
(Wang Lishi)
Chen Mingshu follower
Chen Chunfu Chen Mingshu follower
Seng Chengya Hu Hanmin follower
Feng Yuhsiang 
(Feng Yuxiang)
Fang Cangwu
Sh'ao Tupi 
(Shao Dubi)
Chi Hanchang 
(Ji Hanchang)
Yang Chien 
(Yang Jian)
Lu Sin 
(Lu Xun)
Mo Tu 
(Mo Du)
Chen Pingho 
(Chen Pinghe)
Hu Yutze 
(Hu Yuzi)
Tien Han 
(Tian Han)
Wang Chaoshih 
(Wang Zhaoshi)
Northern warlord
Feng follower 
Feng follower
Feng follower
General Secretary of League for Civil 
Rights (murdered on 18 June 1933)
China's foremost writer
Best known of younger writers in China
Former editor of the Shun Pao (Shenbao), big 
Shanghai daily newspaper
Formerly editor of Eastern Miscellany, popular 
monthly magazine
Well-known left dramatist
leader of the Statist or “Nationalist” party
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A A PA  Auswartiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, Bonn
BA Bundesarchiv, Abteilungen Potsdam
DZA Deutsches Zentral Archiv, Potsdam
FO Great Britain, Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London
FOH Foreign Office Archives, The Hague
GA Guom indang Archives (Historical Committee o f  the
Central Com m ittee o f  N ationalist Party), Taibei
H A PRO Handels Gesellschaft fur Industrielle Produkte
JM FA Japanese M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs Archives, Tokyo
M AE M inistere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris
NA National Archives and Record Service, W ashington DC
N CD N  North China Daily News
N C H  North China H erald
NIDS National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo
SHXW  Shehui xinwen (The Society Mercury), Shanghai
SIF Shanghai Investigation Files
SNHA Second National Historical Archives o f  China, N anjing
SM A Shanghai M unicipal Archives, Shanghai
SMP Shanghai M unicipal Police
TB Toyo Bunko (Oriental Collection), Tokyo
ZStA  Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Potsdam
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